age: add NoIdentityMatchError

Closes #147

age.go

@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ import (
 // An Identity is a private key or other value that can decrypt an opaque file
 // key from a recipient stanza.
 //
-// Unwrap must return ErrIncorrectIdentity for recipient stanzas that don't
+// Unwrap must return an error wrapping ErrIncorrectIdentity for recipient
-// match the identity, any other error might be considered fatal.
+// stanzas that don't match the identity, any other error will be considered
+// fatal.
 type Identity interface {
 	Unwrap(block *Stanza) (fileKey []byte, err error)
 }
@@ -125,6 +126,18 @@ func Encrypt(dst io.Writer, recipients ...Recipient) (io.WriteCloser, error) {
 	return stream.NewWriter(streamKey(fileKey, nonce), dst)
 }
 
+// NoIdentityMatchError is returned by Decrypt when none of the supplied
+// identities match the encrypted file.
+type NoIdentityMatchError struct {
+	// Errors is a slice of all the errors returned to Decrypt by the Unwrap
+	// calls it made. They all wrap ErrIncorrectIdentity.
+	Errors []error
+}
+
+func (*NoIdentityMatchError) Error() string {
+	return "no identity matched any of the recipients"
+}
+
 // Decrypt decrypts a file encrypted to one or more identities.
 //
 // It returns a Reader reading the decrypted plaintext of the age file read
@@ -142,6 +155,7 @@ func Decrypt(src io.Reader, identities ...Identity) (io.Reader, error) {
 		return nil, errors.New("too many recipients")
 	}
 
+	errNoMatch := &NoIdentityMatchError{}
 	var fileKey []byte
 RecipientsLoop:
 	for _, r := range hdr.Recipients {
@@ -151,6 +165,7 @@ RecipientsLoop:
 		for _, i := range identities {
 			fileKey, err = i.Unwrap((*Stanza)(r))
 			if errors.Is(err, ErrIncorrectIdentity) {
+				errNoMatch.Errors = append(errNoMatch.Errors, err)
 				continue
 			}
 			if err != nil {
@@ -161,7 +176,7 @@ RecipientsLoop:
 		}
 	}
 	if fileKey == nil {
-		return nil, errors.New("no identity matched any of the recipients")
+		return nil, errNoMatch
 	}
 
 	if mac, err := headerMAC(fileKey, hdr); err != nil {

cmd/age/encrypted_keys.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 package main
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 
@@ -33,11 +34,12 @@ func (i *LazyScryptIdentity) Unwrap(block *age.Stanza) (fileKey []byte, err erro
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	fileKey, err = ii.Unwrap(block)
-	if err == age.ErrIncorrectIdentity {
+	if errors.Is(err, age.ErrIncorrectIdentity) {
-		// The API will just ignore the identity if the passphrase is wrong, and
+		// ScryptIdentity returns ErrIncorrectIdentity for an incorrect
-		// move on, eventually returning "no identity matched a recipient".
+		// passphrase, which would lead Decrypt to returning "no identity
-		// Since we only supply one identity from the CLI, make it a fatal
+		// matched any recipient". That makes sense in the API, where there
-		// error with a better message.
+		// might be multiple configured ScryptIdentity. Since in cmd/age there
+		// can be only one, return a better error message.
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("incorrect passphrase")
 	}
 	return fileKey, err

scrypt.go

@@ -155,9 +155,9 @@ func (i *ScryptIdentity) Unwrap(block *Stanza) ([]byte, error) {
 	// This AEAD is not robust, so an attacker could craft a message that
 	// decrypts under two different keys (meaning two different passphrases) and
 	// then use an error side-channel in an online decryption oracle to learn if
-	// either key is correct. This is deemed acceptable because the usa case (an
+	// either key is correct. This is deemed acceptable because the use case (an
 	// online decryption oracle) is not recommended, and the security loss is
-	// only one bit. This also does not bypass any scrypt work, but that work
+	// only one bit. This also does not bypass any scrypt work, although that work
 	// can be precomputed in an online oracle scenario.
 	fileKey, err := aeadDecrypt(k, fileKeySize, block.Body)
 	if err != nil {