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Commits
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b4b0346f95 |
iceberg maintenance: resolve table files from the recorded location (#10418)
The worker assumed every file of a table sits under its catalog path, so loadFileByIcebergPath stripped the scheme off a recorded location and joined the remainder onto /buckets/<bucket>/<ns>/<table>. A table the REST catalog placed elsewhere in the bucket — which is what a client gets whenever the catalog path is already occupied — then resolves to a doubled path: lookup /buckets/lake/source/t/lake/source/t-0cd81bca-.../metadata/snap-.avro so the very first manifest list read fails and the job fails again on every scan interval, indefinitely. Resolve absolute references (s3:// URIs and /buckets paths) from the bucket root and keep relative ones under the table's own directory; the bucket-relative form is now the canonical key everywhere references are compared. That directory comes from the metadata location the catalog stores, so reads, writes and deletes all land where the table's other files are instead of splitting it across two trees. References outside the table's bucket are rejected rather than silently misresolved. Rewritten position-delete files now name their data file by absolute URI, the way the table itself names it, instead of a path relative to the table. |
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47b491b53c |
mount: version open file handles by filer log position (#10403)
* filer: stamp a log position on lookup and remote-cache responses Metadata events are logged after their store write and stamped with the filer clock. Reading that clock before serving an entry therefore gives a timestamp with a causal guarantee: every event at or below it is reflected in the returned entry. Clients caching filer state can use it as the entry's version to order the response against subscription events, including events committed before the call but delivered after it. * mount: version open file handles by filer log position A subscription event refreshing an open handle did a second lookup; a transient failure left the handle pinned to its old entry with no retry, since the subscription cursor had already advanced. The deeper problem is ordering: the handle is a cache written by three unordered channels — the async invalidation worker, local mutation acks, and open-time lookups — and overwriting cached state safely requires knowing which write is newer. The filer log timestamp is that order, and it now travels with every value instead of being derived out of band. Events carry it natively; lookup and remote-cache responses carry the log position stamped before the serving read; mutation acks carry it in their returned event; and the local store pairs each read with a version cursor advanced under the same lock as the store write. Each handle records the version its entry reflects, and one rule replaces the per-site reasoning: state at or below the handle's version is old news and must not be installed. The invalidation itself applies the event's own entry — no lookup, so no transient-failure window — except under a cached parent, where the store entry is the ordered merge of the event and anything applied since, and its version outranks the event's. An uncached parent receives no store writes, so a hit there would be a stale leftover masking the event. A vacated path (delete, rename away) keeps the last entry so unlinked-but-open reads still work. Directory builds version the completed directory at the listing snapshot and re-invalidate buffered events at that version, since their mid-build refresh ran against an incomplete store. The tests replay every race this replaces machinery for: rollback of a newer local flush (queued, cached, and read-through), stale leftovers under uncached parents, the build window including abort, handles opened after an event was queued, events landing mid-lookup, and undelivered events at remote-cache time across a filer failover. * filer: serialize the log position fence with mutations, stamp mutation acks The fence stamped before an unlocked entry read could precede state the read returned: a mutation writes storage first and assigns its event timestamp only at notify time, so a lookup racing that window handed the mount an entry newer than its fence, and the event's later delivery looked like fresh news — destroying dirty pages for a change the handle already had. The mutation handlers already hold an exclusive per-path lock across read, write, and notify; the lookup and remote-cache reads now take it shared around the stamp and the read, making the fence exact: everything at or below it is in the entry, nothing above it is. A no-change update returns success without an event, leaving the mount nothing to fence with even though the response confirms current state. Create and update acks now carry a log position stamped under the same lock, and the mount falls back to it whenever the ack has no event. Also regenerate the VT marshalers, which the earlier generation missed: without them a VT round-trip silently zeroed every log position. * java: sync filer.proto * mount: scope store versions to what they vouch for; atomic handle install The store's version cursor claimed too much. Advanced by local mutation acks and directory listing snapshots, it inflated the version of store reads for unrelated paths whose events the subscription still owed, and those events were then fenced out permanently. The cursor now tracks subscription progress only — events arrive in log order, so everything at or below it has been delivered for every path — and a completed listing records its snapshot as a per-directory floor instead of a global claim. Local acks never touch it: they version their own handle directly. Buffered build events advance the cursor at delivery, since their store write may never happen (abort) while their invalidation is already queued; their read-through directory pairs no store read with it, and rename fragments are applied first. Concurrent first opens raced: a slower opener's older lookup could overwrite the newer entry a faster opener had installed, while the monotonic version kept the newer timestamp — an old entry fenced at a new version, immune to every correcting event. Entry and version are now installed as one decision under the handle map lock, and an install that does not outrank the handle's version is dropped. The remote-cache commit also escaped the fence: it wrote storage and notified without the path lock, so a lookup's shared-locked fence and read could land between the two and hand out the cached state under-versioned. The commit now re-reads and writes under the exclusive path lock, and backs off entirely when the entry changed during the download — the concurrent writer supersedes the cached content. * mount: floors gate store applies; installs respect handle users; renames join the fence A directory floor certifies the listing state as of its snapshot, but a delayed event at or below the floor was still applied to the store — rolling the content back to pre-snapshot state while the floor kept claiming the snapshot version, so the correcting events were fenced out of every future read. Events are now gated against the affected directory's floor, each half of a rename independently. Fences are lower bounds: a listing or lookup can include a mutation whose event has not been delivered yet, and that event later passes every gate carrying state the handle already holds. Such a re-delivery now advances the version without destroying dirty pages or reinstalling the entry — invalidating local writes over a no-op was the real damage in every remaining under-fence window, including the unlocked listing snapshot, which no per-path lock can serialize. The concurrent-open install moved from the map lock to the handle lock every reader, writer, and invalidation synchronizes on, and rejects what cannot improve the handle: dirty state (local writes would be lost), unversioned lookup responses (they cannot outrank anything, and two zero-version opens must not overwrite each other), and anything not strictly newer. New handles are still fully initialized before the map exposes them. Renames committed metadata and emitted events with no path lock, so a lookup could read the renamed state under a fence preceding its events. Both rename handlers now hold the source and destination locks, ordered by path, across commit and notification; descendants of a renamed directory are not individually locked and rely on the no-op re-delivery handling above. * mount: per-entry store versions replace the cursor and directory floors The store's aggregate versions — a global subscription cursor and per-directory listing floors — were versions at coarser granularity than the values they described, and every over-claiming bug in this series traced to that gap: an aggregate vouching for state its source never saw. Each store entry now carries the filer log position of the write that produced it — the event that applied it, or the listing snapshot that inserted it, recorded in the store's key-value space under the same lock as the entry write. The store becomes what the handle already is: a last-writer-wins register with one rule, install only what outranks the current claim. The cursor, the floors, their advancement rules, the pairing ordering constraint, and the floor gating all collapse into that rule. Applies are gated per entry, each half of a rename independently; an unversioned local write clears the claim its content no longer proves; version records lingering after a bulk folder wipe cannot fence a recreate, since a claim only blocks while its entry exists. Listing inserts are stamped at build completion, before the buffered replay so newer replayed events override the stamp. Filer side, the fence dance every versioned read must perform is now a single choke point, fencedFindEntry, so a future read RPC gets the lock-serialized stamp by construction rather than by convention. * mount: judge no-op re-deliveries against an immutable base, not the live entry The equal-state skip compared the incoming event to the live handle entry, but local writes mutate the live entry — size, timestamps, chunks — so a delayed event re-delivering the base the handle was opened with no longer matched, and the installer destroyed the dirty pages and rolled the entry back over nothing new. The handle now keeps an immutable snapshot of the filer state it last installed or acknowledged, refreshed at every install and mutation ack (flush acks snapshot the request entry before the id mapping mutates it), and the no-op judgment runs against that base: an event carrying the base brings nothing, whatever the live entry has diverged to since. * mount: tombstones for versioned deletes, absence floors, copy enrollment Four gaps in the per-entry version protocol, all the same shape: a versioned fact with nothing carrying its version. A deletion is a fact about a path with no entry left to hold it — clearing the record let a delayed older event resurrect the deleted path, permanently, since the deletion's own redelivery is dedup-suppressed. Versioned deletes now leave a tombstone record that fences without an entry; renames tombstone their source the same way. Plain records still only block while their entry exists, so