Backend (backend/go.mod): - github.com/go-pkgz/auth/v2 v2.1.2 → v2.1.4 - github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.5 → v1.18.6 - github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.18.0 → v9.19.0 - github.com/slack-go/slack v0.21.1 → v0.23.1 - golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0 → v0.51.0 - golang.org/x/image v0.39.0 → v0.40.0 - golang.org/x/net v0.53.0 → v0.54.0 - golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0 → v0.44.0 - golang.org/x/text v0.36.0 → v0.37.0 Example (backend/_example/memory_store/go.mod): - golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0 → v0.51.0 - golang.org/x/image v0.39.0 → v0.40.0 - golang.org/x/net v0.53.0 → v0.54.0 - golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0 → v0.44.0 Transitive cleanup: github.com/dgryski/go-rendezvous is no longer required after redis/go-redis bump and gets pruned by `go mod tidy`. `go mod tidy` + `go mod vendor` run on both modules. Both build with -race and full test suites pass.
113 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
113 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
package slack
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// Signature headers
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const (
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hSignature = "X-Slack-Signature"
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hTimestamp = "X-Slack-Request-Timestamp"
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)
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// SecretsVerifier contains the information needed to verify that the request comes from Slack
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type SecretsVerifier struct {
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d Debug
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signature []byte
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hmac hash.Hash
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}
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func unsafeSignatureVerifier(header http.Header, secret string) (_ SecretsVerifier, err error) {
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var (
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bsignature []byte
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)
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if secret == "" {
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return SecretsVerifier{}, ErrInvalidConfiguration
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}
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signature := header.Get(hSignature)
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stimestamp := header.Get(hTimestamp)
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if signature == "" || stimestamp == "" {
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return SecretsVerifier{}, ErrMissingHeaders
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}
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if bsignature, err = hex.DecodeString(strings.TrimPrefix(signature, "v0=")); err != nil {
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return SecretsVerifier{}, err
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}
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hash := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret))
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if _, err = fmt.Fprintf(hash, "v0:%s:", stimestamp); err != nil {
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return SecretsVerifier{}, err
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}
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return SecretsVerifier{
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signature: bsignature,
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hmac: hash,
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}, nil
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}
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// NewSecretsVerifier returns a SecretsVerifier object in exchange for an http.Header object and signing secret
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func NewSecretsVerifier(header http.Header, secret string) (sv SecretsVerifier, err error) {
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var (
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timestamp int64
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)
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stimestamp := header.Get(hTimestamp)
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if sv, err = unsafeSignatureVerifier(header, secret); err != nil {
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return SecretsVerifier{}, err
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}
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if timestamp, err = strconv.ParseInt(stimestamp, 10, 64); err != nil {
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return SecretsVerifier{}, err
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}
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diff := absDuration(time.Since(time.Unix(timestamp, 0)))
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if diff > 5*time.Minute {
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return SecretsVerifier{}, ErrExpiredTimestamp
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}
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return sv, err
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}
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func (v *SecretsVerifier) WithDebug(d Debug) *SecretsVerifier {
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v.d = d
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return v
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}
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func (v *SecretsVerifier) Write(body []byte) (n int, err error) {
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return v.hmac.Write(body)
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}
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// Ensure compares the signature sent from Slack with the actual computed hash to judge validity
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func (v SecretsVerifier) Ensure() error {
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computed := v.hmac.Sum(nil)
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// use hmac.Equal prevent leaking timing information.
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if hmac.Equal(computed, v.signature) {
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return nil
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}
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if v.d != nil && v.d.Debug() {
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v.d.Debugln(fmt.Sprintf("Expected signing signature: %s, but computed: %s", hex.EncodeToString(v.signature), hex.EncodeToString(computed)))
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("computed unexpected signature of: %s", hex.EncodeToString(computed))
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}
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func abs64(n int64) int64 {
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y := n >> 63
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return (n ^ y) - y
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}
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func absDuration(n time.Duration) time.Duration {
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return time.Duration(abs64(int64(n)))
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}
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