mirror of
https://tangled.org/evan.jarrett.net/at-container-registry
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0490278fb8a10ccd93ff1891ac0f9b72bcbcd3f0
513
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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0490278fb8 |
appview: don't report a failed README guess as an error
Four of the twelve home-page repos showed "We couldn't load the README, it may be rate-limited or private". The URL in those cases was not configured by anyone: it was derived from org.opencontainers.image.source, a label images inherit from their base image, so the raw URL named an unrelated project and 404ed. A 404 on a URL the appview guessed is an expected outcome the owner cannot act on. The failure flag is now set only when the owner actually pointed us at the URL, via the io.atcr.readme annotation. A derived URL that fails renders as if there were no README. Both paths keep their debug log, now carrying an "explicit" field so the two cases stay distinguishable. Render failures are suppressed for derived URLs too. The panel's copy and its "Edit README" action address an owner who configured a source; on a derived URL there is no configured source, and content that failed to render is very likely another project's README anyway. This is the alarming half of the finding. Rendering the wrong project's README when the fetch succeeds is the larger half and is untouched: there is no reliable way to detect an inherited label, since the only signal is org.opencontainers.image.base.name, which is not always set. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9 |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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44a17cbcdc |
appview: stop the upgrade banner inventing an improvement across arch mismatch
On a public repo, to anonymous visitors, the digest banner read "2 fixes, 12 Critical / 27 High / 26 Medium vulns, -22 layers, -53.6 MB" while the same page showed 244 vulnerabilities and Layers (22), and its own "View diff" link landed on "Layers 22 -> 22, every layer Unchanged". Platform matching only ran when both sides were manifest lists. The comment after that block said the mismatched case would "fall through and show a basic banner without layer/vuln details", but no such branch was ever written and nothing guarded the fallthrough, so execution continued into the layer and vuln computation with the unresolved originals still in place. The newer side was the multi-arch index, which carries no layers of its own and is not scanned, so all 22 layers of the other side read as removed and the vuln delta was computed against an absent scan. Returns 204 for either mismatch direction, as the no-common-platform path already does. The promised "basic banner" is not implementable as the function stands, which is presumably why it never appeared: the template renders only NewerTag, DiffURL and Summary, and DiffSummary is nothing but deltas, so a delta-less banner collapses to the tag name and would be suppressed by the existing "nothing meaningful changed" guard anyway. The comment is replaced with one that says what is actually true. Showing a real banner here would mean resolving the index to the child matching the single-arch side's platform, and that side's os/arch is not in the appview DB at all: Platforms is populated only for manifest lists and the manifests table has no os/arch columns. It would need either a config fetch from the hold at render time or denormalising os/arch during ingest. Not attempted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9 |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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39919cc832 |
appview: stop webhooks reaching private addresses
The URL check accepted http:// while telling the user "must be https", and guarded no addresses at all. POST /api/webhooks with http://127.0.0.1:9/hook returned 200 and created the webhook, so both scheduled deliveries and the synchronous Test button would dial arbitrary destinations from the appview host, on demand, for any authenticated user. Loopback, link-local (including the cloud metadata endpoint at 169.254.169.254) and RFC1918 were all reachable. Enforces https, and refuses non-public destinations. The load-bearing half is the dial-time check, not the creation-time one. An attacker controls their own DNS, so a hostname that resolves publicly when the webhook is created can resolve to loopback when it is delivered, and a creation-time check cannot see a redirect either. The guard is therefore a net.Dialer Control hook on the delivery client, which inspects the resolved address on every connection attempt. Transport.Proxy is explicitly nil: honouring HTTP(S)_PROXY would route around the Control hook and hand the bypass straight back. Redirects are re-validated per hop and capped at 3. The creation-time check stays so the user gets an immediate, comprehensible error instead of a silent delivery failure later. IPv4-mapped IPv6 is unmapped before every check, so ::ffff:127.0.0.1 and friends hit the IPv4 rules. Ranges with no net.IP helper are listed explicitly: CGNAT, NAT64, ::/96, TEST-NET and reserved space. Both outbound paths are covered, since the scheduled dispatcher and the Test button both funnel through attemptDelivery. The dispatcher's other client is deliberately left unguarded: it fetches quota stats from holds, which legitimately live on private addresses, and those URLs are not user-supplied. Note this removes the ability to point a webhook at a localhost receiver in local development. There is deliberately no environment-variable escape hatch, since a security toggle read from the environment is the same bypass wearing a nicer coat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9 |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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dfd604b106 |
hold/scanner: stop one undispatchable job freezing all scanning
Vulnerability scanning produced nothing across the whole deployment for nine days, from 2026-08-25 01:20:48 until a scanner restart on 2026-09-03. The scanner was connected and idle, the hold's discovery pass kept reporting unscannedFound=15 every four hours, and no scan_jobs row was created in that entire window. hasActiveJobs counted pending, assigned and processing rows globally with no age bound, and waitForCapacity spins while it is true. dispatchLoop calls it before popping any candidate, so a single pending row that never reached a terminal state reported "busy" forever: discovery kept pushing candidates into unscannedQueue and nothing ever popped them. That is why the symptom was an empty queue rather than a growing one. Nothing papered over it because push-triggered enqueue only fires for owner or a tier with scan_on_push, which in production means pro alone. All 210 manifests pushed to this hold in that window came from free, supporter, or accounts with no crew row, so the frozen proactive loop was the only source of jobs. Nor could it recover on its own. Only Enqueue and drainPendingJobs dispatch a pending row, and drainPendingJobs runs only when a scanner newly connects; reDispatchTimedOut considered assigned rows only. The hold had been up since Aug 14 and the scanner since Aug 21 on the same websocket, so the drain path had not run since the row appeared. So bound the capacity gate to pending rows younger than pendingStaleAfter, give reDispatchTimedOut a pending reclaim, and check RowsAffected on the assign UPDATE now that two dispatchers can race for a row. waitForCapacity warns and names the blocking jobs after ten minutes without capacity, because the failure mode above was completely silent. Two adjacent fixes for the same outage. The scanner never called InitLogger, so log_level and log_shipper were dead config and an idle scanner was mute, which is what made nine days invisible. And skipReason now also skips a job whose layers contain nothing tar-shaped: the job that wedged this queue was an in-toto attestation whose config mediaType is an ordinary image config, so the existing config-type check missed it and buildOCILayout would have handed Syft an empty image. The regression tests were verified against the old logic first: three of them fail on it and pass on the fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DPWkeCKcbtGoyXyyeMhSps |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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af7522b154 |