records lingering after a bulk folder wipe cannot fence a recreate. A completed listing proves absences as well as presences: a name it omitted was deleted as of the snapshot, and a delayed create below the snapshot re-creates it. The snapshot is kept per directory strictly as an absence fence, consulted only when a path has neither an entry nor a version record — present entries carry their own versions and never touch it, which is what separates this from the over-claiming floor it replaces. A rebuild against a pre-upgrade filer returns no snapshot; stamping now clears the children's records in that case, so a reinserted entry cannot reactivate the stale claim its previous incarnation left behind and reject valid events below it. Server-side copies installed the copied entry without enrolling in the base protocol, so the copy's own event differed from the stale pre-copy base and destroyed writes made to the destination after the copy. The install now refreshes the base and takes its version from the fenced readback. * mount: deletion facts outlive the cache's knowledge of the entry A versioned delete of a path the store held no entry for recorded nothing, so a delayed older event recreated the path — permanently, with the deletion's redelivery dedup-suppressed. The tombstone is now written whenever a versioned event vacates a path: the deletion is a fact about the path, not about what this cache happened to hold. For an absent entry, the listing's absence floor now speaks whatever older record remains: a tombstone at one position does not exhaust what is known about the path when a newer snapshot has confirmed the name still absent, and an event between the two was slipping past both. A committed copy whose readback failed installed a synthesized base with local timestamps; the copy's real event legitimately differs from it, and was read as foreign state — destroying writes made to the destination after the copy. The handle now marks that its own event is en route and adopts that event's state as the base without touching the live entry or the dirty pages; the adoption is one-shot, so a genuinely foreign event still invalidates. * mount: authoritative acks cancel pending event adoption; tombstones scoped and pruned The copy-event adoption flag could outlive its purpose: a flush after the failed readback installs a newer base and advances the version, the copy's own event is then version gated without consuming the flag, and the next genuinely foreign event was silently adopted — base advanced, live entry and dirty pages untouched — leaving the mount to later overwrite that remote change. Every local acknowledgment now installs its base through one helper that also cancels any pending adoption: the ack supersedes the mutation the adoption was waiting for. Tombstones were written for every versioned delete under the mount and survived directory eviction by design, growing LevelDB with historical deletions on delete-heavy mounts. They are now scoped to directories whose cached state the fence actually protects — an uncached parent never serves from the store nor applies the resurrecting insert — and a completed listing prunes the direct-child tombstones its absence floor supersedes, leaving only those above the snapshot. The store gains a key-prefix visitor for the sweep. * mount: acked saves install their value; trailer snapshots; direct-child prune range A version must never advance without its value. saveEntry stamped any open handle with the acknowledgment's version, but a handle opened while the save was in flight holds the pre-mutation entry — stamping it fenced out the events carrying the state it lacked, permanently, with the local apply performing no invalidation and the redelivery deduplicated. The acknowledged entry is now installed together with its version, through the same guarded install the racing-open path uses: under the handle lock, only when it outranks the handle, never over dirty local writes. Empty listings return no in-band snapshot — a snapshot-only response would be read as an entry by older consumers — so directories that end empty gained no absence floor and their tombstones were never pruned. The filer now sends the snapshot in the stream trailer, which older clients ignore, and the client reads it when no in-band snapshot arrived. Empty directories get real floors, their tombstones prune, and their buffered replays gain the snapshot filter instead of the replay-all fallback. Version records now encode the parent directory and name separated by a NUL, making a directory's direct children one contiguous key range: the tombstone prune scans exactly them under the cache lock, instead of walking every descendant record — the whole store, for root. * mount: fix dirty-page loss, uid/gid base, download race, copy adopt, leak; dedup Correctness fixes from the versioned-invalidation review: - A foreign delete/rename-away of a file held open with unflushed local writes destroyed the dirty pages unconditionally. A process may keep writing to an unlinked-but-open file and those writes were already acknowledged; preserve the pages when the handle is dirty. - downloadRemoteEntry stored the handle's base with filer-side uid/gid while every candidate it is later compared against is in local form, so under a non-identity UidGidMapper an unchanged re-delivery looked foreign and force-destroyed dirty pages. Map the base to local. - downloadRemoteEntry wrote the entry/base/version triple under only the handle's shared lock, so two concurrent reads of the same remote-only file could tear it. Serialize the install with a dedicated mutex (invalidation is already excluded by the exclusive handle lock). - A committed server-side copy whose readback failed adopted the FIRST event past the version gate as its base; a foreign write delivered first was silently swallowed. Adopt only an event whose content matches the synthesized base — the copy's own event — and install any other normally. - The deferred-create path relied on AcquireFileHandle installing the passed entry on a pre-existing handle, which the version rework dropped. Restore that install in the compat wrapper; the versioned open path keeps its gated install. Growth and hot-path cost: - Per-entry version records and tombstones leaked when a directory was evicted or read-through without a rebuild. An uncached directory gates its own inserts, so its records fence nothing; clear a directory's child version records when it is wiped for eviction. - FindEntry paid for the version KvGet on every lookup/getattr cache hit and threw it away. FindEntry now reads only the entry; the hot lookupEntry cache-hit path skips the version entirely. Cleanups: - Extract ackVersionTsNs over the shared response interface, replacing the metadata-event-else-log-ts snippet copy-pasted at four ack sites. - Extract acquireRenamePathLocks, replacing the verbatim sorted two-path lock fence in both rename handlers. * mount: no resurrection on foreign delete, version no-event acks, gate downloads, tighten copy adopt Follow-ups to the review patches: - Preserving dirty pages on a foreign delete let the next flush pass the isDeleted guard and CreateEntry, resurrecting the remotely-unlinked name. Mark the handle deleted in the vacate branch: the open fd can still read its buffered writes, but a flush no longer recreates the file. - A no-event acknowledgment (log fence only) synthesized a metadata event with TsNs 0, so the cache stored the entry unversioned and an older subscriber event rolled it back. Stamp the synthesized event with the ack's log position at all four ack sites. - downloadRemoteEntry serialized its install but did not check the version, so an older response arriving last overwrote the entry/base while the monotonic version kept the newer value, fencing corrections out. Install only when the response is at least as new as the handle. - sameEntryContent compared only size and chunks, so a foreign chmod with unchanged content was adopted as the copy's own event. Compare everything except server-assigned timestamps, so a metadata-only foreign change installs instead. * mount: trim comments to the non-obvious why The versioning work accumulated multi-line comment blocks restating what the code says. Keep the constraint a reader cannot derive — why a fence is exact, why a version must not advance without its value, why an uncached parent's records fence nothing — and drop the rest. * mount: distinguish rename from delete, tighten the download and adopt gates - A rename emits a nil old-path invalidation just like an unlink, so the vacate branch marked the handle deleted and later writes through the already-open descriptor were skipped instead of persisted. Carry the delete/rename distinction on the invalidation and mark only an actual delete. - The remote-download install accepted an unversioned response regardless of the handle's version, so during a rolling upgrade a delayed response could install stale content under a newer version. Require the response to be at least as new, with one exception: a handle still lacking local chunks takes the content anyway — it cannot read without it — but does not claim the response's log position. - Copy-event adoption returned without installing, so a foreign touch arriving before the copy's own event lost its timestamps. Content is unchanged either way, so the dirty pages stay valid; a clean handle now takes the entry, while a dirty one keeps its diverged version. * mount: one directory floor instead of a record per child; agree on TTL Review feedback: - Build completion wrote one KV record per direct child inside the cache write lock, so a large directory stalled every other cache operation for O(children) store writes. The directory's listing snapshot already covers every child it saw; make that floor the version for any child without a record of its own, and a child earns a record only when a later event touches it. One map write per build replaces the per-child writes, with the same fencing. - The presence probe read the store directly and so counted a TTL-expired entry as present, judging the path by a record describing content that has logically vanished. It now applies the same expiry the read path does, and an expired path falls back to its directory floor. - Preserve ErrNotFound identity when the commit-time re-read finds the object deleted, so callers still surface a 404. - Assert the rename-away source fence timestamp in the invalidation test. Also record the tombstone ceiling: distinct deleted names in a cached directory accumulate until it is rebuilt or evicted, which prunes everything at or below the new snapshot. * mount: pin the fence's clock domain instead of letting skew decide A log-position fence is stamped by one filer's clock under that filer's in-process lock, so comparing it to an event another filer logged is comparing two unrelated clocks. The two error directions are not equally costly: applying an event the fence already covered is a re-apply the base-equality check absorbs, while skipping one it does not cover leaves the handle holding exactly the state the event was meant to correct, with the subscription cursor already past it — the unhealable staleness this whole PR exists to remove. So refuse to guess. Fences now carry the signature of the filer that stamped them, and a handle records it alongside the