* s3: verify SigV4 against each plausible reverse-proxy host
A portless X-Forwarded-Host leaves the client's true port ambiguous: a
proxy that kept the Host header makes the backend Host port right, one
that rewrote it makes X-Forwarded-Port right, and a client on the
scheme's default port signed no port at all. The verifier bet on the
backend Host port whenever the hostnames matched, so nginx-style
$host/$server_port forwarding got SignatureDoesNotMatch whenever the
proxy and backend share a hostname. Try each plausible host value in
likelihood order instead of guessing one.
* s3: unbracket IPv6 X-Forwarded-Host before matching the request host
net.SplitHostPort strips brackets from the request host, so a bracketed
portless X-Forwarded-Host like [::1] never matched and lost its port
candidate.
* s3: cover unbracketed IPv6 forwarded-host candidates; compare with slices.Equal
* s3: keep listing when empty directories fill the listing window
doListFilerEntries issued a single ListEntries request per directory with
Limit = maxKeys+2. Entries that emit nothing - empty directories, the
.uploads folder, the marker echo - consume that window without consuming
maxKeys, so a bucket whose first window held only empty directories was
reported empty and not truncated, and a subdirectory whose window filled
up silently dropped the entries behind it. Keep requesting from the last
received entry until the quota is filled or a short window shows the
directory is exhausted.
* s3: test listing across windows of empty directories
The test filer client now honors StartFromFileName so repeated windows
advance like the real filer.
* s3: propagate the request context into directory listing RPCs
A disconnected client now cancels the ListEntries streams instead of
letting the listing keep issuing requests against the filer.
* s3: group per-directory listing parameters into a request struct
doListFilerEntries took ten positional parameters; call sites read as
string and bool soup. Wrap the per-directory arguments in
listDirectoryRequest so recursions and tests name what they pass.
* s3: group list request parameters into a struct
listFilerEntries took eight positional parameters ending in two bare
booleans. Wrap them in listObjectsRequest so the V1 and V2 handlers
name what they pass.
* s3: routed last-version delete removes the emptied .versions directory
The routed versioned delete (routedDeleteSpecificVersion) repoints the
latest pointer and deletes the version file, but unlike the lock-path
fallback (updateLatestVersionAfterDeletion) it never tears down the
.versions/ directory it just emptied. The residue keeps the key's read
path in the self-heal rescan loop: every GET of the deleted key logs
event=surfaced plus a GetObject error until the background
EmptyFolderCleaner gets to the directory — at least two minutes away on
its delay queue, and possibly never (the queue is in-memory, bounded,
and gated on the bucket's allow-empty-folders policy). Veeam's lock
arbitration probes deleted lock keys continuously, so those windows are
always open and the log spam is chronic.
ObjectMutation DELETE gains remove_empty_parent: after the child delete,
the filer best-effort removes the parent directory in the same locked
transaction. Non-recursive on purpose — a concurrent write that lands a
new version fails the removal instead of being lost with it. The routed
last-version delete sets it on the version-file DELETE, matching the
lock-path fallback's contract.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014mMYAHXZySkCCUfpRFNtSv
* s3: drain empty .versions residue on read heal and in s3.versions.audit
Directories already stranded by pre-teardown deletes (or dropped from
the EmptyFolderCleaner's bounded in-memory queue) previously re-entered
the self-heal rescan on every GET forever: the heal only cleared the
pointer and nothing ever removed the directory, and s3.versions.audit
counted the state as clean.
When the heal rescan finds no remaining version, remove the directory
outright (non-recursive, so orphan children still block and fall back to
the pointer clear) and log event=healed mode=empty_dir_removed; the next
GET takes the clean not-found path. The audit gains an empty category so
the residue is visible, and -heal removes such directories in bulk.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014mMYAHXZySkCCUfpRFNtSv
Drives the full path: AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity embeds the claims in the
session JWT, AuthenticateJWT restores them, and AuthorizeAction evaluates
ForAnyValue:StringEquals on jwt:groups / jwt:roles per bucket. The mock
OIDC provider now carries token claims through and surfaces roles,
matching the real provider.
* s3: fail over routed object writes when the owner filer is unreachable
A routed object write (multipart completion, PUT, delete, versioned
finalize, metadata replace) dialed the ring-selected owner filer
directly with no failover. After a filer restarts onto a new address the
lock ring can still name the old one, so every routed write hangs on the
dead address until the gateway is restarted; CompleteMultipartUpload in
particular exceeds client timeouts.