appview: stop /auth/token granting anonymous pull the registry will refuse
An unauthenticated token request for a repo on a private hold came back with a signed token granting pull, and /v2/ then 401ed that exact token. The authorization server and the resource server disagreed about the same request. The old behaviour was deliberate — "minting a pull-only token is not a grant", with the hold owning the decision via captain.Public — but a token spec expects the server to issue the subset it will authorize, so granting pull and then refusing it is the wrong shape. Adds an optional AnonymousAuthorizer, kept separate from Authorizer because the anonymous path has no DID and no auth method (three of Authorize's four arguments are meaningless) and because it must drop whole entries rather than narrow actions in place, where entries can belong to different owners. Denied entries are dropped; if nothing granting survives, the caller gets the standard 401 challenge rather than a token with an empty access list, so docker prompts for credentials instead of proceeding to a second 401. The scope-less /v2/ ping and the actionless entry NarrowToPullOnly preserves on purpose both bypass the gate entirely — no identity resolution, no hold lookup — since anonymous discovery depends on them. Fails open on any lookup error, matching the /v2/ check, which states the reason: the hold is the enforcing authority and a transient failure must not break anonymous pulls of public images. /v2/ still enforces; this is a correctness and UX fix, not a security fix, and nothing was exposed. Also closes the successor asymmetry documented under finding 3: /v2/ applies a single-hop migration redirect before checking read access, so judging the pre-migration identity here would have reintroduced the disagreement this gate removes. It was one extra local read of hold_captain_records. Tests pin both directions and prove the chain is not followed past one hop. Costs one directory-cached identity resolution plus two local SQL reads per granting entry, and no call to the hold. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9 |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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4caeb25031 |
appview: rebuild the JS bundle so the committed asset matches src
Picks up the two JS changes in this batch: the crane destination argument in
updatePullCommand (app.js) and syncDiffMenu (repository.js).
The bundle is a committed build artifact, and nothing in the dev loop keeps it
current on its own. Air's pre_cmd is go generate and its cmd is a Go build; it
never invokes esbuild. Bundling happens in npm run js:watch, a separate
process. So a src-only change leaves the committed bundle stale until someone
runs npm run js:build by hand, which is how
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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85f312f953 |
appview: refuse /v2/_catalog with UNSUPPORTED, and send Allow on every 405
/v2/_catalog answered a bare request with 200 {"repositories":[]} but 400ed
any n, because buildDistributionConfig leaves Catalog.MaxEntries at 0 and the
library rejects n > max. crane catalog sends n=1000, so it always failed. The
same endpoint both worked and rejected a legal parameter.
Setting MaxEntries was the obvious fix and is the wrong one. This registry has
no global catalog and will not grow one: repositories live in per-user ATProto
PDS namespaces, and buildStorageConfig hands the library a placeholder
inmemory driver, so its enumeration is empty by construction. An empty 200
asserts that this registry contains no repositories, which is false and
silently so. UNSUPPORTED says the true thing, and matches the vocabulary
DomainRoutingMiddleware already uses to refuse /v2/* on the UI domain.
There is no conformance cost: _catalog is not in the OCI distribution spec at
all. It is a Docker Registry HTTP API V2 extension, and the spec places
repository discovery out of scope. Docker Hub and GHCR both refuse it outright
and Quay returns an unconditional empty list; none of them 400s a legal n.
The path had three distinct behaviours, not two, and all three now collapse to
one: GET varied by parameter, HEAD was answered by gorilla's MethodHandler
with a bare 405, and the trailing-slash form 301-redirected because
distribution sets StrictSlash(true). Both path forms are registered, and chi
prefers a static pattern over the /v2/* wildcard regardless of declaration
order (verified against the pinned chi version, and pinned by a test that
fails if a request reaches the distribution stand-in).
Also adds the Allow header that RFC 9110 requires on any 405 — a MUST in both
15.5.6 and 10.2.1, not a SHOULD. The value is empty, which 10.2.1 defines as
"the resource allows no methods": true for the catalog, and true for /v2/* on
the UI domain, so the pre-existing gap in DomainRoutingMiddleware is closed
too. Naming a method there would advertise something that does not work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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8bc6d65e1e |
appview: emit crane's mandatory destination in the pull command switcher
The client switcher built every command as "<client> pull <ref>". That is valid for docker, podman, buildah and nerdctl, but crane requires a destination: $ crane pull seamark.cr/user/bench8x1:v2 Error: requires at least 2 arg(s), only received 1 So selecting crane handed the user a command that cannot run. pullPrefix is a prefix-only helper, which is precisely why it could not express this; add a matching pullPostfix that returns " <image>.tar" for crane and "" for everything else, including "none" (image reference only), which must get neither prefix nor postfix. Both render paths change together, since fixing one leaves the bug visible in the other: the Go template helper paints first, and updatePullCommand in app.js re-renders when the dropdown changes. Repository names may contain slashes, so only the last path segment is used — otherwise the destination would name a subdirectory that does not exist. A name ending in "/" yields no destination at all rather than a bare ".tar", on the grounds that a visibly wrong-arity command beats silently writing a hidden file. That input is not reachable through the real repo-name path. The test asserts the whole command string rather than just the postfix, so it covers the prefix/postfix interaction and the "none" case where both vanish. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9 |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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3158460298 |
appview: hide the current tag from the repository Diff dropdown
The Diff menu listed every tag including the one being viewed, and clicking
that entry did nothing: diffToTag returns early on to === currentTag, with no
navigation, no toast, no feedback.
