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Follow-up to37bab32. That commit stopped deleting OAuth sessions on transient errors, which fixed spurious sign-outs but overshot on one path: a genuinely dead session stopped being evicted at all, turning a forced re-login into a permanent failure loop. GetOrFetchServiceToken flattened every non-200 from getServiceAuth into fmt.Errorf("service auth failed with status %d: %s"). IsSessionInvalidError then had nothing structured to inspect, and its string fallback could not help: it looks for the OAuth 2.0 code invalid_token, while atproto emits the XRPC name InvalidToken. The difference is the underscore, not the case, so lowercasing never bridged it. A revoked session came back 401 InvalidToken and was classified transient, so /auth/token returned 503 forever and the user was never prompted to re-authenticate. The non-200 branch now wraps an *atclient.APIError carrying the status and the parsed atproto error name, which is what the existing structured checks in IsSessionInvalidError already know how to read. Transient shapes stay transient: atprotoErrorName returns "" for a non-JSON body, so 500s with HTML, 502s, and 429s do not evict. ExpiredToken is deliberately not treated as a dead session. It means "refresh me", and deleting on it would sign the user out of every UI session over an ordinary access-token expiry a refresh would have fixed. isAuthError omits it for the same reason; the two classifiers have to agree about the same condition. The comment on the string fallback claimed it was a looser spelling of the structured check. It is not — it handles a different error family. indigo's RefreshTokens returns OAuth token-endpoint failures as a bare fmt.Errorf carrying the auth server's snake_case code verbatim ("token refresh failed (HTTP 400): invalid_grant"), never a typed error, so a string match is the only thing that can classify a refresh failure, which is the invalid_grant replay case37bab32exists to detect. Both comments now say which family they cover. Two hardening items on the same theme: use_dpop_nonce no longer counts as an auth error in the appview's isOAuthError. It is a routine handshake step indigo retries with the server-supplied nonce, and treating it as fatal signed users out over ordinary nonce rotation. It can still escape when a server sends that error with no DPoP-Nonce header, leaving indigo nothing to retry with; a stuck session there is preferable to signing everyone out in the common case, and the comment says so rather than claiming it cannot happen. Detached session deletes are bounded by SessionDeleteTimeout. They run on context.WithoutCancel so a canceled request cannot leave the cleanup half-done, which also stripped the only deadline they had — a wedged database write blocked the goroutine with no way to shed it. Matches the bound already on the detached persist callback. The unparseable-token-endpoint warning is now deduped per endpoint rather than once per process, since that path fails open by returning the client unwrapped, silently reinstating the refresh burn. The refreshDetachTimeout comment now notes the cap is per-POST: the DPoP-nonce retry means one refresh can issue two, holding the per-DID lock for up to twice the stated value. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
119 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
119 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
package oauth
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import (
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"context"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// refreshDetachTimeout bounds a detached token-refresh POST. Refreshes are
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// normally sub-second; this only exists so a hung auth server can't pin the
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// per-DID session lock forever.
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//
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// Note this is per-POST, not per-refresh: indigo's postToAuthServer retries once
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// on a use_dpop_nonce challenge, so a single refresh can issue two detached
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// POSTs and hold the per-DID lock for up to 2x this value. Keep that product
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// comfortably under the callers' own deadlines (Docker gives up on /auth/token
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// well before it).
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const refreshDetachTimeout = 30 * time.Second
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// badTokenEndpointOnce dedupes the "couldn't parse the token endpoint" warning
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// per endpoint value rather than once per process. That path fails open — it
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// returns the client unwrapped, silently reinstating the refresh-burn bug this
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// file exists to fix — so it must stay visible for every distinct auth server
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// it affects, not just the first one after boot.
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var badTokenEndpointOnce sync.Map
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// refreshDetachTransport detaches the request context for OAuth token-refresh
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// POSTs. A refresh is non-idempotent: the auth server rotates the refresh
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// token as soon as it processes the request, whether or not we stick around
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// for the response. If the inbound request context is canceled mid-refresh
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// (e.g. Docker gives up on a slow /auth/token), aborting the POST strands the
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// rotated token server-side; our stored refresh token is then already
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// consumed, the next refresh fails with invalid_grant "Refresh token
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// replayed", and the whole session gets deleted. Once a refresh starts it
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// must run to completion, capped by its own timeout (same rationale as the
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// upload finalization in pkg/hold/oci/xrpc.go).
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//
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// Only POSTs to the session's auth-server token endpoint are detached; every
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// other request keeps normal cancellation semantics.
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type refreshDetachTransport struct {
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base http.RoundTripper
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tokenEndpoint *url.URL
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timeout time.Duration
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}
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func (t *refreshDetachTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
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if req.Method != http.MethodPost || !sameEndpoint(req.URL, t.tokenEndpoint) {
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return t.base.RoundTrip(req)
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}
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// context.WithoutCancel keeps values (trace/log metadata) but drops
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// cancellation and deadline. The cancel func must outlive RoundTrip: the
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// body is read by the caller, so it is released on Body.Close() instead
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// of a defer here.
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(req.Context()), t.timeout)
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resp, err := t.base.RoundTrip(req.Clone(ctx))
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if err != nil {
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cancel()
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return nil, err
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}
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resp.Body = &cancelOnClose{ReadCloser: resp.Body, cancel: cancel}
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return resp, nil
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}
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// cancelOnClose ties a context.CancelFunc to response-body Close so the
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// detached timeout context stays alive for the full body read.
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type cancelOnClose struct {
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io.ReadCloser
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cancel context.CancelFunc
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}
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func (c *cancelOnClose) Close() error {
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c.cancel()
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return c.ReadCloser.Close()
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}
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// newRefreshDetachClient wraps inner so that token-refresh POSTs to
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// tokenEndpoint survive cancellation of the inbound request context. If the
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// endpoint can't be parsed (corrupt session data), the client is returned
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// unwrapped, preserving the old behavior.
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func newRefreshDetachClient(inner *http.Client, tokenEndpoint string) *http.Client {
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endpoint, err := url.Parse(tokenEndpoint)
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if err != nil || endpoint.Host == "" {
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if _, seen := badTokenEndpointOnce.LoadOrStore(tokenEndpoint, struct{}{}); !seen {
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slog.Warn("Not detaching token-refresh context: unparseable auth server token endpoint",
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"component", "oauth/refresher",
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"tokenEndpoint", tokenEndpoint,
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"error", err)
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}
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return inner
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}
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if inner == nil {
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inner = http.DefaultClient
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}
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base := inner.Transport
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if base == nil {
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base = http.DefaultTransport
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}
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wrapped := *inner // shallow copy: keep Jar, Timeout, redirect policy
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wrapped.Transport = &refreshDetachTransport{base: base, tokenEndpoint: endpoint, timeout: refreshDetachTimeout}
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return &wrapped
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}
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// sameEndpoint reports whether two URLs address the same endpoint, comparing
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// scheme, host, and path rather than raw strings so that canonicalization
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// differences (default ports, escaping) don't cause a miss.
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func sameEndpoint(a, b *url.URL) bool {
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if a == nil || b == nil {
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return false
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}
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return a.Scheme == b.Scheme && a.Host == b.Host && a.Path == b.Path
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}
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