New deployments/ergo/: the Ergo IRC server behind Caddy for Let's Encrypt TLS
and the IRC-over-WebSocket endpoint. Docker rather than a native OpenRC/systemd
service, because Alpine's apk ergo trails upstream (3.24 ships 2.18.0 against a
2.19.1 security release) and Debian/Alma package it at all -- so native would
mean three install paths plus a per-distro ACME client.
Both containers run with network_mode: host. IRC bans, throttling and cloaking
key on the client's address, and Docker's userland proxy would hide every IPv6
client behind the bridge gateway; host mode also makes the repo's INPUT firewall
genuinely govern 80/443/6697. Caddy reaches Ergo over loopback, which is what
lets Ergo honour X-Forwarded-For (proxy-allowed-from defaults to localhost) and
mark web sessions secure.
- deploy.sh generates ircd.yaml ONCE from the pulled image's own default.yaml
(version-matched), rewriting the listeners/websockets blocks wholesale rather
than patching lines, then asserts hard post-conditions and validates with
`ergo run --smoke` in a throwaway container before anything starts.
- update.sh: pinned vX.Y.Z tags, GHSA + "### Security" release-note policies,
pre-flight against the new image, user NOTICE + grace, stop-consistent DB
snapshot, health check (IRC-level, not a bare TCP connect) and rollback that
restores the DB only when the schema actually moved. Compatibility-break
releases are held for review. certsync copies Caddy's cert pairwise-atomically
and verifies the fingerprint served on 6697 after the rehash.
- ergoctl: status/users/logs, validated edit+rehash, oper add/passwd/rm,
moderation, backup/restore, cert and update passthrough. Talks IRC to the
loopback listener over bash /dev/tcp and strips control characters from
replies.
- Ergo runs as a non-root system user, read-only rootfs, all caps dropped;
Caddy keeps only NET_BIND_SERVICE, with admin API and HTTP/3 off.
Reviewed adversarially across six lenses; 20 confirmed findings fixed, notably
a dead SIGHUP fallback (`rc=$?` after an `if` is always 0), several `set -e`
aborts from non-total pipelines, a release-list cache that only ever populated
in a subshell, and re-runs that used shell defaults instead of the deployed
.env. Verified locally: bash -n, LF endings, the ircd.yaml render against the
real 2.19.1 template in both PLAINTEXT modes, the yaml/oper/version/env helpers,
and the IRC client against a fake server (registration, oper, rehash success and
400-failure, control-character stripping, server-down paths). Not yet exercised
on a Docker host: the containers themselves, ACME issuance and cert sync.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
automations.sh was #!/usr/bin/env bash and written in bash, but a stock Alpine
box has busybox ash and no bash at all -- so the launcher died before it could
install anything:
./automations.sh -> env: 'bash': No such file or directory
curl ... | bash -> bash: not found
sh automations.sh -> syntax errors
cloud-init/base.yml already installs bash/git/curl before touching the repo;
the launcher never got the same treatment.
Give it a #!/bin/sh shebang and a strictly-POSIX prologue that ash can parse:
self-locate via ${0%/*} (busybox dirname takes `--` as the filename, so
`dirname -- "$0"` would answer "."), clone on the piped path as before, install
git/bash via apk/apt-get/dnf/yum, then exec bash on this same file. The bash
pass skips the prologue via BASH_VERSION, and an exported _AUTOMATIONS_REEXEC
guard rules out an exec loop. Everything below the handoff is the unchanged
bash launcher.
The generated bundle stub had the identical bug -- it's the other fresh-host
entry point -- so make it POSIX sh too and have it install bash before
extracting.
Docs: the one-liner now pipes to `sh`, bundle examples use `sh`.
Still bash-only on a bare Alpine host: the scp'd deployments/*/deploy.sh
artifacts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A multi-agent sanity audit of the freshly-merged deployment found four
end-to-end blockers (and several smaller issues); all fixed here.
HIGH (were blocking):
- deploy.sh never called install_docker(), so `docker compose pull` hit
command-not-found on any host without Docker. Now called before the
compose steps.
- The container's server process runs as the image's own (often non-root)
user but the mounted config/TLS were root-owned 0640/0600 and the raft
volume root-owned -> vault crash-looped, never binding :8200. deploy.sh
now detects the image UID after pull and aligns ownership of config.hcl,
./tls and the data volume (a no-op when the image runs as root);
config.hcl is installed 0644 (holds no secrets).
- Docs told operators to set the daemon key `openbao_ca_cert`, but the
Kanrisha daemon's key is `ca_cert` (config.go, mapstructure:"ca_cert").
The wrong key is fatal on strict unmarshal / leaves TLS unverified.