Fixed in JS rather than in the template, which is the part that is easy to
get wrong. #diff-dropdown sits outside #tag-content, and the tag selector
block is marked "stays in DOM, never swapped" — so a {{ range }} filter would
be correct on first paint and stale after the first htmx tag swap, omitting
the originally loaded tag and re-including the newly current one. Same dead
entry, harder to see.
syncDiffMenu() reads the live value from #tag-selector and is called from
initTabs(), which already runs on load and again from the htmx:afterSettle
handler for #tag-content, so it stays correct across swaps.
Hidden rather than disabled: a disabled row still takes space and still reads
as an item to a screen reader, and "diff against the tag you are already on"
is meaningless rather than temporarily unavailable. Uses style.display to
match filterTags() in the same file, since daisyUI's .menu li rules outrank
Tailwind's .hidden.
The template guards the dropdown with {{ if gt (len .AllTags) 1 }} and tag
names are unique per repo (tags PK is did+repository+tag), so exactly one
entry is ever hidden and the menu can never end up empty. The early return in
diffToTag stays as a backstop.
Pre-existing, not a deploy regression. The baseline missed it because the
test repo had one tag, so the check skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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1631898005 |
appview: give every Repository() error an OCI code instead of 500 {}
A user with an unresolvable defaultHold (did:web:localhost%3A8080) got HTTP
500 with a body of literally {} on every request in their namespace, and
crane retried it three times because 500 is retryable.
The cause is in the distribution library. handlers/app.go:755 switches on the
error type returned by Repository() with cases for ErrRepositoryUnknown,
ErrRepositoryNameInvalid and errcode.Error, and no default. A bare fmt.Errorf
matches none of them, so context.Errors stays empty; ServeJSON then finds no
ErrorCoder, leaves sc == 0, falls through to 500, and Errors.MarshalJSON
renders the nil slice as {} via omitempty.
So every error leaving Repository() must be coded. Four were not:
hold URL unresolvable -> 404 NAME_UNKNOWN when errors.Is
atproto.ErrHoldDIDPermanent, else 503 UNAVAILABLE
no hold DID configured -> 500 UNKNOWN, but with a body and a log line
invalid image name -> 400 NAME_INVALID
name missing an owner -> 400 NAME_INVALID
The permanent/transient split is the point: a DNS blip must stay retryable,
but a did:web that can never resolve must not be retried at all. Stored user
data that cannot resolve is a 4xx condition, not a server fault, and the
NAME_UNKNOWN message now names the hold so the owner can fix their profile.
The hold DID is already world-readable in their sailor profile record.
Tests assert through a helper that replays distribution's exact type switch,
so an uncoded error still surfaces as 500 {} and the assertions bind to the
real behaviour rather than to the constructors.
Does not address the logrus line at app.go:757, which fires unconditionally
before the type switch and cannot be avoided by any returned error type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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2ee5a35525 |
appview: stop the schema-drift check reporting phantom index differences
reportSchemaDrift logged 76 differences on every boot, all false positives: 38 indexes each reported twice, once as missing from the database and once as present but undeclared. The only difference was a single space before the column list. The two sides of the comparison are built differently. referenceSnapshot() applies schema.sql to a local in-memory libsql, which stores the CREATE text verbatim as "ON t(col)". Production is an embedded replica syncing to Bunny, whose parser re-emits normalized DDL as "ON t (col)". describeIndexes collapsed whitespace runs but could not normalize a space that exists on one side only, and SchemaDrift compares by exact string. Normalize whitespace adjacent to ( ) and , so both spellings converge. Space after ) is deliberately left alone, and the space before DESC is untouched, so column order and direction still have to match. This mattered because the check exists to catch a migration recorded but not executed (0004 was, which is why 0009 exists). At 76 phantom findings, real drift would have been one line among 77, under a hint telling the operator to write a corrective migration that is not needed. The first boot after this lands is the first honest reading of that warning. The existing tests all passed because they run local-only, which is exactly how this shipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9 |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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a63b839613 |
appview: gzip UI and static responses, leaving /v2 alone
Go's net/http compresses nothing by default and the appview is served by a
raw Go server behind a load balancer that does not compress either, so
everything went out uncompressed: style.css at 180 KB, bundle.min.js at
105 KB, and the homepage HTML at 95 KB. Lighthouse put style.css alone at
1,768 ms of blocked first paint, and mobile Performance measured 77 against
98 on desktop, entirely on paint metrics (TBT 10ms, CLS 0).
klauspost/compress is already a direct dependency and ships gzhttp, so this
costs no new one. Brotli would save roughly 11 KB more across the three
largest assets in exchange for a runtime dependency, which is not worth it.
The /v2 skip is the part that needs care. The OCI registry API is mounted on
the same chi router as the UI (server.go:561), and container layers are
already gzipped tarballs, so compressing that path burns CPU for no gain.
The content-type allowlist would catch most of it, but /v2/* also serves
application/json for tag listings and errors, so the path check keeps the
registry out of the compression path entirely. The predicate matches the one
the domain-routing middleware already uses.
