feat(openbao): add update.sh, an updater that refuses to strand a sealed vault
Follows the copyparty/ergo updater idiom -- check/update/run/install/uninstall, a conf file the environment overrides, the version pinned into .env so the running release is explicit, DRY_RUN -- but inverts its central assumption. copyparty and ergo come back by themselves after a recreate. OpenBao comes back SEALED: with the default Shamir seal a restart needs three unseal keys typed in by a human. A scheduled `latest` update would therefore take the vault offline at 03:00 and leave it there. So the scheduled path defaults to UPDATE_POLICY= notify and never changes the running version; `install` schedules a daily CHECK and says so. UPDATE_POLICY=auto opts in, and is STILL refused unless an uncommented `seal` stanza is present in config.hcl -- only auto-unseal makes an unattended update defensible. `update` preflights before touching anything, because every one of these fails worse halfway through than up front: - the container must be running; - the vault must be UNSEALED, since a sealed vault cannot produce a snapshot and there would be no rollback plan; - BAO_TOKEN must be present, because the snapshot is token-gated on sys/storage/raft/snapshot; - the target must not cross into 2.7.x while a built-in seal "pkcs11" stanza is active. That stanza is REMOVED in 2.7.0, not deprecated, so the vault would start with no way to unseal at all. The snapshot is the rollback plan, not a formality: OpenBao's upgrade guide states that reverting the image alone does not roll back the data store. It is streamed out with `exec -T ... cat` rather than `compose cp`, which emits a TAR wrapper that will not restore; written 0600 to /var/backups/openbao; and checked for being a non-empty valid gzip archive, with a failure treated as fatal. SKIP_SNAPSHOT=1 exists and warns exactly what it costs. A failed pull or start rolls the OPENBAO_TAG pin back and restarts the previous version. BAO_TOKEN is deliberately never written to the conf file: a long-lived root token sitting next to the vault it opens defeats the vault. Verified: the 2.7-with-active-pkcs11 refusal and its three negative cases (2.6.2 active, 3.x active, 2.7 commented); auto-unseal detection distinguishing a commented stanza from a live one; set_env/env_get; the release-tag parse with and without a leading v; and all four `run` policy branches, including that auto refuses without auto-unseal and that an unknown policy dies. Not verified without a live host: the snapshot, pull and recreate themselves. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -169,6 +169,43 @@ ssh -L 8200:<bind-addr>:8200 root@<host>
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This is also the better way to do the first `operator init`: the unseal keys and
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root token are shown in your browser instead of a root shell's scrollback.
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## Updating
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`update.sh` is installed alongside the stack. It is **not** run by `deploy.sh`,
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because upgrading a live vault seals it — that is an operator's decision, not a
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deploy step.
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```bash
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cd /srv/openbao
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bash update.sh check # declared / running / latest + seal state
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BAO_TOKEN=<token> bash update.sh update # snapshot, then upgrade
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```
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Unlike the copyparty and ergo updaters in this repo, this one **will not update
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on a schedule by default**. Those services come back by themselves; OpenBao
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comes back *sealed*, so an unattended 03:00 update would take the vault offline
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until someone arrives with three unseal keys. `update.sh install` therefore
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schedules a daily **check** (`UPDATE_POLICY=notify`). `UPDATE_POLICY=auto` opts
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into unattended updates and is still refused unless a `seal` stanza is
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configured — only auto-unseal makes the vault come back on its own.
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Before it changes anything, `update` requires that the container is running, the
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vault is **unsealed** (a sealed vault cannot produce a snapshot, so there would
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be no rollback plan), and a `BAO_TOKEN` with `sys/storage/raft/snapshot` — the
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root token works. It writes the snapshot to `/var/backups/openbao` at `0600`,
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verifies it is a valid non-empty gzip archive, and refuses to continue if it is
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not. **Copy it off the host**: it is the rollback plan, and OpenBao's upgrade
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guide is explicit that reverting the image alone does not roll back the data
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store. `SKIP_SNAPSHOT=1` exists and says loudly what you are giving up.
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If the pull or the start fails, the `OPENBAO_TAG` pin is rolled back and the
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previous version is started again — still sealed.
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`update.sh` also refuses to cross into 2.7.x while an active built-in
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`seal "pkcs11"` stanza is present: that stanza is *removed* in 2.7.0, not merely
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deprecated, so the vault would come up with no way to unseal at all. Migrate to
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the external `plugin "kms" "pkcs11"` first.
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## Backup / DR
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The vault is the sole recovery path for encrypted tapes — back it up:
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