Route the transaction through withFilerClientFailover, skipping an owner
that recently failed, so a live filer forwards it to the real owner by
route_key. Mirrors the read path's getObjectEntryRoutedByKey.
* s3: fail over bucket-config writes when the owner filer is unreachable
patchBucketEntry dialed the bucket's ring owner directly, so a restarted
filer's stale ring address hung every bucket-config write (versioning,
lifecycle, object lock, ownership, ACL, policy, CORS) - the same failure
as routed object writes. Route it through objectTxnOnFiler so it skips an
unreachable owner and a live filer forwards by route_key.
* Optimize s3api encodePath to eliminate O(n^2) allocations
encodePath built its result via string concatenation in a loop, which is
O(n^2) in allocations. For non-ASCII (e.g. Chinese) runes it additionally
called make + hex.EncodeToString + strings.ToUpper per byte (~10 allocations
per character). Under high QPS with long non-ASCII object keys this produced
a very high allocation rate, frequent GC and long GC pauses, causing S3
request latency spikes.
Replace with a preallocated strings.Builder, a manual hex lookup table, and a
zero-allocation fast path. EncodePath now delegates to encodePath to remove
the duplicated implementation. Output is byte-for-byte identical, verified by
TestEncodePath and TestEncodePathEqual.
Benchmark (long Chinese path): 261 -> 1 allocs/op, 35810 -> 480 B/op, 7.5x faster.
Load test (50M calls): 212x fewer allocations, 76x fewer GC cycles.
* s3api: drop regexp from encodePath fast path
The unreserved-character scan already decides whether any byte needs
encoding, so reservedObjectNames.MatchString was a redundant second pass
that also ran the RE2 engine on every authenticated request. Rely on the
scan alone; output is unchanged. The ASCII fast path drops from ~188ns to
~11ns per call.
---------
Co-authored-by: LiuDoge <liudoge@LiuDogedeMacBook-Air.local>
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com>
CRC64NVME multipart objects now emit a full-object checksum instead of a composite base64-N value, matching AWS (CRC64NVME supports full-object only). Adds x-amz-checksum-type handling (COMPOSITE/FULL_OBJECT) for CRC32/CRC32C/CRC64NVME via CRC combination, resolved at CreateMultipartUpload and applied at completion.
* s3: answer application/x-directory for a directory without a stored mime
A real directory reached via a trailing-slash GET/HEAD answered the
octet-stream default when it had no stored mime, so Hadoop-style S3
filesystems (flink-s3-fs-presto and friends) classified the path as a
0-byte file instead of a directory and then failed reading it as one.
Answer application/x-directory, the marker type those clients probe
for. Stored mimes still echo verbatim, and a file promoted to a
directory keeps octet-stream for its data.
* s3: 404 GET and HEAD on a bare directory path consistently
A directory with no object data of its own answered differently per
path: plain GET gave an empty 200, ranged GET and non-versioned HEAD
gave 404, and on versioned buckets the null-version fallback adopted
the filer directory as a 0-byte object and answered 200. Clients that
probe HEAD-then-GET took the 200s at face value, treated the path as
an empty file, and never fell back to LIST-based directory discovery.
Answer 404 for a bare directory path everywhere, which is what AWS
returns for a prefix. A file promoted to a directory keeps its data
and stays retrievable.
* s3: enforce bucket quota on logical size, not un-vacuumed physical size
A bucket full of deleted/overwritten objects awaiting vacuum went
read-only while its live data stayed under quota, because enforcement
used the raw single-copy volume size with garbage included. Subtract
DeletedByteCount via a LogicalSize() helper in the auto-enforce loop,
the s3.bucket.quota.enforce command, and the bucket_size_bytes metric
(labeled logical but counting garbage too). Deleting objects now
relieves quota immediately and enforcement matches the UI usage figure.
* admin: surface bucket read-only state in the S3 buckets UI
Read the read-only flag quota enforcement writes to filer.conf and show
it as a badge in the bucket list and a Status row in the details modal,
so an operator can see why writes are being rejected.
The owner index read the raw filer entry off BucketConfig, which no
longer carries one. Cache Crtime alongside IdentityId, and pass the
owner id rather than the entry through the ListBuckets visibility
checks so the scan and granted-bucket paths share one implementation.