Measured against a local build, gzip vs identity:
/ 14,526 -> 4,298 71%
/css/style.css 183,990 -> 31,596 83%
/js/bundle.min.js 107,781 -> 32,648 70%
/icons.svg 26,360 -> 8,403 69%
total 332,657 -> 76,945 77%
Verified end to end against a running binary: UI and static responses carry
Content-Encoding: gzip with Vary: Accept-Encoding, /v2/ and /v2/*/tags/list
carry neither, and woff2 stays untouched. Tests cover both directions plus
the under-1 KB and no-Accept-Encoding cases.
HTTP/2 is the remaining half and cannot be fixed here: the load balancer
terminates TLS and negotiates no ALPN at all, which pins every request to
HTTP/1.1. That is an LB setting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0124r73LT4qoFE82TqwH2Gu9
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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cbd0c5f05c |
appview: rebuild the JS bundle so the committed asset matches src
The tracked bundle predated
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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27fab41c1c |
appview: make the webhook cap agree between creation and delivery
The UI and the dispatcher asked the same question and got different
answers. getWebhookLimits short-circuited on a disabled billing manager and
returned unlimited without consulting it, while server.go hands
BillingManager.GetWebhookLimits straight to NewDispatcher, bypassing that
short-circuit entirely. With billing compiled out the stub answers
non-captains with (1, false).
So a non-captain saw "N / unlimited webhooks configured", could create as
many as they liked, and only the oldest was ever delivered. allTriggers was
false on that same path, so even the surviving one was restricted to
FreeTriggerMask; a webhook set to a scan trigger fired nothing at all, with
no message anywhere and only an INFO line server-side.
Route both paths through the manager so they cannot drift. The intended
non-billing policy is one webhook with TriggerFirst | TriggerPush |
TriggerQuota, which is what the stub already returned and what the shipped
config's Free tier specifies (max_webhooks: 1, webhook_all_triggers: false),
so enabling billing leaves free users exactly where they were and only
unlocks upward. That also removes a downgrade cliff: nobody can accumulate
webhooks under a phantom unlimited and lose them when billing turns on.
Drop the dead webhookLimits{Max: 1}, overwritten on the following line, and
give a nil manager the same policy rather than a third answer.
Latent, not live: production has zero webhooks configured today.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAqi2hS2dhZoatqcWoYZQk
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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62aea5f3f0 |
credhelper: print the verification URL that carries the code
The interactive prompt named codeResp.VerificationURI while openBrowser was handed verificationURL, the one with ?user_code= appended. Pressing Enter therefore always worked, which is why this went unnoticed; copying the printed URL instead landed on /device with no code. That matters more than it looks, because the branch tests the wrong thing. isTerminal(os.Stdin) asks whether stdin is a TTY, not whether a browser exists, so an SSH session on a headless box takes the headed path and is told to press Enter to open a browser it does not have. The non-interactive branch, which already printed the full URL, is only reached by piping stdin. Printing the code-carrying URL in both branches makes that mismatch moot rather than requiring a smarter predicate. Also give /device without a code the styled device-error page instead of bare text/plain, matching the expired-code path beside it, and stop renderError panicking when Templates is nil. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAqi2hS2dhZoatqcWoYZQk |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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a219df9545 |
appview/js: fix webhook test result, 400 toasts, and Layers tab init
Three unrelated client-side defects found while baselining production. The webhook Test button always reported success. renderAlert writes no status code, so both outcomes are HTTP 200 and the result lives in the markup, which partials/alert.html emits as "alert alert-error". testWebhook looked for class="error", which that string does not contain, and resp.ok is always true, so the failure branch was unreachable. A webhook pointed at a dead URL was reported as delivered. Match alert-error instead. Avatar upload rejections lost the server's reason. The htmx:responseError handler maps status codes to fixed strings and had no 400 case, so "File too large (max 3MB)" and "Invalid file type" both surfaced as "Something went wrong". Surface the body when it is short plain text; a rendered error page or a long trace is not toast material. The repository page's Layers tab was never initialised. initLayersTables runs from DOMContentLoaded, when the panel is still a spinner, and from htmx:afterSettle, which htmx.process() does not emit. So empty-layer hiding and no-history run collapsing never ran there, and the checkbox claimed rows were hidden while all of them were on screen. Export it and call it from the tab controller. It now also re-seeds checkboxes within the loaded scope, which fixes the digest page contradicting itself: the stored preference was honoured for the rows and ignored for the control. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAqi2hS2dhZoatqcWoYZQk |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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1253ca15ec |
appview: report a never-scanned image as unscanned, not as a failure
digest_content.go branched on Error == "never-scanned" to pick the "not scanned yet" copy, but nothing anywhere produced that string: both FetchVulnDetails and FetchSbomDetails returned the human sentence "No scan record found" for a missing record. So vulnReason and sbomReason could never be "not-scanned", the friendly branches in vulns-section.html and sbom-section.html were dead code, and every unscanned image fell through to fetch-failed. Free-tier accounts have scan_on_push off, so this was every image they push, told "Scan data couldn't be loaded... try refreshing in a minute" about something that had never been scanned and never would be by refreshing. The digest page showed the raw internal string instead. Replace the prose sentinel with a NotScanned bool the 404 path actually sets, and give other non-200 statuses a distinct message so a 500 from the hold stops being indistinguishable from an absent record. The detail templates branch on it before Error, so nothing leaks the internal value. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAqi2hS2dhZoatqcWoYZQk |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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27ce122db0 |
auth: stop logging an unresolvable hold DID at ERROR
