* fix(security): reject non-image content-types in image proxy and /picture/ to prevent stored XSS
The /api/v1/img proxy and /api/v1/picture/{user}/{id} endpoints emitted
http.DetectContentType on the served bytes as the response Content-Type. A
controlled upstream serving Content-Type: image/png with an HTML body passed
the upstream check (only the response header was inspected, not the body),
and the body bytes then sniffed back to text/html — so the proxy served the
attacker's HTML from the remark42 origin. Browsers honoured the declared
text/html and executed the response as a document with access to cookies and
CSRF tokens. Affected from v1.6.0 (April 2020) through v1.15.0; verified live
via published docker images.
Layered defense applied to both handlers:
- rest.SafeImgContentType (in backend/app/rest/) validates sniffed content
against a strict allowlist: image/png, image/jpeg, image/gif, image/webp,
image/bmp, image/x-icon. Anything else (HTML, XML, SVG, plain text,
octet-stream, or any future image type the stdlib sniffer may learn) is
rejected with no body echo. SVG is implicitly excluded — it sniffs as
text/xml or text/plain, never image/svg+xml, and SVG can execute scripts
when navigated to top-level. The previous octet-stream → image/* fallback
is gone.
- Per-endpoint Content-Security-Policy override sets
"default-src 'none'; sandbox; frame-ancestors 'none'" on every response
(success, 304, or error). Sandbox neuters scripts even if Content-Type
ever regresses. The same policy is also applied to all /api/v1/* via
apiCSPMiddleware as defense-in-depth.
- Content-Disposition: inline; filename="image" frames the response as a
file rather than a renderable document.
- /picture/ rejection paths set Cache-Control: no-store so 4xx responses
are never cached.
The defense headers and the strict ETag matcher are extracted as
rest.SetImageDefenseHeaders and rest.EtagMatches in the shared rest package
(consumed by both proxy/image and api/rest_public — no package cycle).
The /api/v1/img path additionally bumps the ETag to a versioned `"v2:..."`
so revalidating clients (top-level navigation, Ctrl+R, intermediaries) get
a fresh 200 instead of a 304 against poisoned pre-fix cached HTML.
DELIBERATE TRADEOFF: Cache-Control on /api/v1/img success responses remains
max-age=2592000 (30 days), unchanged from before. An aggressive "force
revalidate on every reuse" policy was prototyped during review but reverted
because the perf cost (a server round-trip on every image view, even with
304 saving the body bytes) outweighed the corner-case mitigation. The
realistic exposure of cache carryover is narrow: cache carryover only
affects users who navigated top-level to an attacker URL pre-fix and still
have it in their local cache — the normal <img> embed path cached text/html
but never executed it. Local browser caches that hold pre-fix bytes
continue to serve them until their 30-day TTL expires or are evicted under
memory pressure. The ETag bump reaches all clients that DO revalidate
during the cached lifetime (Ctrl+R, intermediaries, post-expiry use); for
the rest, exposure self-limits via cache expiry. Operators running a
CDN/edge cache in front of remark42 should purge /api/v1/img after deploy.
The /api/v1/img handler short-circuits on a matching current-version
If-None-Match before any store Load or upstream fetch, returning a bodyless
304 with the defense headers set. Safe because the 304 carries no body and
the client's cached bytes came from a prior validated 200; an attacker
fabricating an etag value can only short-circuit fetches for URLs they
themselves crafted. This avoids upstream DoS amplification when clients
revalidate on hot comment pages.
The /api/v1/img route was moved from the "open routes" group (which uses
middleware.NoCache, stripping If-None-Match from incoming requests) to the
"open routes, cached" group alongside /picture/ and /qr/telegram so the
304 revalidation path is no longer broken upstream of the handler.
The /picture/{user}/{id} endpoint does not need the v2 etag prefix. Upload
validates input format via readAndValidateImage and the serve path
re-validates the stored bytes via rest.SafeImgContentType. Bytes within
the resize dimension limits are preserved verbatim, so the browser defense
relies on the response headers (validated Content-Type + nosniff + strict
CSP + Content-Disposition: inline), not on byte normalization.
Global CSP: font-src data: → font-src 'none'. Audit confirmed no @font-face,
no base64 fonts, no icon-font library in the bundle. Drops an unnecessary
attack surface; no behavioural change.
