Added security checks to prevent mounting VeraCrypt volumes on system directories (like /usr/bin) or directories in the user's PATH, which could theoretically allow execution of malicious binaries instead of legitimate system binaries.
Key changes:
- Block mounting on protected system directories (/usr, /bin, /lib, etc.)
This restriction cannot be overridden
- Block mounting on directories present in user's PATH environment variable
This can be overridden with --allow-insecure-mount flag
- Add visual warnings (red border, "[INSECURE MODE]") when mounting on PATH directories is allowed
- Handle symlinks properly when checking paths
- Add new error messages for blocked mount points
To override PATH-based restrictions only (system directories remain protected):
veracrypt --allow-insecure-mount [options] volume mountpoint
Security Impact: Low to Medium
The attack requires either:
- User explicitly choosing a system directory as mount point instead of using VeraCrypt's default mount points
- Or attacker having both filesystem access to modify favorites configuration AND knowledge of the volume password
Default mount points are not affected by this vulnerability.
Security: CVE-2025-23021
Currently on a system without xterm or konsole (like fresh
Ubuntu install) the fsck check will not launch. Added
gnome-terminal as an alternative and fixed an issue where
konsole will always error out as --title and --caption are
no longer valid arguments.
Previously the error message was simply "xterm not found", so
new LangString LINUX_EX2MSG_TERMINALNOTFOUND was added to let the
user knows which programs they need to get the feature working.
Mounir IDRASSI
Mounir IDRASSI
Jertzukka
alt3r 3go
David Foerster