A hold DID that can never resolve is a property of stored user data, not a fault on our side. The value comes from a user's own sailor profile defaultHold, so any account can choose the appview's ERROR volume, and nothing is cached on the failure path, so it re-logs on every request for that user. On production this was not a rounding error: two accounts pointing at did:web:localhost%3A8080 produced 2956 of 2958 ERROR lines over seven days, 99.9%. The genuine rate underneath was about two a day, which made level=ERROR useless as a signal or an alert threshold. Classify at the resolution boundary instead of string-matching prose. ErrHoldDIDPermanent marks a malformed identifier or a missing DID document; those log at DEBUG while everything an operator could act on stays at ERROR. didWebHostUnusable is conservative on purpose: it only claims the cases we are sure about (percent-encoded ports, bare IPs, localhost), so an unfamiliar failure stays loud rather than being quietly swallowed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAqi2hS2dhZoatqcWoYZQk |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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a4aedbd2c8 |
gc: retry transient PDS failures instead of pinning a user's storage
Both paginated walks bailed on the first error, and the caller treats a failed walk as "assume everything is referenced", so one blip skipped that DID's storage for the whole run. Measured before changing anything: every DID GC had classified unreachable but healthy failed only one or two runs out of six, and replaying the exact same listRecords calls afterwards returned 200 in 45-680 ms with no rate limiting. Ordinary blips on small self-hosted PDSes, amplified into a full-DID skip. Share one listRecordsPage helper between fetchUserTags and fetchUserManifestsFromEndpoint. The retry decision splits deliberately: timeouts, connection reset, 5xx and 429 get another attempt, while DNS failure, TLS failure, connection refused and any 4xx do not. Those are stable facts about an endpoint, and retrying them would only slow the run and keep a dead PDS looking alive longer. Unrecognised errors stay permanent, so an unfamiliar failure degrades to today's behaviour rather than hammering. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAqi2hS2dhZoatqcWoYZQk |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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c36e90f6b7 |
hold/admin: swap out the deleted crew row instead of sending 204
The delete handler returned 204 No Content for htmx requests, on the theory that an empty body plus hx-swap="outerHTML" would make the row disappear. htmx's default responseHandling maps 204 to swap:false, so it never swapped at all: the record was gone from the PDS but the row stayed on screen until a manual refresh. Return an empty 200, which htmx does swap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ai43R3s33cBGMybGp2gUcG |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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2a58ccebd8 |
hold/gc: name the third ownership state instead of encoding it as a lie
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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264d332bbd |
hold/gc: stop an unreachable hold's manifests from being adopted
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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15871ad188 |
deps: update all modules, bump go and builder images to 1.26.7
Update every direct dependency across all five workspace modules to latest. Notable jumps: syft v1.43.0 -> v1.51.1, grype v0.111.1 -> v0.118.0, stereoscope v0.1.23 -> v0.3.1, indigo -> 2026-09-01, aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.99.1 -> v1.110.0, grpc v1.80.0 -> v1.83.2, x/crypto v0.50.0 -> v0.55.0. Three deps needed more than a version bump: go-libipfs could not be updated at all. The repo was renamed to boxo, so every tag past v0.7.0 declares `module github.com/ipfs/boxo` and cannot be required under the old path. sqlite_store.go already imported go-block-format alongside it and used the archived package exactly once, inside a function already returning blockformat.Block, so it was relying on structural interface satisfaction. Collapsing to the native type drops the archived dependency entirely. go-didplc moved its package from the repo root into a didplc/ subdir in v0.2.2. Package name is unchanged and every symbol we use (RegularOp, OpEnum, OpService, Client.DirectoryURL, Submit) is intact, so this is an import path change only. The go-diskfs replace in scanner/go.mod had inverted. It pinned v1.7.0 because syft v1.43 passed diskfs entries as os.FileInfo; syft v1.51.1 fixed that upstream and now requires v1.9.4, so the workaround had become the thing breaking the build. Removed per its own "Remove when syft ships a fix" note, closing anchore/syft#4796 for us. The indigo bump needed no code changes: of the 21 packages we import only 5 changed, and the repo/MST/CAR-store core is byte-identical. It does bring a util/ssrf fix blocking 6to4 addresses (2002::/16), which we inherit through atproto/auth/oauth. Go 1.26.7 across go.work, all five go.mod files, the four Dockerfiles, the three tangled workflows, and the stale references in docs/DEVELOPMENT.md. Verified golang:1.26.7-trixie resolves on mirror.gcr.io, which is what the Dockerfiles actually pull from. Makefile's TRIXIE_BUILDER_IMAGE stays on the floating golang:1-trixie. make test, make lint, and make test-race all pass, as do the scanner module's tests and the integration-tagged build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWoKzpgtBJ33sCyGxJGR7x |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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606338b33e |
appview: fix mockup-code contrast in both themes
daisyUI dims the gutter prefix with `opacity: .5`, which multiplies against whatever opacity the line's own text color carries. On bg-base-300 a plain `$` measured 3.20:1 in light and 4.19:1 in dark, and the `#` on a line already dimmed to /70 compounded to 2.15:1. The text needs 4.5:1, so this failed in dark mode too, just less visibly than the light-mode report that surfaced it. Give the prefix an absolute muted color instead of a multiplying opacity. The override has to sit unlayered: daisyUI ships this selector in `@layer daisyui`, declared after `@layer components`, so a rule in components loses on layer order however specific it is. A first attempt inside components left daisyUI's `opacity: .5` live on top of the new 70% color, which made the `$` worse (0.5 -> 0.35 effective) rather than better. The hero tagline drops its /70 and now reads at the same weight as the docker commands above it. install.html's two comment lines were at /50, which failed on the text itself (3.20:1 light), and move to /70 where they still read as comments. Measured in Chromium against the built stylesheet, compositing each pseudo-element color over its real background on a canvas: every prefix and comment is now 5.84:1 light / 6.71:1 dark, against 14.03:1 / 12.02:1 for the command text, so the gutter stays visibly de-emphasized. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LpqkSRqpcnAjsSZgFTUN5z |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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ee9ccc1fb8 |