* s3: paginate ListBuckets with max-buckets, continuation-token, and prefix
ListBuckets buffered every bucket entry into one slice and one XML body,
which falls over with very large bucket counts. Page through the filer
listing instead, cap each response at 10000 buckets like AWS, and honor
max-buckets, prefix, and an opaque keyset continuation-token.
* s3: maintain a bucket owner index under /buckets/.system/owners
Map each bucket owner to its buckets as zero-length entries at
/buckets/.system/owners/<owner>/<bucket>, with Crtime mirroring the
bucket's creation time. The bucket handlers write the index
synchronously, the /buckets metadata subscription reconciles changes
made elsewhere (weed shell, other gateways, direct filer operations),
and a startup backfill indexes pre-existing buckets before writing a
ready marker. Owner names are path-escaped so no identity name can
escape the index directory.
* s3: serve ListBuckets from the bucket owner index
Once the owner index is ready, non-admin identities list their owned
buckets straight from it, merged with any buckets their legacy actions
name explicitly, so ListBuckets costs O(own buckets) instead of a scan
of the global /buckets directory. Admins, identities with a bare List
grant or wildcard action patterns, and policy-authorized identities
whose grants cannot be enumerated keep the paged scan; policy-routed
identities get their owned buckets, matching AWS ListBuckets returning
only the caller's buckets.
* s3: keep dot-prefixed names under /buckets out of bucket surfaces
Dot-prefixed entries (.system) can never be valid bucket names, so
refuse to resolve them as buckets and skip them in the shell bucket
listing, matching what ListBuckets and the admin UI already do.
* test: cover ListBuckets pagination and the owner index end to end
* s3: fail closed on a nil identity when routing ListBuckets
* s3: decide the IAM authorization mechanism in one place
VerifyActionPermission and the ListBuckets owner-index routing each
re-derived the session-token / attached-policy / legacy-actions split;
extract the decision so the two cannot drift.
* s3: heal the owner index on concurrent bucket recreation too
The mkdir-lost-the-race path answers BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou just like
the up-front existence check, so give it the same index repair.
* s3: drop owner-index records for buckets deleted during backfill
A bucket removed between the backfill reading its page and writing the
index record became a permanent phantom in its owner's listing: the
delete's own cleanup ran before the record existed. After indexing each
page, re-list the same name range and remove records whose bucket is
gone; deletes landing after the re-list find the record and remove it
themselves.
* s3: add ContinuationToken and Prefix to the ListBuckets schema
Keep AmazonS3.xsd aligned with the generated ListAllMyBucketsResult so
a regeneration does not drop the pagination fields.
* s3: stop warming every bucket's config at startup
Listing all buckets in BucketRegistry.init() made S3 gateway startup
O(buckets) and pinned every bucket's metadata and config resident, which
does not scale past a few hundred thousand buckets. Both caches already
have lazy miss paths, so load on first access instead and let the
metadata subscription refresh only entries already resident; cold
buckets cost one filer round-trip on their first request.
* s3: bound the per-bucket caches with LRU eviction
The bucket config cache, bucket registry, and their negative caches were
plain maps that only ever grew: the config cache TTL made Get miss but
never evicted the entry, and the not-found sets grew on every probe of a
nonexistent bucket name. Cap all four at 65536 entries with LRU eviction
so a gateway keeps its hot working set and evicted buckets reload from
the filer on next access.
* s3: cache parsed bucket config instead of the full filer entry
Each cached BucketConfig retained the whole bucket entry (extended
attribute map plus raw content bytes) alongside the fields parsed from
it, roughly doubling per-bucket cache cost and keeping data the read
path never looks at. Parse everything up front in
newBucketConfigFromEntry - now also the creator identity, tags,
encryption config, and stored lifecycle XML - and drop the entry.
updateBucketConfig now reads the entry fresh from the filer and diffs
the mapped extended attributes against it, so the patch is computed
against current state instead of a cached copy; the config clone
helpers that existed for that path go away.
* s3: dedup cold bucket-registry loads per bucket
The registry's notFound lock doubled as the load serializer, holding one
global mutex across the filer round-trip so first-touch requests for
different buckets queued behind each other; the cache fill also happened
after the lock was released, so two concurrent misses for the same
bucket could both reach the filer. Replace it with a singleflight per
bucket that fills the cache inside the flight: different buckets load
concurrently, the same bucket loads once.
