Files
remark42/backend/app/rest/api/rest_public.go
T
Dmitry VerkhoturovandGitHub 0e20861419 fix(security): reject non-image content-types in image proxy and /picture/ to prevent stored XSS (#2067)
* fix(security): reject non-image content-types in image proxy and /picture/ to prevent stored XSS

The /api/v1/img proxy and /api/v1/picture/{user}/{id} endpoints emitted
http.DetectContentType on the served bytes as the response Content-Type. A
controlled upstream serving Content-Type: image/png with an HTML body passed
the upstream check (only the response header was inspected, not the body),
and the body bytes then sniffed back to text/html — so the proxy served the
attacker's HTML from the remark42 origin. Browsers honoured the declared
text/html and executed the response as a document with access to cookies and
CSRF tokens. Affected from v1.6.0 (April 2020) through v1.15.0; verified live
via published docker images.

Layered defense applied to both handlers:

- rest.SafeImgContentType (in backend/app/rest/) validates sniffed content
  against a strict allowlist: image/png, image/jpeg, image/gif, image/webp,
  image/bmp, image/x-icon. Anything else (HTML, XML, SVG, plain text,
  octet-stream, or any future image type the stdlib sniffer may learn) is
  rejected with no body echo. SVG is implicitly excluded — it sniffs as
  text/xml or text/plain, never image/svg+xml, and SVG can execute scripts
  when navigated to top-level. The previous octet-stream → image/* fallback
  is gone.
- Per-endpoint Content-Security-Policy override sets
  "default-src 'none'; sandbox; frame-ancestors 'none'" on every response
  (success, 304, or error). Sandbox neuters scripts even if Content-Type
  ever regresses. The same policy is also applied to all /api/v1/* via
  apiCSPMiddleware as defense-in-depth.
- Content-Disposition: inline; filename="image" frames the response as a
  file rather than a renderable document.
- /picture/ rejection paths set Cache-Control: no-store so 4xx responses
  are never cached.

The defense headers and the strict ETag matcher are extracted as
rest.SetImageDefenseHeaders and rest.EtagMatches in the shared rest package
(consumed by both proxy/image and api/rest_public — no package cycle).

The /api/v1/img path additionally bumps the ETag to a versioned `"v2:..."`
so revalidating clients (top-level navigation, Ctrl+R, intermediaries) get
a fresh 200 instead of a 304 against poisoned pre-fix cached HTML.

DELIBERATE TRADEOFF: Cache-Control on /api/v1/img success responses remains
max-age=2592000 (30 days), unchanged from before. An aggressive "force
revalidate on every reuse" policy was prototyped during review but reverted
because the perf cost (a server round-trip on every image view, even with
304 saving the body bytes) outweighed the corner-case mitigation. The
realistic exposure of cache carryover is narrow: cache carryover only
affects users who navigated top-level to an attacker URL pre-fix and still
have it in their local cache — the normal <img> embed path cached text/html
but never executed it. Local browser caches that hold pre-fix bytes
continue to serve them until their 30-day TTL expires or are evicted under
memory pressure. The ETag bump reaches all clients that DO revalidate
during the cached lifetime (Ctrl+R, intermediaries, post-expiry use); for
the rest, exposure self-limits via cache expiry. Operators running a
CDN/edge cache in front of remark42 should purge /api/v1/img after deploy.

The /api/v1/img handler short-circuits on a matching current-version
If-None-Match before any store Load or upstream fetch, returning a bodyless
304 with the defense headers set. Safe because the 304 carries no body and
the client's cached bytes came from a prior validated 200; an attacker
fabricating an etag value can only short-circuit fetches for URLs they
themselves crafted. This avoids upstream DoS amplification when clients
revalidate on hot comment pages.

The /api/v1/img route was moved from the "open routes" group (which uses
middleware.NoCache, stripping If-None-Match from incoming requests) to the
"open routes, cached" group alongside /picture/ and /qr/telegram so the
304 revalidation path is no longer broken upstream of the handler.