appview: drop crossorigin from the imgs.blue preconnect
Connections are keyed by credentials mode. The crossorigin attribute opened the imgs.blue socket in anonymous-CORS mode, but every request to that origin is a plain <img src> avatar fetch (BlobCDNURL / resizeImage) in no-cors mode, so nothing could reuse it. The browser opened a second connection anyway and Lighthouse flagged the hint as unused while still listing imgs.blue as a preconnect candidate worth ~300ms of LCP. The attribute is correct for the font preloads below, which is where it was likely copied from; comment the distinction so it stays put. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LpqkSRqpcnAjsSZgFTUN5z |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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521cf143e5 |
appview: cover the half of 13edb71 that had no tests
That commit throttles two writes and states a statement order. Only one of the three claims was defended. touchLastSeen is the hotter of the two writes — it ran once per indexed record, so a busy firehose meant a database round trip per event for a timestamp read in hours or days. Deleting its throttle outright left every existing test green, as did keying it globally instead of per DID, which would let one busy account suppress every other account's first write. Both now fail. The statement order is the third claim: UpdateLastUsed stamps the throttle before the write rather than after, so a slow or failing write cannot let every concurrent caller through to queue another attempt behind it. That matters because this runs on the authentication path, once per layer during a push, and the pile-up is worst exactly when the database is least able to absorb it. A failing write makes the ordering observable without timing anything: with the stamp after the write every call retries, with it before only the first does. Dropping the table leaves no row to inspect, so the attempts are counted through the warning the function already logs. Under the reordering it reports 10 attempts across 10 calls. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011rmjvU2gSRL9wFnmqVsWaF |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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ff0942196e |
db: cover the orphan drop in 0034, the case production actually presents
TestMigration0034PreservesLayersAndReferences seeds no orphan and says why: the live foreign key refuses to create one, so the migration's join through manifest_id is "insurance for a database whose foreign keys were off at some point, not for anything reachable now". Production is that database. It carries 160 layers and 22 manifest_references pointing at manifests.id values that no longer exist, left by deletes performed under mattn/go-sqlite3, where the constraint the DDL declared was not enforced. libSQL turns foreign keys on by default and mattn did not, so the rows predate the driver swap. The insurance is load-bearing on the only database that matters, and nothing tested it. The new case rebuilds the pre-0034 shape with the child foreign keys absent, which is what that era's schema behaved like, and seeds three orphaned layers and two orphaned references beside live ones. It asserts the orphans are gone, the live rows survive attached to the right key, nothing lands keyless, and foreign_key_check is clean afterwards. Verified against the defect: with the child manifest_key made nullable and the joins turned into LEFT JOINs, all five orphans survive and the test fails on both counts. Recorded honestly, the two guards are redundant with each other — LEFT JOIN alone still drops them, because INSERT OR IGNORE swallows the NOT NULL violation. Only removing both carries an orphan forward, and such a row counts, selects, and joins to no manifest ever again. Confirmed on a copy of the production database: layers 18803 -> 18643 and manifest_references 2175 -> 2153, exactly the rows the join excludes, with manifests unchanged at 3864. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011rmjvU2gSRL9wFnmqVsWaF |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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8c9a85826d |
appview: stop leasing the billing tier refresh, and let it be cancelled
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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f0b28c04f5 |
db: cover the DID guard on the batched tag delete
TestDeleteTagsNotInListScopedToDID passes a nil keep list, which takes the
early return and deletes with `DELETE FROM tags WHERE did = ?`. So the scoping
it proves is the shortcut's, not the one inside the chunk loop that
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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fa6473a896 |
appview/holdclient: cover the tier fan-out itself, and its failure path
The existing tests covered updateCrewTierWithRetry and UpdateCrewTierOnHold. UpdateCrewTierOnAllHolds -- the function the Stripe webhook actually calls, and whose error decides whether a paid upgrade is retried or dropped -- had none. Three cases: the joined error names every failing hold and not the one that succeeded; a hold that accepts and never answers does not starve the holds after it (mutation-verified by making the fan-out serial, which leaves the healthy hold contacted zero times); and a context deadline aborts the retry loop rather than running to tierUpdateMaxAttempts. That last one records a real mismatch rather than an intent. Three attempts at a 5s client timeout need ~15s, and the webhook allows the whole fan-out 10s, so under a hang the budget funds two attempts and never three -- confirmed against a blackholed hold on the dev stack, which failed at exactly 10.0s with a bare context error rather than the "after N attempts" wrapper. If either constant or the deadline moves, that test is where the arithmetic gets re-checked. Also covers the other half in pkg/billing: a fan-out failure has to reach Stripe as a 5xx and leave stripe_processed_events empty. A hold that is briefly down otherwise costs the customer their tier permanently -- the same shape of loss as the customer-lookup hole, one layer further out. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxF2N3HuZ8xSkx6nkirgB |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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4dd473bbf1 |
hold/pds: cover HandleUpdateCrewTier, which had no test