Tests: TestImage_ContentTypeHandling table-tests a real PNG and attack
shapes (HTML claimed as image/png, image/jpeg, image/gif, image/svg+xml,
image/webp; svg with onload; html fragment; polyglot PNG+HTML), proving
the defense holds across arbitrary upstream Content-Type variation.
Polyglot case is intentionally served as image/png — the browser cannot
execute the trailing HTML when the response type is image/png with nosniff.
TestImage_ContentTypeHandling_CacheHit exercises the cache-hit branch with
attacker bytes preloaded into the store. TestImage_PerRequestRevalidation
alternates upstream PNG/HTML across four proxy calls to prove no trust
accumulates between requests. TestImage_RoutesUsingCachedImage asserts
cache-poisoning is caught at serve time. TestImage_EtagVersioned asserts
the v2 prefix invalidates pre-fix etags AND that the revalidation 304
triggers no store Load. TestImage_RevalidationSkipsIO proves the
short-circuit works even with no upstream reachable. TestSafeImgContentType
covers the allowlist directly. TestRest_LoadPictureDefenseHeaders and
TestRest_LoadPictureRejectsNonImage exercise the /picture/ endpoint.
TestRest_apiCSP covers the strict CSP middleware on JSON API + RSS routes;
TestRest_securityHeaders confirms /web/ HTML pages keep the global CSP.
Verified end-to-end against the dev docker image: the original demo URL
(arbitrary HTML claimed as image/png) now returns 415 application/json with
CSP/nosniff/Content-Disposition set, no XSS in the browser.
* fix(security): set Cache-Control: no-store on image-proxy error paths, sync stale route comment
Addresses two review comments on #2067:
1. Cache-Control: max-age=2592000 and Etag were set before the
load/download/validation block, so 404/400/415 error responses inherited
the 30-day cache TTL and the versioned etag — a transient failure (or an
intentionally triggered 415) would be pinned in browser/intermediary
caches for that TTL, keeping users locked out even after the underlying
cause was resolved. Now: etag is computed but not set as a header until
after validation succeeds; error paths route through sendImageProxyError
which sets Cache-Control: no-store and never sets Etag. The 304
short-circuit still sets both because that path serves the same validated
content the client already has cached.
2. The comment at rest.go:282 still described the prototyped
no-cache/must-revalidate Cache-Control policy that was reverted before
the PR landed. Updated to match the actual 30-day max-age behavior.
Tests: TestImage_ContentTypeHandling now asserts reject paths carry
Cache-Control: no-store and have no Etag header, and accept paths carry
the max-age=2592000 + v2: etag.
428 lines
14 KiB
Go
428 lines
14 KiB
Go
// Package image handles storing, resizing and retrieval of images
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// Provides Store with Save and Load implementations on top of local file system and bolt db.
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// Service object encloses Store and add common methods, this is the one consumer should use.
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package image
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// NOTE: matryer/moq should be installed globally and works with `go generate ./...`
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//go:generate moq --out image_mock.go . Store
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/sha1" //nolint:gosec // not used for cryptography
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"image"
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_ "image/gif" // register gif decoder
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_ "image/jpeg" // register jpeg decoder
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"image/png"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"path"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"github.com/PuerkitoBio/goquery"
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log "github.com/go-pkgz/lgr"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
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"github.com/rs/xid"
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"golang.org/x/image/draw"
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_ "golang.org/x/image/webp" // register webp decoder so DecodeConfig accepts what readAndValidateImage allows
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)
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// Service wraps Store with common functions needed for any store implementation
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// It also provides async Submit with func param retrieving all submitting IDs.
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// Submitted IDs committed (i.e. moved from staging to final) on ServiceParams.EditDuration expiration.
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type Service struct {
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ServiceParams
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store Store
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wg sync.WaitGroup
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submitCh chan submitReq
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once sync.Once
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term int32 // term value used atomically to detect emergency termination
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submitCount int32 // atomic increment for counting submitted images
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}
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// ServiceParams contains externally adjustable parameters of Service
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type ServiceParams struct {
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EditDuration time.Duration // edit period for comments
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ImageAPI string // image api matching path
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ProxyAPI string // proxy api matching path
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MaxSize int
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MaxHeight int
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MaxWidth int
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}
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// StoreInfo contains image store meta information
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type StoreInfo struct {
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FirstStagingImageTS time.Time
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}
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// Store defines interface for saving and loading pictures.