The /picture/{user}/{id} endpoint does not need the v2 etag prefix. Upload
validates input format via readAndValidateImage and the serve path
re-validates the stored bytes via rest.SafeImgContentType. Bytes within
the resize dimension limits are preserved verbatim, so the browser defense
relies on the response headers (validated Content-Type + nosniff + strict
CSP + Content-Disposition: inline), not on byte normalization.

Global CSP: font-src data: → font-src 'none'. Audit confirmed no @font-face,
no base64 fonts, no icon-font library in the bundle. Drops an unnecessary
attack surface; no behavioural change.

Tests: TestImage_ContentTypeHandling table-tests a real PNG and attack
shapes (HTML claimed as image/png, image/jpeg, image/gif, image/svg+xml,
image/webp; svg with onload; html fragment; polyglot PNG+HTML), proving
the defense holds across arbitrary upstream Content-Type variation.
Polyglot case is intentionally served as image/png — the browser cannot
execute the trailing HTML when the response type is image/png with nosniff.
TestImage_ContentTypeHandling_CacheHit exercises the cache-hit branch with
attacker bytes preloaded into the store. TestImage_PerRequestRevalidation
alternates upstream PNG/HTML across four proxy calls to prove no trust
accumulates between requests. TestImage_RoutesUsingCachedImage asserts
cache-poisoning is caught at serve time. TestImage_EtagVersioned asserts
the v2 prefix invalidates pre-fix etags AND that the revalidation 304
triggers no store Load. TestImage_RevalidationSkipsIO proves the
short-circuit works even with no upstream reachable. TestSafeImgContentType
covers the allowlist directly. TestRest_LoadPictureDefenseHeaders and
TestRest_LoadPictureRejectsNonImage exercise the /picture/ endpoint.
TestRest_apiCSP covers the strict CSP middleware on JSON API + RSS routes;
TestRest_securityHeaders confirms /web/ HTML pages keep the global CSP.

Verified end-to-end against the dev docker image: the original demo URL
(arbitrary HTML claimed as image/png) now returns 415 application/json with
CSP/nosniff/Content-Disposition set, no XSS in the browser.

* fix(security): set Cache-Control: no-store on image-proxy error paths, sync stale route comment

Addresses two review comments on #2067:

1. Cache-Control: max-age=2592000 and Etag were set before the
   load/download/validation block, so 404/400/415 error responses inherited
   the 30-day cache TTL and the versioned etag — a transient failure (or an
   intentionally triggered 415) would be pinned in browser/intermediary
   caches for that TTL, keeping users locked out even after the underlying
   cause was resolved. Now: etag is computed but not set as a header until
   after validation succeeds; error paths route through sendImageProxyError
   which sets Cache-Control: no-store and never sets Etag. The 304
   short-circuit still sets both because that path serves the same validated
   content the client already has cached.

2. The comment at rest.go:282 still described the prototyped
   no-cache/must-revalidate Cache-Control policy that was reverted before
   the PR landed. Updated to match the actual 30-day max-age behavior.

Tests: TestImage_ContentTypeHandling now asserts reject paths carry
Cache-Control: no-store and have no Etag header, and accept paths carry
the max-age=2592000 + v2: etag.
2026-05-20 22:37:25 -05:00