* s3: surface multipart-list store errors instead of masking them
listMultipartUploads masked a filer/metadata-store list error as an empty
200 response, and listObjectParts masked it as NoSuchUpload. A client
resuming a multipart upload (the Docker Registry S3 driver resolves an
in-progress upload via ListMultipartUploads, then ListParts) reads either
as "upload gone" and fails the upload permanently with a non-retryable
error. Return ErrInternalError so a transient store error stays retryable,
keeping ErrNotFound as an empty list / NoSuchUpload respectively.
* s3: return retryable error for transient CopyObject source lookups
Resolving the copy source is reported as InvalidArgument ("Copy Source must
mention the source bucket and key") whenever the lookup returns any error,
including a transient store error. Clients don't retry a 400, so a resumable
blob commit fails permanently. Keep the client error for a missing, invalid,
directory, or delete-marker source; map a transient store error to
ErrInternalError.
* s3: mark versioned lookup miss with the not-found sentinel
recoverLatestVersionWithoutPointer's terminal miss (a .versions directory
with no pointer, no versions, and no null object) returned a plain error,
so errors.Is-based callers could not tell this designed NoSuchKey state
from a store failure and reported it as an internal error.
* s3: reject a delete-marker copy source with NoSuchKey
getLatestObjectVersion returns the delete-marker entry when the latest
version is a delete marker, and the copy handlers copied its empty stub
into the destination. Every other handler detects ExtDeleteMarkerKey and
answers NoSuchKey; do the same for CopyObject and UploadPartCopy.
* s3: align copy-source not-found detection with the grpc status idiom
The lookup path canonicalizes text-form not-found into the sentinel in
filer_pb.LookupEntry and wraps with %w after that, so matching sentinel
text here was unreachable -- and risky, since a store error whose message
merely mentions the sentinel would be downgraded to a terminal 400.
Match the raw grpc NotFound code instead, like the other version-lookup
sites, and give transient filer errors the 503 that the upload-entry
lookup in this file already returns.
* s3: keep source-bucket versioning lookup errors retryable in copy
CopyObject and UploadPartCopy mapped any source-bucket versioning-state
lookup error to a terminal InvalidCopySource, including transient store
errors; getVersioningState signals a missing bucket with the not-found
sentinel, so split on that and let real store errors surface as 500, the
same mapping the destination-bucket lookup already uses.
* s3: match grpc-transported not-found in multipart list error paths
The list client path returns raw grpc status errors without the sentinel
reconstruction that lookups get in filer_pb.LookupEntry, so errors.Is on
the not-found sentinel never matched a store-reported missing directory;
match the sentinel text as well via a shared helper. The common missing-
directory case still lists as empty with no error and is unaffected.
* s3: complete and abort multipart surface store errors
prepareMultipartCompletionState mapped any upload-directory list or
lookup error to NoSuchUpload, so a transient store error at completion
time made the client discard a fully-uploaded object as gone. Split on
not-found like the sibling listing paths. abortMultipartUpload did the
same on s3a.exists, whose errors are never not-found (filer_pb.Exists
reports that as false with no error) -- a store failure there answered
NoSuchUpload and silently leaked the uploaded parts.
* s3: reject part numbers below 1 in UploadPartCopy
Only the upper bound was checked, unlike PutObjectPart; partNumber=0
passed the route regex and validation and wrote an out-of-range
0000_copy.part into the upload directory.
* s3: embedded IAM inline policy honors prefix-scoped resources
getActions stripped the trailing wildcard from a resource like
arn:aws:s3:::bucket/prefix/*, producing a non-wildcard action
(Write:bucket/prefix) that CanDo only ever matched at bucket level, so
PutObject under the prefix was denied. Preserve the object path with its
wildcard (Write:bucket/prefix/*) to match objects under the prefix,
matching the standalone iamapi behavior.
* s3: prune bucket-confined wildcard actions on bucket delete
actionScopedToBucket treated any wildcard as multi-bucket, so a
prefix-scoped action like Write:bucket/prefix/* survived deletion of its
own bucket and could re-grant access if the bucket was recreated. Scope
the wildcard check to the bucket segment only: a wildcard in the object
path stays scoped to its bucket, while one in the bucket segment does
not.