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// Declares two-stage save with Commit. Save stores to staging area and Commit moves to the final location.
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// Two-stage commit scheme is used for not storing images which are uploaded but later never used in the comments,
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// e.g. when somebody uploaded a picture but did not sent the comment.
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type Store interface {
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Info() (StoreInfo, error) // get meta information about storage
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Save(id string, img []byte) error // store image with passed id to staging
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Load(id string) ([]byte, error) // load image by ID
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Delete(id string) error // delete image by ID
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ResetCleanupTimer(id string) error // resets cleanup timer for the image, called on comment preview
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Commit(id string) error // move image from staging to permanent
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Cleanup(ctx context.Context, ttl time.Duration) error // run removal loop for old images on staging
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}
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const submitQueueSize = 5000
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type submitReq struct {
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idsFn func() (ids []string)
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TS time.Time
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}
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// NewService returns new Service instance
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func NewService(s Store, p ServiceParams) *Service {
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return &Service{ServiceParams: p, store: s}
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}
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// Commit multiple ids immediately
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func (s *Service) Commit(idsFn func() []string) error {
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errs := new(multierror.Error)
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for _, id := range idsFn() {
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err := s.store.Commit(id)
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if err != nil {
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errs = multierror.Append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to commit image %s: %w", id, err))
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}
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}
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return errs.ErrorOrNil()
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}
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// Submit multiple ids via function for delayed commit
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func (s *Service) Submit(idsFn func() []string) {
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if idsFn == nil || s == nil {
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return
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}
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s.once.Do(func() {
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log.Printf("[DEBUG] image submitter activated")
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s.submitCh = make(chan submitReq, submitQueueSize)
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s.wg.Go(func() {
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for req := range s.submitCh {
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// wait for EditDuration expiration with emergency pass on term
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for atomic.LoadInt32(&s.term) == 0 && time.Since(req.TS) <= s.EditDuration {
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time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 10) // small sleep to relive busy wait but keep reactive for term (close)
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}
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err := s.Commit(req.idsFn)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[WARN] image commit error %v", err)
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}
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atomic.AddInt32(&s.submitCount, -1)
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}
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log.Printf("[INFO] image submitter terminated")
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})
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})
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atomic.AddInt32(&s.submitCount, 1)
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// reset cleanup timer before submitting the images
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// to prevent them from being cleaned up while waiting for EditDuration to expire
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for _, imgID := range idsFn() {
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_ = s.store.ResetCleanupTimer(imgID)
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}
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s.submitCh <- submitReq{idsFn: idsFn, TS: time.Now()}
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}
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// ExtractPictures gets list of images from the doc html and convert from urls to ids, i.e. user/pic.png
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func (s *Service) ExtractPictures(commentHTML string) (ids []string) {
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return s.extractImageIDs(commentHTML, true)
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}
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// ExtractNonProxiedPictures gets list of non-proxied images from the doc html and convert from urls to ids, i.e. user/pic.png
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// This method is used in image check on post preview and load, as proxied images have lazy loading
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// and wouldn't be present on disk but still valid as they will be loaded the first time someone requests them.
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func (s *Service) ExtractNonProxiedPictures(commentHTML string) (ids []string) {
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return s.extractImageIDs(commentHTML, false)
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}
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// Cleanup runs periodic cleanup with 1.5*ServiceParams.EditDuration. Blocking loop, should be called inside of goroutine by consumer
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func (s *Service) Cleanup(ctx context.Context) {
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if s.EditDuration <= 0 {
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log.Printf("[INFO] pictures cleanup disabled, edit duration is %v", s.EditDuration)
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<-ctx.Done()
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return
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}
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cleanupTTL := s.EditDuration * 15 / 10 // cleanup images older than 1.5 * EditDuration
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log.Printf("[INFO] start pictures cleanup, staging ttl=%v", cleanupTTL)
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for {
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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log.Printf("[INFO] cleanup terminated, %v", ctx.Err())
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return
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case <-time.After(cleanupTTL):
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if err := s.store.Cleanup(ctx, cleanupTTL); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[WARN] failed to cleanup, %v", err)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// ResetCleanupTimer resets cleanup timer for the image
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func (s *Service) ResetCleanupTimer(id string) error {
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return s.store.ResetCleanupTimer(id)
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}
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// Info returns meta information about storage
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func (s *Service) Info() (StoreInfo, error) {
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return s.store.Info()
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}
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// Close flushes all in-progress submits and enforces waiting commits
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func (s *Service) Close(ctx context.Context) {
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log.Printf("[INFO] close image service ")
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waitForTerm := func(ctx context.Context) {
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ticker := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Millisecond)
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defer ticker.Stop()
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for {
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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return
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case <-ticker.C:
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if atomic.LoadInt32(&s.submitCount) == 0 {
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return
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}
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}
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}
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}
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atomic.StoreInt32(&s.term, 1) // enforce non-delayed commits for all ids left in submitCh
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waitForTerm(ctx)
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if s.submitCh != nil {
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close(s.submitCh)
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}
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s.wg.Wait()
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}
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// Load wraps storage Load function.
