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Commits
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d1f503181b |
[s3] force filer apply s3 expiry metadata (#10469)
* fix: apply S3 Expiry Metadata * add test Header X-Seaweedfs-Expires-S3 * resolve comments * test entry lookup by mtime * filer: skip s3 expiry stamp on versioned entries The s3 expiry path skips entries carrying a version id, so stamping one takes away its expiry rather than moving it onto mtime. Files under .versions/ are written once, so crtime already tracks their needles. --------- Co-authored-by: Konstantin Lebedev <whitefox@mayflower.work> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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f46b2a1925 |
Stop the filer test helpers from pinning gigabytes of log buffers (#10560)
* log buffer: wake the interval loop on shutdown instead of sleeping through it loopInterval parked in time.Sleep(flushInterval) and only re-checked IsStopping when it woke, so a buffer shut down early kept both loop goroutines - and the PreviousBufferCount+1 slabs of BufferSize they reach - alive for up to a full interval afterwards. Select on shutdownCh against a ticker instead, and give the loops a WaitGroup so a test can observe that they exit. * test: release the filers the server tests build Every helper here left its filer's meta log buffer running, so each test pinned PreviousBufferCount+1 buffers of BufferSize for the rest of the run: ~3.5GB of live heap across the package, which overruns the address space on linux/386 and kills the 32-bit job with an out-of-memory throw. Thread the test through the helpers so the buffer is shut down on cleanup, and shut the subscribe harness's filer down outright - its deletion loop keeps the whole filer reachable otherwise. That harness quiesces its flush path first, since Filer.Shutdown closes the store a flush still in flight would write through. |
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a9de90ae29 |
test: wait for every queued flush before deleting the log files (#10546)
TestSubscribeLoop_FlushProvenGapSkipsToRetained deleted the log files once the eviction watermark's own flush had landed, while the windows sealed after it were still queued. Those flushes then wrote their files back, and the subscriber served them from disk instead of taking the gap-skip path, so the windows whose files really were gone came out missing. Wait through the last sealed window instead. |
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813a4b0711 |
fix(filer): stop skipping recent unflushed events on metadata subscription gaps (#10501)
* fix(filer): don't skip unflushed events on metadata subscription gaps A subscriber that falls behind the in-memory log ring during a write burst could have its read position jumped past events that were evicted but not yet flushed to disk — silently lost for filer.backup/filer.sync/ mount subscribers. Route all three gap-skip sites through resolveDiskGapResume: only skip past windows older than a settled horizon (2*LogFlushInterval); recent gaps wait for the flush and re-read disk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(filer): harden metadata gap-skip guard Address review findings on the settled-horizon guard: - local subscriptions: gate the skip on the buffer's flush watermark observed before the disk read (resolveLocalGapResume) — a disk miss is then proof the gap is empty, with no wall-clock assumptions - aggregated subscriptions: cap skips strictly below the horizon boundary (persisted reads exclude ts <= cursor) and pace capped advances, so the sliding horizon cannot cause disk-probe spinning - replace unbounded sync.Cond waits with a bounded select on the buffer's subscriber channel + retry timer + ctx cancellation, eliminating the lost-wakeup stall Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(filer): close remaining gap-skip loss paths from re-review - log_buffer: a sentinel-offset (time-based) read below the earliest in-memory entry silently started at earliest, skipping a window that may hold evicted-but-unflushed events. Track the ring's eviction watermark (lastEvictedTsNs) and keep the inclusive fast path only when nothing at/after the position was ever evicted; otherwise return ResumeFromDiskError so the subscription gap guard decides. - capped horizon advances stay on the disk-probe path (never expose a mid-gap position to the memory read) and keep pacing - gap jumps land just below earliest: positions are exclusive, so the earliest entry itself is still delivered - subscriber notification keys include clientId/epoch so a replacement stream never inherits a channel the old stream's cleanup closes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(log_buffer): generalize the eviction-watermark read gate Third-review findings: - epoch/zero-time reads bypassed the eviction watermark: gate them the same way, so a SinceNs=0 subscriber cannot silently start at the earliest retained entry after an unflushed window was evicted - apply the watermark gate regardless of the cursor's batch offset (batch offsets carry no meaning for time-based reads); this also serves adjacent cursors (earliest == current+1) from memory instead of stalling them in the gap loop - LoopProcessLogData reader names include clientId/epoch, since they are registered as subscriber keys internally (same collision as the outer notification keys) - test: pin the gate (below/at watermark, epoch-after-eviction) and update the slow-consumer test to the sharper contract — complete in-memory history is served from memory; disk only once evicted Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(log_buffer): watermark equality is unsafe for inclusive sentinel cursors Sentinel (Offset <= 0) time-based cursors search from ts-1ns, i.e. they read inclusively of their own timestamp — and the evicted window may end exactly at that timestamp. Allow watermark equality only for exclusive (positive-offset) cursors; sentinel cursors must be strictly above it. Also shut down the test buffer and pin the equality cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(filer): wait on an empty aggregated buffer instead of falling through When a disk read finds nothing for a ResumeFromDiskError gap and the aggregated buffer has no readable entries (zero earliest time), resolveDiskGapResume declines to advance and control fell through to the in-memory read — which returns ResumeFromDiskError again immediately, spinning through the probe cycle without any wait. Fold the case into the existing recent-gap branch so it waits (notification, cancellation, or the retry interval) before re-probing, matching the local subscription path, which already waits unconditionally. * fix(filer): serve the exact eviction-boundary entry without another flush wait When the flush watermark has passed the earliest in-memory entry but that entry sits exactly one nanosecond above the cursor, the exclusive resume target collapses onto the cursor and resolveLocalGapResume declines to advance — while a sentinel cursor at the eviction watermark keeps deferring the in-memory read to disk. Progress then depends on the next flush cycle. Re-arm the cursor with a positive (exclusive) offset instead: ReadFromBuffer explicitly allows positive-offset cursors at the watermark, so the boundary entry is served from memory immediately. Also promote the aggregated path's horizon-capped gap skip to a warning: that skip may pass events a stalled flush lands later (the aggregated ring has no flush watermark to gate on), so operators should see when a flush stall outlasts the settled horizon. * fix(filer): resume a gap skip with an exclusive cursor The resume position landed one nanosecond below the earliest in-memory entry but kept the inclusive sentinel offset. When that timestamp is also the eviction watermark, the read gate answers ResumeFromDiskError for an inclusive cursor, the disk read finds nothing, and the resume target collapses onto the cursor, so neither helper can advance: the subscriber parks on timed waits forever. A skip is only taken once the gap is proven empty, so nothing remains to deliver at the resume timestamp. Resume exclusively instead, and let an inclusive cursor already sitting on the target count as progress. * fix(filer): gate aggregated gap skips on eviction, not wall clock Wall-clock age never proved persistence. The aggregated ring has no flush watermark because peers persist their own local logs, so a horizon of 2 * LogFlushInterval was standing in for one. While the disk stayed empty the horizon kept sliding forward and walked the cursor past evicted-but-unflushed events one window at a time - the volume-outage stall this change set exists to survive. The ring does carry a real proof: its eviction watermark. If nothing at or after the cursor was ever dropped, memory still holds every entry after it and the gap is provably empty. Below the watermark entries were dropped and only the producing peer's flush can supply them, so wait for that flush instead of advancing. The skip that remains is the one the ring can prove, which keeps the infinite-loop guard for a genuinely empty gap. * perf(filer): stop re-probing disk on every metadata append A subscriber parked on a gap woke on the log buffer's subscriber channel, which fires on every append. On the aggregated path each wake re-ran a full ReadPersistedLogBuffer - a ListDirectoryEntries plus a readahead goroutine - so one parked subscriber turned every cluster-wide metadata event into a store query, exactly while the cluster is already struggling with the flush stall that parked it. An append also cannot settle the gap: what this waits on is a peer persisting its own log, which nothing local signals. Wait on the timer alone there. The local buffer does signal its flush on that channel, so keep it, but drain the stale token first: otherwise the appends riding the same channel spin the wait at write rate. The retry interval covers the notification the drain discards. * fix(filer): surface a metadata subscriber parked on a gap Refusing to skip an unresolved gap trades silent loss for a silent stall, and a stall is no easier to diagnose: filer.sync and mount followers just stop advancing, with no error on either end. The only trace was a V(3) line nobody runs with. Warn on entry and once a minute after, and carry a subscribe_gap_stalled gauge for the duration, so a flush that never lands shows up as a stalled subscriber rather than a consumer that mysteriously went quiet. * refactor(filer): drop the metadata listener cond with no waiters left Both listenersCond.Wait() sites are gone, so listenersWaits never leaves zero, the guard in the filer's notify callback never fires, and the two Broadcast calls around client registration wake nobody. Remove the cond, its counter and its lock, and pass a nil notify func: the log buffer already skips a nil one, and the subscriber channels carry these wakeups now. * test(log_buffer): drive the eviction watermark through a real seal Both eviction tests wrote lastEvictedTsNs directly, leaving the one line that sets it uncovered: copyToFlushInternal has to read slot 0 before SealBuffer shifts it out, and moving that read one statement later still passed every test. Append past the ring instead, and check the watermark appears only on the seal that drops a window, matches that window's stop, and then advances. The buffer under test never flushes, matching the aggregated meta ring where the watermark is the only emptiness proof. * refactor(filer): build the subscriber reader name once per stream It was rebuilt on every loop iteration from values that cannot change for the life of the stream. Hoist it next to the notification key it mirrors. * docs(filer): tighten the gap-handling comments Several ran to eight lines restating the same reasoning at each site. Keep the non-obvious why, drop the retelling. * fix(filer): mark a confirmed disk position as an exclusive cursor A disk read returns the timestamp of the last entry it handed to the subscriber, but the cursor built from it stayed inclusive. Land that cursor exactly on the eviction watermark and the read gate sends it back to disk for an entry the disk just delivered; the re-read finds nothing, neither emptiness proof holds for an inclusive cursor there, and the subscriber parks - until some later flush, or forever while one stays stalled. Everything after the watermark was sitting in memory the whole time. Carry the offset instead, so it also covers the ring evicting onto the cursor after the read rather than before it. The constant is no longer gap-specific, so it is now named for what it asserts. * perf(filer): re-park a gap wait woken by an ordinary append Draining one stale token did not bound anything: the subscriber channel carries an append per metadata write, so under continuous writes the next one satisfies the wait immediately. During the write burst these stalls come from, each parked subscriber ran the recovery loop at write rate rather than the intended two-second cadence. Only a flush can settle a gap, so check the flush watermark on wake-up and go back to waiting if an append is all that arrived. The retry timer is created once, so re-parking does not extend the interval. * fix(filer): keep a disk-derived cursor inclusive Marking every disk position exclusive assumed the entry at that timestamp was the only one there. On the aggregated stream it is not: disk can deliver one filer's persisted event at T while another filer's event at the same T is still unflushed in the aggregate ring. The exclusive cursor skipped it, and since the persisted reader also excludes ts <= its start, nothing would ever bring it back. Take the weaker guarantee instead. The reason the exclusive cursor was introduced - an inclusive one landing on the eviction watermark parks forever - is better answered in the resolvers: at the watermark memory holds nothing (retained windows start strictly after it) and the persisted reader cannot return that entry at any later time either, so refusing the gap buys nothing and never ends. Skip it whatever the cursor's inclusivity. That proof does not depend on a flush, so the local resolver takes it as a second, independent disjunct alongside its flush watermark. * perf(filer): wake a parked gap wait on flushes only Re-parking on an append bounded the work but not the wake-ups: the subscriber channel carries one per metadata write, so a parked subscriber still took a scheduling round-trip per write. Worse, draining it kept the channel empty, so every writer's non-blocking notify succeeded instead of falling through - the burst paid for the wake-ups too. Give the log buffer a flush-only subscriber list, notified from loopFlush, and park on that. The append channel now fills once and stays full, which is exactly the state the non-blocking send is designed for. * fix(filer): stop the gap-stall gauge from leaking a series per connection clientName is req.ClientName + "@" + peer address, so it carries the client's ephemeral source port and changes on every reconnect. Labelling the gauge with it minted a new series per connection, and clearing it only ever Set(0), so nothing was ever released - a client in a reconnect loop grows the filer's metric map and /metrics payload without bound. Key it on the stable client-supplied name, as the neighbouring subscribe gauge already does, and delete the series on teardown. Two logging fixes ride along, both in the same reporter: the resume warning was unpaced while the park warning throttles to one a minute, so a burst that parks and resumes every couple of seconds warned on every cycle; and clear() doubled as the teardown path, announcing "resumed after 14m0s parked" for a client that actually gave up and disconnected still behind. * fix(filer): give a parked gap wait the exits the read loop has A park never re-enters the read loop, so every exit that loop relies on stopped working while a subscriber was parked. It kept scanning the filer store every 2s for a client that a higher-epoch reconnect had already superseded, until the TCP connection finally died - hours, on a half-open one. It never reached the only code that honors UntilNs, so bounded callers like `weed shell fs.verify` and `filer.meta.tail -until=` hung instead of exiting. And a notification channel closed out from under it turned the bounded wait into a spin, since a receive on a closed channel returns instantly. Check all three where the subscriber actually waits. Bound the wait too: waiting is productive while the window is still queued for flush, but a peer that never returns, or whose filer store this filer cannot read at all, makes it permanent - and a subscriber that silently stops delivering is no better than one that silently skips. Fail the stream after that instead of hanging, loudly enough to say which gap and for how long. * fix(log_buffer): keep the eviction gate out of the shared read path The gate belonged to the filer's subscribe loops but was installed in ReadFromBuffer, which the message queue shares and which has no gap handling of its own. Three MQ paths broke on it: GetUnflushedMessages asks for everything in memory past the flush watermark and got ResumeFromDiskError instead, so SQL results silently dropped unflushed rows; a RESET_TO_EARLIEST consumer's epoch cursor was sent to disk, and the MQ disk reader resets an empty read back to epoch, so the whole partition replayed on every pass; and a disk cursor landing on the watermark carried offset -2, which the gate refused and the disk reader's ts <= start filter also skips, so neither side could ever serve it. The rewrite also dropped the old Offset <= 0 requirement, letting a stale positive-offset cursor jump to memory over on-disk history, and refused any negative-timestamp cursor even with nothing evicted. Restore the read path exactly as it was and keep only lastEvictedTsNs, which is the useful primitive. The filer loops now consult the watermark themselves before reading memory, which is where the gap handling that makes the refusal actionable already lives - and they check it every pass, not just when the disk came up empty, since a disk read can leave the cursor short of the watermark too. * fix(filer): read the log file whose window spans past its own name A log