* feat: add configurable SMTP HELO hostname
Allow the SMTP HELO/EHLO hostname to be configured separately from
the SMTP server hostname.
This is useful when the SMTP server requires clients to identify
themselves with a fully qualified hostname different from the server
address.
* chore: remove vendored dependency changes
* Bump go-pkgz/notify to v1.4.0 and document SMTP_HELO_HOST
The HELOHost field lands in go-pkgz/notify v1.4.0, so the branch needs the
bump to compile; v1.3.0 in master has no such field. The example module is
tidied alongside, as any change to backend/go.mod requires.
Documents the parameter in the parameters table and, separately, in the email
setup page: what it does, that leaving it unset keeps the previous `localhost`
greeting, and the case it exists for, a relay refusing the greeting under
Postfix `reject_non_fqdn_helo_hostname`.
Also records the current limit: verification emails for email authentication
go through go-pkgz/auth's own sender, which has no equivalent setting, so the
greeting there is unchanged.
* Bump go-pkgz/auth to v2.2.0 and apply SMTP_HELO_HOST to verification email
The verification email sender had no way to set the greeting, so a relay that
refuses the HELO would accept notifications and still reject sign-in emails.
EmailParams gains HELOHost in go-pkgz/auth v2.2.0, so the same SMTP_HELO_HOST
now drives both paths.
The example module is tidied alongside, as any change to backend/go.mod
requires.
---------
Co-authored-by: oli <someone@somewhere.tld>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Verkhoturov <paskal.07@gmail.com>
Bumps go-pkgz/auth to v2.1.5, which adds avatar.ErrNotFound. deleteMeRequestCtrl's
avatar removal was best-effort (log and continue on any error) because before the
sentinel there was no portable way to tell an already-removed avatar from a genuine
failure. It now tolerates only errors.Is(err, avatar.ErrNotFound) - keeping the
repeated-request idempotency - and surfaces any other store failure as 500.
* fix(auth): close OAuth open-redirect by wiring AllowedRedirectHosts
Bump go-pkgz/auth/v2 to master (v2.1.2-0.20260421203319-686683f19cf7)
which carries the `from` redirect validator from go-pkgz/auth#275.
The library default with a nil AllowedRedirectHosts is permissive
(preserves legacy behavior for existing consumers on a dep bump), so
just bumping the dep leaves remark42 vulnerable — a crafted
/auth/<provider>/login?from=https://evil.example.com/... still issues
the 307 to the attacker host after the user completes legitimate
OAuth. Verified end-to-end against a local dev-auth instance before
and after this commit.
Wire Opts.AllowedRedirectHosts in getAuthenticator to the operator's
existing --allowed-hosts config, stripping the CSP "self" sentinel
which is not a real hostname. RemarkURL's own host is always implicit
per the library contract, so a default single-site deployment gains
the protection with no config change. Multi-host embeds work as soon
as their embedding hosts are added to AllowedHosts (they already need
to be there for CSP frame-ancestors).
Refreshed vendor tree to match the new module version.
* chore(lint): suppress G703 false positives on image Save
CI's newer gosec flags os.MkdirAll/os.WriteFile in FileSystem.Save with
G703 because id flows in from the caller. id is validated at the HTTP
layer (safePictureSegment in rest_public.go) and dst is derived via
f.location — not a real traversal. Targeted //nolint with reason.
* fix(auth): normalise AllowedRedirectHosts entries + add unit test
Address Copilot review on PR #2049. The previous closure passed raw
s.AllowedHosts entries straight to the auth library, but --allowed-hosts
holds CSP frame-ancestors source expressions: scheme-prefixed values
(https://blog.example.com), entries with ports, and wildcards
(*.cdn.example.com) are all valid there but the auth library compares
against u.Hostname() and would silently drop them — breaking legitimate
redirects on multi-host deployments.
Extract getAllowedRedirectHosts that:
* trims whitespace, drops empty / 'self' / "self" / wildcard entries
* prepends https:// if scheme missing then url.Parse to extract Hostname
* logs a warning on parse failure rather than poisoning the allowlist
Wire the closure in getAuthenticator to call the helper.
Test_getAllowedRedirectHosts covers all the edge cases Copilot flagged
(scheme stripping, port handling, self spellings, wildcards, empty,
mixed real-world).
* fix(auth): preserve explicit port in AllowedRedirectHosts + clarify fs_store nolint
Address Copilot follow-up on PR #2049:
* getAllowedRedirectHosts stripped explicit ports via u.Hostname(), which
broadened the allowlist. The auth validator checks both Hostname() and
Host, so an entry like admin.example.com:8443 can and should be kept
host:port — allowing only that port, not any. Emit u.Host when
u.Port() != "", u.Hostname() otherwise. Updated tests.
* fs_store Save nolint rationale said "id validated at HTTP layer", but
Save is reached via image.Service.Save and SaveWithID (cache), neither
of which is HTTP validation. id is actually a server-generated hash in
both paths. Updated the comment.
Add AUTH_MICROSOFT_TENANT env var to allow configuring the Azure AD
tenant for single-tenant Entra ID applications, which cannot use the
default /common endpoint.
Depends on go-pkgz/auth#266
Closes#1998