* s3: add IncompleteBody error code
* operation: tag a truncated source read as ErrTruncatedBody
The chunked uploader wraps both source-read failures and volume-upload failures,
and a mid-write volume server drop also carries io.ErrUnexpectedEOF. Tag only the
source read so callers can tell a truncated input apart from a server-side fault.
* s3: return IncompleteBody for a truncated PUT body
A client abort or reverse-proxy timeout truncates the request body mid-upload.
putToFiler mapped every streaming-upload failure to InternalError (500), which a
reverse proxy relays as a 502. Classify a source-read truncation as IncompleteBody
(400) so the response matches AWS and passes through. All S3 write paths share
putToFiler, so they all benefit.
* s3: invalidate stale reader cache locations on chunk read failure
* filer: share the chunk-read self-heal across reader cache and streaming paths
The reader cache retry added a third copy of the invalidate-relookup-compare-retry
dance already inlined in PrepareStreamContentWithThrottler and duplicated in
retryWithCacheInvalidation. Extract retryFetchWithFreshLocations and route all
three through it, parameterized by the refetch primitive.
* filer: drop redundant completedTimeNew store in reader cache success path
startCaching already stamps completedTimeNew unconditionally before the
fetchErr branch; the second store inside the success branch is dead.
* filer: make NewReaderCache cache invalidator an explicit parameter
The variadic ...CacheInvalidator only ever read the first element, so a caller
could pass two and silently get one. Take a single explicit argument and have
the non-S3 callers pass nil.
* filer: inject reader cache chunk fetch as a struct field
Replace the process-global readerCacheFetchChunkData test seam with a
per-instance fetchChunkDataFn field defaulted in NewReaderCache, matching how
lookupFileIdFn is already wired. Tests set the field on the cache instead of
swapping a shared global.
* filer: log the location count, not full URLs, on self-heal retry
---------
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com>
* s3: support AWS object form for bucket policy Principal, add NotPrincipal
Bucket policy statements only accepted a bare string or array of strings for
the Principal element, so the AWS-documented object form was rejected:
"Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root" }
"Principal": { "AWS": ["arn:...", "999999999999"] }
Add a PolicyPrincipal type that parses the bare string, the bare array
(retained for backward compatibility), and the object form keyed by AWS,
Service, Federated or CanonicalUser (each value a string or array). All keyed
values are flattened for principal matching, and the original JSON is preserved
so PutBucketPolicy/GetBucketPolicy returns the exact shape submitted - keeping
infrastructure-as-code tools (Terraform, Ansible) idempotent.
Also add NotPrincipal support (a statement applies to every principal except the
ones named), compiled and evaluated in both policy evaluators, and reject
statements that specify both Principal and NotPrincipal.
* s3: address review - validate principal object form, honor dynamic NotPrincipal
- Reject unsupported Principal object keys (only AWS/Service/Federated/
CanonicalUser) and empty values, so a form like {"AWS":[]} no longer compiles
to zero matchers and silently relies on the match-all fallback.
- Detect both Principal and NotPrincipal by field presence, not by flattened
length, so a present-but-empty field is still rejected.
- Honor dynamic (policy-variable) NotPrincipal/Principal patterns in the
compiled evaluator; previously a NotPrincipal made only of variables was
treated as absent and its exclusion bypassed.
- Add regression tests for the object-form validation and dynamic NotPrincipal.
* sts: enforce session-policy explicit deny during role chaining
A chained AssumeRole caller authenticates with an STS session token whose
inline session policy can explicitly deny sts:AssumeRole. The deny check only
evaluated the caller's named policies, so such a session could still chain into
any role its trust policy admits. Validate the session token in the deny check
and honor an explicit Deny in the inline session policy too.
* test(sts): integration coverage for AssumeRole authorization
Add an end-to-end AssumeRole authorization test (real weed mini + boto3):
a non-admin caller assumes a role its trust policy admits, an explicit
identity-side deny is blocked, and a session policy's explicit deny blocks
role chaining.
* sts: skip OIDC tokens and reject revoked sessions in the chaining deny check
Review follow-ups on the session-policy deny check:
- Guard session validation with !isOIDCToken so a bearer token our STS service
cannot validate does not error into a false deny.
- Reject a revoked session before evaluating its policy, restoring the
revocation enforcement the AssumeRole path lost when it stopped routing
through IsActionAllowed.