file is named for the start of the window it holds, but a window runs up to a flush interval longer, so "12-30" can hold entries through 12:31:58. File selection compared the cursor's minute against that name and skipped anything sorting earlier, so a subscriber resuming at 12:31:10 never saw the rest of that file: the read reported nothing on disk while the entries sat in it. That was survivable when a miss only meant "wait and retry", but the gap resolvers now read a miss as proof the range is empty and move the cursor past it, which turns those entries into silent loss. Start the file scan a flush interval early; entries are still filtered against the exact cursor, so this only opens one more file and never re-delivers. * fix(filer): resume a gap with a cursor the memory read will serve Reverting the eviction gate put ReadFromBuffer back to refusing every positive-offset cursor below the in-memory window, but the resolvers still handed back one - earliest-1 marked exclusive. So the resume bounced straight to ResumeFromDiskError, the disk had nothing, and the resolver saw its own cursor as no progress and parked: a subscriber stalled, and after the new bound failed outright, with the whole gap sitting in the ring the entire time. The exclusive marking only existed to dodge a park the gate itself caused, and the gate is gone. Resume at earliest with the sentinel offset, which is the position master used and which case 2.1 reads inclusively. That makes the resume unconditionally ahead of the cursor, so the progress check it needed goes away with it. * fix(filer): stop dropping a log file whose window outruns its name Listing the earlier file was not enough: the iterator then decided whether to read it by comparing the *following* file's name against the cursor, which treats that name as an upper bound on this file's contents. It is not one. A file is named for the start of the window it holds, minute-truncated, and the window runs up to a flush interval longer, so "12-30" can hold an event at 12:31:20 while "12-31" sits right after it - and a cursor at 12:31:10 skipped straight past the event. Bound the decision on the file itself: skip it only when its name plus the minute truncation plus a flush interval still lands at or before the cursor. That also covers the last file in the queue, which the old check never skipped because it had no successor to compare against. * fix(filer): stop a chunk-ref read from rewinding the subscriber CollectLogFileRefs reports the minute-level name of the last file it shipped, and the caller assigns that straight to the read position. Since the scan now reaches back a flush interval to catch a spanning file, a request at 12:31:10 that picks up the 12-30 ref moved the cursor to 12:30:00 - so the memory read that followed replayed events older than the client's own SinceNs and re-sent what the chunk reader had already been handed. The same rewind was reachable before, within a minute, whenever the last file's name sorted behind the request. Clamp the reported position to the one that was asked for. It still under-advances by design, since the server never reads the entries it ships refs for and cannot know where they end. * fix(filer): resume below earliest so a one-entry window is not skipped Moving the resume onto earliest itself was wrong for the smallest window there is. A sealed window holding a single entry has startTime == stopTime, and the sealed-buffer lookup only enters a window whose stopTime is strictly after the cursor, so a cursor sitting exactly on earliest walks past it and its sole event is never delivered. Low-volume metadata windows are routinely one entry, which is precisely when losing it is hardest to notice. Go back to one nanosecond below, which takes the startTime.After branch and returns the whole window, and keep the sentinel offset the memory read requires. The earlier test used an active multi-entry buffer, where both cursors happen to work; the new one seals single-entry windows and compares which entry comes back. * fix(filer): count a persisted read as progress only when it moves A chunk-ref read reports the minute-level name of the last file it shipped, now clamped so it never rewinds, so it comes back non-zero even when it names the position the subscriber already held. The loops read non-zero as progress: they cleared the stall timer, then found the cursor still short of the eviction watermark and parked again. Every retry re-shipped the same refs and reset the timer, so the bound that is supposed to end an unrecoverable stall was never reached - and a chunk-capable client buffers those refs waiting for an event that never comes, so it just accumulates duplicates. Require the reported position to be strictly ahead of the cursor. * fix(filer): count the evicted ranges the aggregated stream cannot prove The eviction watermark belongs to the merged ring, but the disk it gets checked against is the union of every peer's own log and each peer flushes on its own schedule. A read that lifts the cursor from below the watermark to above it may have done so entirely on a peer that is already ahead, while a lagging peer still holds unflushed events inside the range just crossed; when it flushes them they sit behind the cursor and are never delivered. One aggregate maximum is not proof that every peer persisted the range. Nothing available locally separates that from the ordinary case where every peer had in fact persisted it: the aggregator tracks peers by address while log files carry a random per-filer id, so "has this peer flushed through T" cannot be answered here at all. Deciding it needs the source filer's own flush watermark carried on the subscribe stream, which is a wire change this does not make. Count and log the crossing so the window is at least measurable instead of invisible. * fix(filer): send log file refs through the pipelined sender sendLogFileRefs wrote on the raw gRPC stream while pipelinedSender's goroutine concurrently calls Send for queued memory events - two senders on one stream, which gRPC forbids. The window used to open once per fall-behind; the gap retry loop now reopens it every pass. Routing refs through the sender also restores ordering: refs used to overtake up to 1024 queued events, and the client treats any non-ref message as the signal to process buffered refs, so overtaken refs were applied against the wrong position. The reason refs bypassed the sender was the batcher: their TsNs of 0 reads as far behind, and the client recognizes refs by the top-level field alone - a refs envelope would drop its Events tail, and refs inside Events would be applied as an empty event. Teach the batcher instead: refs messages always go solo, and one drained mid-batch is sent solo right after that batch. * fix(filer): count parked subscribers instead of flagging them by name The per-client gauge series could not work. Its label was rebuilt from the peer address at first, which leaks a series per reconnect; keyed on the client-supplied name instead, it collides - every mount registers as "mount" - so one stream's teardown deleted a parked sibling's live series, and the sibling never re-created it because its own park state said the gauge was already set. Either way the alert this gauge exists to drive goes dark. A count needs no identity: Inc on park, Dec on resume or teardown, scope as the only label. Client details stay in the logs. Also start warning only once a stall has outlived the warn interval. park() warned immediately on every first park, so catch-up churn that parks and resumes every couple of seconds logged a warning pair per cycle - exactly the flood the pacing was supposed to prevent, burying the long-stall warnings that matter. * fix(filer): one gap resolver, and re-arm an unservable adjacent cursor The two resolvers were the same function - the aggregated one is the local one with a flush watermark of zero, since its ring never flushes - duplicated down to the comment justifying the resume target. A fix applied to one and not the other is how the two streams drift; merge them. The merge carries the one behavioral fix both copies needed. Timestamp collision bumps make adjacent entries exactly 1ns apart, so an entry ending an evicted window leaves the cursor exactly one below earliest with a positive batch offset. The resume target then equals the cursor and both copies refused it as no progress - but that cursor cannot be served (ReadFromBuffer refuses positive offsets below the window) while the sentinel resume at the same timestamp is, and both deliver exactly the entries after it. Refusing parked a subscriber whose data was entirely in memory: until the next flush locally, and through a 15-minute stall failure on the aggregated path. Advance on equal target when the held cursor is exclusive; a sentinel there is already served, so it still refuses. * fix(filer): a bounded subscription parked exactly on UntilNs is finished The park's UntilNs check was strict while the bound is inclusive and cursors are exclusive: a disk read whose last entry sits exactly on UntilNs leaves the cursor there with everything up to the bound already delivered. If the next range was an unprovable gap, the completed subscription parked anyway and eventually failed - fs.verify hanging and then erroring on a healthy cluster. * fix(filer): re-derive the subscribe loops as one state machine The loops had grown three generations of gap handling - a post-disk-read branch, a post-memory-read branch, and an every-pass guard bolted on in front of the memory read - each consulting state the others mutated. The worst interaction wedged the aggregated stream permanently: diskExhausted compared the disk result against the cursor that result had just updated, and paired it with a ResumeFromDiskError latch that only a resolver advance cleared, so one fall-behind sent every later pass into the gap block and LoopProcessLogData never ran again. Mounts kept a healthy-looking stream and applied nothing. Both loops now run the same derived sequence. One disk pass; progress is the pre-update cursor against the result, freshly each pass. One gap decision before the memory read: a cursor the ring evicted past either keeps draining the disk (it just advanced), resolves forward (the gap is proven empty), or parks - and a cursor memory refused with nothing evicted after it re-arms onto the retained window. The stale-latch branch is gone: the error is only consulted on a pass whose own disk read came up empty. All four parks go through one parkOnGap helper, so the exits live in one place. The eviction watermark is read after the disk read and the same value feeds both the guard and the unproven-crossing report, which previously compared against a snapshot taken before a potentially minutes-long backlog read and missed evictions landing during it. The next-day jump now clears the stall reporter - it used to leave a stale park epoch that could kill the next brief park instantly at the 15-minute bound - and counts its own watermark crossing. Chunk-ref reads get two rules the old loops lacked. Refs are sent once per position: retries re-sent identical batches every two seconds into a client that only drains them on a non-ref message, growing an unbounded pending list. And when refs cannot advance the cursor - they report file start minutes, which sit below the content the client was actually given, pinning the cursor under the watermark forever during bursts - the pass falls through to entry reads, which move the cursor by real timestamps and double as the client's drain signal. * fix(filer): give up on an unprovable gap instead of failing the stream Failing after maxGapStall assumed the client could do something better, but every consumer just reconnects at the same SinceNs and hits the same wall, so an unprovable gap - a dead peer, or a peer whose filer store this filer cannot read at all - turned into a permanent 15-minute fail/reconnect loop delivering nothing. Master handled the same state by skipping instantly and silently. Take the middle: wait the full bound, then abandon the gap and resume at the eviction watermark, where everything retained starts strictly after, so the loss is exactly the range that could not be proven. The skip shares the unproven-crossing counter and logs at error level - loss is bounded, recorded, and the stream keeps working. A stall with nothing evicted past the cursor loses nothing by waiting, so it restarts the clock and keeps parking rather than skipping. * test(filer): pin the file-skip bound through the production predicate The spanning-file test asserted against its own copy of the arithmetic, so a regression in the iterator - restoring the next-file-name comparison or dropping the flush-interval term - would keep CI green while re-introducing the silent loss the fix closed. Extract the bound into logFileMayContainAfter, call it from the iterator, and point the test at it; breaking the production expression now fails the test. * test(log_buffer): pin the flush-subscriber contract The registry the filer's gap parks wait on had no test at all. Cover the observable contract: an append never wakes a flush subscriber, a flush does with the watermark already stored, unregistering closes the channel so an abandoned waiter unblocks, and double or unknown unregisters are harmless. The store-before-notify ordering in loopFlush is what makes the parks' wake-up re-check sound, and it is not black-box testable - reordering leaves a same-goroutine window of nanoseconds that hundreds of tight round-trips never catch. Mark it load-bearing at the site instead; a reorder now at least has to argue with the comment it deletes. * fix(filer): a -1 SinceNs is a position, not the refs-gate sentinel The once-per-position refs gate used -1 as "never sent", but a client may legally subscribe with SinceNs=-1, whose cursor timestamp is exactly -1: the very first pass then believed refs were already sent there and fell back to streaming the whole persisted history entry by entry - the bootstrap load chunks mode exists to avoid. Use MinInt64, which no cursor can carry. * refactor(filer): drop the aggregator's listener cond with no waiters left Same shape as the FilerServer cond already removed: nothing increments ListenersWaits and nothing ever calls Wait, so the three Broadcasts wake nobody and the notify callback's guard is always false. Aggregated subscribers wake through the buffer's subscriber channels now. * fix(filer): make the gap metrics say what they count The crossing counter's help text described only the aggregated peer case, but give-ups increment it for local stalls too - a wedged local flush - which sends an operator chasing peer replication when the problem is the local store. Label it by scope and say both. The stalled gauge counted every park, including waits with nothing evicted and nothing at risk, while its help text promised evicted-but-unpersisted events; describe it as what it is, a count of subscribers parked on a gap. * test(filer): make the flush and stall tests assert what they claim The flush-subscriber rounds were vacuous: the probe entry sat above the round timestamps, so every round entry was collision-bumped and the stored watermark exceeded the local value each assertion compared against - the same bump mistake this test suite already made once. Put the probe below the rounds and guard each round against bumping, so a vacuous setup fails instead of passing. The stall-outcome test wrote the reporter's park epoch directly, bypassing the gauge Inc that gaveUp() later Decs - leaving the shared process gauge at -1 for every test that runs after it. Park through the real path, age the park by hand, release what the test holds, and assert the gauge lands back where it started. * fix(filer): finish the stream checks before marking it parked parkOnGap stamped the reporter before waitOnGap ran its instant done exits, so a bounded subscription completing inside a gap state was marked parked for the microsecond before done fired - a phantom gauge blip and a false "disconnected still behind" warning on every healthy completion. Fold waitOnGap into parkOnGap so the done exits run first and the park mark only ever covers a stream that actually waits. While the park owns its timer, back the retry off as the stall ages - 2s probes growing toward one a minute - since every retry re-reads the persisted log, and probing the store each 2s for 15 minutes per parked subscriber during the very outage that parked them makes the bad time worse. The subtest still named for the old fail-the-stream stall behavior goes with the merge. * fix(log_buffer): gate filer cursors against eviction under the read lock The subscribe loops checked the eviction watermark and then read memory, but a seal can land between the two: the read then served a sentinel cursor from the earliest retained window, silently skipping the window just evicted - the loss class this PR exists to make loud, surviving as a race. The only place the check is atomic with the serve decision is inside ReadFromBuffer, under the lock seals take to evict. Rather than put the policy back into the shared read path - which broke four message-queue readers last time - add a new sentinel offset that opts into it: EvictionGatedOffset reads inclusively exactly like -2, except below the watermark it is refused to disk. The filer loops stamp it on every cursor they hand the memory read; a refusal lands in the same gap machinery the loop-side check feeds, so the race collapses into the handled path. MQ cursors never carry it and keep master behavior byte-for-byte. * fix(filer): gate the aggregated gap on received, not bumped, timestamps The aggregated ring rewrites an out-of-order arrival to its head plus a nanosecond, so after any bump-heavy interval - a peer history replay following a restart is enough - its eviction watermark lives above every timestamp that exists on any peer's disk. Comparing a disk cursor against it parked subscribers that had in fact drained every peer's log: a 15-minute delivery freeze ending in a give-up skip and a false loss alarm, on a healthy cluster where master resumed instantly. Track a second watermark in the received timestamp space - the highest pre-bump timestamp among evicted entries - and gate the aggregated