Renamed in all 5 places (config.hcl, gen-tls.sh, deploy.sh x2, README).
- DR backup used `docker compose cp openbao:… -`, which emits a TAR stream,
so the age-encrypted snapshot was tar-wrapped and would not restore.
Switched to `docker compose exec -T openbao cat` for the raw bytes, wrote
the snapshot to a scratch path (not the live raft dir), and documented the
matching restore.
MEDIUM:
- Swap detection used `swapon --show` (absent on BusyBox) and `\s` (GNU-only)
-> silently no-op on Alpine, leaving swap on. Now uses /proc/swaps and
[[:space:]] so mlock hardening actually holds on musl.
- A Docker-published port bypasses the host INPUT firewall, so the source
rule was illusory. deploy.sh now narrows OPENBAO_BIND to OPENBAO_ADDR when
it is an IP, the compose/README/.env comments state the reality, and a new
Exposure section + an init-immediately warning were added.
- Fixed broken ../kanrisha/ and deployments/kanrisha/ links (separate repo).
LOW:
- OPENBAO_TLS_SANS is now honored (folded into the SAN list from the env).
- .gitignore excludes *.snap / *.snap.age.
- Bootstrap note clarifies bootstrap.sh needs the `bao` CLI (run it from the
Kanrisha host/workstation, not this Docker-only vault host).
- README multi-OS count corrected (eight stacks) + automations.sh header
lists openbao.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated OpenBao deployment, kept OFF the Kanrisha tape host so a compromise
of the tape node can't reach the vault.
- Native TLS on the listener (self-signed by default via gen-tls.sh, or a
CA-signed cert from a Smallstep CA over ACME) — no Caddy/Let's Encrypt;
reached over the LAN, not the public internet.
- Integrated raft storage (clean snapshot-based DR).
- mlock on (cap_add IPC_LOCK + memlock unlimited + host swapoff in deploy.sh).
- Manual unseal by default; optional PKCS#11 HSM auto-unseal.
- deploy.sh: Docker install (Alpine/Debian/Alma), self-signed cert, .env seed,
swapoff, firewall 8200/tcp, compose up; then prints init/unseal + the KV-v2 +
AppRole bootstrap for Kanrisha + the raft-snapshot DR flow. Self-contained
(config payload embedded by build.sh).
- Registered in automations.sh + the README deployment table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New deployments/copyparty/: copyparty (copyparty/ac) behind Caddy/LE for the
web UI/WebDAV, plus its own SFTP (password auth) and FTPS listeners published
directly. Ships update.sh, which drives container updates off copyparty's
security-advisories API (api.copyparty.eu/advisories) -- policies latest|security|off.
- Real client IP end-to-end: Caddy XFF/X-Real-IP + copyparty xff-src: lan.
- SFTP host key + self-signed FTPS cert generated/persisted in /cfg; admin
password generated on first deploy; conf auto-included via the image's % /cfg.
- Firewall opens 80/443 + SFTP/FTPS + passive range (colon form for ports.d).
- Wired into automations.sh, README, .gitignore; cloud-init for fresh VMs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New deployments/squid/: an explicit forward proxy with SSL-bump TLS
interception (local CA, generated on first deploy) and hostname-targeted
static-content caching. Unlike the other stacks it is a forward proxy, not
a Caddy/Let's-Encrypt inbound site.
- Self-built minimal Alpine image (apk squid ships ssl-bump); entrypoint
renders squid.conf and generates the cache policy from the domain lists.
- Wildcard hostname caching (cache-domains.txt leading-dot + optional
cache-domains.regex); boost vs strict-allowlist toggle (CACHE_ONLY_LISTED).
- Storage gate never caches HTML or dynamic content; query strings exempt on
boosted domains so versioned static assets still cache.
- splice-domains.txt passthrough for pinned/banking domains.
- Deny-by-default http_access (TRUSTED_CIDR) + BIND_ADDR pinning; CA key 0600
on host, never embedded, git-ignored.
- Wired into automations.sh, README, .gitignore; cloud-init for fresh VMs.
A fresh Alma box has firewalld active, and the iptables-based harden-firewall.sh
refused to run there (caught by harden-ssh's '|| warn', so the host firewall was
silently skipped). Use firewalld natively on the rhel family instead of fighting it.
- harden-firewall.sh: family-aware backend. On rhel, apply/allow/deny/list/disable
drive firewall-cmd (deny-by-default zone, SSH + registered ports, ping policy,
source-restricted rich rules); Alpine/Debian keep the iptables engine unchanged.
FW_BACKEND=iptables|firewalld overrides.
