dc9761a66867dcf54dffe6ef863a2cad8cfaad51
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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947c89931d |
fix(deployments): stop interpolating .env values into a sed script
The set_env/env_set helper escaped its value with
`esc=${val//\/\\}; esc=${esc//|/\|}; esc=${esc//&/\&}` and then
interpolated it into `sed -i -e "s|^KEY=.*|KEY=${esc}|"`. The escaping does
not do what it looks like. Tested on bash 5.2:
set_env K 'a&b' -> K=aK=seedb (sed expanded & to the whole match)
set_env K 'a|b' -> sed: unknown option to `s' (rc!=0, aborts under set -e)
So any value containing & is silently corrupted and any value containing the
s||| delimiter kills the run. That is reachable: headscale writes
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET through this, pocket-id writes REDIRECT_URL, copyparty
writes DATA_DIR. A generated secret or a URL query string hits both cases.
The copies in headscale and pocket-id were additionally mangled when they
were introduced -- `${val//\/\}` (pattern `\/`, a literal SLASH) and a raw
newline inside `printf '%s=%s\n'`. The mangled form is a no-op rather than a
corrupter, so the practical failure mode was the same as the original.
Replace all of them with an awk rewrite that passes the key and value through
the ENVIRONMENT, so the value is never parsed as part of a script and needs no
escaping at all. ENVIRON and index() are POSIX, so busybox awk handles them.
Output goes to a temp file and is copied back with `cat >`, which preserves the
original mode and owner -- a .env holding secrets stays 0600. If awk fails,
set -e aborts before .env is touched, which `sed -i` could not promise.
Verified against plain, a&b, a|b, a\b, p@ss&w|rd\x, R&D, a URL with a query
string, s/foo/bar/, a trailing space and the empty string; plus the
append-when-key-absent path, the file-does-not-exist path, non-target lines
left intact, no line-count drift, and mode preservation.
copyparty/update.sh and the rebuilt copyparty payload are included because
update.sh is embedded; regenerated with build.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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4643b77083 |
fix(squid): write explicitly-passed values through to .env on a re-run
.env was seeded only when absent, so a re-run with a corrected value logged
".env exists; leaving it alone" and dropped it. That looked harmless because
compose reads the shell environment before .env: an exported BIND_ADDR did
narrow the bind for that run, `ss -ltn` confirmed it, and the deploy reported
success -- while .env still said 0.0.0.0.
The drift surfaces later. The documented update path is a plain
`docker compose up -d`, which has no such environment, falls back to .env, and
republishes an SSL-bumping intercepting proxy on every interface. Nothing
warned. TRUSTED_CIDR has the same shape: a tightened allow-list silently
reverts to whatever .env kept.
Record which runtime keys actually arrived in the environment BEFORE the ":="
defaults run -- PROXY_PORT especially, whose default is a non-empty 3128, so
afterwards an unset variable is indistinguishable from a supplied one. On a
re-run, write just those keys through with the existing set_env() (a targeted
per-key rewrite, not a file overwrite) and log each change. Keys not passed
that run are untouched, so hand-edits to .env survive.
Verified: narrowing BIND_ADDR updates .env and logs it; a re-run with nothing
exported leaves .env alone; re-passing identical values is a silent no-op; and
a hand-edited PROXY_PORT=8080 survives all three, which is what the
capture-before-defaults ordering exists for.