* fix(sts): authorize AssumeRole by the role's trust policy
The role's trust policy already declares who may assume it, but the caller
also had to pass an identity-side sts:AssumeRole check that only the Admin
action could satisfy — legacy static identities have no way to express
sts:AssumeRole on a role. So assuming any role required a full admin
identity. Drop the redundant check and let the trust policy be the authority;
scope it to specific principals to restrict who can assume.
* sts: resolve caller principal ARN for the trust-policy check
A legacy static identity can reach AssumeRole without a PrincipalArn set;
passing the empty value would miss a trust policy that names a concrete
principal. Resolve it to the canonical user ARN, sharing the logic
GetCallerIdentity already used inline.
* sts: enforce explicit identity-side deny for AssumeRole
Authorizing a named role by its trust policy alone dropped identity-side
evaluation entirely, so a caller whose attached policy explicitly denies
sts:AssumeRole could still assume any role the trust policy admits. Re-check
the caller's policies through the IAM manager for an explicit deny
(deny-always-wins) without requiring an allow; the trust policy stays the
allow authority.
Introduce security.BearerPrefix ("Bearer ", RFC 6750) and use it
everywhere an "Authorization: Bearer <token>" header is constructed,
replacing the scattered "BEARER "/"Bearer " string literals. SeaweedFS
matches the scheme case-insensitively when parsing (security.GetJwt), so
behavior is unchanged; this removes the magic string and settles the
casing on the standard form. The parser's upper-case comparison stays as
is on purpose.
* s3: replicate by fanning out from the gateway to every holder
The S3 gateway uploaded each chunk to one volume server, which then
relayed the copies to the other replica holders. The gateway now uploads
each chunk to every holder in parallel (type=replicate), removing the
primary volume server's receive-then-resend relay.
AssignVolume returns every replica holder (new repeated Location replicas,
forwarded from the master assign), the s3api captures them, and the
chunked uploader fans out whenever a chunk has more than one holder.
Cipher uploads keep the server-driven path since per-call encryption would
diverge the replicas.
* s3: cancel sibling replica uploads on the first failure
* s3: trim replica fan-out comments
* s3: roll back successful fan-out chunk copies when a holder fails
A failed fan-out records no FileChunk, so copies that landed on the holders
that finished before the cancel were leaked as orphans the caller could not
see. Track the holders that succeeded and delete the needle from each
(type=replicate, local-only) on failure, leaving nothing behind.
A config-file reload (SIGHUP) routed through MergeS3ApiConfiguration,
which skips identities marked static so dynamic admin/filer updates can't
clobber them. That also blocked the config file itself from updating its
own identities, so editing a secretKey and reloading had no effect.
Thread a fromStaticFile flag from the file-load path into the merge: the
authoritative file overwrites its static identities (and reapplies service
accounts under them), while dynamic updates still leave them immutable.
Mark the rebuilt identities static in the merge so a concurrent
RemoveIdentity never observes them as removable mid-reload.
Standalone weed s3 created a master client and registered the receiving
SeaweedS3IamCache gRPC service, but never wrapped its credential store
with the propagating store. Only the filer-embedded path called
SetMasterClient, so IAM mutations on one s3 pod never reached peers; they
served a stale in-memory identity cache and returned InvalidAccessKeyId
until restarted.
Wrap the credential store with the master client when one is available,
mirroring the filer path, so mutations fan out over the existing gRPC
cache service.
* s3tables: allow hyphens in namespace and table names
Iceberg REST clients routinely use hyphenated namespace/table names, but the
S3 Tables charset (a-z, 0-9, _) rejected them with 400. Accept '-' as an
interior character (names must still start, and namespaces end, with a letter
or digit), making the catalog conformant for those clients. A permissive
superset of the AWS S3 Tables charset.
* s3tables: allow hyphens in table ARN parsing too
The ARN regexes still excluded '-', so parseTableFromARN rejected ARNs with
hyphenated namespace/table names and existing reject-the-hyphen tests broke.
Widen the ARN patterns to match the validator, retarget those tests at a
still-invalid leading-hyphen name, and cover ARN parsing with hyphens.
* s3tables: purge decoupled table data without deleting the reused name path
A renamed or created-over-leftover table keeps its data at a location that
differs from its catalog name path. Drop now purges that data location and
clears the marker, instead of recursively deleting the name path, which may
still hold another table's data.
* iceberg: route a table created over a leftover to a unique location
When the default location is occupied by a leftover directory (data kept when
another table was renamed to this name), create the new table at a unique
location so it cannot overwrite that table's metadata. Common case is unchanged.
