Files
at-container-registry/pkg/auth/token/claims.go
T
Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5 5aa13abdc2 auth: make anonymous pull work, and let the hold decide it
a7569a7 added credential-less pulls of public images. Three things about it
were wrong, all of them in how the appview handled the decision that belongs
to the hold.

**Scope handling was all-or-nothing.** IsPullOnlyScope required every
requested action to already be "pull", but clients routinely ask for more
than the operation needs — pull,push is common for a plain read, and some
ask for pull,push,delete up front. Those were rejected and challenged,
leaving a credential-less client no way to pull even a public image, which
is the entire feature. NarrowToPullOnly drops the write actions and issues a
token carrying "pull" and nothing else. Granting a subset is what the
distribution token spec expects. The allowlist property is preserved: "pull"
is the only action that survives, and "*" is deliberately not expanded into
it, since a wildcard request is not evidence the caller wants a read.

**The appview-side read gate was inert.** checkReadAccess passed p.ctx.DID,
the DID of the repository *owner*, not the requester. Any non-empty DID
satisfies a private hold's check, and the owner's is never empty, so it asked
"may the owner read their own hold", answered yes, and admitted everyone.
Worse, CheckReadAccessWithCaptain admitted any authenticated DID to a private
hold at all, on an explicitly-MVP assumption that holding a DID was close
enough to being a sailor. Every doc says otherwise (docs/hold.md:109 "Crew
with blob:read", CLAUDE.md:140, docs/BYOS.md:280) and so does the hold
(ValidateBlobReadAccess: owner, or crew carrying blob:read/blob:write). It
now takes isCrew and requires owner-or-crew, and callers only pay for the
crew lookup when it can change the answer — a public hold or an anonymous
caller is decided by the captain record alone. Nothing here loosens access;
it brings the local gate into agreement with the authority.

**Denials could not reach the client.** distribution's blobHandler.GetBlob
maps everything except ErrBlobUnknown to ErrorCodeUnknown, so a 401 raised
in the blob store left as a 500 — misreporting an auth failure as a server
fault, and giving BearerChallenge no 401 to attach WWW-Authenticate to, so
Docker was told "server error" instead of being prompted for credentials.
Clients that retry 5xx looped: 4.1s per case in the matrix, now 0.01s. The
check moves to Repository(), where an errcode.Error is passed through
verbatim by the registry app — the same mechanism a7569a7 used for
NAME_UNKNOWN. It fails open on a lookup error, since the hold is the
authority and a transient failure should not break public pulls.

Removes auth.allow_anonymous_pull. It could only ever withhold — captain.Public
is what grants — so it was a second flag for a decision the hold already owns,
and gating it appview-side was never the intent. Layer bytes 307 straight to
S3, so the appview is not even in the path whose cost might have justified an
operator-side lever.

Tests: TestAuthMatrix only ever ran against a public hold, and its pull cases
never fetched a layer — crane.Pull is lazy and img.Digest() needs only the
manifest, which ATCR serves from the user's PDS where it is world-readable, so
no pull row in the matrix touched blob authorization at all. Pulls now
materialize layer bytes, and testharness.WithPrivateHold plus
TestAuthMatrixPrivateHold cover public:false + allow_all_crew:true — the
production shape, where anyone with an account pulls and pushes and anonymous
gets nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 21:43:32 -05:00