position. An event is only fenced out when the filer that logged it is the one that stamped the fence — the logging filer appends its own signature, so its presence identifies the clock domain. Events from any other filer are applied. Positions taken from events keep comparing as before; the subscription already delivers those in order. The invalidation callback takes a struct now: it carries the path, entry, position, delete/rename distinction, and signatures, and was about to need a fifth positional parameter. * mount: follow a foreign rename; key page invalidation on content, not equality - A rename's old-path invalidation now carries the destination, and the handle follows the file there: an open fd tracks the inode, and leaving it on the old path made its next flush recreate that name instead of updating the renamed file. - Dirty pages overlay content, so only a content change invalidates them. Keying that on exact equality meant any timestamp-only event destroyed them, which the copy-adoption marker existed to paper over — a foreign touch could consume the marker and leave the copy's own event to drop the post-copy writes. Comparing content instead makes the marker unnecessary, so it is gone: a metadata-only event keeps the overlay, and a dirty handle keeps its diverged entry unless foreign content supersedes it. - A remote download response that is merely older is now refused even when the handle still lacks chunks; only an unversioned one is taken (and claims no position), since an older response's content predates what the handle reflects. - A refused or unversioned download no longer publishes to the metadata cache, where a zero-position event would clear the entry's version and let an older subscriber event roll the cache back. * mount: page invalidation keys on content alone; unversioned writes claim no position - sameEntryContent compared everything but timestamps, so a foreign chmod, chown, or xattr change counted as a content change and destroyed the dirty-page overlay. It was strict only to serve the copy-adoption marker, which is gone; its one caller now asks the question it actually needs — did the bytes change — so metadata-only events leave the overlay alone. - A rename over an existing file destroys that file, but its open handle was left live and still pointed at the name the renamed source now occupies, so its flush could overwrite it. MovePath already reports the displaced inode; mark that handle deleted. - An acknowledgment was refused whenever its position was numerically lower, even when a different filer stamped the fence it lost to. Two known, differing signatures mean unrelated clocks, so the comparison no longer applies there; unknown signatures still compare as before. - A local write with no log position behind it now records that explicitly instead of deleting its version record. Absence means the directory listing covers the path, which is why the snapshot floor applies; local content the listing never saw must not inherit it, or the events that would correct it are fenced out. * mount: widen the existing lookup functions instead of forking WithVersion twins The versioning work grew a parallel function for every accessor that needed to return a log position — lookupEntryWithVersion beside lookupEntry, maybeLoadEntryWithVersion beside maybeLoadEntry, FindEntryWithVersion beside FindEntry, AcquireFileHandleWithVersion beside AcquireFileHandle, advanceEntryVersion beside advanceEntryVersionTsNs, plus a getPbEntryWithVersion wrapper and an InsertListedEntriesForTest hook. Two names for one operation is two places to keep in step, and the split let callers pick the one that happened to compile. Each pair is now the single original name carrying the position, with callers that do not want it discarding it. filer_pb.GetEntry returns the fence its response already carried rather than a mount-side wrapper re-issuing the lookup, and InsertEntry takes the position its content reflects rather than a test-only twin that inserted without one. The one behavioural knot the merge exposed: AcquireFileHandle had been installing the entry on a pre-existing handle only in its unversioned form, which conflated 'the caller is authoritative' with 'the lookup had no version'. Deferred create is the only caller that means the former, so it now installs explicitly and the map function just acquires. |
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490379bff3 |
Add codespell support with configuration and typo fixes (#10393)
* Add GitHub Actions workflow for codespell on master * Add rudimentary codespell config * Tune codespell config: skip generated code, ignore camelCase, whitelist domain terms Add camelCase/PascalCase regex to ignore common Go/Rust/JS identifiers like allLocations, publishErr, ReadInside, FlushInterval. Also skip templ-generated *_templ.go files, and whitelist a handful of short/domain-specific words (visibles, fo, te, ser, bject, unparseable, keep-alives, tread, anc, ue) that show up as false positives across the tree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Code 2.1.217 / Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix ambiguous typos and protect false positives Fixes typos that codespell reports with multiple candidate suggestions (so `codespell -w` cannot auto-apply them), plus one inline pragma and one config entry to protect legitimate identifiers. Manual fixes (single correct answer chosen from context): - pattens -> patterns (5x) in filer/upload/shell flag help strings - finded -> found (2x) in tarantool storage.lua comment - spacify -> specify (2x) in helm chart values.yaml comment - wether -> whether in skiplist.go docstring - simpe -> simple in mq schema test case name False-positive protection: - Add `//codespell:ignore` next to `source GET's` (possessive of HTTP verb) in s3api_object_handlers_copy_stream.go - Whitelist `auther` in .codespellrc — it's a local variable meaning "authenticator" in weed/security/tls.go, not a typo of "author". Co-Authored-By: Claude Code 2.1.217 / Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Extend codespell ignore list: .git-meta path and thirdparty groupId Also skip `.git-meta` (scratch dir for commit messages that may contain typo words verbatim) and whitelist `thirdparty` — it appears as the literal Maven groupId `org.apache.hadoop.thirdparty` in hdfs3 poms and cannot be renamed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Code 2.1.217 / Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * [DATALAD RUNCMD] Fix non-ambiguous typos with codespell -w Auto-applied fixes to the 44 remaining single-suggestion typos across docs, comments, log messages, tests, config, and one Java pom. === Do not change lines below === { "chain": [], "cmd": "uvx codespell -w", "exit": 0, "extra_inputs": [], "inputs": [], "outputs": [], "pwd": "." } ^^^ Do not change lines above ^^^ * Revert breaking codespell fixes; whitelist unknwon and atleast Two of the auto-applied `codespell -w` fixes were false positives that would break the build/tests: - go.mod: `github.com/unknwon/goconfig` is a real Go module path — the upstream author's GitHub handle is literally `unknwon`. Renaming to `unknown` would fail dependency resolution. - test/benchmark/fuse_db/bin/{sqlite_verify.py,run_mysql.sh,run_sqlite.sh}: `atleast` is a literal CLI mode value (a string constant compared and passed as a positional argument). Rewriting to `at least` splits it into two arguments and breaks the mode check. Reverted those files and whitelisted both words in .codespellrc so future runs won't re-suggest the same broken fixes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Code 2.1.217 / Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Code 2.1.217 / Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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68a4e3347f |
S3: track manifest blob ownership through multipart completion (#10386)
* s3: track manifest blob ownership through multipart completion Manifest blobs made three orphan paths. A partial fold that failed midway kept its earlier batches on volume servers while the write fell back to flat chunks; the fold now records each saved blob and deletes them on error. A completion that failed after preparing left its fresh manifests behind on every retry; the completion state now owns them and deletes them unless a failed rollback left the version entry still holding them. And a completed upload removes its parts metadata-only, which stranded the part-manifest blobs superseded by flattening; those are collected during flattening and deleted once the completion commits. Two shared-chunk hazards nearby: the version-file rollback deleted its data, destroying the still-registered parts (worse once manifests resolve to inner chunks), and the idempotent-replay cleanup data-deleted leftover parts whose chunks the live object references. Both are metadata-only now. * s3: trim chunk manifest comments * s3: test manifest fold rollback and part range selection The fold-with-rollback and the boundary-to-byte-range logic were only exercised by hand against a live server; give both an injectable seam and cover the fold, the below-threshold and SSE no-ops, the midway failure deleting the blobs it saved, and offset-vs-legacy-index range selection including indexes that no longer address the chunk list. |
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542495f1f1 |
S3: fold large chunk lists into manifest chunks on the direct write path (#10383)
s3: fold large chunk lists into manifest chunks on the direct write path The S3 gateway uploads chunks itself and hands the filer a fully prepared entry. On the routed write path (ObjectTransaction) the filer stores that entry as-is, so a large PutObject or CompleteMultipartUpload persisted its whole flat chunk list - a 900GB object carries 120k chunk references in one entry. Manifestize on the gateway before the entry is written, the same way mount, WebDAV, and filer.copy prepare theirs. Multipart part boundaries also record byte offsets now: the stored chunk indexes stop matching the entry once the list is folded, and partNumber reads plus GetObjectAttributes prefer the offsets. Legacy index-only records still work, with bounds checks instead of a possible panic. Copy paths resolve a manifested source into data chunks before their per-chunk copy loops - copying a manifest chunk raw would store its blob as object data still pointing at the source - and a large copied list is folded again on the destination. Completion likewise resolves manifest chunks a part entry may carry (the filer folds an oversized UploadPartCopy range) before rebasing part offsets. |
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d8196428e7 | s3: invalid tagging on CopyObject returns InvalidTag, not InvalidCopySource (#10362) | ||
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6f14be1138 |
stats: remote-mount bucket cache hit/miss metrics (#10352)
Reads of remote-backed entries now record hit or miss in
SeaweedFS_remote_cache_read_total{source,bucket,result} on the filer HTTP
path and the S3 gateway, so cache effectiveness of mounted buckets can be
graphed. Inline-content entries count as hits since they are served
locally without chunks. The filer purges the per-bucket series when the
bucket directory is deleted, so a standalone filer does not accumulate
series across bucket delete/recreate churn.
