* fix 11400
* persist failed-recovery quarantine and harden rollback
- record the unavailable state in a .unavailable marker, fsync it, and
re-arm it on load so a restart cannot serve an unverified pair
- quarantine the volume so heartbeats stop advertising it
- block MarkVolumeWritable while unavailable, rechecked under noWriteLock
- fail every request of a failed batch, not only the succeeded ones
- restore the needle map and truncate .dat on inline fsync rollback failure
- add truncateIndex for the sorted-file needle map
- mirror the fail-closed semantics in the Rust volume server
* volume: erase rolled-back mappings instead of leaving tombstones
A rolled-back batch or failed inline write used Delete() to undo a
needle that did not exist beforehand, leaving a tombstoned map entry
whose stale offset makes the next write to that needle fail reading a
header that no longer exists. Add removeMapping/restoreMapping to the
mappers so recovery erases entries that were absent before the batch
and reinstates the exact prior offset/size for ones that were,
including tombstones. The index row still goes through Delete so a
replay forgets the needle.
* volume: gate bulk readers on unavailable and fsync the marker's dir
- fsync_dir(&self.dir) synced the volume dir's parent, not the dir
holding .unavailable; pass the marker path so the create survives
a host crash
- export UnavailableError and check it in ReadAllNeedles,
VolumeTailSender, VolumeIncrementalCopy, and IncrementalBackup so
replica-sync paths cannot stream or append data from an unverified
.dat/.idx pair; mirror on the Rust side via read_dat_slice,
read_all_needles, dat_scan_plan, and the incremental-copy handler
* volume: drop issue references from comments near touched code
* volume: stop active scans when the volume becomes unavailable
The stream entry-point checks ran once per RPC, so a volume quarantined
by a failed recovery mid-scan kept serving data. Recheck availability
per needle/chunk on the detached read paths: tail scan and heartbeat,
read-all, incremental copy, incremental backup writes, and the Rust
StreamingBody chunk reads. Rust incremental copy also rejects a
quarantined volume before sync_to_disk touches the backend.
---------
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com>
fix(volume): stop scans at a header they cannot advance past
A corrupt .dat header with a very negative size gives a record length
(NeedleHeaderSize + NeedleBodyLength) of zero or less: v3 sizes -43..-36
and v2 sizes -35..-28 give exactly zero, and smaller sizes give a
negative length. ScanVolumeFileFrom advanced by that length, so it
re-read the same header forever or stepped back into the record before
it. weed fix, weed export, weed compact, incremental weed backup and the
tail sender behind volume.move and volume.merge could hang on such a
volume, and weed compact could also finish with a .cpx that had dropped
every needle after the header.
Return an error wrapping needle.ErrorCorrupted instead. The check runs
after the visitor has seen the record, so the rebuild scanner still
stops quietly with io.EOF. Smaller negative sizes whose record length is
positive are still stepped over, preserving the salvage behavior
compaction relies on.
Mirror the guard into the Rust volume scans: DatScanPlan::scan and
read_all_needles fail on a non-positive record length, as does
scan_dat_head, so a corrupt header cannot stall a tail pass or leave the
repair scan walking stale offsets.
* fix(volume): reject negative sizes in ReadNeedleBlob and WriteNeedleBlob
A ReadNeedleBlob RPC with a size of -44 or below (-36 on v2 volumes)
panics in makeslice inside needle.ReadNeedleBlob. The volume gRPC server
has no recovery interceptor, so one request kills the process. Smaller
negative sizes return bytes that are not a record.
WriteNeedleBlob accepted a negative size whenever the blob header
carried the same value: it appended the blob to .dat and indexed the
needle with that size, which reads as deleted.
Reject size < 0 in both Volume methods. Size 0 still passes, since
delete records carry it. The Rust volume server got the same storage
guards in #11345.
* fix(volume): reject needle blobs whose length does not match their size
WriteNeedleBlob appends the blob as is. A blob that is not the length
its size implies leaves .dat off the 8-byte grid, and every later
ordinary write to the volume is indexed at a truncated offset and reads
back as EOF. A blob off by 8 bytes keeps the grid but leaves bytes that
a .dat scan reads as the next record.