- oslib: install_firewalld(); sshguard_backend() prefers sshg-fw-firewalld on rhel
so brute-force blocks land in firewalld (no INPUT->sshguard jump needed).
- Deployments already fall through to a firewall-cmd branch when the iptables
engine is absent, so they need no changes.
- README + script header document the per-family backend.
harden-ssh / harden-jumphost are unchanged -- they call harden-firewall.sh apply
and read sshguard_backend(), so the switch happens underneath them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
base.yml set AUTO_UPDATE=1 but never forwarded it to harden-ssh.sh (which
defaults to 0), so base hosts never actually scheduled daily updates despite
the config implying they did. Auto-update is intentionally bastion-only for
now — jumphost.yml / harden-jumphost.sh enable it by default, and base
(container) hosts will get a dedicated docker-image updater later — so remove
the knob entirely rather than wire it through. No behavior change.
Also drop cloud-init/base.yml from the README "Daily updates" line that
claimed it takes AUTO_UPDATE=1.
Add a reusable iptables baseline that hardens hosts with ICMP + SSH
defaults and lets deployments register the ports they need. INPUT is
deny-by-default (loopback, established, ICMP, SSH on the configured port,
plus registered ports); OUTPUT stays open and FORWARD is left untouched so
Docker container networking is unaffected.
Persistence is native -- no boot hook. Rules are saved and restored by the
distro's own package (iptables/ip6tables on Alpine, iptables-persistent on
Debian, iptables-services on Alma) via the new oslib helpers
install_iptables / fw_save_cmd / fw_enable_restore. The saved ruleset
carries the INPUT->sshguard jump, so brute-force protection survives reboot
without the old sshguard-iptables hook.
A self-contained /usr/local/sbin/firewall-apply rebuilds INPUT from
declarative drop-ins under /etc/firewall/ports.d and runs the native save,
so deployments add a port without needing the repo present:
printf '80/tcp\n443/tcp\n' > /etc/firewall/ports.d/mystack.rule
/usr/local/sbin/firewall-apply
- SSH port read live from sshd_config (custom bastion ports just work);
FW_SSH_SOURCE restricts the source CIDR; FW_ALLOW_PING gates echo
- harden-ssh.sh / harden-jumphost.sh install it when ENABLE_FIREWALL=1
(default) and skip the sshguard-only hook; ENABLE_FIREWALL=0 keeps it
- cloud-init base.yml / jumphost.yml forward the toggle
- the four stack deploy.sh open_web_ports() register 80/443 via the
firewall (ufw/firewalld kept as fallback); Docker-published ports bypass
INPUT, so this is belt-and-braces and self-documenting
- README + cloud-init/README document the mechanism, Docker caveat, and the
`disable` recovery path
Explain the project's origin — years of personal infra notes and scripts,
polished with Claude into a consistent, multi-distro toolkit — and note that
more is still being added from the collection. Framed as a starting point for
friends to use and extend. PRs and ideas welcome.
Restructure around a single entry point (automations.sh) with a Gum wizard and
a self-extracting bundle for repo-less installs. Add scripts/oslib.sh so the
provisioning scripts (setup-host, harden-ssh, harden-jumphost, sshuser) run on
Alpine/Debian/Alma; seed root keys from globals/.
- ntfy SSH-login alerts (user, source IP, key, region, jump target) via pam_exec
- daily auto-updates: AUTO_REBOOT=idle reboots only when no SSH active; opt-in
Alpine stable-branch upgrades (ALLOW_RELEASE_UPGRADE)
- cloud-init: generic base/jumphost + per-deployment, which harden SSH by
default on fresh VMs
- pocket-id: optional WebFinger block (BASE_DOMAIN), tag v2.8.0
- headscale: fix oidc.expiry schema for 0.28 so the container starts
- Gitea release workflow on tag (TOKEN_GITEA); repo URLs -> Gitea
- README/LICENSE/.gitignore/.gitattributes (force LF)
Restructure around a single entry point (automations.sh) with a Gum wizard and
a self-extracting bundle for repo-less installs. Add scripts/oslib.sh so the
provisioning scripts (setup-host, harden-ssh, harden-jumphost, sshuser) run on
Alpine/Debian/Alma; seed root keys from globals/.
- ntfy SSH-login alerts (user, source IP, key, region, jump target) via pam_exec
- daily auto-updates with AUTO_REBOOT=idle (reboots only when no SSH active) and
opt-in Alpine stable-branch upgrades
- generic + per-deployment cloud-init; Gitea release workflow on tag
- README/LICENSE/.gitignore/.gitattributes (force LF); repo URLs -> Gitea
57_WolveandClaude Opus 5