anchorage v1.0 initial tree

Greenfield Go multi-tenant IPFS Pinning Service wire-compatible with the
IPFS Pinning Services API spec. Paired 1:1 with Kubo over localhost RPC,
clustered via embedded NATS JetStream, Postgres source-of-truth with
RLS-enforced tenancy, Fiber + huma v2 for the HTTP surface, Authentik
OIDC for session login with kid-rotated HS256 JWT API tokens.

Feature-complete against the 22-milestone build plan, including the
ship-it v1.0 gap items:

  * admin CLIs: drain/uncordon, maintenance, mint-token, rotate-key,
    prune-denylist, rebalance --dry-run, cache-stats, cluster-presences
  * TTL leader election via NATS KV, fence tokens, JetStream dedup
  * rebalancer (plan/apply split), reconciler, requeue sweeper
  * ristretto caches with NATS-backed cross-node invalidation
    (placements live-nodes + token denylist)
  * maintenance watchdog for stuck cluster-pause flag
  * Prometheus /metrics with CIDR ACL, HTTP/pin/scheduler/cache gauges
  * rate limiting: session (10/min) + anonymous global (120/min)
  * integration tests: rebalance, refcount multi-org, RLS belt
  * goreleaser (tar + deb/rpm/apk + Alpine Docker) targeting Gitea

Stack: Cobra/Viper, Fiber v2 + huma v2, embedded NATS JetStream,
pgx/sqlc/golang-migrate, ristretto, TypeID, prometheus/client_golang,
testcontainers-go.

internal/pkg/httpserver/ratelimit.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package httpserver
+
+import (
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
+	"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2/middleware/limiter"
+
+	"anchorage/internal/pkg/auth"
+)
+
+// SessionLimiter is the brute-force guard on `POST /v1/auth/session`.
+// Applies only to that specific method+path via Fiber's `Next` skip
+// function — so you can install it globally with `app.Use(...)` and
+// have it no-op on every other request.
+//
+// perMinute == 0 falls back to 10 attempts per IP per minute.
+func SessionLimiter(perMinute int) fiber.Handler {
+	if perMinute <= 0 {
+		perMinute = 10
+	}
+	return limiter.New(limiter.Config{
+		Max:        perMinute,
+		Expiration: time.Minute,
+		Next: func(c *fiber.Ctx) bool {
+			return !(c.Method() == fiber.MethodPost && c.Path() == "/v1/auth/session")
+		},
+		LimitReached: func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
+			return c.Status(fiber.StatusTooManyRequests).JSON(fiber.Map{
+				"error":   "Too Many Requests",
+				"message": "too many session attempts; slow down",
+			})
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+// AnonymousLimiter caps unauthenticated requests per IP across the whole
+// API. Authenticated requests (those carrying a valid Bearer or session
+// cookie the BearerMiddleware already resolved) skip the limiter. Probe
+// paths (/health, /ready, /metrics) are also exempt.
+//
+// perMinute == 0 falls back to 120 — a generous bound for a single IP
+// hitting /openapi.json, /docs, and unauthenticated pre-login traffic.
+func AnonymousLimiter(perMinute int) fiber.Handler {
+	if perMinute <= 0 {
+		perMinute = 120
+	}
+	return limiter.New(limiter.Config{
+		Max:        perMinute,
+		Expiration: time.Minute,
+		Next: func(c *fiber.Ctx) bool {
+			// Skip health / metrics — orchestrator probes hit these far
+			// more often than the per-minute bound and we don't want to
+			// DoS ourselves.
+			switch c.Path() {
+			case "/v1/health", "/v1/ready", "/metrics", "/lbz":
+				return true
+			}
+			// Skip authenticated traffic — real API clients burst
+			// legitimately and we don't want to throttle them here.
+			return auth.FromContext(c.UserContext()) != nil
+		},
+		LimitReached: func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
+			return c.Status(fiber.StatusTooManyRequests).JSON(fiber.Map{
+				"error":   "Too Many Requests",
+				"message": "anonymous request rate exceeded",
+			})
+		},
+	})
+}