* iceberg: fail table create when the leftover-path check errors
A transient filer lookup error fell through as "not occupied", routing the
new table back to the default path and risking the very overwrite this check
guards against. Propagate the error and return 500 instead.
* s3tables: assert all catalog xattrs cleared on decoupled drop
Seed the full marker set so the test catches a regression that leaves the
policy, tags, version, or entry-type attribute on the reused name path.
* s3tables: refuse to drop a table whose data path is an ancestor
Corrupt metadata can resolve the data path to the bucket or namespace root,
which the bucket-scope check still admits; a recursive purge there would wipe
sibling tables. Reject an ancestor data path before deleting.
handleCreateTable used a type assertion that fails through WithFilerClient's
'all filers failed' wrap, so a concurrent create that the pre-check missed
fell through instead of returning the existing table. Use errors.As.
* s3tables: add RenameTable operation
* iceberg: support table rename
* iceberg: test table rename
* s3tables: keep table data in place on rename
rename is catalog-only: drop the source's catalog xattrs in place instead of recursively deleting its directory, which wiped the metadata.json and data files the renamed destination still points at. treat a missing table-metadata xattr as NoSuchTable in GetTable so the soft-deleted source name stops resolving.
* s3tables: test rename preserves data
make the in-memory filer honor recursive data deletion and seed the source table's metadata/ and data/ children, then assert a rename leaves them intact, the source name resolves to NoSuchTable, and the destination resolves to the preserved location.
* iceberg: map rename errors through wrapped manager error
* s3tables: authorize rename destination namespace
rename moved a table into the destination namespace after only checking the source, letting a source-authorized caller place tables in namespaces they don't control. require CreateTable on the destination namespace and bucket before writing.
* s3tables: purge renamed table data on drop
* s3tables: test table data dir derivation
s3: don't write 503 to a disconnected client during remote cache wait
When the remote-only cache poll returns without chunks, re-check the
request context before emitting 503 + Retry-After. A client that
disconnected during the wait surfaces as context.Canceled, which the
caller already handles silently; writing to the closed connection only
produced broken-pipe log noise.
* s3tables: tag table entries and exclude views from table listings
* s3tables: add view CRUD operations
* iceberg: support view create, load, exists, drop, and list
* iceberg: support view update
* iceberg: test view error classification and metadata round-trip
* iceberg: pre-check existence and write view metadata only after create
* iceberg: map view namespace-not-found to 404
* iceberg: test view create namespace-404 and duplicate no-clobber
* s3tables: tag view metadata and entry type atomically
CreateView wrote ExtendedKeyMetadata and ExtendedKeyEntryType in two
UpdateEntry calls, so a partial failure could leave a view directory
untagged. Add setExtendedAttributes to set both in one UpdateEntry.
* iceberg: roll back view registration when metadata write fails
The metadata file is written after the catalog registers the view. If
that write fails, drop the just-created view so it doesn't linger
pointing at a missing metadata.json. Reuse the DeleteView path via a
shared dropView helper.
* iceberg: support multi-table transaction commit
Add handleCommitTransaction for POST /v1/transactions/commit. Validation
is atomic across all table-changes (resolve, load, evaluate every
requirement before any write); metadata writes and pointer flips are
best-effort with rollback, so this is not crash-atomic.
* iceberg: route transactions/commit with and without prefix
* iceberg: test transaction commit request decoding
* iceberg: restore full prior table state on transaction rollback
* iceberg: test transaction rollback restores full prior table state
* iceberg: only clean up metadata for rolled-back tables
* s3tables: add RegisterTable op
* iceberg: support table register
* iceberg: test register table
* iceberg: parse engine-written metadata version from location
* iceberg: test metadata version parsing for both filename forms
* iceberg: map register errors through wrapped manager error
* iceberg: validate register metadata-location bucket and reject traversal
* iceberg: log register metadata load failure
* filer: treat a directory carrying object data as an S3 key object
A file promoted to a directory by a child write keeps its chunks, inline
content, or remote-tiered entry. Recognize that as a directory key object,
not only when a Mime is set, so the object still lists, demotes on delete,
and is not reclaimed by cleanup like the object it still is.