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0ad83d5061 |
Fix object tagging writing back to the wrong object for nested keys (#10338)
Put/DeleteObjectTagging set the update directory to the bucket root for a null version, so a tag change on allowed/protected.txt landed on protected.txt at the bucket root instead. A principal scoped to one nested key could overwrite a different object sharing the basename, the same class of scope bypass fixed for PutObjectAcl. Share the object's parent-directory resolver across both paths. |
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f3e4a73696 |
s3: return NoSuchKey/NoSuchBucket for a missing CopyObject source (#10332)
* s3: CopyObject returns NoSuchKey for a missing copy source * s3: CopyObject returns NoSuchBucket for a missing source bucket |
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311bc3a6df |
Fix PutObjectAcl writing back to the wrong object for nested keys (#10333)
* Fix PutObjectAcl writing back to the wrong object for nested keys PutObjectAcl set the update directory to the bucket root, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt landed on protected.txt at the bucket root instead. A principal scoped to one nested key could overwrite a different object sharing the basename. Target the object's own parent directory. * Test object ACL update directory resolution for nested keys |
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76ec1d8f0f |
s3: accept raw semicolons in query strings (#10305)
* s3: accept raw semicolons in query strings Go's url.ParseQuery drops any key=value pair containing a raw ';'. A presigned PUT that signs content-type carries X-Amz-SignedHeaders=content-type%3Bhost; when a client or proxy decodes the %3B, the parameter vanished and the upload failed with MissingFields, while AWS accepts the raw ';' as query data. Re-encode it before routing so the pair survives parsing and signature verification. * iam, iceberg: recover raw-semicolon query pairs on the other listeners The standalone IAM API verifies SigV4 with a canonical query recomputed from the parsed query, and Iceberg REST warehouse/parent values may legally contain ';'. Move the normalization middleware to util/http and attach it to both routers. |
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ac524e140a |
s3: enforce role trust policy on direct OIDC bearer authentication (#10302)
A raw OIDC token sent as Authorization: Bearer was validated and mapped to a role through the provider's roleMapping, then authorized against the role's attached policies without ever consulting the role's trust policy. A federated user could act as a role that AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity would refuse to issue a session for with the same token. Run the same trust-policy validation before returning the principal on the bearer path. |
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e6b2849381 |
s3: verify SigV4 against each plausible reverse-proxy host (#10284)
* s3: verify SigV4 against each plausible reverse-proxy host A portless X-Forwarded-Host leaves the client's true port ambiguous: a proxy that kept the Host header makes the backend Host port right, one that rewrote it makes X-Forwarded-Port right, and a client on the scheme's default port signed no port at all. The verifier bet on the backend Host port whenever the hostnames matched, so nginx-style $host/$server_port forwarding got SignatureDoesNotMatch whenever the proxy and backend share a hostname. Try each plausible host value in likelihood order instead of guessing one. * s3: unbracket IPv6 X-Forwarded-Host before matching the request host net.SplitHostPort strips brackets from the request host, so a bracketed portless X-Forwarded-Host like [::1] never matched and lost its port candidate. * s3: cover unbracketed IPv6 forwarded-host candidates; compare with slices.Equal |
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399f8033f8 |
s3: keep listing when empty directories fill the listing window (#10280)
* s3: keep listing when empty directories fill the listing window doListFilerEntries issued a single ListEntries request per directory with Limit = maxKeys+2. Entries that emit nothing - empty directories, the .uploads folder, the marker echo - consume that window without consuming maxKeys, so a bucket whose first window held only empty directories was reported empty and not truncated, and a subdirectory whose window filled up silently dropped the entries behind it. Keep requesting from the last received entry until the quota is filled or a short window shows the directory is exhausted. * s3: test listing across windows of empty directories The test filer client now honors StartFromFileName so repeated windows advance like the real filer. * s3: propagate the request context into directory listing RPCs A disconnected client now cancels the ListEntries streams instead of letting the listing keep issuing requests against the filer. * s3: group per-directory listing parameters into a request struct doListFilerEntries took ten positional parameters; call sites read as string and bool soup. Wrap the per-directory arguments in listDirectoryRequest so recursions and tests name what they pass. * s3: group list request parameters into a struct listFilerEntries took eight positional parameters ending in two bare booleans. Wrap them in listObjectsRequest so the V1 and V2 handlers name what they pass. |
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a9cfbd8d3a |
s3: tear down the emptied .versions directory on last-version delete; drain existing residue (#10278)
* s3: routed last-version delete removes the emptied .versions directory The routed versioned delete (routedDeleteSpecificVersion) repoints the latest pointer and deletes the version file, but unlike the lock-path fallback (updateLatestVersionAfterDeletion) it never tears down the .versions/ directory it just emptied. The residue keeps the key's read path in the self-heal rescan loop: every GET of the deleted key logs event=surfaced plus a GetObject error until the background EmptyFolderCleaner gets to the directory — at least two minutes away on its delay queue, and possibly never (the queue is in-memory, bounded, and gated on the bucket's allow-empty-folders policy). Veeam's lock arbitration probes deleted lock keys continuously, so those windows are always open and the log spam is chronic. ObjectMutation DELETE gains remove_empty_parent: after the child delete, the filer best-effort removes the parent directory in the same locked transaction. Non-recursive on purpose — a concurrent write that lands a new version fails the removal instead of being lost with it. The routed last-version delete sets it on the version-file DELETE, matching the lock-path fallback's contract. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014mMYAHXZySkCCUfpRFNtSv * s3: drain empty .versions residue on read heal and in s3.versions.audit Directories already stranded by pre-teardown deletes (or dropped from the EmptyFolderCleaner's bounded in-memory queue) previously re-entered the self-heal rescan on every GET forever: the heal only cleared the pointer and nothing ever removed the directory, and s3.versions.audit counted the state as clean. When the heal rescan finds no remaining version, remove the directory outright (non-recursive, so orphan children still block and fall back to the pointer clear) and log event=healed mode=empty_dir_removed; the next GET takes the clean not-found path. The audit gains an empty category so the residue is visible, and -heal removes such directories in bulk. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014mMYAHXZySkCCUfpRFNtSv |
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65f2f1488a |
iam: test that groups and roles claims reach request-time policy evaluation
Drives the full path: AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity embeds the claims in the session JWT, AuthenticateJWT restores them, and AuthorizeAction evaluates ForAnyValue:StringEquals on jwt:groups / jwt:roles per bucket. The mock OIDC provider now carries token claims through and surfaces roles, matching the real provider. |
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a16194f5b4 |
refract: reduce mem alloc while building str (#10261)
Signed-off-by: jayl1e <jayl1e@outlook.com> |
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d35c4b3d2d |
s3: fail over routed object writes when the owner filer is unreachable (#10251)
* s3: fail over routed object writes when the owner filer is unreachable A routed object write (multipart completion, PUT, delete, versioned finalize, metadata replace) dialed the ring-selected owner filer directly with no failover. After a filer restarts onto a new address the lock ring can still name the old one, so every routed write hangs on the dead address until the gateway is restarted; CompleteMultipartUpload in particular exceeds client timeouts. Route the transaction through withFilerClientFailover, skipping an owner that recently failed, so a live filer forwards it to the real owner by route_key. Mirrors the read path's getObjectEntryRoutedByKey. * s3: fail over bucket-config writes when the owner filer is unreachable patchBucketEntry dialed the bucket's ring owner directly, so a restarted filer's stale ring address hung every bucket-config write (versioning, lifecycle, object lock, ownership, ACL, policy, CORS) - the same failure as routed object writes. Route it through objectTxnOnFiler so it skips an unreachable owner and a live filer forwards by route_key. |
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f58721b22f |
s3api: optimize encodePath memory allocations (#10252)