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func (s *Service) Load(id string) ([]byte, error) {
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return s.store.Load(id)
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}
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// Delete wraps storage Delete function.
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func (s *Service) Delete(id string) error {
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return s.store.Delete(id)
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}
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// Save wraps storage Save function, validating and resizing the image before calling it.
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func (s *Service) Save(userID string, r io.Reader) (id string, err error) {
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id = path.Join(userID, guid())
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return id, s.SaveWithID(id, r)
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}
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// SaveWithID wraps storage Save function, validating and resizing the image before calling it.
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func (s *Service) SaveWithID(id string, r io.Reader) error {
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img, err := s.prepareImage(r)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return s.store.Save(id, img)
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}
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// returns list of image IDs from the comment html, including proxied images if includeProxied is true
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func (s *Service) extractImageIDs(commentHTML string, includeProxied bool) (ids []string) {
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doc, err := goquery.NewDocumentFromReader(strings.NewReader(commentHTML))
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[ERROR] can't parse commentHTML to parse images: %q, error: %v", commentHTML, err)
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return nil
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}
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doc.Find("img").Each(func(_ int, sl *goquery.Selection) {
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if im, ok := sl.Attr("src"); ok {
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if strings.Contains(im, s.ImageAPI) {
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elems := strings.Split(im, "/")
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if len(elems) >= 2 {
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id := elems[len(elems)-2] + "/" + elems[len(elems)-1]
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ids = append(ids, id)
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}
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}
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if includeProxied && strings.Contains(im, s.ProxyAPI) {
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proxiedURL, err := url.Parse(im)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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imgURL, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(proxiedURL.Query().Get("src"))
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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imgID, err := CachedImgID(string(imgURL))
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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ids = append(ids, imgID)
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}
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}
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})
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return ids
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}
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// maxImagePixels caps the declared pixel count of an image before any raster decode
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// is allowed. Without this, a tiny compressed "decompression bomb" image declaring
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// e.g. 65535x65535 px would force image.Decode to allocate gigabytes of pixel memory
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// and OOM the service on a single comment upload. 16 MP covers any realistic image
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// (~4096x4096) while keeping peak allocation bounded.
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const maxImagePixels = 16 * 1024 * 1024
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// prepareImage calls readAndValidateImage and resize on provided image.
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func (s *Service) prepareImage(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
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data, err := readAndValidateImage(r, s.MaxSize)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("can't load image: %w", err)
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}
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resized := resize(data, s.MaxWidth, s.MaxHeight)
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if resized == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("image rejected: malformed or exceeds %d-pixel safe limit", maxImagePixels)
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}
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return resized, nil
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}
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// resize validates an image and, if needed, re-encodes it to fit within the given
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// pixel limits preserving aspect ratio. Returns nil for malformed input or for
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// declared dimensions exceeding maxImagePixels so attacker payloads (decompression
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// bombs) never reach the store. With limit <= 0 or when the image already fits, the
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// original bytes are returned verbatim so animated GIFs and other multi-frame formats
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// round-trip without being flattened to one frame.
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//
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// Validation uses image.DecodeConfig (cheap — declares dimensions, allocates nothing)
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// before any full image.Decode, so a 100 KB compressed image declaring 65535x65535 px
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// is rejected without ever materializing the raster.
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func resize(data []byte, limitW, limitH int) []byte {
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if len(data) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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// validate format and dimensions without allocating pixel memory.