547 lines
19 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/sha1" // nolint
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"unicode"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
cache "github.com/go-pkgz/lcw/v2"
log "github.com/go-pkgz/lgr"
R "github.com/go-pkgz/rest"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/skip2/go-qrcode"
"github.com/umputun/remark42/backend/app/rest"
"github.com/umputun/remark42/backend/app/store"
"github.com/umputun/remark42/backend/app/store/image"
"github.com/umputun/remark42/backend/app/store/service"
)
type public struct {
dataService pubStore
cache LoadingCache
readOnlyAge int
commentFormatter *store.CommentFormatter
imageService *image.Service
}
type pubStore interface {
Create(comment store.Comment) (commentID string, err error)
Get(locator store.Locator, commentID string, user store.User) (store.Comment, error)
FindSince(locator store.Locator, sort string, user store.User, since time.Time) ([]store.Comment, error)
Last(siteID string, limit int, since time.Time, user store.User) ([]store.Comment, error)
User(siteID, userID string, limit, skip int, user store.User) ([]store.Comment, error)
UserCount(siteID, userID string) (int, error)
Count(locator store.Locator) (int, error)
List(siteID string, limit, skip int) ([]store.PostInfo, error)
Info(locator store.Locator, readonlyAge int) (store.PostInfo, error)
ValidateComment(c *store.Comment) error
IsReadOnly(locator store.Locator) bool
Counts(siteID string, postIDs []string) ([]store.PostInfo, error)
}
// GET /find?site=siteID&url=post-url&format=[tree|plain]&sort=[+/-time|+/-score|+/-controversy]&view=[user|all]&since=unix_ts_msec&limit=100&offset_id={id}
// find comments for given post. Returns in tree or plain formats, sorted.
//
// When `url` parameter is not set (e.g. request is for site-wide comments), does not return deleted comments.
//
// When `limit` is set, first {limit} comments are returned. When `offset_id` is set, comments are returned starting
// after the comment with the given id.
// format="tree" limits comments by top-level comments and all their replies,
// and never returns parent comment with only part of replies.
//
// `count` in the response refers to total number of non-deleted comments,
// `count_left` to amount of comments left to be returned _including deleted_.
func (s *public) findCommentsCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
locator := store.Locator{SiteID: r.URL.Query().Get("site"), URL: r.URL.Query().Get("url")}
sort := r.URL.Query().Get("sort")
if strings.HasPrefix(sort, " ") { // restore + replaced by " "
sort = "+" + sort[1:]
}
view := r.URL.Query().Get("view")
since, err := s.parseSince(r)
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't parse since", rest.ErrCommentNotFound)
return
}
format := r.URL.Query().Get("format")
if format == "tree" {
since = time.Time{} // since doesn't make sense for tree
}
limitParam := r.URL.Query().Get("limit")
var limit int
if limitParam != "" {
if limit, err = strconv.Atoi(limitParam); err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "bad limit value", rest.ErrCommentNotFound)
return
}
}
offsetID := r.URL.Query().Get("offset_id")
if offsetID != "" {
if _, err = uuid.Parse(offsetID); err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "bad offset_id value", rest.ErrCommentNotFound)
return
}
}
log.Printf("[DEBUG] get comments for %+v, sort %s, format %s, since %v, limit %d, offset %s", locator, sort, format, since, limit, offsetID)
key := cache.NewKey(locator.SiteID).ID(URLKeyWithUser(r)).Scopes(locator.SiteID, locator.URL)
data, err := s.cache.Get(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
comments, e := s.dataService.FindSince(locator, sort, rest.GetUserOrEmpty(r), since)
if e != nil {
comments = []store.Comment{} // error should clear comments and continue for post info
}
comments = s.applyView(comments, view)
var commentsInfo store.PostInfo
if info, ee := s.dataService.Info(locator, s.readOnlyAge); ee == nil {
commentsInfo = info
}
if !since.IsZero() { // if since is set, number of comments can be different from total in the DB
commentsInfo.Count = 0
for _, c := range comments {
if !c.Deleted {
commentsInfo.Count++
}
}
}
// post might be readonly without any comments, Info call will fail then and ReadOnly flag should be checked separately
if !commentsInfo.ReadOnly && locator.URL != "" && s.dataService.IsReadOnly(locator) {
commentsInfo.ReadOnly = true
}
var b []byte
switch format {
case "tree":
withInfo := treeWithInfo{Tree: service.MakeTree(comments, sort, limit, offsetID), Info: commentsInfo}
withInfo.Info.CountLeft = withInfo.CountLeft()
withInfo.Info.LastComment = withInfo.LastComment()
if withInfo.Nodes == nil { // eliminate json nil serialization
