Keep the NTFS kernel-driver option as a generic in-kernel NTFS path rather than an ntfs3-specific path. Add --filesystem=kernel-ntfs and -m kernelntfs routes that select a registered or loadable kernel NTFS driver and mount with -i so mount.ntfs/ntfs-3g helpers are not invoked.
Preserve --filesystem=ntfs3 as a literal pin to the ntfs3 driver. Treat both ntfs3 and kernel-ntfs as mount-only selectors; volume creation continues to use filesystem type NTFS.
The preference and -m kernelntfs path only select an in-kernel NTFS driver when no explicit filesystem type was supplied and blkid detects NTFS.
Treat ntfs as the preferred in-kernel driver on Linux 7.1 and later, where the upstream read/write driver is expected. On earlier kernels, select ntfs only when module metadata identifies the standalone read/write driver and /sys/module confirms it loaded, avoiding ntfs3 read-only ntfs compatibility registrations. Fall back to ntfs3 otherwise, and report a generic kernel-driver error if neither supported driver is available or loadable.
Rename the internal preference/config field to MountNtfsWithKernelDriver, migrate the old MountNtfsWithNtfs3 preference key, and update UI strings, CLI help, documentation, release notes, and translation placeholders accordingly.
Reference: https://github.com/veracrypt/VeraCrypt/issues/1735
This commit fixes a critical security vulnerability where VeraCrypt could be tricked into executing malicious binaries with elevated privileges. The vulnerability has two severe implications:
1. When sudo's secure_path option is disabled, attackers could execute malicious binaries with root privileges by placing them in user-writable PATH directories (e.g., making "sudo mount" execute a malicious mount binary)
2. By placing a malicious sudo binary in PATH, attackers could intercept and steal the user's password when VeraCrypt prompts for sudo authentication
The vulnerability allowed attackers to place malicious binaries in user-writable directories that appear in PATH before system directories, potentially leading to privilege escalation and credential theft.
Key changes:
- Implement FindSystemBinary() to locate executables in secure system paths
- Replace all relative binary paths with absolute paths for system commands
- Add security checks for executable permissions
- Update process execution to use absolute paths for:
* sudo
* mount
* fsck
* terminal emulators
* file managers
* system utilities (hdiutil, mdconfig, vnconfig, lofiadm)
The fix ensures all system binaries are called using their absolute paths from secure system directories, preventing both privilege escalation through PATH manipulation and password theft through sudo hijacking.
Security: CVE-2024-54187
* *: source files should not be executable
* *: make sure files have final newline
* *: remove BOM from text files
* translations: unify headers
* *: fix typos
* *: trim excess whitespace
Mounir IDRASSI
Mounir IDRASSI
ZhanYF
a1346054
kokokodak