loop on that. Disk cursors and received timestamps are the same space, so the comparison means what it says: at or past it, every evicted entry's original was at or below the cursor, and everything flushed of them was already delivered. The bumped watermark keeps guarding the in-ring read gate, whose cursors live in ring space. The local buffer is untouched: it flushes its own bumped timestamps, so there the two spaces are one. * fix(filer): ship each log chunk once and stop echoing ref'd files inline Chunk mode duplicated data through two doors. Consecutive ref collections overlap by design - the scan backs off a flush interval to catch a spanning file, and a filer appends chunks to its newest file - so the same file was shipped again on every pass that re-listed it: the client re-downloaded its chunks, and a duplicated file mid-batch rewinds timestamps inside the client's per-filer merge, which reads each stream as sorted - transiently resurrecting deleted entries during catch-up. Track per subscription how many chunks of each file were shipped and send only the unsent suffix; state prunes with the scan window, so it holds a few files per filer. The second door was the entry fallback: when refs cannot advance the minute-named cursor, the pass streamed the ref'd file's tail inline, and the client applies inline events unfiltered - the same tail it already applied from chunks. Entry passes for chunk clients now advance the cursor without delivering; everything they skip is covered by the refs already sent or the deltas the next collection ships. * refactor(filer): one gap decision shared by both subscribe loops The post-disk gap tree - guard, drain, resolve, two parks, the re-arm - existed twice, differing only in buffer, watermark space, flush getter, park channels, and reason strings. Four rounds of review fixes have shown the copies drift the moment one is edited alone. gapPass now carries the five differences and the tree lives once; the loops shrink to a three-way switch between reading memory, restarting the pass, and ending the stream. * docs(filer): trim the gap-machinery comments to the why Several blocks had grown to ten-plus lines restating what the tests already pin or retelling one rationale at multiple sites. Keep the non-obvious why - the load-bearing flush ordering, the two timestamp spaces, the refusal-at-equality argument - in a few lines each. * fix(log_buffer): credit an entry's received timestamp to its own window The received-ts capture ran before the rollover check, so an append that sealed the previous window stamped its timestamp onto that window and then lost it in the reset of the new one. The eviction watermark this feeds broke both ways: the sealed window's value was inflated by an entry it does not contain - parking aggregated subscribers on gaps that were drained - and the entry's real window was deflated, proving gaps empty that still held its event on some peer's unflushed path. Credit the timestamp only after the entry lands, when its window is known. * fix(filer): rebase a shipped chunk suffix to logical offset zero A grown file's delta kept the chunks' original file offsets, but the client's chunk reader starts at logical zero and a list opening higher reads as instant EOF - a successfully empty replay, and since chunk clients no longer receive disk entries inline, the appended events were silently dropped. Clone the suffix chunks with offsets rebased to zero; the cut is record-aligned because each append is one uploaded chunk of whole entries, so the suffix decodes as a file of its own. * fix(filer): finish every chunk refs batch with a transition the client acts on Both chunk consumers buffer refs until a non-ref message arrives, so a source with historical logs and a quiet ring - a mount reconnecting after a filer restart is the common case - shipped its backlog and then went silent: the client sat on the refs until the next metadata mutation anywhere in the cluster. The disk step now ends every batch with the empty-notification marker the client already treats as a resume-cursor advance. The same step closes the inline replay: the cursor used to stay at the last file's minute name, so the memory read re-delivered the retained tail of a file the client had just read via chunks - T1..Tn applied twice. The advance-only entry read now runs on every chunk pass, moving the cursor to the true disk content end before memory is consulted. Ordering inside the pass is load-bearing: the entry read can outrun the shipped refs by a chunk appended between collection and read, and the transition timestamp becomes the client's refs filter - stamping it past unshipped content would silently drop that chunk's events on the next delta. The pass therefore re-ships the delta after the entry read, so the transition never exceeds shipped content. Bump-displaced aggregated entries can still arrive inline above the cursor with originals below it; that duplication is bounded and stays within the documented at-least-once residual. * fix(filer): prune ref state at the minute the scan actually stops at The collector compares file names at minute granularity while the prune used the exact-nanosecond scan bound, so for a cursor at 12:31:20 the 12-30 file was still collected but its sent state was already deleted - the next pass reshipped the whole file, re-creating the duplicate-refs class the state exists to prevent. Truncate the bound to the minute the file names live in. * fix(filer): derive the chunk cursor from the shipped refs themselves The advance-only entry read left the three positions that must agree in each other's blind spots. Its snapshot could trail the second delta's, so a chunk appended between them shipped events newer than the cursor and the memory pass sent them again. And it made the filer decode the tail range on every pass, serialized ahead of the client's own reads by the transition marker - re-introducing a slice of the replay work chunk mode exists to offload. Compute the cursor from the shipped set instead: the final entry timestamp of each filer's last shipped chunk, decoded once through the shared chunk cache. Refs coverage, transition marker, and memory start are then the same number by construction - nothing is decoded twice, nothing is dropped, and the per-pass server cost falls to one cached chunk decode per filer. The second delta and the once-per-position refs gate existed to patch the entry read's snapshot races, so both go with it; the range read survives only as a fallback for legacy chunks that do not decode standalone. * fix(filer): keep the chunk-cursor probe inside the shipped snapshot Three holes in the tail probe, all variations of stepping outside what was shipped. A permanently missing chunk failed the stream before the transition marker, so the client discarded its pending refs and reconnected to the same failure forever - blocking all later metadata behind one dead volume, where every other replay path (including the client's own reader) skips such chunks; the probe now walks back to the last readable chunk, and a filer with nothing readable simply contributes no cursor. The legacy fallback re-listed the logs after the refs were collected, so a concurrent append could push the range end over an unshipped chunk and the marker past events the client never received; it now streams the shipped chunk list itself, so no snapshot other than the shipped one is ever consulted. And a file selected before UntilNs can hold entries past it, which the client filters while still adopting the marker as its checkpoint - a later bounded request then skipped them; the marker is clamped to the bound. * fix(filer): make the cursor probe an exact mirror of the client's reader The probe answered from the server's view of the chunks; the marker's correctness depends on the client's. Its backward walk found the last readable chunk, but the client reads forward and stops at the first unreadable one, never resuming within a file - for readable, missing, readable the marker claimed the suffix the client never applied, losing those entries permanently. Keeping only each filer's final file ref discarded the progress of earlier readable files when that file was wholly missing, rewinding the marker to the start cursor. And a torn trailing size prefix - what a crashed writer leaves - failed the probe where the client reads a clean end, blocking the marker forever on data the client accepts. The probe is now shaped like the reader it answers for: per file the readable prefix, per filer the newest file with content, and no condition escapes as an error - understating the marker only re-ships, overstating loses events, and a probe failure must never block the transition the client is waiting on. Each rule is pinned by a test that fails against the previous shape. * fix(filer): judge chunk readability at the volumes, not the decode cache Two ways the probe's answer could drift from what the client experiences. A chunk this server decoded earlier stays warm in the shared cache after its volume dies, so the probe sailed past a chunk the direct-reading client stops at - marker beyond the unread suffix, entries lost. Every chunk now passes a volume lookup before the cache is consulted; the lookup rides the master client's in-memory map, so the probe stays cheap. And a probe stop was treated as harmless understatement, but the delta had already marked the whole ref sent: a transient server-side failure left the cursor stranded behind shipped content for the life of the connection, parking aggregated streams below the watermark for data the client already holds. The pass now rolls back the sent state of every ref above the file that answered the probe, so unreached refs re-ship and re-probe until the cursor gets there. Re-shipped entries at or below the client's checkpoint are filtered client-side, and batches are marker-separated, so a re-shipped file cannot rewind a merge mid-batch. * test(filer): end-to-end subscribe-loop harness and wire-contract tests Every escaped bug across this change's review rounds lived in an interaction the unit tests could not see: the loop state machine, the disk/memory handoff, or the server/client contract. The harness runs the real SubscribeLocalMetadata loop against a real leveldb-backed filer, faking only the volume layer behind the existing test hooks, and asserts the delivered stream itself. Eight scenarios, each pinning a class this change was reviewed for: the headline evicted-unflushed gap parks and then delivers in full; a ring that evicted nothing serves memory promptly; a backlog-to-live handoff with 1ms-adjacent timestamps across every boundary delivers exactly once; a flush-proven gap over vacuumed log files skips to the retained ring including a single-entry window; a bounded subscription terminates at its bound; a permanently wedged flush ends in the give-up skip with the stream still alive; and chunk mode is checked against the real client code - pb.ReadLogFileRefs applied to the shipped refs must cover everything the transition marker claims, with and without a dead volume in the middle. Validated by re-introducing three fixed bugs: the missing eviction guard delivers during the unproven gap, a 2ms cursor error at the handoff drops exactly one event, and resuming at rather than below the earliest retained window loses a single-entry window's sole event - each caught by the scenario built for it. The gap timing knobs become vars so parks run at test speed, a small filer hook swaps the volume-touching read functions, and a sender test pins the refs wire rules the client depends on: never batched, never an envelope, everything in order. * fix(filer): re-ship a partially read answering file, pin the probe's limits The sent-state rollback stopped at files newer than the one that answered the probe. When the answering file itself was only prefix-readable - a dead or transient chunk mid-file - its unread suffix stayed marked sent, and the next append advanced the cursor past it for good. The probe now reports whether the answering file was read through to its end, and a prefix-limited answer re-ships that file too; a torn tail counts as complete, since the client's read ends there as well. The rollback rules live in one predicate with a table test - files below a complete answer stay sent, because the client has moved past them and re-shipping cannot rewind its filter. Two test honesty fixes ride along. The loop harness derived its timestamp base from time.Now() per call, so expectations recomputed across a second boundary drifted by exactly one second; the base is now fixed per harness. And the probe's liveness boundary is pinned as a test instead of a comment: a volume lookup cannot see a dead needle or a stale location inside a resolvable volume, so a warm cache can answer past a chunk the client fails on - accepted because metadata log chunks die volume-at-a-time and the alternative is a real read per probe, which is what the probe exists to avoid. The test states the boundary so changing it is a decision, not an accident. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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3514925581 |
filer: let a nested path rule turn worm off (#10503)
* filer: let a nested path rule turn worm off mergePathConf ORs the booleans, so worm set on a bucket could never be lifted on a directory under it, while every string field is overridden by the more specific rule. Make worm tri-state instead: unset inherits, set wins. readOnly, fsync and disableChunkDeletion keep the OR, so a nested rule still cannot escape a lock the bucket set. Configurations written before this carry an explicit "worm": false on every rule, because they are marshalled with EmitUnpopulated. Reading those back as an override would quietly drop worm from nested paths, so filer.conf is now stamped with a version and the flag is dropped to unset when the version predates it. * filer: copy the worm value out of the matched rule mergePathConf aliased the pointer into the merged result, so a caller that wrote through it would reach into the stored rule. |
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ccf5dc34e9 |
test: stop comparing two JWTs minted a second apart (#10495)
TestProxyReadDropsCallerJwtQueryParam mints a read token up front and requires the token the volume server would evaluate to equal it byte for byte. The expiry claim has one-second resolution -- GenJwtForVolumeServer sets it from jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(...)) -- so two mints on either side of a tick produce different strings for the same authority and the same file, and the assertion fails for a reason the test is not about. It surfaces on the 32-bit job, where the runner is slow enough that the HEAD subtest (the second one, after a full proxy round trip) lands in a later second than the mint at the top of the test. Confirmed directly: minting the same file id with the same key either side of a boundary yields different tokens. Assert what the test is actually about instead -- that the credential decodes against the read key and authorizes this file id -- which holds whatever second it is minted in, and is a closer statement of the property than string equality. |
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78ed665557 |
webdav: answer PROPFIND child stats from the listing (#10492)
* webdav: answer PROPFIND child stats from the listing golang.org/x/net/webdav discards the FileInfo that Readdir returned and stats every child again, five times over, so a PROPFIND on a directory costs five sequential filer lookups per entry: 15006 lookups and 1.4s for 3000 subdirectories, 24s for 60000. Windows Explorer times out well before that. Hold the entries a listing already fetched for the lifetime of the request and serve those stats from them - 6 lookups and 0.03s for the same 3000 entries. WebDavFile.Stat has to stop dropping its request context for the held entries to be reachable. * webdav: keep the request context on the lookups a listing drives stat, Readdir and Seek reached the filer on context.Background(), so a client that walked away left the listing streaming and the lookups running. Seek also missed the entries the listing had already fetched. Write and cleanup paths keep their own context - a cancelled request must not abandon a flush half done. |
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9351202ca9 |
volume: scan for on-disk EC shards when staging a decoded volume (#10465)
The staged-new-volume placement skipped a disk holding the vid's EC shards using only the in-memory ecVolumes map, missing a shard present on disk but not mounted. Also scan the candidate disk for <vid>.ecNN files, so the promise holds regardless of mount state. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ks16jnt4S7gdDk8cheQ3xu |
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3b3e8af430 |
volume: skip a shard-holding disk when staging a decoded volume (Go+Rust) (#10464)
volume: skip a shard-holding disk when staging a decoded volume ReceiveFile staged-new-volume mode picked any free disk of the target medium. Skip a disk that already holds the vid's EC shards (Go DiskLocation.FindEcVolume / Rust ec_volumes), so a decoded .dat never lands in the same directory as a shard. This lets a caller safely stage onto a shard host that has a spare disk, instead of requiring a host with no shard of the vid at all. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ks16jnt4S7gdDk8cheQ3xu |
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9c37e52c9b |
volume: EC decode onto a clean peer via staged-new-volume adopt (Go+Rust) (#10463)
Decoding EC shards back to a normal volume in place reconstructs <vid>.dat
in the shards' own directory, so the vid is momentarily registered as both
an EC and a normal volume in one location — the load/scan path then sees it
as both, risking mount ambiguity and needle loss. VolumeEcShardsToVolume
still supports that in-place path; this adds the primitives to decode onto
a *clean* peer instead:
- ReceiveFile gains a staged-new-volume mode: when the volume does not
exist here and ReceiveFileInfo.disk_type is set, pick a free-slot disk
of that medium and write <base><ext>.copying (not a valid volume name,
so the scanner never half-loads a partial push).