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cfg, _, err := image.DecodeConfig(bytes.NewReader(data))
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[WARN] can't decode image config, %s", err)
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return nil
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}
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// multiply in int64 — on 32-bit builds (GOARCH=386, 32-bit arm) the int
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// product of two 16-bit-or-larger dimensions can overflow and wrap below
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// maxImagePixels, bypassing the cap.
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if cfg.Width <= 0 || cfg.Height <= 0 || int64(cfg.Width)*int64(cfg.Height) > int64(maxImagePixels) {
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log.Printf("[WARN] image dimensions %dx%d exceed safe limit", cfg.Width, cfg.Height)
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return nil
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}
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// dimensions are bounded — full decode is now safe to allocate. Decode also
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// validates the raster body: a header that DecodeConfig accepts but with a
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// corrupt or truncated payload would slip through if we returned early on the
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// no-resize path without ever touching the pixels. Decode unconditionally,
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// then either return the original bytes (no resize needed, multi-frame intact)
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// or the re-encoded result.
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src, _, err := image.Decode(bytes.NewReader(data))
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[WARN] can't decode image after dim-check, %s", err)
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return nil
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}
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if limitW <= 0 || limitH <= 0 || (cfg.Width <= limitW && cfg.Height <= limitH) {
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return data
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}
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w, h := src.Bounds().Dx(), src.Bounds().Dy()
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newW, newH := getProportionalSizes(w, h, limitW, limitH)
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m := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, newW, newH))
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draw.CatmullRom.Scale(m, m.Bounds(), src, src.Bounds(), draw.Src, nil)
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var out bytes.Buffer
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if err = png.Encode(&out, m); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[WARN] can't encode resized image to png, %s", err)
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return data // fall back to the validated original
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}
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return out.Bytes()
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}
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// getProportionalSizes returns width and height resized by both dimensions proportionally
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func getProportionalSizes(srcW, srcH, limitW, limitH int) (resW, resH int) {
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if srcW <= limitW && srcH <= limitH {
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return srcW, srcH
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}
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ratioW := float64(srcW) / float64(limitW)
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propH := float64(srcH) / ratioW
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ratioH := float64(srcH) / float64(limitH)
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propW := float64(srcW) / ratioH
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if int(propH) > limitH {
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return int(propW), limitH
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}
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|
return limitW, int(propH)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// check if file f is a valid image format, i.e. gif, png, jpeg or webp and reads up to maxSize.
|
|
func readAndValidateImage(r io.Reader, maxSize int) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
isValidImage := func(b []byte) bool {
|
|
ct := http.DetectContentType(b)
|
|
return ct == "image/gif" || ct == "image/png" || ct == "image/jpeg" || ct == "image/webp"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lr := io.LimitReader(r, int64(maxSize)+1)
|
|
data, err := io.ReadAll(lr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(data) > maxSize {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("file is too large (limit=%d)", maxSize)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// read header first to check the format. http.DetectContentType inspects up
|
|
// to the first 512 bytes, but a smaller body is fine — pass the whole slice
|
|
// rather than panicking on a fixed-size sub-slice.
|
|
header := data
|
|
if len(header) > 512 {
|
|
header = header[:512]
|
|
}
|
|
if !isValidImage(header) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("file format not allowed")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return data, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// guid makes a globally unique id
|
|
func guid() string {
|
|
return xid.New().String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sha1Str converts provided string to sha1
|
|
func Sha1Str(s string) string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha1.Sum([]byte(s))) //nolint:gosec // not used for cryptography
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CachedImgID generates ID for a cached image.
|
|
// ID would look like: "cached_images/<sha1-of-image-url-hostname>-<sha1-of-image-entire-url>"
|
|
// <sha1-of-image-url-hostname> - would allow us to identify all images from particular site if ever needed
|
|
// <sha1-of-image-entire-url> - would allow us to avoid storing duplicates of the same image
|
|
// (as accurate as deduplication based on potentially mutable url can be)
|
|
func CachedImgID(imgURL string) (string, error) {
|
|
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(imgURL)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("can parse url %s: %w", imgURL, err)
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("cached_images/%s-%s", Sha1Str(parsedURL.Hostname()), Sha1Str(imgURL)), nil
|
|
}
|