feat(openbao): hardened same-LAN tape-encryption key store for Kanrisha

A dedicated OpenBao deployment, kept OFF the Kanrisha tape host so a compromise
of the tape node can't reach the vault.

- Native TLS on the listener (self-signed by default via gen-tls.sh, or a
  CA-signed cert from a Smallstep CA over ACME) — no Caddy/Let's Encrypt;
  reached over the LAN, not the public internet.
- Integrated raft storage (clean snapshot-based DR).
- mlock on (cap_add IPC_LOCK + memlock unlimited + host swapoff in deploy.sh).
- Manual unseal by default; optional PKCS#11 HSM auto-unseal.
- deploy.sh: Docker install (Alpine/Debian/Alma), self-signed cert, .env seed,
  swapoff, firewall 8200/tcp, compose up; then prints init/unseal + the KV-v2 +
  AppRole bootstrap for Kanrisha + the raft-snapshot DR flow. Self-contained
  (config payload embedded by build.sh).
- Registered in automations.sh + the README deployment table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
57_WolveandClaude Opus 4.8 committed 2026-07-08 14:10:22 -05:00
1 parent c6b0f7d418
commit 2efc9dbffb
11 files changed
+677 -3

No files matched your search

+109
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
# openbao
Hardened [OpenBao](https://openbao.org) — the tape-encryption key store for
[Kanrisha](../kanrisha/). Deliberately **separate from the tape host**: a
compromise of the tape node must not reach the vault, and OpenBao's
mlock/TLS/unseal lifecycle is cleaner on its own box.
Unlike the other stacks here there is **no Caddy / Let's Encrypt** — a secrets
store terminates TLS itself and is reached over the **LAN**, not the public
internet.
- **Native TLS** on the listener — self-signed by default, or a CA-signed cert
from your Smallstep CA over ACME.
- **Integrated raft storage** — snapshot-based DR.
- **mlock on** — key material never hits swap.
- **Manual unseal by default**, or PKCS#11 HSM auto-unseal.
> ⚠️ This vault is the **sole recovery path for encrypted tapes.** Losing the
> OpenBao data *and* the unseal keys/root token loses every encrypted tape. Take
> raft snapshots and store the unseal material out of band (below).
## Required `.env` values
| Variable | Notes |
|----------|-------|
| `OPENBAO_ADDR` | IP/DNS the Kanrisha tape host uses to reach this vault (goes in the cert SAN; you point the daemon at `https://$OPENBAO_ADDR:8200`). |
| `OPENBAO_BIND` | Host interface the API binds to. Default all; set the LAN IP to narrow it. |
| `OPENBAO_TLS_SANS` | Extra SANs for the self-signed cert (deploy.sh adds `OPENBAO_ADDR` + loopback). |
| `OPENBAO_TAG` | OpenBao image tag (pin it). |
| `OPENBAO_HSM_PIN` | Only for PKCS#11 auto-unseal. Leave blank for manual unseal. |
See [`.env.example`](.env.example) for the full list.
## Deploy
```bash
./automations.sh # Deploy on this host → deploy: openbao
# or, non-interactive:
OPENBAO_ADDR=10.0.0.10 SKIP_PROMPTS=1 bash deployments/openbao/deploy.sh
```
`deploy.sh` installs Docker, generates a self-signed TLS cert (if none present),
seeds `.env`, disables swap (for mlock), firewalls `8200/tcp`, and brings the
stack up. OpenBao starts **sealed** — initialise + unseal once:
```bash
docker compose exec -e BAO_ADDR=https://127.0.0.1:8200 openbao \
bao operator init -tls-skip-verify # prints 5 unseal keys + root token
docker compose exec -e BAO_ADDR=https://127.0.0.1:8200 openbao \
bao operator unseal -tls-skip-verify <key> # x3, three different keys
```
**Store the unseal keys + root token out of band** — ideally age-encrypted with
your backup recipient (`globals/age-pubkey.txt`), never on this host.
## TLS
- **Self-signed (default):** `deploy.sh` runs [`gen-tls.sh`](gen-tls.sh) to
create `./tls/tls.{crt,key}` with `OPENBAO_ADDR` in the SAN. Hand `tls.crt` to
the Kanrisha daemon as `[encryption.openbao].openbao_ca_cert`.
- **Smallstep CA over ACME (option):** issue a cert from your `step-ca` and drop
it in `./tls` instead — `gen-tls.sh` then no-ops. e.g. with the `step` client:
```bash
step ca certificate "$OPENBAO_ADDR" ./tls/tls.crt ./tls/tls.key \
--provisioner acme --acme https://ca.lan/acme/acme/directory
# renew on a timer: step ca renew --daemon ./tls/tls.crt ./tls/tls.key
```
Give the Kanrisha daemon your Smallstep **root** as `openbao_ca_cert` (then it
trusts the vault without `-tls-skip-verify`).
## Auto-unseal (optional)
Default is manual unseal after each restart. For hands-off restarts, enable the
`seal "pkcs11"` stanza in [`config.hcl`](config.hcl), mount the PKCS#11 module +
device into the `openbao` service, and set `OPENBAO_HSM_PIN` in `.env`.
## Bootstrap for Kanrisha
Once unsealed, enable KV v2 + AppRole and seed the domain key with the Kanrisha
bootstrap script (from the Kanrisha repo, `deploy/openbao/bootstrap.sh`):
```bash
BAO_ADDR=https://$OPENBAO_ADDR:8200 BAO_CACERT=./tls/tls.crt \
BAO_TOKEN=<root> bash bootstrap.sh
```
It enables the `kanrisha-tape` KV-v2 mount (with **effectively-unlimited**
`max_versions` so a key rotation never orphans old tapes), creates the AppRole +
policy, seeds the domain key, and prints the `[encryption.openbao]` block for the
Kanrisha config. Point the daemon at `address = "https://$OPENBAO_ADDR:8200"`.
## Backup / DR
The vault is the sole recovery path for encrypted tapes — back it up:
```bash
# Consistent raft snapshot (safe while running):
docker compose exec -e BAO_ADDR=https://127.0.0.1:8200 openbao \
bao operator raft snapshot save -tls-skip-verify /openbao/data/snapshot.snap
# then copy it off-box, age-encrypted:
docker compose cp openbao:/openbao/data/snapshot.snap - | \
age -r "$(cat ../../globals/age-pubkey.txt)" > openbao-$(date +%F).snap.age
```
Restore: `bao operator raft snapshot restore`. Snapshots do **not** contain the
unseal keys — you still need those (and the root token) to unseal a restored
vault, which is why they are stored separately.