- VolumeEcShardsToVolume gains from_staged: adopt the pushed .dat/.idx/
.vif — rename .copying into place under a .note in-progress marker,
then mount — so <vid> lands on the peer only as a normal volume.
The caller decodes the shards off-box and streams the finished volume to a
peer holding no shard of the vid on the target medium. Go and Rust volume
servers get identical handlers. Proto: ReceiveFileInfo.disk_type (12; 8-11
reserved for versioned-EC), VolumeEcShardsToVolumeRequest.from_staged (3) +
disk_type (4).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ks16jnt4S7gdDk8cheQ3xu
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fee3fcb55a |
mount: report data sizes to df with -df.logical (#10459)
df on a mount shows the space the cluster gives up to the data: every replica of a regular volume, every shard of an ec one. That is the honest answer for capacity planning, but it is not the question a user asks when they want to know how much of their data is stored. Add -df.logical. The master reports the logical sizes alongside the raw ones: one replica per regular volume, the data shards of each ec volume counted once. Free space is divided by the copies the requested replication makes, so used plus available stays the amount of data the mount can still write, and it comes off the cluster-wide usage rather than one collection's, since capacity is cluster-wide too. Statistics through a filer resolves an unset replication to the filer's default rather than the master's, matching where the writes it is sizing for actually land. The flag governs the quota check too, so a mount has one notion of how much it is using. A filer that predates the new fields sends zeros, and the mount keeps reporting the raw sizes. |
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152f1a2096 |
master: count EC volumes in statistics used size (#10457)
Statistics aggregates the volume layouts of a collection, but EC volumes are tracked outside collectionMap, so they were reported as nothing. A mount over a cluster whose volumes have mostly been encoded showed a df used size of a few GiB against terabytes of EC data. Walk the data nodes and add the EC volumes of the requested collection. Every shard copy counts, parity included, the way a regular volume's used size counts every replica, so used size stays the space the cluster actually occupies. File count comes from the volume-wide .ecx and .ecj counts, taking the largest a holder reports rather than summing them: both files travel with the shards on a move, so several nodes can report the same tombstones. |
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c7d0477117 |
volume: widen the gRPC admin gate and stop it drifting (#10443)
* volume: gate the admin RPCs that only shell and workers call checkGrpcAdminAuth covered 19 of the 48 VolumeServer RPCs, so an operator who sets -whiteList expecting it to cover the gRPC surface gets partial coverage. Extend it to ten that mutate state and are only ever called by the shell or a worker: SetState, VolumeCopy, the EC generate/rebuild/copy/unmount/to-volume pair, both tier moves, and VolumeTailReceiver. That is safe because the same callers already reach gated RPCs today -- VolumeMarkReadonly, VacuumVolume*, VolumeEcShardsDelete, VolumeDelete -- so a whitelist deployment already lists those hosts. Nothing here is on a master or peer path, which is what made the earlier fail-closed gate break multi-host clusters. The split is by caller rather than by blast radius: the guard matches a peer IP against the whitelist, and a whitelist holds masters, shell hosts and workers, not every peer volume server. Gating a call one volume server makes to another would break replication, EC and tiering, so those stay open. Two test fakes embedded a nil grpc.ServerStream and only implemented Send; they now implement Context, which the streaming RPCs read to authorize. * volume: fail the build when a gRPC method skips the admin gate The admin gate is an opt-in list in a 48-method service, which is how it drifted down to covering 19 of them: nothing tied adding an RPC to deciding whether it needed the gate. Parse volume_server.proto, walk the AST of every *VolumeServer method, and require each RPC to either call checkGrpcAdminAuth or appear in ungatedVolumeServerRPCs with the reason it stays open. A stale entry naming an RPC that no longer exists fails too, so the list can't quietly stop exempting anything. The exemptions are the cluster-internal calls -- replica sync, EC shard distribution, vacuum reads, backup, tailing -- plus the read-only and liveness RPCs. Closing the cluster-internal ones needs a peer identity rather than an IP whitelist; recording them here makes that a visible decision instead of an omission. The AST walk also corrects the count: a line-window scan credits VacuumVolumeCheck and VolumeServerStatus with a neighbouring function's guard. |
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be81b9d5d7 |
volume: fix EC decode/reconstruct index locality under -dir.idx (#10442)
* volume: fix EC decode/reconstruct index locality under -dir.idx EC->replicated decode failed under -dir.idx and on multi-disk with "volume not found on disk". The reconstruct rebuilds the .dat on the data disk but the on-demand VolumeMount scans only the data directory, matching on .idx/.vif; with the rebuilt .idx off in the index directory it matched the volume's leftover EC .vif and skipped the volume as EC metadata. - Resolve the EC .ecx local-first: prefer the copy co-located with the shards over the shared -dir.idx copy, with a non-empty preference so a 0-byte local stub still yields to a valid sibling (the cross-disk fallback). - Co-locate the rebuilt .idx with the .dat at the end of the reconstruct so the mount finds it; sweep .ecx/.ecj from both the data and index directories on Destroy so a stale copy cannot re-mount as a phantom EC volume. - Add VolumeConsolidateIndex: once the EC shards are deleted, unmount, move the .idx/.sdx from the data disk back to the -dir.idx directory (copy fallback across filesystems), and remount. A no-op without -dir.idx. * volume: tests for EC index locality (local-first .ecx, sweep, consolidate) - NewEcVolume prefers a non-empty local .ecx over the shared index dir, and a 0-byte local stub yields to a non-empty shared copy (the #9212 fallback). - Destroy sweeps .ecx/.ecj from both the data and index directories. - ConsolidateVolumeIndex moves a co-located index back to the -dir.idx dir and keeps the volume mounted; no-op without a separate index dir. - RenameOrCopyFile moves a file and drops the source. * volume: relocate the decoded index in place, without a read gap ConsolidateVolumeIndex previously unmounted the volume, moved the index, and remounted it. Between the EC-shard delete and the remount the volume had neither a normal nor an EC form mounted, so a read landing in that window got a not-found (or was proxied away). Move the index in place instead: RelocateIndexTo takes the data-file write lock, closes the needle map and data backend, moves the .idx (and derived .sdx), then retargets dirIdx and reloads — the same close-swap-load CommitCompact uses. The volume never leaves the mounted set, so a concurrent read blocks briefly on the lock rather than failing. The test now writes a needle before consolidating and reads it back after, proving the in-place reload keeps the volume serving. * volume: address review — maintenance guard, no orphan on copy failure - VolumeConsolidateIndex now rejects the request under maintenance mode, like VolumeConfigure and the other mutating volume RPCs. - RenameOrCopyFile rolls the cross-device copy back when the source cannot be removed, so a failed move never leaves two divergent copies (the loader would keep the data-dir one while the idx-dir orphan goes stale). - RelocateIndexTo logs a failed reopen-after-failed-move instead of swallowing it, since that leaves the volume unusable until the next load. |
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5cac980b32 |
filer: drop a caller's jwt query param on a proxied read (#10440)
security.GetJwt reads the "jwt" query parameter before the Authorization header, and the proxy forwarded the caller's whole query apart from proxyChunkId. So on a read, where the filer mints a volume token and sets the header itself, a caller-supplied ?jwt= silently outranked it: the volume server validated a credential the caller chose rather than the one the filer attached, and the read failed with a 401 the filer could not explain. Drop it on the read path, where the filer owns the credential. Writes keep theirs -- the proxy forwards a writer's own AssignVolume token either way, so the query parameter is just a second channel for the same credential and stripping it would break a caller that presents it that way. Nothing in the tree passes a jwt by query; maybeAddAuth always sets the header. |
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0f718f8509 |
filer: add a placement overlay seam for the write path (#10437)
* filer: add a placement overlay seam for the write path New volumes take their disk type, replication, and data center from the explicit request or the matched filer.conf rule. That leaves no way for a feature to steer a whole collection onto a medium without an operator writing an fs.configure rule by hand. Add a generic PlacementOverlay hook on the filer: a func that maps a collection to a placement override, installed by a factory the way the plugin-worker handlers register. detectStorageOption consults it between the explicit request value and the filer.conf rule, so it overrides the rule but yields to a value the caller asked for. The seam names no feature concepts, so it stays generic; a downstream build registers the overlay it wants (e.g. a storage-class Landing tier). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ks16jnt4S7gdDk8cheQ3xu * filer: address review on the placement overlay seam Honor ResolvePlacement's ok flag explicitly rather than relying on empty values falling through the util.Nvl chain, and log at V(4) when the overlay steers a collection. Document that RegisterPlacementOverlay is init-only, so the unsynchronized read in NewFiler cannot race the write. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ks16jnt4S7gdDk8cheQ3xu |
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91979ec51e |
filer: fix credential handling on the proxyChunkId path (#10434)
* filer: claim the base fid when minting a volume read token GenJwtForVolumeServer stamped the fid verbatim, but the volume server strips a trailing _N delta suffix before comparing the claim, so a token minted for a batch-assigned fid like 3,01637037d6_1 was checked against 3,01637037d6 and never matched. Reading such a chunk through the filer returned 401 wherever jwt.signing.read.key was configured. Strip the suffix before minting, via a helper shared with the proxyChunkId validation that was already doing the same thing inline. * filer: don't mint a volume write token for an anonymous proxy caller The ?proxyChunkId= branch dispatches and returns before the JWT gate, so whatever credential the proxy attaches is reachable without authentication. It attached a token from maybeGetVolumeReadJwtAuthorizationToken, which fell back to the write signing key when jwt.signing.read.key was unset -- the configuration scaffold/security.toml recommends for a filer, since read JWTs are only supported in a master+volume setup. An anonymous DELETE /?proxyChunkId=<fid> therefore arrived at the volume server holding a write-key token scoped to that fid, and the volume server honored it. Sign read tokens with the read key only. The fallback bought nothing on a read anyway: a volume server enforces read JWTs solely when that same key is set, so when the fallback fired the read was unchecked regardless. Mint only for reads. Writers proxied through the filer carry their own volume JWT from AssignVolume, forwarded with the rest of the caller's headers, so weed mount -filerProxy uploads are unaffected. Moving the dispatch below the JWT gate instead would have broken them, since that token is signed with jwt.signing rather than jwt.filer_signing. On a read with nothing to mint, drop the caller's Authorization rather than relaying it: there it is a filer credential, and forwarding it would hand a volume server a token it never used to see. * filer: keep proxied writes out of the read concurrency semaphore The semaphore is named and documented for reads -- it exists so replication bursts can't open hundreds of connections to one volume server -- but it was applied to every proxied method. A write queued behind sixteen in-flight reads can wait past the 10s default expiry of the AssignVolume token it carries, and the volume server then answers 401. shouldReassignUpload treats a 4xx as final, so the uploader replays the same expired token instead of re-assigning and the write fails up to the caller. This only became reachable once the filer stopped re-minting a fresh token after the wait. |
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4f43153918 |
filer: reject a proxyChunkId that isn't a well-formed fid (#10436)
LookupFileId only requires the fid to contain a single comma, and the value is pasted straight into the volume server URL path, so ?proxyChunkId=3,x/../../status resolves to volume 3 and then addresses an endpoint the caller never named: Go sends the dot segments verbatim, the volume server's mux cleans the path and redirects to /status, and the filer follows the redirect and relays the body. That reaches any handler on the volume server -- status, stats, the UI -- past a filer that operators expect to be the only exposed surface. Parse the fid before the lookup and answer 400 when it doesn't parse. A trailing _N delta suffix from batch assigns is legal, so it is stripped first, but only when it is a non-empty run of digits. The volume server strips at the last "_" unconditionally, which is safe there because its fid came out of a path the mux parsed and so cannot hold a "/"; here the value is raw query input, and an unguarded strip would reduce "3,01637037d6_1/../../status" to a valid fid and wave the traversal through. |
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47b491b53c |
mount: version open file handles by filer log position (#10403)
* filer: stamp a log position on lookup and remote-cache responses Metadata events are logged after their store write and stamped with the filer clock. Reading that clock before serving an entry therefore gives a timestamp with a causal guarantee: every event at or below it is reflected in the returned entry. Clients caching filer state can use it as the entry's version to order the response against subscription events, including events committed before the call but delivered after it. * mount: version open file handles by filer log position A subscription event refreshing an open handle did a second lookup; a transient failure left the handle pinned to its old entry with no retry, since the subscription cursor had already advanced. The deeper problem is ordering: the handle is a cache written by three unordered channels — the async invalidation worker, local mutation acks, and open-time lookups — and overwriting cached state safely requires knowing which write is newer. The filer log timestamp is that order, and it now travels with every value instead of being derived out of band. Events carry it natively; lookup and remote-cache responses carry the log position stamped before the serving read; mutation acks carry it in their returned event; and the local store pairs each read with a version cursor advanced under the same lock as the store write. Each handle records the version its entry reflects, and one rule replaces the per-site reasoning: state at or below the handle's version is old news and must not be installed. The invalidation itself applies the event's own entry — no lookup, so no transient-failure window — except under a cached parent, where the store entry is the ordered merge of the event and anything applied since, and its version outranks the event's. An uncached parent receives no store writes, so a hit there would be a stale leftover masking the event. A vacated path (delete, rename away) keeps the last entry so unlinked-but-open reads still work. Directory builds version the completed directory at the listing snapshot and re-invalidate buffered events at that version, since their mid-build refresh ran against an incomplete store. The tests replay every race this replaces machinery for: rollback of a newer local flush (queued, cached, and read-through), stale leftovers under uncached parents, the build window including abort, handles opened after an event was queued, events landing mid-lookup, and undelivered events at remote-cache time across a filer failover. * filer: serialize the log position fence with mutations, stamp mutation acks The fence stamped before an unlocked entry read could precede state the read returned: a mutation writes storage first and assigns its event timestamp only at notify time, so a lookup racing that window handed the mount an entry newer than its fence, and the event's later delivery looked like fresh news — destroying dirty pages for a change the handle already had. The mutation handlers already hold an exclusive per-path