The hold end of the billing fan-out had no test at all -- only the ErrCrewMemberNotFound sentinel was covered. Its answer decides whether the Stripe webhook records an event as processed or retries it, so each status it can return means something different upstream and is covered separately: the applied path (asserting the stored crew record actually changed, not just the response body), not-crew as a successful no-op, the 403 on a body userDid that disagrees with the signed subject, an empty body userDid falling back to the token subject, 401 unsigned, 400 with no tiers configured, and rank clamping. Each was mutation-verified. One of them corrected the test's own comment: removing the 403 guard does not let a body retarget a grant, because every step after it keys off the token's sub claim and req.UserDID is read nowhere else. The guard makes a disagreeing body loud rather than silently ignored, and the stored-tier assertion is the regression guard for the day something reaches for that unsigned field when it needs "which user". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxF2N3HuZ8xSkx6nkirgB |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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3263156067 |
billing: key entitlements on the Stripe product, not the price
Tier resolution matched a subscription's price ID against the configured stripe_price_monthly/stripe_price_yearly, which inverts what a price change is supposed to do. Stripe prices are immutable, so changing what a tier costs means creating a new price, and Stripe never migrates existing subscribers off the old one. Updating the config to the new price IDs therefore un-tiers precisely the subscribers a price change is meant to leave alone. They did not even drop cleanly to free. An unresolved tier logs a warning, returns nil, and the event is recorded in stripe_processed_events -- so Stripe answers 200, never redelivers, and a later dashboard Resend is swallowed by the idempotency check. Reproduced against the sandbox: a subscription on a price the config does not list granted nothing, and the event could not be replayed afterwards. A tier has one product and many prices over its life, so the product is the durable key for an entitlement. Tiers gain a stripe_product field, and resolution tries the product first, falling back to the price IDs so configs without it keep working unchanged. Checkout still keys on price -- that direction has to name a specific price to charge. Verified live: a subscription on a price created outside the config, under the Pro product, resolved to tierName=Pro tierRank=2 and landed on the hold. The same shape with an unknown product produced the silent no-op before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxF2N3HuZ8xSkx6nkirgB |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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4b9d4bcbeb |
billing: retry a failed customer lookup instead of dropping the subscription
getCustomerDID returned "" for a FAILED customer.Get exactly as it does for a
customer carrying no user_did. handleSubscriptionChange read that as "not our
customer" and returned nil, so HandleWebhook recorded the event as processed
and answered 200. Stripe never redelivered. A transient Stripe API error
therefore dropped a paid upgrade permanently — the precise "paid but never
received tier" hole
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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894dd243da |
hold/admin: cover the top-users panel 7d9de7c fixed
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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f4d0c8bf05 |
auth: verify the hold before caching a captain record on the third path
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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5112425673 |
appview: make the footer Bluesky link configurable
The link was hardcoded before |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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17e25a4df2 |
appview: guard the tag-listing paging that gates a shared-record delete
The delete path decides whether an io.atcr.manifest record is still wanted by
enumerating the DID's tag records. That enumeration is load-bearing in a way a
tag listing usually is not: records for every one of a DID's repositories share
one collection, so a single page is a per-account budget rather than a per-repo
one. Past it a live tag falls off the end, the digest reads as unreferenced,
and the shared record is deleted out from under a repository nobody touched —
along with its layers on the hold.
Two cases, both mutation-verified:
* the tag that keeps the digest alive sits on page 3. Stopping after the
first page deletes the record. cleanupUntaggedManifest has carried this
hazard in a comment since
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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0b212a527f |
appview: guard the two UI delete paths against cross-repo destruction
Same defect as the OCI path, two more places. The io.atcr.manifest record is
keyed by digest alone, so one record backs every repository of a DID holding
identical content, and both of these deleted it without asking whether another
repository still wants it — then purged the layers on the hold.
DeleteManifestHandler already removes this repository's tags before deleting
the record, so a tag remaining at that point can only belong to another
repository. It now checks IsManifestTaggedAnyRepo there and keeps the shared
record when one does, reporting sharedRecordKept so the caller can tell the
difference between "deleted" and "deliberately left alone".
DeleteUntaggedManifestsHandler is the subtler one. Its digest list comes from
GetAllUntaggedManifestDigests, whose tag join is scoped to one repository
(m.repository = t.repository), so a digest tagged only in a DIFFERENT
repository is reported as untagged and swept. The query is a reasonable
per-repository view and a dangerous delete list; the guard goes at the delete,
not in the query, matching how DeleteTagHandler already works. Skips are
counted separately from failures, because a skip is the guard working and
folding it into "failed" would make a correct run look broken.
Both fail closed. Leaving a manifest behind is recoverable; deleting one
another repository is still serving is not.
The new db test pins both halves of the interaction: that the query really does
report a cross-repo-tagged digest as untagged, so a change there is noticed,
and that IsManifestTaggedAnyRepo answers DID-wide, which is the thing actually
standing between the sweep and another repo's live image.
DeleteTagHandler needed no change —
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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701c866723 |
appview: stop an OCI manifest delete destroying another repo's image
The io.atcr.manifest record is keyed by digest alone (digestToRKey), so one
record backs every repository of a DID holding identical content.
ManifestStore.Delete removed it unconditionally and then called
purgeDeletedManifest, which asks the hold to drop the layer records and free
the blobs. Deleting through one repository therefore stripped the manifest out
from under every other repository sharing that digest and took their bytes with
it — reachable from the public OCI API with `crane delete`, and not recoverable.
Reproduced end to end before fixing: push identical content to shared-a and
shared-b, delete shared-a by digest, and shared-b:v1 answers 404.
The codebase already had the right guard and the right policy written down.