* Optimize s3api encodePath to eliminate O(n^2) allocations encodePath built its result via string concatenation in a loop, which is O(n^2) in allocations. For non-ASCII (e.g. Chinese) runes it additionally called make + hex.EncodeToString + strings.ToUpper per byte (~10 allocations per character). Under high QPS with long non-ASCII object keys this produced a very high allocation rate, frequent GC and long GC pauses, causing S3 request latency spikes. Replace with a preallocated strings.Builder, a manual hex lookup table, and a zero-allocation fast path. EncodePath now delegates to encodePath to remove the duplicated implementation. Output is byte-for-byte identical, verified by TestEncodePath and TestEncodePathEqual. Benchmark (long Chinese path): 261 -> 1 allocs/op, 35810 -> 480 B/op, 7.5x faster. Load test (50M calls): 212x fewer allocations, 76x fewer GC cycles. * s3api: drop regexp from encodePath fast path The unreserved-character scan already decides whether any byte needs encoding, so reservedObjectNames.MatchString was a redundant second pass that also ran the RE2 engine on every authenticated request. Rely on the scan alone; output is unchanged. The ASCII fast path drops from ~188ns to ~11ns per call. --------- Co-authored-by: LiuDoge <liudoge@LiuDogedeMacBook-Air.local> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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eefe634962 |
s3api: FULL_OBJECT checksums for CRC multipart uploads (#10236)
CRC64NVME multipart objects now emit a full-object checksum instead of a composite base64-N value, matching AWS (CRC64NVME supports full-object only). Adds x-amz-checksum-type handling (COMPOSITE/FULL_OBJECT) for CRC32/CRC32C/CRC64NVME via CRC combination, resolved at CreateMultipartUpload and applied at completion. |
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d0e47cf4da |
s3: answer directory-path probes like AWS so Flink savepoints restore (#10225)
* s3: answer application/x-directory for a directory without a stored mime A real directory reached via a trailing-slash GET/HEAD answered the octet-stream default when it had no stored mime, so Hadoop-style S3 filesystems (flink-s3-fs-presto and friends) classified the path as a 0-byte file instead of a directory and then failed reading it as one. Answer application/x-directory, the marker type those clients probe for. Stored mimes still echo verbatim, and a file promoted to a directory keeps octet-stream for its data. * s3: 404 GET and HEAD on a bare directory path consistently A directory with no object data of its own answered differently per path: plain GET gave an empty 200, ranged GET and non-versioned HEAD gave 404, and on versioned buckets the null-version fallback adopted the filer directory as a 0-byte object and answered 200. Clients that probe HEAD-then-GET took the 200s at face value, treated the path as an empty file, and never fell back to LIST-based directory discovery. Answer 404 for a bare directory path everywhere, which is what AWS returns for a prefix. A file promoted to a directory keeps its data and stays retrievable. |
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292c7493fa |
s3: enforce bucket quota on logical size and surface read-only state in Admin UI (#10224)
* s3: enforce bucket quota on logical size, not un-vacuumed physical size A bucket full of deleted/overwritten objects awaiting vacuum went read-only while its live data stayed under quota, because enforcement used the raw single-copy volume size with garbage included. Subtract DeletedByteCount via a LogicalSize() helper in the auto-enforce loop, the s3.bucket.quota.enforce command, and the bucket_size_bytes metric (labeled logical but counting garbage too). Deleting objects now relieves quota immediately and enforcement matches the UI usage figure. * admin: surface bucket read-only state in the S3 buckets UI Read the read-only flag quota enforcement writes to filer.conf and show it as a badge in the bucket list and a Status row in the details modal, so an operator can see why writes are being rejected. |
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98e49d2d42 |
s3: read bucket owner and crtime from the entry-free bucket config
The owner index read the raw filer entry off BucketConfig, which no longer carries one. Cache Crtime alongside IdentityId, and pass the owner id rather than the entry through the ListBuckets visibility checks so the scan and granted-bucket paths share one implementation. |
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17af32f3ff |
s3: paginate ListBuckets and serve it from a bucket owner index (#10214)
* s3: paginate ListBuckets with max-buckets, continuation-token, and prefix ListBuckets buffered every bucket entry into one slice and one XML body, which falls over with very large bucket counts. Page through the filer listing instead, cap each response at 10000 buckets like AWS, and honor max-buckets, prefix, and an opaque keyset continuation-token. * s3: maintain a bucket owner index under /buckets/.system/owners Map each bucket owner to its buckets as zero-length entries at /buckets/.system/owners/<owner>/<bucket>, with Crtime mirroring the bucket's creation time. The bucket handlers write the index synchronously, the /buckets metadata subscription reconciles changes made elsewhere (weed shell, other gateways, direct filer operations), and a startup backfill indexes pre-existing buckets before writing a ready marker. Owner names are path-escaped so no identity name can escape the index directory. * s3: serve ListBuckets from the bucket owner index Once the owner index is ready, non-admin identities list their owned buckets straight from it, merged with any buckets their legacy actions name explicitly, so ListBuckets costs O(own buckets) instead of a scan of the global /buckets directory. Admins, identities with a bare List grant or wildcard action patterns, and policy-authorized identities whose grants cannot be enumerated keep the paged scan; policy-routed identities get their owned buckets, matching AWS ListBuckets returning only the caller's buckets. * s3: keep dot-prefixed names under /buckets out of bucket surfaces Dot-prefixed entries (.system) can never be valid bucket names, so refuse to resolve them as buckets and skip them in the shell bucket listing, matching what ListBuckets and the admin UI already do. * test: cover ListBuckets pagination and the owner index end to end * s3: fail closed on a nil identity when routing ListBuckets * s3: decide the IAM authorization mechanism in one place VerifyActionPermission and the ListBuckets owner-index routing each re-derived the session-token / attached-policy / legacy-actions split; extract the decision so the two cannot drift. * s3: heal the owner index on concurrent bucket recreation too The mkdir-lost-the-race path answers BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou just like the up-front existence check, so give it the same index repair. * s3: drop owner-index records for buckets deleted during backfill A bucket removed between the backfill reading its page and writing the index record became a permanent phantom in its owner's listing: the delete's own cleanup ran before the record existed. After indexing each page, re-list the same name range and remove records whose bucket is gone; deletes landing after the re-list find the record and remove it themselves. * s3: add ContinuationToken and Prefix to the ListBuckets schema Keep AmazonS3.xsd aligned with the generated ListAllMyBucketsResult so a regeneration does not drop the pagination fields. |
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c4f0b12a9a |
s3: lazy, bounded, entry-free per-bucket caches (#10213)
* s3: stop warming every bucket's config at startup Listing all buckets in BucketRegistry.init() made S3 gateway startup O(buckets) and pinned every bucket's metadata and config resident, which does not scale past a few hundred thousand buckets. Both caches already have lazy miss paths, so load on first access instead and let the metadata subscription refresh only entries already resident; cold buckets cost one filer round-trip on their first request. * s3: bound the per-bucket caches with LRU eviction The bucket config cache, bucket registry, and their negative caches were plain maps that only ever grew: the config cache TTL made Get miss but never evicted the entry, and the not-found sets grew on every probe of a nonexistent bucket name. Cap all four at 65536 entries with LRU eviction so a gateway keeps its hot working set and evicted buckets reload from the filer on next access. * s3: cache parsed bucket config instead of the full filer entry Each cached BucketConfig retained the whole bucket entry (extended attribute map plus raw content bytes) alongside the fields parsed from it, roughly doubling per-bucket cache cost and keeping data the read path never looks at. Parse everything up front in newBucketConfigFromEntry - now also the creator identity, tags, encryption config, and stored lifecycle XML - and drop the entry. updateBucketConfig now reads the entry fresh from the filer and diffs the mapped extended attributes against it, so the patch is computed against current state instead of a cached copy; the config clone helpers that existed for that path go away. * s3: dedup cold bucket-registry loads per bucket The registry's notFound lock doubled as the load serializer, holding one global mutex across the filer round-trip so first-touch requests for different buckets queued behind each other; the cache fill also happened after the lock was released, so two concurrent misses for the same bucket could both reach the filer. Replace it with a singleflight per bucket that fills the cache inside the flight: different buckets load concurrently, the same bucket loads once. |
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77694d3a93 |
s3: surface transient store errors during multipart resume/copy instead of masking them (#10207)
* s3: surface multipart-list store errors instead of masking them
listMultipartUploads masked a filer/metadata-store list error as an empty
200 response, and listObjectParts masked it as NoSuchUpload. A client
resuming a multipart upload (the Docker Registry S3 driver resolves an
in-progress upload via ListMultipartUploads, then ListParts) reads either
as "upload gone" and fails the upload permanently with a non-retryable
error. Return ErrInternalError so a transient store error stays retryable,
keeping ErrNotFound as an empty list / NoSuchUpload respectively.