lock across read, write, and notify; the lookup and remote-cache reads now take it shared around the stamp and the read, making the fence exact: everything at or below it is in the entry, nothing above it is. A no-change update returns success without an event, leaving the mount nothing to fence with even though the response confirms current state. Create and update acks now carry a log position stamped under the same lock, and the mount falls back to it whenever the ack has no event. Also regenerate the VT marshalers, which the earlier generation missed: without them a VT round-trip silently zeroed every log position. * java: sync filer.proto * mount: scope store versions to what they vouch for; atomic handle install The store's version cursor claimed too much. Advanced by local mutation acks and directory listing snapshots, it inflated the version of store reads for unrelated paths whose events the subscription still owed, and those events were then fenced out permanently. The cursor now tracks subscription progress only — events arrive in log order, so everything at or below it has been delivered for every path — and a completed listing records its snapshot as a per-directory floor instead of a global claim. Local acks never touch it: they version their own handle directly. Buffered build events advance the cursor at delivery, since their store write may never happen (abort) while their invalidation is already queued; their read-through directory pairs no store read with it, and rename fragments are applied first. Concurrent first opens raced: a slower opener's older lookup could overwrite the newer entry a faster opener had installed, while the monotonic version kept the newer timestamp — an old entry fenced at a new version, immune to every correcting event. Entry and version are now installed as one decision under the handle map lock, and an install that does not outrank the handle's version is dropped. The remote-cache commit also escaped the fence: it wrote storage and notified without the path lock, so a lookup's shared-locked fence and read could land between the two and hand out the cached state under-versioned. The commit now re-reads and writes under the exclusive path lock, and backs off entirely when the entry changed during the download — the concurrent writer supersedes the cached content. * mount: floors gate store applies; installs respect handle users; renames join the fence A directory floor certifies the listing state as of its snapshot, but a delayed event at or below the floor was still applied to the store — rolling the content back to pre-snapshot state while the floor kept claiming the snapshot version, so the correcting events were fenced out of every future read. Events are now gated against the affected directory's floor, each half of a rename independently. Fences are lower bounds: a listing or lookup can include a mutation whose event has not been delivered yet, and that event later passes every gate carrying state the handle already holds. Such a re-delivery now advances the version without destroying dirty pages or reinstalling the entry — invalidating local writes over a no-op was the real damage in every remaining under-fence window, including the unlocked listing snapshot, which no per-path lock can serialize. The concurrent-open install moved from the map lock to the handle lock every reader, writer, and invalidation synchronizes on, and rejects what cannot improve the handle: dirty state (local writes would be lost), unversioned lookup responses (they cannot outrank anything, and two zero-version opens must not overwrite each other), and anything not strictly newer. New handles are still fully initialized before the map exposes them. Renames committed metadata and emitted events with no path lock, so a lookup could read the renamed state under a fence preceding its events. Both rename handlers now hold the source and destination locks, ordered by path, across commit and notification; descendants of a renamed directory are not individually locked and rely on the no-op re-delivery handling above. * mount: per-entry store versions replace the cursor and directory floors The store's aggregate versions — a global subscription cursor and per-directory listing floors — were versions at coarser granularity than the values they described, and every over-claiming bug in this series traced to that gap: an aggregate vouching for state its source never saw. Each store entry now carries the filer log position of the write that produced it — the event that applied it, or the listing snapshot that inserted it, recorded in the store's key-value space under the same lock as the entry write. The store becomes what the handle already is: a last-writer-wins register with one rule, install only what outranks the current claim. The cursor, the floors, their advancement rules, the pairing ordering constraint, and the floor gating all collapse into that rule. Applies are gated per entry, each half of a rename independently; an unversioned local write clears the claim its content no longer proves; version records lingering after a bulk folder wipe cannot fence a recreate, since a claim only blocks while its entry exists. Listing inserts are stamped at build completion, before the buffered replay so newer replayed events override the stamp. Filer side, the fence dance every versioned read must perform is now a single choke point, fencedFindEntry, so a future read RPC gets the lock-serialized stamp by construction rather than by convention. * mount: judge no-op re-deliveries against an immutable base, not the live entry The equal-state skip compared the incoming event to the live handle entry, but local writes mutate the live entry — size, timestamps, chunks — so a delayed event re-delivering the base the handle was opened with no longer matched, and the installer destroyed the dirty pages and rolled the entry back over nothing new. The handle now keeps an immutable snapshot of the filer state it last installed or acknowledged, refreshed at every install and mutation ack (flush acks snapshot the request entry before the id mapping mutates it), and the no-op judgment runs against that base: an event carrying the base brings nothing, whatever the live entry has diverged to since. * mount: tombstones for versioned deletes, absence floors, copy enrollment Four gaps in the per-entry version protocol, all the same shape: a versioned fact with nothing carrying its version. A deletion is a fact about a path with no entry left to hold it — clearing the record let a delayed older event resurrect the deleted path, permanently, since the deletion's own redelivery is dedup-suppressed. Versioned deletes now leave a tombstone record that fences without an entry; renames tombstone their source the same way. Plain records still only block while their entry exists, so records lingering after a bulk folder wipe cannot fence a recreate. A completed listing proves absences as well as presences: a name it omitted was deleted as of the snapshot, and a delayed create below the snapshot re-creates it. The snapshot is kept per directory strictly as an absence fence, consulted only when a path has neither an entry nor a version record — present entries carry their own versions and never touch it, which is what separates this from the over-claiming floor it replaces. A rebuild against a pre-upgrade filer returns no snapshot; stamping now clears the children's records in that case, so a reinserted entry cannot reactivate the stale claim its previous incarnation left behind and reject valid events below it. Server-side copies installed the copied entry without enrolling in the base protocol, so the copy's own event differed from the stale pre-copy base and destroyed writes made to the destination after the copy. The install now refreshes the base and takes its version from the fenced readback. * mount: deletion facts outlive the cache's knowledge of the entry A versioned delete of a path the store held no entry for recorded nothing, so a delayed older event recreated the path — permanently, with the deletion's redelivery dedup-suppressed. The tombstone is now written whenever a versioned event vacates a path: the deletion is a fact about the path, not about what this cache happened to hold. For an absent entry, the listing's absence floor now speaks whatever older record remains: a tombstone at one position does not exhaust what is known about the path when a newer snapshot has confirmed the name still absent, and an event between the two was slipping past both. A committed copy whose readback failed installed a synthesized base with local timestamps; the copy's real event legitimately differs from it, and was read as foreign state — destroying writes made to the destination after the copy. The handle now marks that its own event is en route and adopts that event's state as the base without touching the live entry or the dirty pages; the adoption is one-shot, so a genuinely foreign event still invalidates. * mount: authoritative acks cancel pending event adoption; tombstones scoped and pruned The copy-event adoption flag could outlive its purpose: a flush after the failed readback installs a newer base and advances the version, the copy's own event is then version gated without consuming the flag, and the next genuinely foreign event was silently adopted — base advanced, live entry and dirty pages untouched — leaving the mount to later overwrite that remote change. Every local acknowledgment now installs its base through one helper that also cancels any pending adoption: the ack supersedes the mutation the adoption was waiting for. Tombstones were written for every versioned delete under the mount and survived directory eviction by design, growing LevelDB with historical deletions on delete-heavy mounts. They are now scoped to directories whose cached state the fence actually protects — an uncached parent never serves from the store nor applies the resurrecting insert — and a completed listing prunes the direct-child tombstones its absence floor supersedes, leaving only those above the snapshot. The store gains a key-prefix visitor for the sweep. * mount: acked saves install their value; trailer snapshots; direct-child prune range A version must never advance without its value. saveEntry stamped any open handle with the acknowledgment's version, but a handle opened while the save was in flight holds the pre-mutation entry — stamping it fenced out the events carrying the state it lacked, permanently, with the local apply performing no invalidation and the redelivery deduplicated. The acknowledged entry is now installed together with its version, through the same guarded install the racing-open path uses: under the handle lock, only when it outranks the handle, never over dirty local writes. Empty listings return no in-band snapshot — a snapshot-only response would be read as an entry by older consumers — so directories that end empty gained no absence floor and their tombstones were never pruned. The filer now sends the snapshot in the stream trailer, which older clients ignore, and the client reads it when no in-band snapshot arrived. Empty directories get real floors, their tombstones prune, and their buffered replays gain the snapshot filter instead of the replay-all fallback. Version records now encode the parent directory and name separated by a NUL, making a directory's direct children one contiguous key range: the tombstone prune scans exactly them under the cache lock, instead of walking every descendant record — the whole store, for root. * mount: fix dirty-page loss, uid/gid base, download race, copy adopt, leak; dedup Correctness fixes from the versioned-invalidation review: - A foreign delete/rename-away of a file held open with unflushed local writes destroyed the dirty pages unconditionally. A process may keep writing to an unlinked-but-open file and those writes were already acknowledged; preserve the pages when the handle is dirty. - downloadRemoteEntry stored the handle's base with filer-side uid/gid while every candidate it is later compared against is in local form, so under a non-identity UidGidMapper an unchanged re-delivery looked foreign and force-destroyed dirty pages. Map the base to local. - downloadRemoteEntry wrote the entry/base/version triple under only the handle's shared lock, so two concurrent reads of the same remote-only file could tear it. Serialize the install with a dedicated mutex (invalidation is already excluded by the exclusive handle lock). - A committed server-side copy whose readback failed adopted the FIRST event past the version gate as its base; a foreign write delivered first was silently swallowed. Adopt only an event whose content matches the synthesized base — the copy's own event — and install any other normally. - The deferred-create path relied on AcquireFileHandle installing the passed entry on a pre-existing handle, which the version rework dropped. Restore that install in the compat wrapper; the versioned open path keeps its gated install. Growth and hot-path cost: - Per-entry version records and tombstones leaked when a directory was evicted or read-through without a rebuild. An uncached directory gates its own inserts, so its records fence nothing; clear a directory's child version records when it is wiped for eviction. - FindEntry paid for the version KvGet on every lookup/getattr cache hit and threw it away. FindEntry now reads only the entry; the hot lookupEntry cache-hit path skips the version entirely. Cleanups: - Extract ackVersionTsNs over the shared response interface, replacing the metadata-event-else-log-ts snippet copy-pasted at four ack sites. - Extract acquireRenamePathLocks, replacing the verbatim sorted two-path lock fence in both rename handlers. * mount: no resurrection on foreign delete, version no-event acks, gate downloads, tighten copy adopt Follow-ups to the review patches: - Preserving dirty pages on a foreign delete let the next flush pass the isDeleted guard and CreateEntry, resurrecting the remotely-unlinked name. Mark the handle deleted in the vacate branch: the open fd can still read its buffered writes, but a flush no longer recreates the file. - A no-event acknowledgment (log fence only) synthesized a metadata event with TsNs 0, so the cache stored the entry unversioned and an older subscriber event rolled it back. Stamp the synthesized event with the ack's log position at all four ack sites. - downloadRemoteEntry serialized its install but did not check the version, so an older response arriving last overwrote the entry/base while the monotonic version kept the newer value, fencing corrections out. Install only when the response is at least as new as the handle. - sameEntryContent compared only size and chunks, so a foreign chmod with unchanged content was adopted as the copy's own event. Compare everything except server-assigned timestamps, so a metadata-only foreign change installs instead. * mount: trim comments to the non-obvious why The versioning work accumulated multi-line comment blocks restating what the code says. Keep the constraint a reader cannot derive — why a fence is exact, why a version must not advance without its value, why an uncached parent's records fence nothing — and drop the rest. * mount: distinguish rename from delete, tighten the download and adopt gates - A rename emits a nil old-path invalidation just like an unlink, so the vacate branch marked the handle deleted and later writes through the already-open descriptor were skipped instead of persisted. Carry the delete/rename distinction on the invalidation and mark only an actual delete. - The remote-download install accepted an unversioned response regardless of the handle's version, so during a rolling upgrade a delayed response could install stale content under a newer version. Require the response to be at least as new, with one exception: a handle still lacking local chunks takes the content anyway — it cannot read without it — but does not claim the response's log position. - Copy-event adoption returned without installing, so a foreign touch arriving before the copy's own event lost its timestamps. Content is unchanged either way, so the dirty pages stay valid; a clean handle now takes the entry, while a dirty one keeps its diverged version. * mount: one directory floor instead of a record per child; agree on TTL Review feedback: - Build completion wrote one KV record per direct child inside the cache write lock, so a large directory stalled every other cache operation for O(children) store writes. The directory's listing snapshot already covers every child it saw; make that floor the version for any child without a record of its own, and a child earns a record only when a later event touches it. One map write per build replaces the per-child writes, with the same fencing. - The presence probe read the store directly and so counted a TTL-expired entry as present, judging the path by a record describing content that has logically vanished. It now applies the same expiry the read path does, and an expired path falls back to its directory floor. - Preserve ErrNotFound identity when the commit-time re-read finds the object deleted, so callers still surface a 404. - Assert the rename-away source fence timestamp in