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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ae1d7ba626 |
auth: test NarrowToPullOnly, the function that gates the anonymous path
NarrowToPullOnly had no test. IsPullOnlyScope has a thorough one, but it only answers yes/no — NarrowToPullOnly rewrites the access list, so what it emits is what gets signed, and anonymous tokens skip the authgate entirely. Nothing downstream re-authorizes what this function decides to hand out. The load-bearing property is the allowlist: "pull" is the only action that can survive. Beyond the per-case assertions, every case re-checks that no other action reached the output, so a new case cannot accidentally assert its way past the property the function exists to hold. The wildcard cases are the point. A wildcard action means "any action" to distribution's actionSet.contains, so expanding "*" into "pull" is the single rewrite that would turn a wildcard request into a grant. Mutation-verified: * treat "*" as pull -> the three wildcard cases fail * stop narrowing the actions -> the four narrowing cases fail * trim the action slice in place -> DoesNotMutateInput fails That last one initially did NOT fail, and the fixture is why. The input had "pull" first, so an in-place trim writing "pull" into index 0 changed nothing observable and the test passed against the exact defect it was written for. "pull" is now deliberately not first, with a comment saying so, because the ordering is the whole instrument here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SeaUS5AFPX9gqCahoLRMRh |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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915d9adcb2 |
test/e2e: cover the /auth/token surface, and correct 9d4ad84's provenance
batch09-token.sh drives the request shapes against a running stack, which is where the interesting part of |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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85a07d660a |
appview: give the O(n) bcrypt scan a guard that can actually fail
TestDeviceStore_ValidateDoesNotScanIndexedRows is documented as "the
regression guard for the O(n) bcrypt scan", but it does not observe whether a
scan happened. It asserts that every row is indexed and that an unknown secret
errors, and both hold with or without the fix. Deleting the
`WHERE secret_lookup IS NULL` filter from the fallback query — which is the
defect
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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ce01e47ba6 |
auth: cover the two batch-09 commits that shipped without tests
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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2984331f0c |
hold/gc: test the blob sweep, and give the S3 mock object ages
deleteOrphanedBlobs is the only part of GC that removes bytes and it had no test. It could not have had one: object age decides whether a blob is deletable, the in-process harness stamps every object with time.Now(), and MockS3Client's ListObjectsV2 set no LastModified at all. Neither could express "this blob is nine days old", so both halves of the grace rule went unexercised — including the half that protects a push still in flight. MockS3Client gains ObjectTimes, a per-key LastModified consulted by ListObjectsV2. Keys with no entry list without a timestamp exactly as before, so existing tests are unaffected. It also gains DeleteObjectError, matching the error injection the other operations already had. Four cases, three of which are reasons NOT to delete: an old unreferenced blob goes; a young unreferenced blob stays; a referenced old blob stays; a /link object is never treated as a blob. Plus a failure case pinning that one undeletable object does not abort the walk, and that a blob which never left storage is not counted as deleted or reported as reclaimed space. Verified by mutation. Disabling the grace check deletes the young blob; disabling the referenced check deletes the live one; both fail. Disabling the /data suffix check changes nothing, because extractDigestFromPath anchors on /data$ and rejects everything else — so that check is a redundant early-out rather than a guard, and the test says so rather than implying otherwise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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4542897f08 |
hold/gc: escape the DID in listRecords/getRecord repo parameters
fetchUserManifestsFromEndpoint, fetchUserTags and fetchUserProfile
interpolated the user DID straight into a query string. A did:web carrying a
port spells that port as a literal %3A, so the PDS received the parameter
decoded back to ":" — a different DID, matching no repo. listRecords then
answers 200 with an empty list and GC reads it as "this user has no
manifests": every blob they own drops out of the referenced set and is
deleted once past the seven-day blob grace.
There is no error and no status code to notice, which is the same soft
failure
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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891ad01de3 |
hold/gc: require a predecessor's successor to name this hold
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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48eee49ef9 |
hold/gc: cover checkPredecessorAt and the unresolved-holds reset
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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bb45a80d51 |
hold/pds: cover the scanner-disconnect teardown 05b856b fixed
newTestScanBroadcaster builds the struct with only a database, so nothing in
the suite ever reached handleWriter, handleReader, or the Unsubscribe teardown
they share — which is precisely what
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
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8cd59a61f1 |
appview: stop a UI session outliving the OAuth session behind it
Only one oauth_sessions row is kept per account, so signing in again — on a
second device, or simply a second time — replaces it and leaves every earlier
ui_sessions row pointing at an oauth_session_id that no longer exists. Get
checked only expiry, so those still read back as usable.
Found on a live appview: four ui_sessions rows, three orphaned, and requesting
/settings/user with an orphaned cookie returned 200 with the account's handle
rendered throughout, where an anonymous request gets a 302. The browser looks
signed in while the credential behind it is gone, so every PDS-backed action
fails against a UI insisting the session is fine. It now fails closed and sends
the user back through login.
Get also never checked ownership. oauth_sessions is unique on
(account_did, session_id), so the existence check is scoped by both; matching
session_id alone would let one account's live OAuth session validate another
account's dangling reference. That has its own test.
An empty oauth_session_id stays valid, since Create makes sessions that never
had one, and a test pins that so the check cannot start rejecting them.
TestSessionStore_CreateWithOAuth referenced an OAuth session it never inserted,
which is an orphan by definition, so it now creates the row. Its intent was
that CreateWithOAuth persists the ID; it relied on the orphan behaviour only
incidentally. Its not-found branch used t.Error and then dereferenced the nil
session, so that is now t.Fatal.
Pre-existing at
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Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5
|
c9f8b4178c |
credhelper: stop dev builds nagging about an update to themselves
isNewerVersion split versions on "." and ran each component through
strconv.Atoi, discarding the error and substituting 0. For a git-describe
build the last component is "4-18-g8f70cce", which does not parse, so it
became 0 and every published release compared as newer. Running
v0.1.4-18-g8f70cce printed "Update available: v0.1.4" on every single
invocation, naming a version the binary was already 18 commits past.
Versions are now parsed properly: the "-<commits>-g<sha>" tail is recognised
and kept as a count of commits past the tag, and a version that cannot be
read in full returns false rather than being silently treated as 0. That
second part is the actual root cause — the comparison could not distinguish
"this component is zero" from "I could not read this component".
Ordering for a git-describe build is deliberately not semver, where a
prerelease sorts below its release. Such a build is commits AHEAD of its tag,
so v0.1.4-18-g8f70cce is newer than v0.1.4 and older than v0.1.4-20-gabc1234.
The function had no tests. Both failing cases are pinned along with the
ordinary release comparisons, so the git-describe handling cannot regress the
normal upgrade path.
Pre-existing at
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