* s3: return retryable error for transient CopyObject source lookups
Resolving the copy source is reported as InvalidArgument ("Copy Source must
mention the source bucket and key") whenever the lookup returns any error,
including a transient store error. Clients don't retry a 400, so a resumable
blob commit fails permanently. Keep the client error for a missing, invalid,
directory, or delete-marker source; map a transient store error to
ErrInternalError.
* s3: mark versioned lookup miss with the not-found sentinel
recoverLatestVersionWithoutPointer's terminal miss (a .versions directory
with no pointer, no versions, and no null object) returned a plain error,
so errors.Is-based callers could not tell this designed NoSuchKey state
from a store failure and reported it as an internal error.
* s3: reject a delete-marker copy source with NoSuchKey
getLatestObjectVersion returns the delete-marker entry when the latest
version is a delete marker, and the copy handlers copied its empty stub
into the destination. Every other handler detects ExtDeleteMarkerKey and
answers NoSuchKey; do the same for CopyObject and UploadPartCopy.
* s3: align copy-source not-found detection with the grpc status idiom
The lookup path canonicalizes text-form not-found into the sentinel in
filer_pb.LookupEntry and wraps with %w after that, so matching sentinel
text here was unreachable -- and risky, since a store error whose message
merely mentions the sentinel would be downgraded to a terminal 400.
Match the raw grpc NotFound code instead, like the other version-lookup
sites, and give transient filer errors the 503 that the upload-entry
lookup in this file already returns.
* s3: keep source-bucket versioning lookup errors retryable in copy
CopyObject and UploadPartCopy mapped any source-bucket versioning-state
lookup error to a terminal InvalidCopySource, including transient store
errors; getVersioningState signals a missing bucket with the not-found
sentinel, so split on that and let real store errors surface as 500, the
same mapping the destination-bucket lookup already uses.
* s3: match grpc-transported not-found in multipart list error paths
The list client path returns raw grpc status errors without the sentinel
reconstruction that lookups get in filer_pb.LookupEntry, so errors.Is on
the not-found sentinel never matched a store-reported missing directory;
match the sentinel text as well via a shared helper. The common missing-
directory case still lists as empty with no error and is unaffected.
* s3: complete and abort multipart surface store errors
prepareMultipartCompletionState mapped any upload-directory list or
lookup error to NoSuchUpload, so a transient store error at completion
time made the client discard a fully-uploaded object as gone. Split on
not-found like the sibling listing paths. abortMultipartUpload did the
same on s3a.exists, whose errors are never not-found (filer_pb.Exists
reports that as false with no error) -- a store failure there answered
NoSuchUpload and silently leaked the uploaded parts.
* s3: reject part numbers below 1 in UploadPartCopy
Only the upper bound was checked, unlike PutObjectPart; partNumber=0
passed the route regex and validation and wrote an out-of-range
0000_copy.part into the upload directory.
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c46526822b |
s3: embedded IAM inline policy honors prefix-scoped resources (#10192)
* s3: embedded IAM inline policy honors prefix-scoped resources getActions stripped the trailing wildcard from a resource like arn:aws:s3:::bucket/prefix/*, producing a non-wildcard action (Write:bucket/prefix) that CanDo only ever matched at bucket level, so PutObject under the prefix was denied. Preserve the object path with its wildcard (Write:bucket/prefix/*) to match objects under the prefix, matching the standalone iamapi behavior. * s3: prune bucket-confined wildcard actions on bucket delete actionScopedToBucket treated any wildcard as multi-bucket, so a prefix-scoped action like Write:bucket/prefix/* survived deletion of its own bucket and could re-grant access if the bucket was recreated. Scope the wildcard check to the bucket segment only: a wildcard in the object path stays scoped to its bucket, while one in the bucket segment does not. |
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155140bed8 |
s3: return IncompleteBody instead of 500 for truncated PUT bodies (#10186)
* s3: add IncompleteBody error code * operation: tag a truncated source read as ErrTruncatedBody The chunked uploader wraps both source-read failures and volume-upload failures, and a mid-write volume server drop also carries io.ErrUnexpectedEOF. Tag only the source read so callers can tell a truncated input apart from a server-side fault. * s3: return IncompleteBody for a truncated PUT body A client abort or reverse-proxy timeout truncates the request body mid-upload. putToFiler mapped every streaming-upload failure to InternalError (500), which a reverse proxy relays as a 502. Classify a source-read truncation as IncompleteBody (400) so the response matches AWS and passes through. All S3 write paths share putToFiler, so they all benefit. |
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424cd164e9 |
s3: invalidate stale reader cache locations on chunk read failure (#10156)
* s3: invalidate stale reader cache locations on chunk read failure * filer: share the chunk-read self-heal across reader cache and streaming paths The reader cache retry added a third copy of the invalidate-relookup-compare-retry dance already inlined in PrepareStreamContentWithThrottler and duplicated in retryWithCacheInvalidation. Extract retryFetchWithFreshLocations and route all three through it, parameterized by the refetch primitive. * filer: drop redundant completedTimeNew store in reader cache success path startCaching already stamps completedTimeNew unconditionally before the fetchErr branch; the second store inside the success branch is dead. * filer: make NewReaderCache cache invalidator an explicit parameter The variadic ...CacheInvalidator only ever read the first element, so a caller could pass two and silently get one. Take a single explicit argument and have the non-S3 callers pass nil. * filer: inject reader cache chunk fetch as a struct field Replace the process-global readerCacheFetchChunkData test seam with a per-instance fetchChunkDataFn field defaulted in NewReaderCache, matching how lookupFileIdFn is already wired. Tests set the field on the cache instead of swapping a shared global. * filer: log the location count, not full URLs, on self-heal retry --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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5797fb24ec |
s3: support AWS object form for bucket policy Principal, add NotPrincipal (#10125)
* s3: support AWS object form for bucket policy Principal, add NotPrincipal
Bucket policy statements only accepted a bare string or array of strings for
the Principal element, so the AWS-documented object form was rejected:
"Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root" }
"Principal": { "AWS": ["arn:...", "999999999999"] }
Add a PolicyPrincipal type that parses the bare string, the bare array
(retained for backward compatibility), and the object form keyed by AWS,
Service, Federated or CanonicalUser (each value a string or array). All keyed
values are flattened for principal matching, and the original JSON is preserved
so PutBucketPolicy/GetBucketPolicy returns the exact shape submitted - keeping
infrastructure-as-code tools (Terraform, Ansible) idempotent.