the invalidation test. Also record the tombstone ceiling: distinct deleted names in a cached directory accumulate until it is rebuilt or evicted, which prunes everything at or below the new snapshot. * mount: pin the fence's clock domain instead of letting skew decide A log-position fence is stamped by one filer's clock under that filer's in-process lock, so comparing it to an event another filer logged is comparing two unrelated clocks. The two error directions are not equally costly: applying an event the fence already covered is a re-apply the base-equality check absorbs, while skipping one it does not cover leaves the handle holding exactly the state the event was meant to correct, with the subscription cursor already past it — the unhealable staleness this whole PR exists to remove. So refuse to guess. Fences now carry the signature of the filer that stamped them, and a handle records it alongside the position. An event is only fenced out when the filer that logged it is the one that stamped the fence — the logging filer appends its own signature, so its presence identifies the clock domain. Events from any other filer are applied. Positions taken from events keep comparing as before; the subscription already delivers those in order. The invalidation callback takes a struct now: it carries the path, entry, position, delete/rename distinction, and signatures, and was about to need a fifth positional parameter. * mount: follow a foreign rename; key page invalidation on content, not equality - A rename's old-path invalidation now carries the destination, and the handle follows the file there: an open fd tracks the inode, and leaving it on the old path made its next flush recreate that name instead of updating the renamed file. - Dirty pages overlay content, so only a content change invalidates them. Keying that on exact equality meant any timestamp-only event destroyed them, which the copy-adoption marker existed to paper over — a foreign touch could consume the marker and leave the copy's own event to drop the post-copy writes. Comparing content instead makes the marker unnecessary, so it is gone: a metadata-only event keeps the overlay, and a dirty handle keeps its diverged entry unless foreign content supersedes it. - A remote download response that is merely older is now refused even when the handle still lacks chunks; only an unversioned one is taken (and claims no position), since an older response's content predates what the handle reflects. - A refused or unversioned download no longer publishes to the metadata cache, where a zero-position event would clear the entry's version and let an older subscriber event roll the cache back. * mount: page invalidation keys on content alone; unversioned writes claim no position - sameEntryContent compared everything but timestamps, so a foreign chmod, chown, or xattr change counted as a content change and destroyed the dirty-page overlay. It was strict only to serve the copy-adoption marker, which is gone; its one caller now asks the question it actually needs — did the bytes change — so metadata-only events leave the overlay alone. - A rename over an existing file destroys that file, but its open handle was left live and still pointed at the name the renamed source now occupies, so its flush could overwrite it. MovePath already reports the displaced inode; mark that handle deleted. - An acknowledgment was refused whenever its position was numerically lower, even when a different filer stamped the fence it lost to. Two known, differing signatures mean unrelated clocks, so the comparison no longer applies there; unknown signatures still compare as before. - A local write with no log position behind it now records that explicitly instead of deleting its version record. Absence means the directory listing covers the path, which is why the snapshot floor applies; local content the listing never saw must not inherit it, or the events that would correct it are fenced out. * mount: widen the existing lookup functions instead of forking WithVersion twins The versioning work grew a parallel function for every accessor that needed to return a log position — lookupEntryWithVersion beside lookupEntry, maybeLoadEntryWithVersion beside maybeLoadEntry, FindEntryWithVersion beside FindEntry, AcquireFileHandleWithVersion beside AcquireFileHandle, advanceEntryVersion beside advanceEntryVersionTsNs, plus a getPbEntryWithVersion wrapper and an InsertListedEntriesForTest hook. Two names for one operation is two places to keep in step, and the split let callers pick the one that happened to compile. Each pair is now the single original name carrying the position, with callers that do not want it discarding it. filer_pb.GetEntry returns the fence its response already carried rather than a mount-side wrapper re-issuing the lookup, and InsertEntry takes the position its content reflects rather than a test-only twin that inserted without one. The one behavioural knot the merge exposed: AcquireFileHandle had been installing the entry on a pre-existing handle only in its unversioned form, which conflated 'the caller is authoritative' with 'the lookup had no version'. Deferred create is the only caller that means the former, so it now installs explicitly and the map function just acquires. |
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5a54beac80 |
EC decode: read shards with the encode-time block layout (#10385)
* erasure_coding: WriteDatFile takes the encode-time dat size for the shard block layout * volume server: derive EC decode layout from the encode-time dat size, not the live extent * erasure_coding: test decode after tail deletions shrink the live extent below a large-block row * seaweed-volume: write_dat_file_from_shards takes the encode-time dat size for the shard block layout * seaweed-volume: derive EC decode layout from the encode-time dat size, not the live extent * seaweed-volume: test decode after tail deletions shrink the live extent below a large-block row * erasure_coding: reject decoding with no data shards * worker: record the encode-time dat size in the .vif * erasure_coding: fall back to the shard-derived layout only when the encode-time dat size is missing * erasure_coding: reject an ambiguous shard-derived block layout * seaweed-volume: fall back to the shard-derived layout only when the encode-time dat size is missing * seaweed-volume: reject an ambiguous shard-derived block layout |
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cdb60069a6 |
filer: conditional UpdateEntry with a chunk-set write condition (#10382)
* filer: accept a WriteCondition on UpdateEntry, under the per-path lock UpdateEntry was a bare read-modify-write: the precondition check, the chunk garbage diff, and the store write could interleave with a concurrent update to the same path. Take the per-path lock CreateEntry already holds, and evaluate an optional CreateEntry-style WriteCondition under it, failing with FailedPrecondition like expected_extended. * filer: IF_CHUNKS_EQUAL write condition compares the stored chunk fid set A chunk-preserving read-modify-write (tagging, setattr, copy-in-place) races UpdateEntry's garbage diff: if a concurrent update empties the chunk list first, the stale writer's commit resurrects fids that are already queued for deletion, stranding the entry on a dead needle once vacuum reclaims it. The reverse also holds: a writer that read an empty chunk list can wipe chunks a concurrent update just added. IF_CHUNKS_EQUAL guards both: the stored chunk fid multiset must still equal what the caller read, order-independent, with an empty fids list expecting no chunks. Absent entry counts as no chunks for CreateEntry overwrites and transactions. * filer: delete and append serialize on the entry path lock DeleteEntry queues the entry's chunks for deletion and AppendToEntry rewrites the chunk list, but neither held the per-path lock, so either could interleave with a conditional update between its precondition check and its write — a passed IF_CHUNKS_EQUAL would then resurrect fids already on the deletion queue, or clobber a freshly appended chunk. AppendToEntry keeps the cluster lock for cross-filer append serialization; the path lock covers the local read-modify-write. * filer: reuse lockPath in UpdateEntry lookup |
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564803becd |
shell: show who holds the cluster lock (#10353)
* regenerate master_grpc.pb.go with protoc-gen-go-grpc v1.6.2 The other generated pb files are already on v1.6.2; this one was stale. * shell: keep unlock from racing the lease renewal A renewal RPC in flight while ReleaseLock runs re-creates the lock on the master after the release deletes it, and can blank the client name if the renewal reads it mid-release. The stale-token release is then ignored, so the lock stays held (sometimes anonymously) until it expires. Serialize the renew and release RPCs, and set the client name before flipping isLocked so the renewal never sends a partial acquisition. * shell: restart lease renewal after a failed renewal The renewal goroutine exits on error but never cleared its running flag, so later locks in the same process were never renewed and silently expired after ten seconds. * shell: show who holds the cluster lock A blocked lock command gave no hint that another client holds the lock (the refusals only surfaced at -v=2), and cluster.status reported the shell's own lock state as if it were the cluster's. Add a GetAdminLockStatus RPC to the master so lock prints the holder before blocking and cluster.status shows the actual cluster-wide holder. Both degrade silently against masters without the RPC. * shell: bound admin lock RPC attempts with timeouts The lease, renew, release, and holder-status calls all ran without a deadline, so an unresponsive master could hang the renewal goroutine, an unlock (which now waits on the renewal mutex), or the shell prompt. Give each attempt its own short context; the retry loops still resolve a fresh leader on the next try. * master: reject admin token release on non-leaders A follower holds no lock state, so it answered a release with success while the leader kept the lock until expiry. Refuse like LeaseAdminToken does so the client can try the leader instead. * shell: leave the lock release call unbounded A release cut short by a deadline leaves the lock held on the master until it expires, so a slow master would turn every unlock into a ten-second ghost lock. Restore the single fire-and-forget attempt; the timeouts stay on the lease and renew paths, where a stalled call forfeits the lease anyway. * shell: release only the token unlock started with A RequestLock racing a slow release (the admin presence lock does this on shutdown) could have its freshly acquired token sent in the release request or zeroed by the trailing stores. Capture the token once under the mutex and compare on clear so a concurrent acquisition survives an in-flight unlock. |
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6f14be1138 |
stats: remote-mount bucket cache hit/miss metrics (#10352)
Reads of remote-backed entries now record hit or miss in
SeaweedFS_remote_cache_read_total{source,bucket,result} on the filer HTTP
path and the S3 gateway, so cache effectiveness of mounted buckets can be
graphed. Inline-content entries count as hits since they are served
locally without chunks. The filer purges the per-bucket series when the
bucket directory is deleted, so a standalone filer does not accumulate
series across bucket delete/recreate churn.
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1fda7aa7f1 |
master: assign re-picks once after its growth concludes instead of shedding (#10348)
The initiator's shed check (initiatedGrow != HasGrowRequest) compares against an err from a PickForWrite that may predate the growth concluding: the grower registers its volumes before clearing the flag, so when growth lands between the failed pick and the check, the assign shed ResourceExhausted even though a writable volume was already registered. Re-pick once after observing the conclusion and shed only if the volume layout still has nothing writable. Applies to both the gRPC Assign and the HTTP dirAssign paths, which share the shed logic. Flaked in CI as TestAssignInitiatorWaitsForItsOwnGrowth; reproduced deterministically by widening the enqueue-to-check window. |
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8bff3b3213 |
fix(volume): reject overflowing needle ID deltas (#10342)
* fix: reject overflowing needle ID deltas Problem: Parsing a file ID with a delta can wrap a valid maximum needle ID back to zero without returning an error. Root cause: Needle.ParsePath added the parsed uint64 delta without checking whether the sum exceeded the needle ID range. Fix: Compare the delta with the remaining uint64 capacity before addition and return a contextual overflow error when it does not fit. Validation: go test ./weed/storage/needle -run ^TestNeedleParsePathRejectsDeltaOverflow$ -count=1; go test ./weed/storage/needle -count=1; git diff --check 10cdaf381875492a2c752d1038797e96ff18208f..HEAD Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> * fix: propagate needle ID delta parse errors Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> * print the needle id in hex in the delta overflow error * batch delete: keep processing after a cookie mismatch * rust volume: reject overflowing needle id deltas --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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c015cc3939 |
generate vtproto marshalers for filer_pb and use them on the metadata log path (#10337)
* generate vtproto marshalers for filer_pb and use them on the metadata log path Reflection-based proto.Unmarshal allocates a fresh message tree through reflect.New on every call. On the metadata subscription fan-out the same event is decoded once per subscriber, so reflect.New tops the decode churn under many mounts. Generate MarshalVT/UnmarshalVT/SizeVT for filer.proto (a separate filer_vtproto.pb.go, filer.pb.go untouched) and call them on the log entry marshal and the subscribe/replay decode paths. UnmarshalVT allocates message structs directly and copies byte and string fields, so it stays wire-compatible with proto.Unmarshal and preserves the non-aliasing the persisted-log cache depends on. For SubscribeMetadataResponse this cuts decode allocations 69 -> 50 and ~4.5us -> ~2.1us per event; the win scales with subscriber overlap. * marshal log entries directly into the buffer SizeVT is allocation-free and MarshalToSizedBufferVT writes into a pre-sized slice, so the log entry can be marshaled straight into logBuffer.buf. This drops the per-entry MarshalVT allocation and the follow-up copy on the write path. * expand vtproto benchmarks: marshal, decode, and marshal-into-buffer by chunk count Parametrize by nested-message count (chunks per event) and add encode + zero-alloc marshal-into-buffer benchmarks alongside the decode one, so the write-path win from MarshalToSizedBufferVT is measurable too. * keep proto.Unmarshal for metadata events to preserve UTF-8 validation UnmarshalVT skips proto3's UTF-8 validation of string fields, so a SubscribeMetadataResponse with an invalid-UTF-8 string (e.g. Directory "\xff") that proto.Unmarshal rejects would decode and reach path filtering and subscribers. Decode events with proto.Unmarshal again; UnmarshalVT stays on the log entry paths, whose only variable-length fields are bytes and so carry no UTF-8 constraint. Tests cover the codec difference and that a malformed event is skipped before delivery. |
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19dc085e33 |
master: statistics used size covers all collections and layouts (#10319)
StatFs on a mount reported cluster-wide total capacity but used size from a single volume layout keyed by collection, replication, ttl, and disk type. A mount without -collection therefore showed only the default collection's usage, hiding data in named collections, and even a collection-scoped mount missed volumes with a different replication, ttl, or disk type. Aggregate used size and file count across all layouts of the requested collection, and across every collection when the collection is empty, matching how Topology.Lookup treats an empty collection. Looking up stats no longer creates a phantom collection as a side effect. |
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fa549e9c83 |
filer: harden TUS session authorization against cross-prefix access (#10315)
