fix(openbao): sanity-audit fixes — 4 blockers + hardening
A multi-agent sanity audit of the freshly-merged deployment found four end-to-end blockers (and several smaller issues); all fixed here. HIGH (were blocking): - deploy.sh never called install_docker(), so `docker compose pull` hit command-not-found on any host without Docker. Now called before the compose steps. - The container's server process runs as the image's own (often non-root) user but the mounted config/TLS were root-owned 0640/0600 and the raft volume root-owned -> vault crash-looped, never binding :8200. deploy.sh now detects the image UID after pull and aligns ownership of config.hcl, ./tls and the data volume (a no-op when the image runs as root); config.hcl is installed 0644 (holds no secrets). - Docs told operators to set the daemon key `openbao_ca_cert`, but the Kanrisha daemon's key is `ca_cert` (config.go, mapstructure:"ca_cert"). The wrong key is fatal on strict unmarshal / leaves TLS unverified. Renamed in all 5 places (config.hcl, gen-tls.sh, deploy.sh x2, README). - DR backup used `docker compose cp openbao:… -`, which emits a TAR stream, so the age-encrypted snapshot was tar-wrapped and would not restore. Switched to `docker compose exec -T openbao cat` for the raw bytes, wrote the snapshot to a scratch path (not the live raft dir), and documented the matching restore. MEDIUM: - Swap detection used `swapon --show` (absent on BusyBox) and `\s` (GNU-only) -> silently no-op on Alpine, leaving swap on. Now uses /proc/swaps and [[:space:]] so mlock hardening actually holds on musl. - A Docker-published port bypasses the host INPUT firewall, so the source rule was illusory. deploy.sh now narrows OPENBAO_BIND to OPENBAO_ADDR when it is an IP, the compose/README/.env comments state the reality, and a new Exposure section + an init-immediately warning were added. - Fixed broken ../kanrisha/ and deployments/kanrisha/ links (separate repo). LOW: - OPENBAO_TLS_SANS is now honored (folded into the SAN list from the env). - .gitignore excludes *.snap / *.snap.age. - Bootstrap note clarifies bootstrap.sh needs the `bao` CLI (run it from the Kanrisha host/workstation, not this Docker-only vault host). - README multi-OS count corrected (eight stacks) + automations.sh header lists openbao. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
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# openbao
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Hardened [OpenBao](https://openbao.org) — the tape-encryption key store for
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[Kanrisha](../kanrisha/). Deliberately **separate from the tape host**: a
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compromise of the tape node must not reach the vault, and OpenBao's
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mlock/TLS/unseal lifecycle is cleaner on its own box.
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**Kanrisha** (the LTO tape-archive system; separate repo, separate host).
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Deliberately **separate from the tape host**: a compromise of the tape node must
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not reach the vault, and OpenBao's mlock/TLS/unseal lifecycle is cleaner on its
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own box.
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Unlike the other stacks here there is **no Caddy / Let's Encrypt** — a secrets
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store terminates TLS itself and is reached over the **LAN**, not the public
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@@ -24,8 +25,8 @@ internet.
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| Variable | Notes |
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|----------|-------|
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| `OPENBAO_ADDR` | IP/DNS the Kanrisha tape host uses to reach this vault (goes in the cert SAN; you point the daemon at `https://$OPENBAO_ADDR:8200`). |
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| `OPENBAO_BIND` | Host interface the API binds to. Default all; set the LAN IP to narrow it. |
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| `OPENBAO_TLS_SANS` | Extra SANs for the self-signed cert (deploy.sh adds `OPENBAO_ADDR` + loopback). |
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| `OPENBAO_BIND` | Host interface the API publishes on. Left at the default, deploy.sh narrows it to `OPENBAO_ADDR` when that is an IP (a published port bypasses the INPUT firewall, so this bind is the real restriction — see [Exposure](#exposure)). |
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| `OPENBAO_TLS_SANS` | **Extra** SANs beyond `OPENBAO_ADDR` + loopback (which deploy.sh always adds). Read from the environment at deploy time — `export` it before running deploy.sh. |
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| `OPENBAO_TAG` | OpenBao image tag (pin it). |
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| `OPENBAO_HSM_PIN` | Only for PKCS#11 auto-unseal. Leave blank for manual unseal. |
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@@ -40,8 +41,11 @@ OPENBAO_ADDR=10.0.0.10 SKIP_PROMPTS=1 bash deployments/openbao/deploy.sh
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```
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`deploy.sh` installs Docker, generates a self-signed TLS cert (if none present),
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seeds `.env`, disables swap (for mlock), firewalls `8200/tcp`, and brings the
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stack up. OpenBao starts **sealed** — initialise + unseal once:
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seeds `.env`, disables swap (for mlock), narrows the API bind to the LAN IP,
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opens `8200/tcp`, aligns file/volume ownership to the container's UID, and brings
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the stack up. OpenBao starts **sealed** — initialise + unseal once (do this
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immediately; an uninitialised vault reachable on the LAN can be init'd by anyone
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who connects):
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```bash
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docker compose exec -e BAO_ADDR=https://127.0.0.1:8200 openbao \
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@@ -57,7 +61,7 @@ your backup recipient (`globals/age-pubkey.txt`), never on this host.