Also add NotPrincipal support (a statement applies to every principal except the
ones named), compiled and evaluated in both policy evaluators, and reject
statements that specify both Principal and NotPrincipal.
* s3: address review - validate principal object form, honor dynamic NotPrincipal
- Reject unsupported Principal object keys (only AWS/Service/Federated/
CanonicalUser) and empty values, so a form like {"AWS":[]} no longer compiles
to zero matchers and silently relies on the match-all fallback.
- Detect both Principal and NotPrincipal by field presence, not by flattened
length, so a present-but-empty field is still rejected.
- Honor dynamic (policy-variable) NotPrincipal/Principal patterns in the
compiled evaluator; previously a NotPrincipal made only of variables was
treated as absent and its exclusion bypassed.
- Add regression tests for the object-form validation and dynamic NotPrincipal.
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3b9e196e5f |
sts: enforce session-policy explicit deny during role chaining (#10103)
* sts: enforce session-policy explicit deny during role chaining A chained AssumeRole caller authenticates with an STS session token whose inline session policy can explicitly deny sts:AssumeRole. The deny check only evaluated the caller's named policies, so such a session could still chain into any role its trust policy admits. Validate the session token in the deny check and honor an explicit Deny in the inline session policy too. * test(sts): integration coverage for AssumeRole authorization Add an end-to-end AssumeRole authorization test (real weed mini + boto3): a non-admin caller assumes a role its trust policy admits, an explicit identity-side deny is blocked, and a session policy's explicit deny blocks role chaining. * sts: skip OIDC tokens and reject revoked sessions in the chaining deny check Review follow-ups on the session-policy deny check: - Guard session validation with !isOIDCToken so a bearer token our STS service cannot validate does not error into a false deny. - Reject a revoked session before evaluating its policy, restoring the revocation enforcement the AssumeRole path lost when it stopped routing through IsActionAllowed. |
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88a4a939aa |
fix(sts): authorize AssumeRole by the role's trust policy (#10097)
* fix(sts): authorize AssumeRole by the role's trust policy The role's trust policy already declares who may assume it, but the caller also had to pass an identity-side sts:AssumeRole check that only the Admin action could satisfy — legacy static identities have no way to express sts:AssumeRole on a role. So assuming any role required a full admin identity. Drop the redundant check and let the trust policy be the authority; scope it to specific principals to restrict who can assume. * sts: resolve caller principal ARN for the trust-policy check A legacy static identity can reach AssumeRole without a PrincipalArn set; passing the empty value would miss a trust policy that names a concrete principal. Resolve it to the canonical user ARN, sharing the logic GetCallerIdentity already used inline. * sts: enforce explicit identity-side deny for AssumeRole Authorizing a named role by its trust policy alone dropped identity-side evaluation entirely, so a caller whose attached policy explicitly denies sts:AssumeRole could still assume any role the trust policy admits. Re-check the caller's policies through the IAM manager for an explicit deny (deny-always-wins) without requiring an allow; the trust policy stays the allow authority. |
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95427b5573 |
security: add BearerPrefix constant for Authorization headers (#10101)
Introduce security.BearerPrefix ("Bearer ", RFC 6750) and use it
everywhere an "Authorization: Bearer <token>" header is constructed,
replacing the scattered "BEARER "/"Bearer " string literals. SeaweedFS
matches the scheme case-insensitively when parsing (security.GetJwt), so
behavior is unchanged; this removes the magic string and settles the
casing on the standard form. The parser's upper-case comparison stays as
is on purpose.
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96d2d13efe |
s3: replicate by fanning out from the gateway to every holder (#10078)
* s3: replicate by fanning out from the gateway to every holder The S3 gateway uploaded each chunk to one volume server, which then relayed the copies to the other replica holders. The gateway now uploads each chunk to every holder in parallel (type=replicate), removing the primary volume server's receive-then-resend relay. AssignVolume returns every replica holder (new repeated Location replicas, forwarded from the master assign), the s3api captures them, and the chunked uploader fans out whenever a chunk has more than one holder. Cipher uploads keep the server-driven path since per-call encryption would diverge the replicas. * s3: cancel sibling replica uploads on the first failure * s3: trim replica fan-out comments * s3: roll back successful fan-out chunk copies when a holder fails A failed fan-out records no FileChunk, so copies that landed on the holders that finished before the cancel were leaked as orphans the caller could not see. Track the holders that succeeded and delete the needle from each (type=replicate, local-only) on failure, leaving nothing behind. |
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089acfbf36 |
fix(s3api): apply static config file updates on reload (#10096)
A config-file reload (SIGHUP) routed through MergeS3ApiConfiguration, which skips identities marked static so dynamic admin/filer updates can't clobber them. That also blocked the config file itself from updating its own identities, so editing a secretKey and reloading had no effect. Thread a fromStaticFile flag from the file-load path into the merge: the authoritative file overwrites its static identities (and reapplies service accounts under them), while dynamic updates still leave them immutable. Mark the rebuilt identities static in the merge so a concurrent RemoveIdentity never observes them as removable mid-reload. |
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cd828f6503 |
s3: propagate IAM changes from standalone weed s3 to peer pods (#10095)
Standalone weed s3 created a master client and registered the receiving SeaweedS3IamCache gRPC service, but never wrapped its credential store with the propagating store. Only the filer-embedded path called SetMasterClient, so IAM mutations on one s3 pod never reached peers; they served a stale in-memory identity cache and returned InvalidAccessKeyId until restarted. Wrap the credential store with the master client when one is available, mirroring the filer path, so mutations fan out over the existing gRPC cache service. |
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c15989387b |
s3tables: allow hyphens in namespace and table names (#10093)
* s3tables: allow hyphens in namespace and table names Iceberg REST clients routinely use hyphenated namespace/table names, but the S3 Tables charset (a-z, 0-9, _) rejected them with 400. Accept '-' as an interior character (names must still start, and namespaces end, with a letter or digit), making the catalog conformant for those clients. A permissive superset of the AWS S3 Tables charset. * s3tables: allow hyphens in table ARN parsing too The ARN regexes still excluded '-', so parseTableFromARN rejected ARNs with hyphenated namespace/table names and existing reject-the-hyphen tests broke. Widen the ARN patterns to match the validator, retarget those tests at a still-invalid leading-hyphen name, and cover ARN parsing with hyphens. |
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1c5f8244a4 |
s3tables: fix create-after-rename overwriting the renamed table (#10091)
* s3tables: purge decoupled table data without deleting the reused name path A renamed or created-over-leftover table keeps its data at a location that differs from its catalog name path. Drop now purges that data location and clears the marker, instead of recursively deleting the name path, which may still hold another table's data. * iceberg: route a table created over a leftover to a unique location When the default location is occupied by a leftover directory (data kept when another table was renamed to this name), create the new table at a unique location so it cannot overwrite that table's metadata. Common case is unchanged. * iceberg: fail table create when the leftover-path check errors A transient filer lookup error fell through as "not occupied", routing the new table back to the default path and risking the very overwrite this check guards against. Propagate the error and return 500 instead. * s3tables: assert all catalog xattrs cleared on decoupled drop Seed the full marker set so the test catches a regression that leaves the policy, tags, version, or entry-type attribute on the reused name path. * s3tables: refuse to drop a table whose data path is an ancestor Corrupt metadata can resolve the data path to the bucket or namespace root, which the bucket-scope check still admits; a recursive purge there would wipe sibling tables. Reject an ancestor data path before deleting. |
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e744b5f2ee |
iceberg: detect table-exists through the wrapped manager error (#10075)
handleCreateTable used a type assertion that fails through WithFilerClient's 'all filers failed' wrap, so a concurrent create that the pre-check missed fell through instead of returning the existing table. Use errors.As. |
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c95401b11a |
iceberg: support table rename (#10068)