* filer: authorize TUS existing-session verbs against the validated stored target Scope-check on TUS HEAD/PATCH/DELETE only populated a resource path for POST, so a prefix-restricted token that learned another tenant's session id could act on that session and land content at a TargetPath its own AllowedPrefixes forbid. Split the filer JWT check into authenticateFilerJwt (signature and method) and authorizeFilerJwtPaths (resource scope), and make the scope check fail closed: a prefix-restricted token with no resolved resource path is denied instead of authorized on signature alone. The TUS handler now authenticates first, reads and validates the session once, authorizes the stored TargetPath, then operates on that single pinned snapshot. readTusSessionInfo rejects a session whose id, target or size is unusable, and getTusSession is split so the authorization lookup no longer lists chunks. * filer: reject non-canonical TUS upload ids The uploads route took the first path component as the session id, so a trailing path or other non-canonical spelling aliased one session under several URLs. Require the id to be a canonical UUID, the only form the server mints, both at routing and when reading a session's metadata, so one URL maps to one resource. * filer: revalidate the pinned TUS session before completing an upload Completion re-read chunks but not the session identity, so a PATCH finishing after a concurrent DELETE or metadata replacement could still land at the id's stored path. Before completing, confirm the session still exists and its target, size and creation time are unchanged from the authorized snapshot; otherwise the completion fails instead of writing to a path the request never authorized. * filer: log TUS session lookup failures before returning not-found readTusSessionInfo and loadTusSessionChunks failures answered "not found" with no log line, so a transient filer or listing error was indistinguishable from a genuinely missing session. Log the lookup at V(1) (a missing session is common and benign) and the chunk-load error at Errorf (the session already resolved). |
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c1a1e3c1e3 |
shell: volume.tier.upload keeps volume replicas (#10314)
* volume: copying a remote-backed volume only needs space for the index VolumeCopy sized its target-location check by the source .dat even when that .dat lives in a cloud tier and only .idx/.vif land locally, so re-replicating a tiered volume demanded the full remote size in free disk. Require the index size instead. * shell: volume.tier.upload keeps volume replicas Tiering a replicated volume deleted every replica but the upload source, leaving one server holding the only .idx and the only .vif that knows the remote object key — losing that server orphaned the volume even though its data sat intact in the cloud. Replicate the uploaded .idx/.vif onto the other replica servers instead (VolumeCopy skips the .dat for remote-backed volumes), so all replicas serve reads from the same remote object and the volume keeps its replica count. An already-tiered replica is preferred as the upload source, so a rerun after a partial failure reuses the existing remote object instead of uploading a second copy under a new key. * shell: group tier upload locations instead of re-prepending * rust volume: copying a remote-backed volume only needs space for the index Mirror the Go VolumeCopy change: size the free-location check by the source .idx when the .dat lives in a cloud tier, since only .idx/.vif land locally. |
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c006dc563e |
ec: remove .ecsum sidecars on destroy / shard delete; align Go and Rust cleanup (#10307)
* fix(rust-volume): remove .ecsum sidecars on EC destroy / shard delete Rust EcVolume::destroy removed shards and .ecx/.ecj/.vif but left bitrot checksum sidecars (.ecsum / .ecsum.v*). On clusters that run weed-volume (not Go weed volume), collection.delete therefore orphans every sidecar while correctly wiping shards — observed live on 4.39 (14/14 .ecsum survived after collection.delete on a freshly encoded EC volume). Go Destroy already calls RemoveBitrotSidecars; this brings Rust to parity: - hoist remove_bitrot_sidecars into ec_bitrot (shared helper) - call it from EcVolume::destroy for dir / dir_idx / ecx_actual_dir - call it from Store::delete_ec_shards when a disk has no remaining shards - unit test: test_destroy_removes_bitrot_sidecar * rust volume: gate the shard-delete sidecar sweep on a local shard removal Only sweep a disk's .ecsum when this delete actually removed a shard file there, matching Go's found gate: a delete that never touched a disk must not strip a sidecar it does not own — a shared -dir.idx sibling with surviving shards, or an ec.rebuild index-prep copy that lands .ecx/.ecsum before any shard. The shard-presence probe now treats unexpected stat errors as "exists" so a transient failure cannot orphan-classify live shards, and check_all_ec_shards_deleted reuses it. * rust volume: destroy() sidecar sweep needs only the data and idx bases ecx_actual_dir is always one of the two, so the third branch could never run; this is now exactly Go Destroy()'s two-base sweep. * rust volume: call the shared sidecar removal helper directly * rust volume: unit-test remove_bitrot_sidecars Mirrors Go's TestRemoveBitrotSidecars: legacy and versioned sidecars are removed, a shard file and a longer-vid sidecar survive, absent is success. * rust volume: keep the shared idx-base sidecar while a sibling disk has shards One -dir.idx serves every location, so emptying one disk must not sweep <idx>/<vol>.ecsum out from under a sibling that still holds shards. Nothing reads the idx-base sidecar today, but .ecx shows index-dir files are real; this keeps the defensive sweep safe if a writer ever lands one there. * ec shard delete: keep the shared idx-base sidecar while a sibling disk has shards One -dir.idx serves every disk, so emptying one disk must not sweep <idx>/<vol>.ecsum out from under a sibling that still holds shards of the volume — the same gate the Rust volume server applies. A status error counts as in-use so a transient failure never strips it early. * rust volume: drop a shard-only disk's stale .vif with the node's last shard Go's removeEcSharedIndexFiles also clears the data-base .vif in the all-shards-gone pass, gated on .idx absence so a disk still hosting the source volume keeps its live .vif; the Rust delete path left it behind. Unexpected stat errors count as .idx-present so a transient failure never strips a live volume's .vif. --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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ce82e3a057 |
filer: scope TUS HEAD/PATCH/DELETE against the session target path (#10309)
* filer: scope TUS HEAD/PATCH/DELETE against the session target path checkTusJwtAuthorization only populated the scoped-path list for POST, so a prefix-restricted token was scope-checked at session creation but not on HEAD/PATCH/DELETE, which act on an existing session addressed by id. A low-privilege tenant holding a valid write token who learns another upload's session id could PATCH attacker bytes into that session, or DELETE/HEAD it, landing content at a target path its own AllowedPrefixes forbids. The session id is unguessable to an unauthenticated attacker but is not an authorization boundary against a legitimate tenant. Resolve the effective target for HEAD/PATCH/DELETE from the session's stored TargetPath and scope the prefix check against it, the same way POST scopes the create target. The scoped paths are resolved lazily so the session read runs only for a prefix-restricted token; unrestricted tokens and deployments without a signing key touch no extra state. An unknown session stays unscoped so the handler still answers 404. * filer: fail closed when a TUS session target cannot be resolved The lazy scope resolver swallowed every readTusSessionInfo error and left the request unscoped, so a filer read error or a corrupt session .info would authorize a prefix-restricted token against a target the server never resolved. Only a genuinely missing session should stay unscoped (so the handler answers 404); any other failure now propagates and denies the request. checkJwtAuthorizationScoped's resolver returns an error and a failed resolution is treated as not-authorized. * filer: fold the scoped-path resolver into checkJwtAuthorization checkJwtAuthorization now takes the lazy resolver directly instead of a separate checkJwtAuthorizationScoped wrapper, and the surrounding comments are trimmed to the load-bearing why. |
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a9cfbd8d3a |
s3: tear down the emptied .versions directory on last-version delete; drain existing residue (#10278)
* s3: routed last-version delete removes the emptied .versions directory The routed versioned delete (routedDeleteSpecificVersion) repoints the latest pointer and deletes the version file, but unlike the lock-path fallback (updateLatestVersionAfterDeletion) it never tears down the .versions/ directory it just emptied. The residue keeps the key's read path in the self-heal rescan loop: every GET of the deleted key logs event=surfaced plus a GetObject error until the background EmptyFolderCleaner gets to the directory — at least two minutes away on its delay queue, and possibly never (the queue is in-memory, bounded, and gated on the bucket's allow-empty-folders policy). Veeam's lock arbitration probes deleted lock keys continuously, so those windows are always open and the log spam is chronic. ObjectMutation DELETE gains remove_empty_parent: after the child delete, the filer best-effort removes the parent directory in the same locked transaction. Non-recursive on purpose — a concurrent write that lands a new version fails the removal instead of being lost with it. The routed last-version delete sets it on the version-file DELETE, matching the lock-path fallback's contract. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014mMYAHXZySkCCUfpRFNtSv * s3: drain empty .versions residue on read heal and in s3.versions.audit Directories already stranded by pre-teardown deletes (or dropped from the EmptyFolderCleaner's bounded in-memory queue) previously re-entered the self-heal rescan on every GET forever: the heal only cleared the pointer and nothing ever removed the directory, and s3.versions.audit counted the state as clean. When the heal rescan finds no remaining version, remove the directory outright (non-recursive, so orphan children still block and fall back to the pointer clear) and log event=healed mode=empty_dir_removed; the next GET takes the clean not-found path. The audit gains an empty category so the residue is visible, and -heal removes such directories in bulk. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014mMYAHXZySkCCUfpRFNtSv |
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254c2a1024 |
volume: clear remote flag when tiering a volume back to local (#10262)
VolumeTierMoveDatFromRemote downloads the .dat, trims the .vif, and swaps the data backend to the local file, but left hasRemoteFile set. The volume.tier.download command masks this by unmounting and remounting right after, which reloads the flag from the trimmed .vif — but in the window before the remount the in-memory flag is wrong: doDeleteRequest would skip appending the tombstone to the freshly local .dat, and the phantom-.dat guard stays disabled. Give SwapDataBackend a hasRemoteFile argument so the backend swap and the flag move together under one lock, and route both tier directions through it: the tier-down download passes false, LoadRemoteFile passes true. The flag can no longer disagree with the live backend. |
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4f1f0dcb17 |
filer: require JWT authorization on TUS upload endpoints (#10249)
* filer: require JWT authorization on TUS upload endpoints filerHandler and readonlyFilerHandler run every request through maybeCheckJwtAuthorization, but the TUS routes were registered only behind filerGuard.WhiteList, which is a pass-through for the filer (its guard is built with an empty whitelist), and no TUS handler called the JWT check. So with jwt.filer_signing.key set, normal PUT/POST/DELETE were authorized while the TUS endpoints were not. Run the same check in tusHandler before routing: HEAD uses the read key, POST/PATCH/DELETE use the write key, and creation scopes a prefix-restricted token against the resolved target path. OPTIONS stays open for capability discovery. * filer: enforce read-only and WORM rules on TUS completion completeTusUpload wrote the final entry with CreateEntry directly, skipping the read-only and WORM checks the normal write path applies. Reject completion when the target prefix is read-only or the existing entry at the target is WORM-enforced. * filer: align TUS write path with the normal write path Resolve the create target with a guaranteed leading slash so a prefix-restricted token and the stored path stay absolute even if TusBasePath were set with a trailing slash. Reject read-only prefixes at session creation before any chunk is written, and map read-only and WORM rejections at completion to 507 and 403 instead of a generic 500. * filer: cover method-restricted TUS tokens in the auth test |
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a6effe3cfb |
master: repair the lookup index after a vacuum that raced a disconnect (#10226)
* master: re-create a vacuum-committed volume the index has lost SetVolumeAvailable dereferenced vid2location[vid] with no nil check. A disconnect during a long vacuum can drop a single-replica volume from the lookup index while it stays on the node; the commit then panics the master instead of re-registering it. Re-create the entry, and seed its size tracking so assigns are counted right away rather than after the next heartbeat. * master: re-register a vacuumed volume the index lost on mark-writable The maintenance worker re-enables a volume by marking it writable after the vacuum commit, but VolumeMarkReadonly only updated nodes the lookup index already knew. If a disconnect race dropped the volume from the index during the vacuum, that path was a no-op and the volume stayed "not found" until the next full heartbeat healed it. Re-register it from the node that still holds it. |
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6206f60032 |
fix(master): let the growth initiator wait instead of shedding itself (#10202)
* fix(master): let the growth initiator wait for the growth it triggered The growth-in-flight shed also fired on the request that initiated the growth: it sets the pending flag right before the shed check, so a cold-start assign enqueued growth and immediately failed itself with "volume growth in progress". With no concurrent assigns around to pick up the freshly grown volume, a single writer against an empty cluster never completes a write despite ample free space. Claim the pending flag with a compare-and-swap so exactly one request becomes the initiator, triggering growth at most once, and let it wait for that growth to land. Everyone else still sheds retryably instead of pinning a goroutine: followers behind an in-flight growth, an initiator whose growth concluded without yielding a writable volume, and an initiator whose growth outlives the 10s wait budget, which previously surfaced a non-retryable error (gRPC Unknown, HTTP 406) even though a retry would have succeeded moments later. * fix(master): stop assign waits when the request is cancelled The assign retry loops slept through client cancellation, keeping a goroutine spinning for the rest of the 10s budget after the caller had gone; StreamAssign also ran assigns on a background context detached from the stream. Wait on the request context and pass the stream context through. * topology: drop the unconditional grow-request setter Growth is only claimed through AddGrowRequestIfAbsent's compare-and-swap now; keeping the raw Store(true) around invites the check-then-set race back. * test: cover cold-start first write with a real cluster Boot a fresh master plus three empty volume servers and require the very first assign - HTTP and gRPC, each on a cold volume layout, no client retries - to complete a write. The assign that triggers volume growth must wait for it rather than answering "volume growth in progress"; unit tests stub the topology, so only a real cluster exercises the assign-grow-wait path end to end. |
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292abfae33 |
[filer] applyStorageDefaultsToEntry before CreateEntry (#10196)
* applyStorageDefaultsToEntry befor CreateEntry * Update weed/server/filer_grpc_server.go Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Update weed/server/filer_grpc_server.go Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * add tests * fix: tests * enforce read-only storage rule regardless of explicit TTL, match CreateEntry remote handling * CreateEntry shares applyStorageDefaultsToEntry * routed PUT enforces the path rule's max file name length --------- Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Konstantin Lebedev <whitefox@mayflower.work> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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05b4b5bf56 |
ec: expose force_deleted_needles_check in ScrubEcVolume RPC and shell (#10176)
* ec: expose force_deleted_needles_check in ScrubEcVolume RPC and shell FULL EC scrubs can opt into strict deleted-needle verification via the -forceDeletedNeedlesCheck shell flag, off by default since it can report false positives when EC indexes disagree. Rejected for non-FULL modes. The Rust volume server parses the new field and ignores it: its FULL scrub verifies shards via RS parity, not per-needle reads. * volume: require admin auth for ScrubEcVolume ScrubEcVolume ran unauthenticated while its sibling ScrubVolume, and the rest of the mutating volume handlers, gate on checkGrpcAdminAuth. Close the gap so an EC scrub can't be triggered anonymously. * shell: reject ec.scrub -forceDeletedNeedlesCheck outside full mode Fail in the client before fanning out to every volume server, instead of erroring halfway through once the servers reject the request. |