Found by an adversarial sweep for the openbao bug class (
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e7ba68790b
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Done — the Squid deployment is fully built, wired in, and statically verified on the feat/squid-proxy branch. ## What landed deployments/squid/ (13 files) plus wiring into [automations.sh](automations.sh:51), [README.md](README.md), and [.gitignore](.gitignore). All six approved design decisions are implemented: - **Self-built minimal Alpine image** — apk add squid (ssl-bump compiled in), openssl/tini. [entrypoint.sh](deployments/squid/entrypoint.sh) renders squid.conf and generates the cache policy from the lists at start. - **SSL-bump** peek→splice→bump with [splice-domains.txt](deployments/squid/splice-domains.txt) passthrough. - **Wildcard hostname caching** — leading-dot [cache-domains.txt](deployments/squid/cache-domains.txt) + optional regex; CACHE_ONLY_LISTED boost/allowlist toggle. - **HTML/dynamic storage gate**, with query strings exempt on boosted domains. - **CA lifecycle** — generated on first deploy via the built image, key 0600 on the host, staged to tmpfs for the container, never embedded, git-ignored. - **Deny-by-default http_access + BIND_ADDR pinning** as the real access gate (Docker bypasses INPUT). ## One bug caught & fixed The test of the entrypoint's policy generation showed it emitting ubuntu.com with an **unescaped dot** — the s/\./\\./g double-backslash is sed-implementation-dependent and silently failed. Switched to a [.] character class (ubuntu[.]com), portable across busybox/git-bash, re-embedded, re-audited. ✅ ## Verified vs. pending **Verified locally:** bash -n on all scripts, LF endings, launcher parses, embedded archive byte-matches the loose files, and the cache-policy generation produces correct Squid directives in both modes. **Pending a Docker host** (this Windows box has none, as the plan anticipated): the container functional smoke test — build, CA mint, a bumped HTTPS fetch, a TCP_HIT, and a splice check. A few version-sensitive specifics get confirmed there: tls-cert=/tls-key= option names, the security_file_certgen path, busybox install -o/-g, ssl::server_name subdomain matching, and the squid -z flag. (All isolated and easy to adjust if any differ.) ## Commit (for you to GPG-sign) Staged and ready. Per your convention I haven't committed — here's the message: `` feat(squid): add SSL-bump caching forward-proxy deployment New deployments/squid/: an explicit forward proxy with SSL-bump TLS interception (local CA, generated on first deploy) and hostname-targeted static-content caching. Unlike the other stacks it is a forward proxy, not a Caddy/Let's-Encrypt inbound site. - Self-built minimal Alpine image (apk squid ships ssl-bump); entrypoint renders squid.conf and generates the cache policy from the domain lists. - Wildcard hostname caching (cache-domains.txt leading-dot + optional cache-domains.regex); boost vs strict-allowlist toggle (CACHE_ONLY_LISTED). - Storage gate never caches HTML or dynamic content; query strings exempt on boosted domains so versioned static assets still cache. - splice-domains.txt passthrough for pinned/banking domains. - Deny-by-default http_access (TRUSTED_CIDR) + BIND_ADDR pinning; CA key 0600 on host, never embedded, git-ignored. - Wired into automations.sh, README, .gitignore; cloud-init for fresh VMs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> ` `bash git commit -S -F- <<'EOF' <paste message above> EOF ` Want me to **push feat/squid-proxy** once you've committed (you'd open the PR in Gitea), or hold? And if you can point me at a Docker host (or run docker compose build in /srv/squid` after a test deploy), I'll drive the functional smoke test and fix anything the live Squid version flags.
New deployments/squid/: an explicit forward proxy with SSL-bump TLS interception (local CA, generated on first deploy) and hostname-targeted static-content caching. Unlike the other stacks it is a forward proxy, not a Caddy/Let's-Encrypt inbound site. - Self-built minimal Alpine image (apk squid ships ssl-bump); entrypoint renders squid.conf and generates the cache policy from the domain lists. - Wildcard hostname caching (cache-domains.txt leading-dot + optional cache-domains.regex); boost vs strict-allowlist toggle (CACHE_ONLY_LISTED). - Storage gate never caches HTML or dynamic content; query strings exempt on boosted domains so versioned static assets still cache. - splice-domains.txt passthrough for pinned/banking domains. - Deny-by-default http_access (TRUSTED_CIDR) + BIND_ADDR pinning; CA key 0600 on host, never embedded, git-ignored. - Wired into automations.sh, README, .gitignore; cloud-init for fresh VMs. |