withInfo.Nodes = []*service.Node{}
}
b, e = encodeJSONWithHTML(withInfo)
default:
if limit > 0 || offsetID != "" {
comments, commentsInfo.CountLeft = limitComments(comments, limit, offsetID)
}
if limit > 0 && len(comments) > 0 {
commentsInfo.LastComment = comments[len(comments)-1].ID
}
withInfo := commentsWithInfo{Comments: comments, Info: commentsInfo}
b, e = encodeJSONWithHTML(withInfo)
}
return b, e
})
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't find comments", rest.ErrCommentNotFound)
return
}
if err = R.RenderJSONFromBytes(w, r, data); err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't render comments for post %+v", locator)
}
}
// GET /info?site=siteID&url=post-url - get info about the post
func (s *public) infoCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
locator := store.Locator{SiteID: r.URL.Query().Get("site"), URL: r.URL.Query().Get("url")}
key := cache.NewKey(locator.SiteID).ID(URLKey(r)).Scopes(locator.SiteID, locator.URL)
data, err := s.cache.Get(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
info, e := s.dataService.Info(locator, s.readOnlyAge)
if e != nil {
return nil, e
}
return encodeJSONWithHTML(info)
})
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't get post info", rest.ErrPostNotFound)
return
}
if err = R.RenderJSONFromBytes(w, r, data); err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't render info for post %+v", locator)
}
}
// GET /last/{limit}?site=siteID&since=unix_ts_msec - last comments for the siteID, across all posts, sorted by time, optionally
// limited with "since" param
func (s *public) lastCommentsCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
siteID := r.URL.Query().Get("site")
log.Printf("[DEBUG] get last comments for %s", siteID)
limit, err := strconv.Atoi(chi.URLParam(r, "limit"))
if err != nil {
limit = 0
}
sinceTime, err := s.parseSince(r)
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't translate since parameter", rest.ErrDecode)
return
}
key := cache.NewKey(siteID).ID(URLKey(r)).Scopes(lastCommentsScope)
data, err := s.cache.Get(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
comments, e := s.dataService.Last(siteID, limit, sinceTime, rest.GetUserOrEmpty(r))
if e != nil {
return nil, e
}
// filter deleted from last comments view. Blocked marked as deleted and will sneak in without
filterDeleted := filterComments(comments, func(c store.Comment) bool { return !c.Deleted })
return encodeJSONWithHTML(filterDeleted)
})
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "can't get last comments", rest.ErrInternal)
return
}
if err = R.RenderJSONFromBytes(w, r, data); err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't render last comments for site %s", siteID)
}
}
// GET /id/{id}?site=siteID&url=post-url - gets a comment by id
func (s *public) commentByIDCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
siteID := r.URL.Query().Get("site")
url := r.URL.Query().Get("url")
log.Printf("[DEBUG] get comments by id %s, %s %s", id, siteID, url)
comment, err := s.dataService.Get(store.Locator{SiteID: siteID, URL: url}, id, rest.GetUserOrEmpty(r))
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't get comment by id", rest.ErrCommentNotFound)
return
}
if err = R.RenderJSONWithHTML(w, r, comment); err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't render last comments for url=%s, id=%s", url, id)
}
}
// GET /comments?site=siteID&user=id&limit=123&skip=10 - returns comments for given userID
func (s *public) findUserCommentsCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID := r.URL.Query().Get("user")
siteID := r.URL.Query().Get("site")
getNumWithDef := func(key string) int {
res, err := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get(key))
if err != nil {
res = 0
}
return res
}
limit, skip := getNumWithDef("limit"), getNumWithDef("skip")
resp := struct {
Comments []store.Comment `json:"comments"`
Count int `json:"count"`
}{}
log.Printf("[DEBUG] get comments for userID %s, %s", userID, siteID)
key := cache.NewKey(siteID).ID(URLKeyWithUser(r)).Scopes(userID, siteID)
data, err := s.cache.Get(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
comments, e := s.dataService.User(siteID, userID, limit, skip, rest.GetUserOrEmpty(r))
if e != nil {
if strings.Contains(e.Error(), "no comments for user") { // store returns this error when no comments found
resp.Comments, resp.Count = []store.Comment{}, 0
return encodeJSONWithHTML(resp)
}
return nil, e
}
comments = filterComments(comments, func(c store.Comment) bool { return !c.Deleted })
count, e := s.dataService.UserCount(siteID, userID)
if e != nil {
return nil, e
}
resp.Comments, resp.Count = comments, count
return encodeJSONWithHTML(resp)
})
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't get comment by user id", rest.ErrCommentNotFound)