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bdcc3154ed |
refactor: centralize genUploadUrl in UploadOption (#10164)
* refactor: centralize genUploadUrl in UploadOption Replace inline genFileUrlFn closures with operation.GenUploadUrl field: - Add GenUploadUrl func(host, fileId) string to UploadOption struct - Add GenUploadUrlProxy(filerAddress string) utility function - Remove genFileUrlFn parameter from UploadWithRetry signature - Update all callers: mount, gateway, mq, filer_copy, filer_sync This matches the weed mount -filerProxy pattern exactly, factorizing the URL generation logic across all consumers. Co-Authored-By: Athena 🏛️ <hermes-agent@local> (custom / Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-Q4_K_XL.gguf) * docker release: run all platform jobs in one wave, cache rocksdb compile Drop max-parallel so the 13 per-platform builds run together instead of two waves of 8 (rocksdb was queuing behind the cap and starting ~8 min late). Keep cache-to mode=max for rocksdb: its RocksDB static_lib compile is sha-independent, so it caches across releases and stops being the ~16-min long-pole that gates the merge fan-in. go-build variants stay mode=min. Co-Authored-By: Athena 🏛️ <hermes-agent@local> (custom / Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-Q4_K_XL.gguf) * refactor: centralize genUploadUrl in UploadOption Replace inline genFileUrlFn closures with operation.GenUploadUrl field: - Add GenUploadUrl func(host, fileId) string to UploadOption struct - Add GenUploadUrlProxy(filerAddress string) utility function - Remove genFileUrlFn parameter from UploadWithRetry signature - Update all callers: mount, gateway, mq, filer_copy, filer_sync This matches the weed mount -filerProxy pattern exactly, factorizing the URL generation logic across all consumers. Co-Authored-By: Athena 🏛️ <hermes-agent@local> (custom / Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-Q4_K_XL.gguf) * Remove accidental ROCmFPX submodule reference * gofmt chunk upload option block * Preserve broker cipher and re-read proxy filer per upload attempt Chunk uploads must keep the configured Cipher, and both the mount and broker current filer can change on failover, so build the proxy upload URL inside the closure instead of capturing the address once. --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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77bf2a3ab0 |
volume.balance: gate on real physical disk usage (fixes #10160) (#10162)
* shell: add volume.balance -byDiskUsage to balance by actual data The default balancer ranks servers by slot density, dividing used volumes by MaxVolumeCount. When MaxVolumeCount is configured higher than the disk can hold, a physically near-full server looks nearly empty and gets picked as the move target, so balancing drains less-full servers onto an already-full one. -byDiskUsage ranks servers by the actual data they hold (sum of volume sizes) instead, so the fullest-by-data server is treated as full and balancing drains it. It assumes comparable disk sizes per disk type and still respects each server's free volume slots. Default behavior is unchanged. * plumb physical disk usage into topology, gate volume.balance on it Volume servers now report each disk's filesystem total/free bytes in the heartbeat, and the master stores them in DiskInfo. volume.balance uses them to skip any move target whose disk is already near full (-maxDiskUsagePercent, default 90), so an over-configured maxVolumeCount can no longer make a physically full server look empty and get drained onto. The gate judges each server against its own disk, so heterogeneous disk sizes are fine; servers that do not report bytes fall back to slot-only behavior. Rust seaweed-volume mirrors the heartbeat reporting. * admin: report real physical disk capacity when volume servers provide it The dashboard estimated server capacity as maxVolumeCount * volumeSizeLimit, which overstates it when maxVolumeCount is set higher than the disk holds. Prefer the filesystem capacity now reported per disk, falling back to the estimate for servers that do not report it. * worker: gate automatic balance on physical disk fullness too The maintenance balance worker selects the least slot-utilized server as the move destination, so an over-configured maxVolumeCount makes a physically full server look empty and get drained onto — the same defect as the shell command. Now that DiskInfo carries real disk bytes, skip any destination whose disk is at/above 90% used (per server, against its own disk); a full server can still be a source. When every candidate destination is full, create no tasks. Servers that do not report disk bytes are not gated. * balance: share the physical-disk-fullness gate between shell and worker The shell volume.balance command and the maintenance balance worker each grew their own copy of the disk-fullness gate (targetDiskTooFull / destinationDiskTooFull) and a maxDiskUsagePercent=90 constant. Pull both into weed/topology/balancer (DiskTooFullAfter + DefaultMaxDiskUsagePercent) so the policy has one home and the two balancers can't drift. * balance: harden the physical-disk gate Guard against a nil DiskInfo in the byte/slot lookups. Let a zero disk-capacity report clear previously stored bytes (0 means "not reported" for bytes, unlike maxVolumeCount), so a server that stops reporting falls back to slot-only instead of trusting stale capacity. In the worker, charge each planned move's bytes to its destination within a detection cycle so the gate sees a target fill up rather than only its heartbeat-time free space. Note the per-location capacity summing assumes one location per filesystem (the used ratio the gate relies on stays correct regardless; absolute capacity can over-report). |
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424cd164e9 |
s3: invalidate stale reader cache locations on chunk read failure (#10156)
* s3: invalidate stale reader cache locations on chunk read failure * filer: share the chunk-read self-heal across reader cache and streaming paths The reader cache retry added a third copy of the invalidate-relookup-compare-retry dance already inlined in PrepareStreamContentWithThrottler and duplicated in retryWithCacheInvalidation. Extract retryFetchWithFreshLocations and route all three through it, parameterized by the refetch primitive. * filer: drop redundant completedTimeNew store in reader cache success path startCaching already stamps completedTimeNew unconditionally before the fetchErr branch; the second store inside the success branch is dead. * filer: make NewReaderCache cache invalidator an explicit parameter The variadic ...CacheInvalidator only ever read the first element, so a caller could pass two and silently get one. Take a single explicit argument and have the non-S3 callers pass nil. * filer: inject reader cache chunk fetch as a struct field Replace the process-global readerCacheFetchChunkData test seam with a per-instance fetchChunkDataFn field defaulted in NewReaderCache, matching how lookupFileIdFn is already wired. Tests set the field on the cache instead of swapping a shared global. * filer: log the location count, not full URLs, on self-heal retry --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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cac83bb4a8 |
Fix scrubbing of deleted needles on EC volumes. (#10130)
EC volumes do not propagate deletions to all shard indexes, so it is possible to run scrubbing on a volume where a deleted needle is still present in the index, or a needle deleted from the index is still present on the volume. On either scenario, scrubbing will fail due to size mismatch errors. This PR reworks the scrubbing logic so needle size mismatches are ignored in such scenarios. Scrubbing can still be forced to check deleted needles (f.ex. to discover index inconsistencies); this option will be exposed in RPCs and `weed shell` on a follow-up PR. |
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d0db94c34a |
feat(metrics): Add EC rebuild/reconstruct Prometheus metrics (#10124)
* Review comment removed unnecessary success and failure count * fix: use Gather.Gather() with seeded counter for EC rebuild registration test - Restore Gather.Gather() to verify MustRegister calls as requested in review - Seed VolumeServerECRebuildCounter before gathering because CounterVec only appears after at least one label value is observed - Use correct fully-qualified metric names (SeaweedFS_volumeServer_*) * fix: remove preflight checkEcVolumeStatus failure from ec_rebuild_total counter ec_rebuild_total should only reflect actual rebuild execution failures (from RebuildEcFiles / RebuildEcxFile), not scan/precheck failures in the volume status loop. The error is still returned to the caller; only the misleading counter increment was removed. * Review comment removed unnecessary observe * label EC rebuild duration histogram by result Without a result label, fast failures pull down the success-latency quantiles shown on the EC Rebuild Duration panel. Make the histogram a HistogramVec keyed by result, record success/failure through one recordEcRebuild helper, and split the Grafana quantiles by (le, result). * reset EC rebuild metric vecs in registration test The HistogramVec needs a child before Gather emits it, so the test must observe once; reset both vecs in cleanup so that sample doesn't leak into other tests. --------- Co-authored-by: Ubuntu User <ubuntu@example.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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f643893891 |
fix(master): shed assign load when volume growth is already in flight (#10121)
Under a herd of concurrent assigns with no writable volume, Assign spun PickForWrite for the full 10s timeout, pinning a goroutine per request and starving the master of the cycles it needs to process growth and answer heartbeats. When growth is the relevant remedy and already in flight, stop spinning: if free space exists, shed with a fast retryable error so clients back off and retry once growth lands; if the cluster is out of space, fail fast with the real out-of-space error instead of masking it as retryable. The gRPC shed uses ResourceExhausted, not Unavailable: operation.Assign retries it, but the client connection layer doesn't treat it as a dead channel, so a per-request shed across a herd doesn't tear down the shared master connection and cancel every other in-flight assign. The HTTP dirAssignHandler sheds with 503 + Retry-After. |
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81ed379884 |
volume server: route VolumeMarkReadonly to raft leader (#10120)
* volume server: route VolumeMarkReadonly to raft leader After a master raft election, volume servers may still heartbeat a follower while admin paths such as weed shell volume.mark call notifyMasterVolumeReadonly via vs.GetMaster(). Followers reject VolumeMarkReadonly with NotLeader, which breaks tiering and other mark-readonly workflows until the heartbeat loop reconnects. Resolve the leader through GetMasterConfiguration on configured -master peers (same Leader field filer/master clients already use) before calling VolumeMarkReadonly. When the leader differs from the heartbeat peer, update currentMaster so the heartbeat loop converges faster. Adds operation.LookupRaftLeaderMaster with unit tests. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix: address review feedback on volume.mark raft leader routing Do not update currentMaster during leader lookup — heartbeat owns that field and uses stream GetLeader() to reconnect. Try the heartbeat peer first and only resolve the raft leader after a NotLeader rejection. Add ctx.Err() early exit and quieter logging for context cancellation. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(operation): thread the lookup timeout ctx into connection invalidation The 5s timeout drove only the RPC; WithMasterServerClient saw the unbounded outer ctx, so a self-inflicted timeout (slow GetMasterConfiguration during an election) was treated as a stale channel and tore down the shared master connection. Pass the timeout ctx into the helper so its own expiry leaves ctx.Err() set and spares the connection. --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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2efc0e1656 |
ec: recover EC shards whose .ecx index lives only on a peer server (#10108)
* ec: recover EC shards whose .ecx index lives only on a peer server A volume server that boots with EC shard files on disk but no .ecx index on any local disk cannot mount the shards, so the master never learns about them. ec.rebuild works off master-registered shards, so it sees the volume as short and gives up even though the shard data is intact. Add an operator-triggered recovery: VolumeEcShardsMount gains a recover_missing_index flag that makes the volume server fetch the missing .ecx (plus .ecj/.vif) from a peer holding it and mount the on-disk shards. ec.rebuild runs this across the cluster before planning, so orphaned shards register and the rebuild sees the true shard set. .ecx is an immutable encode-time index, identical on every holder. .ecj is a per-holder deletion journal that differs across holders, so the recovered node adopts the source peer's deletion view, like a balanced or rebuilt shard does. * ec: mirror missing-index recovery into the Rust volume server Port the #10104 recovery to seaweed-volume so the Rust volume server self-heals the same layout: EC shards on disk with the .ecx index only on a peer. Adds collect_ec_volumes_missing_index / mount_recovered_ec_shards to the store, recover_missing_ec_indexes (master LookupEcVolume + peer CopyFile fetch + mount) to the server, and the recover_missing_index flag on VolumeEcShardsMount. .ecx is the immutable encode-time index, identical on every holder. .ecj is a per-holder deletion journal, so the recovered node adopts the source peer's deletion view, matching the Go path. |
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a1fff50935 |
fix(postgres): prevent uint32 underflow & OOM in message parsing (#10099)
* fix(postgres): prevent uint32 underflow & OOM in message parsing * postgres: drop redundant startup guard, use maxStartupMessageSize const The msgTotalLen < 8 check already guarantees msgLength >= 4, so the extra msgLength < 4 guard before reading the protocol version was unreachable. Point the startup size limit at maxStartupMessageSize instead of a literal. * postgres: trim query terminator safely, cap pre-auth payloads Use strings.TrimSuffix for the simple-query null terminator so a non-null-terminated body isn't silently shortened, matching the auth handlers. Bound password/MD5 reads with a dedicated maxAuthMessageSize (10 KiB) instead of the 100 MiB maxMessageSize, since these payloads are read before authentication. --------- Co-authored-by: shangshuhan <shangshuhan@cmict.chinamobile.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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95427b5573 |
security: add BearerPrefix constant for Authorization headers (#10101)
Introduce security.BearerPrefix ("Bearer ", RFC 6750) and use it
everywhere an "Authorization: Bearer <token>" header is constructed,
replacing the scattered "BEARER "/"Bearer " string literals. SeaweedFS
matches the scheme case-insensitively when parsing (security.GetJwt), so
behavior is unchanged; this removes the magic string and settles the
casing on the standard form. The parser's upper-case comparison stays as
is on purpose.
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4d3e5d94a9 |
filer: mint volume read JWT when proxying chunk reads (#10100)
The /?proxyChunkId= endpoint forwards the caller's headers to the volume server but never mints a read token, so proxied chunk reads return 401 once jwt.signing.read.key is configured. Generate a fileId-scoped volume token the same way the direct filer read path does, which fixes filer.sync, filer.backup, filerProxy mounts, the MQ broker and the upload gateway in one place. |
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96d2d13efe |
s3: replicate by fanning out from the gateway to every holder (#10078)
* s3: replicate by fanning out from the gateway to every holder The S3 gateway uploaded each chunk to one volume server, which then relayed the copies to the other replica holders. The gateway now uploads each chunk to every holder in parallel (type=replicate), removing the primary volume server's receive-then-resend relay. AssignVolume returns every replica holder (new repeated Location replicas, forwarded from the master assign), the s3api captures them, and the chunked uploader fans out whenever a chunk has more than one holder. Cipher uploads keep the server-driven path since per-call encryption would diverge the replicas. * s3: cancel sibling replica uploads on the first failure * s3: trim replica fan-out comments * s3: roll back successful fan-out chunk copies when a holder fails A failed fan-out records no FileChunk, so copies that landed on the holders that finished before the cancel were leaked as orphans the caller could not see. Track the holders that succeeded and delete the needle from each (type=replicate, local-only) on failure, leaving nothing behind. |