The in-tree callers already send exact lengths. The one case this newly
refuses is a copy between volumes of different needle versions, and
that case already writes a broken record: a v3 record lands on a v2
volume with 8 extra bytes, and a v2 record on a v3 volume either fails
the timestamp check or lands 8 bytes short.
This is separate from the negative-size guards, whose Rust counterpart
is #11345. The Rust server does not check the length yet.
* fix(volume): guard the blob buffer allocation in needle.ReadNeedleBlob
Volume.ReadNeedleBlob rejected negative sizes, but needle.ReadNeedleBlob
still sized its buffer from the size and is called directly by vacuum and
other paths. Reject a deletion marker before make() there too, and use
size.IsDeleted() in the volume-level checks.
* fix(volume): mirror the blob length check in the rust volume server
write_needle_blob_and_index checked the size against the blob header but
appended the blob verbatim, so a blob that is not the length its size
implies still leaves .dat off the record grid. Match the Go check.
---------
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com>
* s3api: map ambiguous filer transport errors to retryable 503
Canceled, DeadlineExceeded and Unavailable can be returned after the
filer applied the write, so the outcome is ambiguous. Reporting them as
a 4xx tells the client not to retry; report ServiceUnavailable instead.
* s3api: verify entry existence before deleting orphaned chunks
A failed CreateEntry can still have landed on the filer when the error
is a transport failure, and entryCreated=false would tombstone chunks a
live entry references, leaving a dangling pointer that survives only
because reads pass readDeleted=true until vacuum reclaims the needle.
Before deleting, look the entry up: if it is stored with the same
chunks, the write succeeded; if the lookup cannot be answered, keep the
chunks for vacuum to reclaim; only a confirmed absence still cleans up.
* s3api: regression tests for ambiguous CreateEntry outcomes
Covers the three post-create-failure cases in putToFiler: the entry
landed despite the error (treat as success, keep chunks), the entry is
confirmed absent (delete orphans), and the outcome is unverifiable
(keep chunks, return error).
* volume: count reads served from deleted needles
A readDeleted read succeeding on a tombstoned needle is the signal that
metadata still points at deleted data. Count it under a
readDeletedNeedle handler label in both the Go and Rust volume servers
so the condition is visible before vacuum turns it into a 404.
* s3api: never delete chunks on an ambiguous create error
Review feedback on the first fix showed verification could still go
wrong in both directions: a stale or lagged lookup could report
not-found for a committed entry, a prefix object stores its chunks on a
directory entry, and filer-side manifestization rewrites the top-level
chunk ids the comparison relied on.
Rework the rule so the outcome classes are asymmetric:
- A transport-level error (anything filerErrorToS3Error maps to a
retryable 503) is ambiguous and never deletes chunks; the lookup can
only upgrade the write to success.
- Any other error is a definitive filer refusal and still cleans up.
confirmCreateLanded asks the write owner first, resolves the stored
entry through chunk manifests, requires an exact match of the uploaded
file ids, and on success runs the finalize callback the failed create
skipped (under the object write lock, with the same rmObject undo the
create path uses). Zero-chunk writes stay ambiguous since they cannot
be told apart by chunks.
* s3api: cover definitive refusals and stale entries in put tests
The confirmed-failure case now uses a definitive refusal so it still
exercises orphan cleanup, and a new case keeps chunks when the stored
entry belongs to an older object rather than this PUT.
* volume: count deleted-needle reads once per request
Streamed Go reads ran the deleted check in readNeedle and again in
readNeedleDataInto, and non-streamed Rust reads in stream_info and the
full-read fallback, double-counting one request. Count at the single
entry probe each implementation takes per GET: readNeedle in Go,
read_needle_stream_info in Rust.
* s3api: run recovered-write rollback under the object lock
Two follow-ups from review: ResolveChunkManifest returns traversed
manifest blobs in its manifestChunks output, so requiring it empty
rejected every manifestized landing; and the rmObject undo ran after
the object write lock was released, so a concurrent newer write could
be deleted between finalize failure and rollback. Compare only the
resolved data chunks and keep the undo inside the lock.