return
}
if err = R.RenderJSONFromBytes(w, r, data); err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't render found comments for user %s", userID)
}
}
// GET /count?site=siteID&url=post-url - get number of comments for given post
func (s *public) countCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
locator := store.Locator{SiteID: r.URL.Query().Get("site"), URL: r.URL.Query().Get("url")}
count, err := s.dataService.Count(locator)
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't get count", rest.ErrPostNotFound)
return
}
R.RenderJSON(w, R.JSON{"count": count, "locator": locator})
}
// POST /counts?site=siteID - get number of comments for posts from post body
func (s *public) countMultiCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
const countBodyLimit int64 = 1024 * 128 // count request can be big for some site because it lists all urls
siteID := r.URL.Query().Get("site")
posts := []string{}
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, countBodyLimit)).Decode(&posts); err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't get list of posts from request", rest.ErrSiteNotFound)
return
}
// key could be long for multiple posts, make it sha1
k := URLKey(r) + strings.Join(posts, ",")
h := sha1.Sum([]byte(k)) // nolint
sha := base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
key := cache.NewKey(siteID).ID(sha).Scopes(siteID)
data, err := s.cache.Get(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
counts, e := s.dataService.Counts(siteID, posts)
if e != nil {
return nil, e
}
return encodeJSONWithHTML(counts)
})
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't get counts for "+siteID, rest.ErrSiteNotFound)
return
}
if err = R.RenderJSONFromBytes(w, r, data); err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't render comments counters site %s", siteID)
}
}
// GET /list?site=siteID&limit=50&skip=10 - list posts with comments
func (s *public) listCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
siteID := r.URL.Query().Get("site")
limit, skip := 0, 0
if v, err := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get("limit")); err == nil {
limit = v
}
if v, err := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get("skip")); err == nil {
skip = v
}
key := cache.NewKey(siteID).ID(URLKey(r)).Scopes(siteID)
data, err := s.cache.Get(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
posts, e := s.dataService.List(siteID, limit, skip)
if e != nil {
return nil, e
}
return encodeJSONWithHTML(posts)
})
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err, "can't get list of comments for "+siteID, rest.ErrSiteNotFound)
return
}
if err = R.RenderJSONFromBytes(w, r, data); err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't render posts list for site %s", siteID)
}
}
// safePictureSegment reports whether seg is acceptable as a path segment in
// the picture URL (no traversal markers, no path separators, no control
// characters). Picture IDs are server-generated hashes plus a known
// extension, so any value carrying these characters is hostile and must be
// rejected before reaching the store. Rejecting controls (CR, LF, TAB, NUL,
// etc.) also closes a log-injection vector since the rejected segment is
// echoed into the access log.
func safePictureSegment(seg string) bool {
if seg == "" || seg == "." {
return false
}
if strings.ContainsAny(seg, "/\\") {
return false
}
if strings.Contains(seg, "..") { // also covers seg == ".."
return false
}
for _, r := range seg {
if unicode.IsControl(r) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// sendPictureError writes a no-store Cache-Control header and delegates to rest.SendErrorJSON.
// Used by every rejection branch in loadPictureCtrl so error responses never inherit the
// 7-day client cache of the success path.
func sendPictureError(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, err error, details string, code int) {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, status, err, details, code)
}
// GET /picture/{user}/{id} - get picture
func (s *public) loadPictureCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rest.SetImageDefenseHeaders(w)
user, imgID := chi.URLParam(r, "user"), chi.URLParam(r, "id")
if user == "" || imgID == "" || !safePictureSegment(user) || !safePictureSegment(imgID) {
log.Printf("[WARN] rejected picture request with unsafe id segments user=%q id=%q", user, imgID)
sendPictureError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("invalid picture id"), "invalid picture id", rest.ErrAssetNotFound)
return
}
id := user + "/" + imgID
img, err := s.imageService.Load(id)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't load image %s: %v", id, err)
