Run display discovery asynchronously and bound batched disk-image inventory
queries. Filter auxiliary mounts by basename, filesystem and owner, and
keep unresolved candidates separate from verified volumes. Allow targeted
dismounts despite incomplete discovery while requiring complete results
for slot allocation and empty-inventory decisions.
Use nonthrowing GUI snapshots with monotonic freshness, completion events
and safe window lifetimes. Suspend inactivity decisions while the snapshot
is stale, without restarting idle timers: activity counters are cumulative
per volume instance. Refresh logout targets and retry only failed ones.
Show a progress dialog for interactive unmounts, but keep automatic ones
synchronous, so a quit or logout request that arrives meanwhile is handled
afterwards rather than refused. Guard core operations against reentry and
route wait-dialog requests only from worker threads, so a main-thread
message cannot wait for itself.
Bind teardown to captured mount and service identities, including process
start time. Report a service exit that cannot be confirmed after auxiliary
mount removal as a distinct error that keeps the original details. Such
volumes are not retried, and a multi-volume unmount reports all of them
together with any other failure or a declined prompt. Warn about it after
automatic unmounts and at quit, and keep the background application until
the warning is acknowledged. Keep rollback responsive, and let services
remove their auxiliary directories without probing mounted paths. Preserve
released /control compatibility and perform best-effort cleanup for older
services.
Reap bounded subprocesses as soon as their output ends. A child that
survives SIGKILL is reaped by a later call, which starts no new child until
then. Keep subjects and subprocess command, status and error output when
formatting exceptions for wrapping and logs. Clarify discovery and rollback
diagnostics. Fix the localization-dependent busy-volume regression
assertion and extend discovery, snapshot, process identity, cleanup, GUI
lifecycle, inactivity and teardown coverage.
On macOS, Process::FindSystemBinary() searched /usr/local/bin first, so a
user-writable /usr/local/bin (the default on Homebrew installs) could
shadow system tools.
This resolver is also used to locate privileged binaries during privilege
elevation: CoreService.cpp resolves "sudo" (and "true") through it both
when probing for an active sudo session and when launching the elevated
helper, and the admin password is written to that sudo process's stdin.
On a typical Homebrew install /usr/local is owned by the (non-root) user,
so a planted /usr/local/bin/sudo would be selected ahead of /usr/bin/sudo
and could capture the admin password, leading to privilege escalation.
Reorder the macOS list to {/usr/bin, /bin, /usr/sbin, /sbin,
/usr/local/bin} so system locations always win. The binaries actually
resolved through this function on macOS (sudo, true, fsck, the terminal
helper used for filesystem checks and its dependencies, and non-APFS
formatters) live in system directories, so /usr/local/bin is kept only as
a last-resort fallback and can no longer shadow them. (diskutil, hdiutil
and newfs_apfs are invoked via absolute paths and were never affected.)
Co-authored-by: Damian Rickard <damian@rickard.us>
This commit fixes a critical security vulnerability where VeraCrypt could be tricked into executing malicious binaries with elevated privileges. The vulnerability has two severe implications:
1. When sudo's secure_path option is disabled, attackers could execute malicious binaries with root privileges by placing them in user-writable PATH directories (e.g., making "sudo mount" execute a malicious mount binary)
2. By placing a malicious sudo binary in PATH, attackers could intercept and steal the user's password when VeraCrypt prompts for sudo authentication
The vulnerability allowed attackers to place malicious binaries in user-writable directories that appear in PATH before system directories, potentially leading to privilege escalation and credential theft.
Key changes:
- Implement FindSystemBinary() to locate executables in secure system paths
- Replace all relative binary paths with absolute paths for system commands
- Add security checks for executable permissions
- Update process execution to use absolute paths for:
* sudo
* mount
* fsck
* terminal emulators
* file managers
* system utilities (hdiutil, mdconfig, vnconfig, lofiadm)
The fix ensures all system binaries are called using their absolute paths from secure system directories, preventing both privilege escalation through PATH manipulation and password theft through sudo hijacking.
Security: CVE-2024-54187
The variable has enough capacity so pointer &buffer[0] is valid but since clear method was called, we are not supposed to access element at index 0.
Related to Github issue #896
* Revert previous commit
* Fix "Invalid characters..." issue by not using "foreach" macro
The "foreach" macro creates a copy of the container.
This copy is destroyed immediately after the iteration is completed.
C-strings pointers passed to the local array were invalidated
with destroying of "std::string"s contained in the copy.
Mounir IDRASSI
Mounir IDRASSI
Christopher BergqvistandGitHub
Hanno BöckandMounir IDRASSI
Alexander KarzhenkovandMounir IDRASSI
David Foerster