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- **Self-signed (default):** `deploy.sh` runs [`gen-tls.sh`](gen-tls.sh) to
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create `./tls/tls.{crt,key}` with `OPENBAO_ADDR` in the SAN. Hand `tls.crt` to
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the Kanrisha daemon as `[encryption.openbao].openbao_ca_cert`.
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the Kanrisha daemon as `[encryption.openbao].ca_cert`.
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- **Smallstep CA over ACME (option):** issue a cert from your `step-ca` and drop
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it in `./tls` instead — `gen-tls.sh` then no-ops. e.g. with the `step` client:
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@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ your backup recipient (`globals/age-pubkey.txt`), never on this host.
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# renew on a timer: step ca renew --daemon ./tls/tls.crt ./tls/tls.key
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```
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Give the Kanrisha daemon your Smallstep **root** as `openbao_ca_cert` (then it
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Give the Kanrisha daemon your Smallstep **root** as `ca_cert` (then it
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trusts the vault without `-tls-skip-verify`).
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## Auto-unseal (optional)
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@@ -79,10 +83,13 @@ device into the `openbao` service, and set `OPENBAO_HSM_PIN` in `.env`.
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## Bootstrap for Kanrisha
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Once unsealed, enable KV v2 + AppRole and seed the domain key with the Kanrisha
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bootstrap script (from the Kanrisha repo, `deploy/openbao/bootstrap.sh`):
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bootstrap script (from the Kanrisha repo, `deploy/openbao/bootstrap.sh`). It calls
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the `bao` CLI directly, so run it **from a host that has `bao`** (the Kanrisha
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host or your workstation) pointed at this vault — this vault host only ships
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Docker. Copy `tls.crt` to that host first and pass it as `BAO_CACERT`:
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```bash
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BAO_ADDR=https://$OPENBAO_ADDR:8200 BAO_CACERT=./tls/tls.crt \
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BAO_ADDR=https://$OPENBAO_ADDR:8200 BAO_CACERT=/path/to/openbao-ca.crt \
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BAO_TOKEN=<root> bash bootstrap.sh
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```
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@@ -91,19 +98,48 @@ It enables the `kanrisha-tape` KV-v2 mount (with **effectively-unlimited**
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policy, seeds the domain key, and prints the `[encryption.openbao]` block for the
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Kanrisha config. Point the daemon at `address = "https://$OPENBAO_ADDR:8200"`.
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## Exposure
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This is a secrets store on the LAN, not a public service. Two things to know:
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- **A Docker-published port is DNAT'd and bypasses the host `INPUT` firewall.** A
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source-restricting rule on `INPUT` does **not** gate `:8200`. The real interface
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restriction is the publish bind: `deploy.sh` defaults `OPENBAO_BIND` to
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`OPENBAO_ADDR` when that is an IP, so the API listens only on that LAN IP. To
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restrict by *source host*, use a `FORWARD`/`DOCKER-USER` rule or network
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segmentation, not `INPUT`.
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- **mTLS (optional):** to require the tape host to present a client cert, enable
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the `tls_require_and_verify_client_cert` stanza in [`config.hcl`](config.hcl)
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and issue the tape host a client cert from the same CA.
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And **initialise the vault immediately** after `deploy.sh` — an uninitialised
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vault reachable on the LAN can be `bao operator init`'d by anyone who connects,
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handing them the root token and unseal keys.
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## Backup / DR
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The vault is the sole recovery path for encrypted tapes — back it up:
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```bash
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# Consistent raft snapshot (safe while running):
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docker compose exec -e BAO_ADDR=https://127.0.0.1:8200 openbao \
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bao operator raft snapshot save -tls-skip-verify /openbao/data/snapshot.snap
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# then copy it off-box, age-encrypted:
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docker compose cp openbao:/openbao/data/snapshot.snap - | \
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age -r "$(cat ../../globals/age-pubkey.txt)" > openbao-$(date +%F).snap.age
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# Consistent raft snapshot (safe while running); write it to a scratch path, NOT
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# into the live raft dir:
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docker compose exec openbao \
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bao operator raft snapshot save -address=https://127.0.0.1:8200 -tls-skip-verify /tmp/openbao.snap
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# then stream the RAW file off-box, age-encrypted. Use `exec -T ... cat`, not
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# `compose cp openbao:… -` (which emits a TAR wrapper that won't restore):
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docker compose exec -T openbao cat /tmp/openbao.snap | \
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age -r "$(cat /path/to/globals/age-pubkey.txt)" > "openbao-$(date +%F).snap.age"
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```
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Restore: `bao operator raft snapshot restore`. Snapshots do **not** contain the
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unseal keys — you still need those (and the root token) to unseal a restored
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vault, which is why they are stored separately.
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Restore (into a fresh, unsealed vault): decrypt, copy the raw `.snap` in, and
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apply it:
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```bash
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age -d -i ~/.age/key.txt openbao-DATE.snap.age > openbao.snap
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docker compose cp openbao.snap openbao:/tmp/openbao.snap
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docker compose exec openbao \
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bao operator raft snapshot restore -address=https://127.0.0.1:8200 -tls-skip-verify /tmp/openbao.snap
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```
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Snapshots do **not** contain the unseal keys or root token — you still need
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those to unseal a restored vault, which is why they are stored separately.
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