Since toleration seconds can be empty, we were forcing it to be an integer defaulting to 0 which
was creating a toleration with value 0 when value should have been nil.
This PR adds the following features:
- Allow user to provide its own keypair certificates for enable TLS in
MinIO
- Allow user to configure data encryption at rest in MinIO with KES
- Removes JWT schema for login and instead Console authentication will use
encrypted session tokens
Enable TLS between client and MinIO with user provided certificates
Instead of using AutoCert feature now the user can provide `cert` and
`key` via `tls` object, values must be valid `x509.Certificate`
formatted files encoded in `base64`
Enable encryption at rest configuring KES
User can deploy KES via Console/Operator by defining the encryption
object, AutoCert must be enabled or custom certificates for KES must be
provided, KES support 3 KMS backends: `Vault`, `AWS KMS` and `Gemalto`,
previous configuration of the KMS is necessary.
eg of body request for create-tenant
```
{
"name": "honeywell",
"access_key": "minio",
"secret_key": "minio123",
"enable_mcs": false,
"enable_ssl": false,
"service_name": "honeywell",
"zones": [
{
"name": "honeywell-zone-1",
"servers": 1,
"volumes_per_server": 4,
"volume_configuration": {
"size": 256000000,
"storage_class": "vsan-default-storage-policy"
}
}
],
"namespace": "default",
"tls": {
"tls.crt": "",
"tls.key": ""
},
"encryption": {
"server": {
"tls.crt": "",
"tls.key": ""
},
"client": {
"tls.crt": "",
"tls.key": ""
},
"vault": {
"endpoint": "http://vault:8200",
"prefix": "",
"approle": {
"id": "",
"secret": ""
}
}
}
}
```
Whe Console is configured, we auto generate credentials for Console and store them in a secret but we need to return them to the user so he knows what credentials he/she can use to log in to console.
Previously every Handler function was receiving the session token in the
form of a jwt string, in consequence every time we want to access the
encrypted claims of the jwt we needed to run a decryption process,
additionally we were decrypting the jwt twice, first at the session
validation then inside each handler function, this was also causing a
lot of using related to the merge between m3 and mcs
What changed:
Now we validate and decrypt the jwt once in `configure_mcs.go`, this
works for both, mcs (console) and operator sessions, and then pass the
decrypted claims to all the functions that need it, so no further token
validation or decryption is need it.
`MCS` will authenticate against `Mkube`using bearer tokens via HTTP
`Authorization` header. The user will provide this token once
in the login form, MCS will validate it against Mkube (list tenants) and
if valid will generate and return a new MCS sessions
with encrypted claims (the user Service account token will be inside the
JWT in the data field)
Kubernetes
The provided `JWT token` corresponds to the `Kubernetes service account`
that `Mkube` will use to run tasks on behalf of the
user, ie: list, create, edit, delete tenants, storage class, etc.
Development
If you are running mcs in your local environment and wish to make
request to `Mkube` you can set `MCS_M3_HOSTNAME`, if
the environment variable is not present by default `MCS` will use
`"http://m3:8787"`, additionally you will need to set the
`MCS_MKUBE_ADMIN_ONLY=on` variable to make MCS display the Mkube UI
Extract the Service account token and use it with MCS
For local development you can use the jwt associated to the `m3-sa`
service account, you can get the token running
the following command in your terminal:
```
kubectl get secret $(kubectl get serviceaccount m3-sa -o
jsonpath="{.secrets[0].name}") -o jsonpath="{.data.token}" | base64
--decode
```
Then run the mcs server
```
MCS_M3_HOSTNAME=http://localhost:8787 MCS_MKUBE_ADMIN_ONLY=on ./mcs
server
```
Self-signed certificates and Custom certificate authority for Mkube
If Mkube uses TLS with a self-signed certificate, or a certificate
issued by a custom certificate authority you can add those
certificates usinng the `MCS_M3_SERVER_TLS_CA_CERTIFICATE` env variable
````
MCS_M3_SERVER_TLS_CA_CERTIFICATE=cert1.pem,cert2.pem,cert3.pem ./mcs
server
````
Remove ping check and instead use a context that will be canceled
if it the client sends a close message or an error occurs on reading.
The context will be used to cancel all functions using it.
This PR sets the initial version of the ACL for mcs, the idea behind
this is to start using the principle of least privileges when assigning
policies to users when creating users through mcs, currently mcsAdmin policy uses admin:*
and s3:* and by default a user with that policy will have access to everything, if want to limit
that we can create a policy with least privileges.
We need to start validating explicitly if users has acccess to an
specific endpoint based on IAM policy actions.
In this first version every endpoint (you can see it as a page to),
defines a set of well defined admin/s3 actions to work properly, ie:
```
// corresponds to /groups endpoint used by the groups page
var groupsActionSet = iampolicy.NewActionSet(
iampolicy.ListGroupsAdminAction,
iampolicy.AddUserToGroupAdminAction,
//iampolicy.GetGroupAdminAction,
iampolicy.EnableGroupAdminAction,
iampolicy.DisableGroupAdminAction,
)
// corresponds to /policies endpoint used by the policies page
var iamPoliciesActionSet = iampolicy.NewActionSet(
iampolicy.GetPolicyAdminAction,
iampolicy.DeletePolicyAdminAction,
iampolicy.CreatePolicyAdminAction,
iampolicy.AttachPolicyAdminAction,
iampolicy.ListUserPoliciesAdminAction,
)
```
With that said, for this initial version, now the sessions endpoint will
return a list of authorized pages to be render on the UI, on subsequent
prs we will add this verification of authorization via a server
middleware.
