The set_env/env_set helper escaped its value with
`esc=${val//\/\\}; esc=${esc//|/\|}; esc=${esc//&/\&}` and then
interpolated it into `sed -i -e "s|^KEY=.*|KEY=${esc}|"`. The escaping does
not do what it looks like. Tested on bash 5.2:
set_env K 'a&b' -> K=aK=seedb (sed expanded & to the whole match)
set_env K 'a|b' -> sed: unknown option to `s' (rc!=0, aborts under set -e)
So any value containing & is silently corrupted and any value containing the
s||| delimiter kills the run. That is reachable: headscale writes
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET through this, pocket-id writes REDIRECT_URL, copyparty
writes DATA_DIR. A generated secret or a URL query string hits both cases.
The copies in headscale and pocket-id were additionally mangled when they
were introduced -- `${val//\/\}` (pattern `\/`, a literal SLASH) and a raw
newline inside `printf '%s=%s\n'`. The mangled form is a no-op rather than a
corrupter, so the practical failure mode was the same as the original.
Replace all of them with an awk rewrite that passes the key and value through
the ENVIRONMENT, so the value is never parsed as part of a script and needs no
escaping at all. ENVIRON and index() are POSIX, so busybox awk handles them.
Output goes to a temp file and is copied back with `cat >`, which preserves the
original mode and owner -- a .env holding secrets stays 0600. If awk fails,
set -e aborts before .env is touched, which `sed -i` could not promise.
Verified against plain, a&b, a|b, a\b, p@ss&w|rd\x, R&D, a URL with a query
string, s/foo/bar/, a trailing space and the empty string; plus the
append-when-key-absent path, the file-does-not-exist path, non-target lines
left intact, no line-count drift, and mode preservation.
copyparty/update.sh and the rebuilt copyparty payload are included because
update.sh is embedded; regenerated with build.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Caddyfile is reassembled every run, but the WebFinger decision reads
BASE_DOMAIN/REDIRECT_URL from .env, and .env was written only on the first
run. So enabling WebFinger on a re-run was a silent no-op: the operator
answers the apex prompt, and the script prints the green
"[+] No BASE_DOMAIN -- pocket-id only" -- contradicting what they just
typed -- then pulls, restarts and prints DEPLOYED with exit 0.
The failure is invisible at the far end too. Caddy has no site block for the
apex, so it never gets a cert for it and discovery fails with a TLS or
connection error rather than a 404. Nothing warns; the one contradicting
line is a green [+] among docker pull output.
Moving the apex had the squid shape: compose reads the shell environment
first, so the new value served for that run only, and the documented later
`docker compose up -d` fell back to stale .env and reverted it.
Record which of the two keys arrived in the environment BEFORE the ":="
defaults, then write those through with a set_env upsert. Only keys actually
passed are touched: automations.sh drops a blank optional answer, so "blank"
cannot be told apart from "not supplied" and must not be read as "disable".
Since that means the prompt cannot retire WebFinger, the enabled path now
says so and points at the .env edit that can.
Verified: enabling on a re-run lands in .env and appends the block; changing
the apex lands and is logged; passing nothing touches nothing; BASE_DOMAIN
without REDIRECT_URL still dies rather than half-enabling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a reusable iptables baseline that hardens hosts with ICMP + SSH
defaults and lets deployments register the ports they need. INPUT is
deny-by-default (loopback, established, ICMP, SSH on the configured port,
plus registered ports); OUTPUT stays open and FORWARD is left untouched so
Docker container networking is unaffected.
Persistence is native -- no boot hook. Rules are saved and restored by the
distro's own package (iptables/ip6tables on Alpine, iptables-persistent on
Debian, iptables-services on Alma) via the new oslib helpers
install_iptables / fw_save_cmd / fw_enable_restore. The saved ruleset
carries the INPUT->sshguard jump, so brute-force protection survives reboot
without the old sshguard-iptables hook.
A self-contained /usr/local/sbin/firewall-apply rebuilds INPUT from
declarative drop-ins under /etc/firewall/ports.d and runs the native save,
so deployments add a port without needing the repo present:
printf '80/tcp\n443/tcp\n' > /etc/firewall/ports.d/mystack.rule
/usr/local/sbin/firewall-apply
- SSH port read live from sshd_config (custom bastion ports just work);
FW_SSH_SOURCE restricts the source CIDR; FW_ALLOW_PING gates echo
- harden-ssh.sh / harden-jumphost.sh install it when ENABLE_FIREWALL=1
(default) and skip the sshguard-only hook; ENABLE_FIREWALL=0 keeps it
- cloud-init base.yml / jumphost.yml forward the toggle
- the four stack deploy.sh open_web_ports() register 80/443 via the
firewall (ufw/firewalld kept as fallback); Docker-published ports bypass
INPUT, so this is belt-and-braces and self-documenting
- README + cloud-init/README document the mechanism, Docker caveat, and the
`disable` recovery path
Restructure around a single entry point (automations.sh) with a Gum wizard and
a self-extracting bundle for repo-less installs. Add scripts/oslib.sh so the
provisioning scripts (setup-host, harden-ssh, harden-jumphost, sshuser) run on
Alpine/Debian/Alma; seed root keys from globals/.
- ntfy SSH-login alerts (user, source IP, key, region, jump target) via pam_exec
- daily auto-updates: AUTO_REBOOT=idle reboots only when no SSH active; opt-in
Alpine stable-branch upgrades (ALLOW_RELEASE_UPGRADE)
- cloud-init: generic base/jumphost + per-deployment, which harden SSH by
default on fresh VMs
- pocket-id: optional WebFinger block (BASE_DOMAIN), tag v2.8.0
- headscale: fix oidc.expiry schema for 0.28 so the container starts
- Gitea release workflow on tag (TOKEN_GITEA); repo URLs -> Gitea
- README/LICENSE/.gitignore/.gitattributes (force LF)
Restructure around a single entry point (automations.sh) with a Gum wizard and
a self-extracting bundle for repo-less installs. Add scripts/oslib.sh so the
provisioning scripts (setup-host, harden-ssh, harden-jumphost, sshuser) run on
Alpine/Debian/Alma; seed root keys from globals/.
- ntfy SSH-login alerts (user, source IP, key, region, jump target) via pam_exec
- daily auto-updates with AUTO_REBOOT=idle (reboots only when no SSH active) and
opt-in Alpine stable-branch upgrades
- generic + per-deployment cloud-init; Gitea release workflow on tag
- README/LICENSE/.gitignore/.gitattributes (force LF); repo URLs -> Gitea
57_WolveandClaude Opus 5