* s3tables: add RenameTable operation * iceberg: support table rename * iceberg: test table rename * s3tables: keep table data in place on rename rename is catalog-only: drop the source's catalog xattrs in place instead of recursively deleting its directory, which wiped the metadata.json and data files the renamed destination still points at. treat a missing table-metadata xattr as NoSuchTable in GetTable so the soft-deleted source name stops resolving. * s3tables: test rename preserves data make the in-memory filer honor recursive data deletion and seed the source table's metadata/ and data/ children, then assert a rename leaves them intact, the source name resolves to NoSuchTable, and the destination resolves to the preserved location. * iceberg: map rename errors through wrapped manager error * s3tables: authorize rename destination namespace rename moved a table into the destination namespace after only checking the source, letting a source-authorized caller place tables in namespaces they don't control. require CreateTable on the destination namespace and bucket before writing. * s3tables: purge renamed table data on drop * s3tables: test table data dir derivation |
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7abed4e517 |
s3: skip 503 when client disconnects during remote cache wait (#10071)
s3: don't write 503 to a disconnected client during remote cache wait When the remote-only cache poll returns without chunks, re-check the request context before emitting 503 + Retry-After. A client that disconnected during the wait surfaces as context.Canceled, which the caller already handles silently; writing to the closed connection only produced broken-pipe log noise. |
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0403e47ef6 |
iceberg: support views (#10069)
* s3tables: tag table entries and exclude views from table listings * s3tables: add view CRUD operations * iceberg: support view create, load, exists, drop, and list * iceberg: support view update * iceberg: test view error classification and metadata round-trip * iceberg: pre-check existence and write view metadata only after create * iceberg: map view namespace-not-found to 404 * iceberg: test view create namespace-404 and duplicate no-clobber * s3tables: tag view metadata and entry type atomically CreateView wrote ExtendedKeyMetadata and ExtendedKeyEntryType in two UpdateEntry calls, so a partial failure could leave a view directory untagged. Add setExtendedAttributes to set both in one UpdateEntry. * iceberg: roll back view registration when metadata write fails The metadata file is written after the catalog registers the view. If that write fails, drop the just-created view so it doesn't linger pointing at a missing metadata.json. Reuse the DeleteView path via a shared dropView helper. |
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1ca628d3e9 |
iceberg: support multi-table transaction commit (#10066)
* iceberg: support multi-table transaction commit Add handleCommitTransaction for POST /v1/transactions/commit. Validation is atomic across all table-changes (resolve, load, evaluate every requirement before any write); metadata writes and pointer flips are best-effort with rollback, so this is not crash-atomic. * iceberg: route transactions/commit with and without prefix * iceberg: test transaction commit request decoding * iceberg: restore full prior table state on transaction rollback * iceberg: test transaction rollback restores full prior table state * iceberg: only clean up metadata for rolled-back tables |
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628ce57625 |
iceberg: support table register (#10067)
* s3tables: add RegisterTable op * iceberg: support table register * iceberg: test register table * iceberg: parse engine-written metadata version from location * iceberg: test metadata version parsing for both filename forms * iceberg: map register errors through wrapped manager error * iceberg: validate register metadata-location bucket and reject traversal * iceberg: log register metadata load failure |
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63f2f0bef5 |
s3: keep a file promoted to a directory retrievable as an object (#10070)
* filer: treat a directory carrying object data as an S3 key object A file promoted to a directory by a child write keeps its chunks, inline content, or remote-tiered entry. Recognize that as a directory key object, not only when a Mime is set, so the object still lists, demotes on delete, and is not reclaimed by cleanup like the object it still is. * filer: keep the empty-folder cleaner from reclaiming a promoted object The cleaner skips directory key objects, but its check only looked at the Mime. Mirror the chunks/content/remote check so a file promoted to a directory is not deleted once its children are gone. * s3: serve ranged GET for a directory that carries object data Reject only zero-size directories so a file promoted to a directory streams range requests instead of returning 404, while empty directories still 404. * s3: return HEAD metadata for a directory that carries object data HEAD now 404s a directory only when it has no data, so a promoted object is retrievable while empty/implicit directories still fall back to LIST. |
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4bcd27fb6f |
s3api: preserve equals signs in tag values (#10058)
* s3api: preserve equals signs in tag values * s3api: decode tag key once in parseTagsHeader --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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6de283ccaa |
iceberg: return 400 for invalid namespace/table names (#10051)
* iceberg: return 400 for invalid namespace/table names The S3 Tables name charset (a-z, 0-9, _) is stricter than the Iceberg REST spec, so clients sending hyphens or uppercase hit a validation error. That error fell through to 500; it's client input, so map it to 400 BadRequestException across the namespace and table handlers. * iceberg: tighten name-validation error matching Match the validator's own phrasings (invalid/must/cannot) instead of a bare "namespace name"/"table name" substring, so an unrelated fault that happens to mention a name isn't misreported as a 400. Lowercase first to stay robust to message capitalization. |
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0ded0984a4 |
iceberg: support namespace property updates (#10052)
* iceberg: support namespace property updates
Add POST /v1/namespaces/{namespace}/properties to the REST catalog. It
applies the request's removals and updates and returns the removed/updated/
missing summary the spec defines. A new UpdateNamespace op on the S3 Tables
manager rewrites the stored namespace properties; AWS S3 Tables namespaces
have no properties, so this is the SeaweedFS-side backing for the catalog.
* iceberg: dedup namespace property removals
A key repeated in removals was deleted on its first occurrence, then
reported as missing on the next — landing in both removed and missing.
Skip keys already processed.
* iceberg: map namespace-update backend errors to REST statuses
UpdateNamespaceProperties returned 500 for every manager failure, masking
the namespace being dropped between read and write, or a denied caller.
Inspect the typed S3TablesError and answer 404/403 accordingly, 500 only
for the rest. Also replaces the GetNamespace not-found string match.
* iceberg: test the namespace-properties conflict path
Cover the 422 returned when a key appears in both removals and updates.
The check runs before any backend call, so it needs no filer.
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44d575100a |
fix(s3api): preserve requested AES256 copy encryption (#10049)
* fix(s3api): preserve requested AES256 copy encryption Problem CopyObject metadata processing ignored an explicit x-amz-server-side-encryption: AES256 request header. A destination copy could lose the requested SSE-S3 metadata even though KMS requests were handled. Root cause processMetadataBytes only wrote the destination SSE header when the requested algorithm was aws:kms. Any other explicit SSE algorithm fell through to the source-preservation branch. Fix Write the requested SSE algorithm whenever x-amz-server-side-encryption is present, and keep KMS-specific metadata handling limited to aws:kms. Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> * fix(s3api): reject unsupported copy encryption algorithms A mistyped or unsupported x-amz-server-side-encryption value on a copy request slipped past validation and got persisted as the destination's algorithm header, advertising encryption that was never applied. Reject anything other than AES256 or aws:kms up front. * fix(s3api): write SSE key metadata for empty encrypted copies A zero-byte source copied with an explicit SSE request took the no-content branch and never ran the encryption path, leaving the object with a bare algorithm header but no key. HEAD then advertised SSE while the encryption-state machine saw the header as orphaned. Run the inline encryption path when the destination requests encryption so the key metadata is written too. * s3api: use SSEAlgorithmKMS constant in copy metadata handling * test(s3api): cover source SSE preservation on copy * test(iam): allow the local client's real source IP in SourceIp tests The aws:SourceIp allow policies hardcoded the loopback CIDRs, but a CI runner reaching the server over localhost can be observed with one of the host's RFC1918 addresses (the S3 endpoint is advertised on a 10.x interface), so the positive-condition PutObject was denied and the allow assertion flaked while the deny path passed trivially. Broaden the allow list to loopback plus private ranges via a shared helper, and log the denial on each failed attempt so any residual failure is diagnosable. --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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d7860ddf24 | s3api: reject malformed Range offsets (#10034) |