sendPictureError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("image not found"), "can't get image", rest.ErrAssetNotFound)
return
}
contentType, err := rest.SafeImgContentType(img)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] rejecting non-image picture %s: %v", id, err)
sendPictureError(w, r, http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType, err, "invalid image content", rest.ErrAssetNotFound)
return
}
// /picture/ does not need a security-version etag prefix — the upload flow
// validates input format (readAndValidateImage) and the serve path re-validates
// the stored bytes via rest.SafeImgContentType. Bytes within the resize dimension
// limits ARE preserved verbatim by resize, so the browser defense relies on the
// response headers (validated Content-Type + nosniff + strict CSP +
// Content-Disposition: inline), not on byte normalization. Picture IDs are limited
// to safePictureSegment (alphanumeric xid-generated guids), so the comma split
// inside rest.EtagMatches cannot collide; if the ID format ever changes, revisit.
etag := `"` + id + `"`
w.Header().Set("Etag", etag)
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "max-age=604800") // 7 days
if match := r.Header.Get("If-None-Match"); match != "" && rest.EtagMatches(match, etag) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentType)
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(img)))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err = io.Copy(w, bytes.NewReader(img)); err != nil {
log.Printf("[WARN] can't send response to %s, %s", r.RemoteAddr, err)
}
}
// GET /robots.txt
func (s *public) robotsCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
allowed := []string{"/find", "/last", "/id", "/count", "/counts", "/list", "/config", "/user",
"/img", "/avatar", "/picture"}
for i := range allowed {
allowed[i] = "Allow: /api/v1" + allowed[i]
}
responseText := fmt.Sprintf("User-agent: *\nDisallow: /auth/\nDisallow: /api/\n%s\n", strings.Join(allowed, "\n"))
rest.PlainTextResponse(w, http.StatusOK, responseText)
}
// GET /qr/telegram - generates QR for provided URL, used for Telegram auth and notifications subscription. The first
// step of both is the user opening a link to Telegram and writing bot a message, and the user might try to log in
// from a computer but have Telegram installed only on the mobile device.
// Provided text should start with https://t.me/.
func (s *public) telegramQrCtrl(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
text := r.URL.Query().Get("url")
if text == "" {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("missing parameter"), "text parameter is required", rest.ErrInternal)
return
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(text, "https://t.me/") {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("wrong parameter"), "text parameter should start with https://t.me/", rest.ErrInternal)
return
}
q, err := qrcode.New(text, qrcode.Medium)
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "can't generate QR", rest.ErrInternal)
return
}
q.DisableBorder = true
png, err := q.PNG(256)
if err != nil {
rest.SendErrorJSON(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "can't generate QR", rest.ErrInternal)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "image/png")
if _, err = w.Write(png); err != nil { //nolint:gosec // png bytes from go-qrcode, not HTML
log.Printf("[WARN] can't render qr, %v", err)
}
}
func (s *public) applyView(comments []store.Comment, view string) []store.Comment {
if strings.EqualFold(view, "user") {
projection := make([]store.Comment, 0, len(comments))
for _, c := range comments {
if c.Deleted {
continue
}
p := store.Comment{
ID: c.ID,
User: c.User,
}
projection = append(projection, p)
}
return projection
}
return comments
}
func (s *public) parseSince(r *http.Request) (time.Time, error) {
sinceTS := time.Time{}
if since := r.URL.Query().Get("since"); since != "" {
unixTS, e := strconv.ParseInt(since, 10, 64)
if e != nil {
return time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("can't translate since parameter: %w", e)
}
sinceTS = time.Unix(unixTS/1000, 1000000*(unixTS%1000)) // since param in msec timestamp
}
return sinceTS, nil
}
// limitComments returns limited list of comments and count of comments left after limit.
// If offsetID is provided, the list will be sliced starting from the comment with this ID.
// If offsetID is not found, the full list will be returned.
// It's used for only "
func limitComments(c []store.Comment, limit int, offsetID string) (comments []store.Comment, countLeft int) {
if offsetID != "" {
for i, comment := range c {
if comment.ID == offsetID {
c = c[i+1:]
break
}
}
}
if limit > 0 && len(c) > limit {
countLeft = len(c) - limit
c = c[:limit]
}
return c, countLeft
}