* s3api: verify, finalize and roll back recovered creates in one lock
A lookup done before the object write lock let a concurrent PUT replace
the entry between the chunk comparison and the finalize/rollback
section, so a failed afterCreate could rmObject a newer write. Run the
owner lookup, manifest resolution, chunk comparison, afterCreate and
the conditional undo inside a single withObjectWriteLock section.
Two follow-ups on PR #9382:
1. Quarantine wasn't sticky. Once CollectHeartbeat crossed the streak
threshold and hid the replica, a subsequent successful read called
checkReadWriteError(nil), wiping the streak; the next heartbeat
then re-announced the suspect replica as read-only and master could
send reads back to a disk that already failed IoErrorTolerance.
Added an ioErrorQuarantined sticky flag set on the first heartbeat
that observes the threshold and cleared only by MarkVolumeWritable
(resetIoErrorState). clearIoError continues to reset just the
streak so successful ops don't accumulate phantom errors.
2. Streamed reads bypassed the EIO counter. readNeedleDataInto and
ReadNeedleBlob — the hot paths for large/range GETs — returned
ReadNeedleData / needle.ReadNeedleBlob errors without threading
them through checkReadWriteError, so a disk failing only on those
paths would never trip IoErrorTolerance. Both now route the
backend error through the tracker, and a fully clean
readNeedleDataInto call clears the streak.
Tests cover the sticky flag (TestQuarantineIsSticky) and the streamed
read path (TestReadNeedleBlobTracksEIO via a fake EIO backend).
* fix(volume): don't panic on read when needle map is nil
A failed CommitCompact reload (and #9335's new error path for a
remote-tiered volume with a stray .vif but no .idx) leaves v.nm == nil
on a volume that's still in the store. readNeedle / readNeedleDataInto
dereferenced v.nm with no guard, so the next GET segfaulted the
http handler instead of returning an error the client could retry on
another replica.
Add the same v.nm == nil check the other Volume accessors already use,
including the slow-read inner loop where the lock is released between
iterations and a failed reload can race in.
Fixes#9339.
* match rust nm-nil read behavior; trim comments
seaweed-volume's read_needle_with_option / re_lookup_needle_data_offset
already lift Option<NeedleMap> through ok_or(NotFound). Use ErrorNotFound
on the Go side too instead of a generic 500-mapped error so both volume
servers respond identically when v.nm is nil.
* log once when reads hit nil needle map
ErrorNotFound alone hides the real cause: a half-loaded volume just
returns 404s and the operator has nothing to grep for. Add a once-per-
volume Errorf on the nil path, reset on successful load. Mirror the
same in seaweed-volume via nm_or_not_found().
* trim comments
* drop once-flag, log inline on every nil-nm read
* Fix disk errors handling in vacuum compaction
When a disk reports IO errors during vacuum compaction (e.g., 'read /mnt/d1/weed/oc_xyz.dat: input/output error'), the vacuum task should signal the error to the master so it can:
1. Drop the faulty volume replica
2. Rebuild the replica from healthy copies
Changes:
- Add checkReadWriteError() calls in vacuum read paths (ReadNeedleBlob, ReadData, ScanVolumeFile) to flag EIO errors in volume.lastIoError
- Preserve error wrapping using %w format instead of %v so EIO propagates correctly
- The existing heartbeat logic will detect lastIoError and remove the bad volume
Fixes issue #8237
* error
* s3: fix health check endpoints returning 404 for HEAD requests #8243
When a disk reports IO errors during vacuum compaction (e.g., 'read /mnt/d1/weed/oc_xyz.dat: input/output error'), the vacuum task should signal the error to the master so it can:
1. Drop the faulty volume replica
2. Rebuild the replica from healthy copies
Changes:
- Add checkReadWriteError() calls in vacuum read paths (ReadNeedleBlob, ReadData, ScanVolumeFile) to flag EIO errors in volume.lastIoError
- Preserve error wrapping using %w format instead of %v so EIO propagates correctly
- The existing heartbeat logic will detect lastIoError and remove the bad volume
Fixes issue #8237
* simplify a bit
* feat: volume: add "readBufSize" option to customize read optimization
* refactor : redbufSIze -> readBufferSize
* simplify a bit
* simplify a bit
hsdfatandGitHub
Chris LuandGitHub
Eugeniy E. MikhailovandGitHub
famosssandGitHub