remark42/backend/app/rest/api/middleware.go

// Package api middleware: request-scoped HTTP middlewares used by the REST router.
package api

import (
	"context"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"net/mail"
	"regexp"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/didip/tollbooth/v8"
	"github.com/didip/tollbooth/v8/limiter"
	log "github.com/go-pkgz/lgr"
	"github.com/umputun/remark42/backend/app/rest"
	"github.com/umputun/remark42/backend/app/store"
)

// timeout returns a middleware matching chi's middleware.Timeout: it sets a
// deadline on the request context and writes 504 Gateway Timeout if the
// deadline is exceeded. The 504 is sent once the downstream handler returns
// after observing the canceled context; a handler that ignores r.Context()
// is not aborted.
func timeout(d time.Duration) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), d)
			defer func() {
				cancel()
				if ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {
					w.WriteHeader(http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
				}
			}()
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
		})
	}
}

// rejectAnonUser is a middleware rejecting anonymous users
func rejectAnonUser(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		user, err := rest.GetUserInfo(r)
		if err != nil {
			http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
			return
		}

		if strings.HasPrefix(user.ID, "anonymous_") {
			http.Error(w, "Access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
			return
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	}
	return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
}

// matchSiteID is a middleware rejecting users with mismatch between site param and and User.SiteID
func matchSiteID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		user, err := rest.GetUserInfo(r)
		if err != nil {
			http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
			return
		}

		// skip for basic auth user
		if user.Name == "admin" && user.ID == "admin" {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		siteID := r.URL.Query().Get("site")
		// require an explicit site so the user.SiteID check below cannot be bypassed
		// by simply omitting the query parameter
		if siteID == "" || user.SiteID != siteID {
			http.Error(w, "Access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
			return
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	}
	return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
}

// cacheControl is a middleware setting cache expiration. Using url+version as etag
func cacheControl(expiration time.Duration, version string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
	etag := func(r *http.Request, version string) string {
		s := version + ":" + r.URL.String()
		return store.EncodeID(s)
	}

	return func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
		fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			e := `"` + etag(r, version) + `"`
			w.Header().Set("Etag", e)
			w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", fmt.Sprintf("max-age=%d, no-cache", int(expiration.Seconds())))

			if match := r.Header.Get("If-None-Match"); match != "" {
				if strings.Contains(match, e) {
					w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
					return
				}
			}
			h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
		}
		return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
	}
}

// apiCSPMiddleware overrides the global Content-Security-Policy on /api/v1 routes
// with a strict, default-deny policy. The global CSP (securityHeadersMiddleware) keeps
// 'self' 'unsafe-inline' for script-src/style-src because the widget HTML pages
// (/web/*.html) need inline bootstrap blocks. API responses serve JSON, XML/RSS, or
// images — none of those should ever execute scripts when rendered, so they get the
// strictest policy available as defense-in-depth against future trust-boundary bugs.
//
// Image-serving handlers (/api/v1/img, /api/v1/picture/{user}/{id}) re-apply the same
// rest.StrictImageCSP value at the handler level and additionally set Content-Disposition:
// inline; filename="image" (framing the response as a file rather than a renderable
// document) and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff. The CSP re-apply is intentional belt-and-
// braces: if a future route refactor bypasses this middleware, the image handlers still
// emit the policy.
func apiCSPMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", rest.StrictImageCSP)
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// securityHeadersMiddleware sets security-related headers:
//   - Content-Security-Policy: controls which resources the browser is allowed to load
//   - Permissions-Policy: disables browser features (camera, mic, etc.) not needed by a comment widget
//   - X-Content-Type-Options: prevents browsers from MIME-sniffing responses away from the declared type,
//     stopping e.g. a user-uploaded image from being reinterpreted as executable HTML/JS
//   - Referrer-Policy: controls how much URL information leaks in the Referer header on cross-origin
//     requests; "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" sends only the origin (no path) to other domains
//     and nothing at all on HTTPS→HTTP downgrades
func securityHeadersMiddleware(imageProxyEnabled bool, allowedAncestors []string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			imgSrc := "*"
			if imageProxyEnabled {
				imgSrc = "'self'"
			}
			frameAncestors := "*"
			if len(allowedAncestors) > 0 {
				frameAncestors = strings.Join(allowedAncestors, " ")
			}
			// font-src is set to 'none' (no @font-face / no base64 fonts in the bundle).
			w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", fmt.Sprintf("default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; connect-src 'self'; frame-src 'self' mailto:; img-src %s; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'none'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors %s;", imgSrc, frameAncestors))
			w.Header().Set("Permissions-Policy", "accelerometer=(), autoplay=(), camera=(), cross-origin-isolated=(), display-capture=(), encrypted-media=(), fullscreen=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), keyboard-map=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), midi=(), payment=(), picture-in-picture=(), publickey-credentials-get=(), screen-wake-lock=(), sync-xhr=(), usb=(), xr-spatial-tracking=(), clipboard-read=(), clipboard-write=(), gamepad=(), hid=(), idle-detection=(), interest-cohort=(), serial=(), unload=(), window-management=()")
			w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
			w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
		})
	}
}

// subscribersOnly is a middleware rejecting non-paid_sub users
func subscribersOnly(enable bool) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
		fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			if enable {
				user, err := rest.GetUserInfo(r)
				if err != nil {
					http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
					return
				}
				if !user.PaidSub {
					http.Error(w, "Access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
					return
				}
			}
			h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
		}
		return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
	}
}

// validEmailAuth is a middleware for auth endpoints for email method.
// it rejects login request if user, site or email are suspicious
func validEmailAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {

	reUser := regexp.MustCompile(`^[\p{L}\d\s_]{4,64}$`) // matches ui side validation, adding min/max limitation
	reSite := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z\d\s_.-]{1,64}$`)

	return func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
		fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

			if r.URL.Path != "/auth/email/login" {
				// not email login, skip the check
				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
				return
			}

			if u := r.URL.Query().Get("user"); u != "" {
				if !reUser.MatchString(u) {
					log.Printf("[WARN] suspicious user rejected: %s", u)
					http.Error(w, "Access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
					return
				}
			}

			if a := r.URL.Query().Get("address"); a != "" {
				if _, err := mail.ParseAddress(a); err != nil {
					log.Printf("[WARN] suspicious address rejected: %s", a)
					http.Error(w, "Access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
					return
				}
			}

			if s := r.URL.Query().Get("site"); s != "" {
				if !reSite.MatchString(s) {
					log.Printf("[WARN] suspicious site rejected: %s", s)
					http.Error(w, "Access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
					return
				}
			}

			h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
		}
		return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
	}
}

// rateLimiter creates a rate limiting middleware with proper IP lookup configuration.
// tollbooth v8 requires explicit IP lookup method to be set.
// uses RemoteAddr which is set by rest.RealIP to the real client IP
// from X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, or True-Client-IP headers.
func rateLimiter(maxReq float64) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
	lmt := tollbooth.NewLimiter(maxReq, nil)
	lmt.SetIPLookup(limiter.IPLookup{
		Name:           "RemoteAddr",
		IndexFromRight: 0,
	})
	return tollbooth.HTTPMiddleware(lmt)
}