178 lines
6.4 KiB
Go

// Package token provides JWT claims and token handling for registry authentication.
package token
import (
"slices"
"time"
"atcr.io/pkg/auth"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
)
// Auth method constants
const (
AuthMethodOAuth = "oauth"
AuthMethodAppPassword = "app_password"
// AuthMethodAnonymous marks a token issued without credentials for a
// pull-only scope. Such tokens carry an empty Subject (no puller DID); the
// destination hold decides whether anonymous reads are allowed (captain.Public).
AuthMethodAnonymous = "anonymous"
)
// Claims represents the JWT claims for registry authentication
// This follows the Docker Registry token specification
type Claims struct {
jwt.RegisteredClaims
Access []auth.AccessEntry `json:"access,omitempty"`
AuthMethod string `json:"auth_method,omitempty"` // "oauth" or "app_password"
}
// NewClaims creates a new Claims structure with standard fields
func NewClaims(subject, issuer, audience string, expiration time.Duration, access []auth.AccessEntry, authMethod string) *Claims {
now := time.Now()
return &Claims{
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Subject: subject, // User's DID
Issuer: issuer, // "atcr.io"
Audience: jwt.ClaimStrings{audience}, // Service name
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(expiration)),
},
Access: access,
AuthMethod: authMethod, // "oauth" or "app_password"
}
}
// ExtractAuthMethod parses a JWT token string and extracts the auth_method claim
// Returns the auth method or empty string if not found or token is invalid
// This does NOT validate the token - it only parses it to extract the claim
func ExtractAuthMethod(tokenString string) string {
// Parse token without validation (we only need the claims, validation is done by distribution library)
parser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
token, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(tokenString, &Claims{})
if err != nil {
return "" // Invalid token format
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
if !ok {
return "" // Wrong claims type
}
return claims.AuthMethod
}
// ExtractAccess parses a JWT token string and extracts the access entries (scopes)
// Returns nil if not found or token is invalid
// This does NOT validate the token - it only parses it to extract the claim
func ExtractAccess(tokenString string) []auth.AccessEntry {
parser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
token, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(tokenString, &Claims{})
if err != nil {
return nil
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
if !ok {
return nil
}
return claims.Access
}
// HasPushScope checks if any access entry contains a "push" action
func HasPushScope(access []auth.AccessEntry) bool {
for _, entry := range access {
if slices.Contains(entry.Actions, "push") {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// IsPullOnlyScope reports whether the requested access is safe to grant without
// credentials. This is the gate for anonymous token issuance, so it allowlists:
// every requested action must be exactly "pull". Empty access (the /v2/ ping)
// and an entry with no actions are both fine.
//
// It must not be written as a denylist of "push"/"delete". Distribution's
// actionSet.contains returns true for ANY action when the set holds "*"
// (registry/auth/token/util.go), so a scope of `repository:victim/img:*` names
// neither string yet authorizes push and delete. Denylisting would hand an
// unauthenticated caller a token that clears the whole appview authorization
// layer — the authgate is deliberately skipped for anonymous tokens.
func IsPullOnlyScope(access []auth.AccessEntry) bool {
for _, entry := range access {
for _, action := range entry.Actions {
if action != "pull" {
return false
}
}
}
return true
}
// NarrowToPullOnly returns a copy of access holding only the "pull" action, and
// reports whether the result is worth issuing a token for.
//
// Clients routinely request more than they need for the operation in hand —
// `repository:x:pull,push` for a plain pull is common, and some request
// pull,push,delete up front — so an all-or-nothing IsPullOnlyScope test rejects
// the request, challenges, and leaves a credential-less client with no way
// forward even for a public image. Granting a subset is the behavior the
// distribution token spec expects: the server issues what it is willing to
// authorize and the client proceeds with that.
//
// The allowlist property from IsPullOnlyScope is preserved exactly: "pull" is
// the only action that survives, so nothing here can emit a token carrying
// push, delete, or "*". An entry left with no actions is dropped rather than
// emitted empty, since distribution treats an empty action set as granting
// nothing and it only adds noise to the token.
//
// "*" is deliberately NOT expanded into "pull". Rewriting it would be safe in
// the narrow sense (the issued token would name only "pull"), but a wildcard
// request is not evidence the caller wants a read, and refusing it keeps the
// anonymous path free of any case where a wildcard turns into a grant.
func NarrowToPullOnly(access []auth.AccessEntry) ([]auth.AccessEntry, bool) {
narrowed := make([]auth.AccessEntry, 0, len(access))
grantable := false
for _, entry := range access {
if len(entry.Actions) == 0 {
// No actions requested (the /v2/ ping shape). Preserve it as-is:
// it grants nothing and callers rely on the entry surviving.
narrowed = append(narrowed, entry)
continue
}
if !slices.Contains(entry.Actions, "pull") {
continue
}
pullOnly := entry
pullOnly.Actions = []string{"pull"}
narrowed = append(narrowed, pullOnly)
grantable = true
}
return narrowed, grantable || len(access) == 0
}
// ExtractSubject parses a JWT token string and extracts the Subject claim (the user's DID)
// Returns the subject or empty string if not found or token is invalid
// This does NOT validate the token - it only parses it to extract the claim
func ExtractSubject(tokenString string) string {
// Parse token without validation (we only need the claims, validation is done by distribution library)
parser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
token, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(tokenString, &Claims{})
if err != nil {
return "" // Invalid token format
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
if !ok {
return "" // Wrong claims type
}
return claims.Subject
}