* filer: keep the empty-folder cleaner from reclaiming a promoted object
The cleaner skips directory key objects, but its check only looked at the
Mime. Mirror the chunks/content/remote check so a file promoted to a
directory is not deleted once its children are gone.
* s3: serve ranged GET for a directory that carries object data
Reject only zero-size directories so a file promoted to a directory streams
range requests instead of returning 404, while empty directories still 404.
* s3: return HEAD metadata for a directory that carries object data
HEAD now 404s a directory only when it has no data, so a promoted object is
retrievable while empty/implicit directories still fall back to LIST.
* iceberg: return 400 for invalid namespace/table names
The S3 Tables name charset (a-z, 0-9, _) is stricter than the Iceberg
REST spec, so clients sending hyphens or uppercase hit a validation
error. That error fell through to 500; it's client input, so map it to
400 BadRequestException across the namespace and table handlers.
* iceberg: tighten name-validation error matching
Match the validator's own phrasings (invalid/must/cannot) instead of a
bare "namespace name"/"table name" substring, so an unrelated fault that
happens to mention a name isn't misreported as a 400. Lowercase first to
stay robust to message capitalization.
* iceberg: support namespace property updates
Add POST /v1/namespaces/{namespace}/properties to the REST catalog. It
applies the request's removals and updates and returns the removed/updated/
missing summary the spec defines. A new UpdateNamespace op on the S3 Tables
manager rewrites the stored namespace properties; AWS S3 Tables namespaces
have no properties, so this is the SeaweedFS-side backing for the catalog.
* iceberg: dedup namespace property removals
A key repeated in removals was deleted on its first occurrence, then
reported as missing on the next — landing in both removed and missing.
Skip keys already processed.
* iceberg: map namespace-update backend errors to REST statuses
UpdateNamespaceProperties returned 500 for every manager failure, masking
the namespace being dropped between read and write, or a denied caller.
Inspect the typed S3TablesError and answer 404/403 accordingly, 500 only
for the rest. Also replaces the GetNamespace not-found string match.
* iceberg: test the namespace-properties conflict path
Cover the 422 returned when a key appears in both removals and updates.
The check runs before any backend call, so it needs no filer.
* fix(s3api): preserve requested AES256 copy encryption
Problem
CopyObject metadata processing ignored an explicit x-amz-server-side-encryption: AES256 request header. A destination copy could lose the requested SSE-S3 metadata even though KMS requests were handled.
Root cause
processMetadataBytes only wrote the destination SSE header when the requested algorithm was aws:kms. Any other explicit SSE algorithm fell through to the source-preservation branch.
Fix
Write the requested SSE algorithm whenever x-amz-server-side-encryption is present, and keep KMS-specific metadata handling limited to aws:kms.
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
* fix(s3api): reject unsupported copy encryption algorithms
A mistyped or unsupported x-amz-server-side-encryption value on a copy
request slipped past validation and got persisted as the destination's
algorithm header, advertising encryption that was never applied. Reject
anything other than AES256 or aws:kms up front.
* fix(s3api): write SSE key metadata for empty encrypted copies
A zero-byte source copied with an explicit SSE request took the
no-content branch and never ran the encryption path, leaving the object
with a bare algorithm header but no key. HEAD then advertised SSE while
the encryption-state machine saw the header as orphaned. Run the inline
encryption path when the destination requests encryption so the key
metadata is written too.
* s3api: use SSEAlgorithmKMS constant in copy metadata handling
* test(s3api): cover source SSE preservation on copy
* test(iam): allow the local client's real source IP in SourceIp tests
The aws:SourceIp allow policies hardcoded the loopback CIDRs, but a CI
runner reaching the server over localhost can be observed with one of the
host's RFC1918 addresses (the S3 endpoint is advertised on a 10.x
interface), so the positive-condition PutObject was denied and the allow
assertion flaked while the deny path passed trivially. Broaden the allow
list to loopback plus private ranges via a shared helper, and log the
denial on each failed attempt so any residual failure is diagnosable.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com>
* fix(s3api): sort repeated SigV4 query values
Problem
SigV4 canonical query strings must sort repeated parameter values. SeaweedFS preserved the incoming value order, so a correctly signed request with repeated query parameters could fail verification when the request order differed from canonical order.
Root cause
getCanonicalQueryString delegated directly to url.Values.Encode(), which sorts parameter names but preserves each key's value slice order.
Fix
Sort every query value slice before encoding the canonical query string, while still excluding X-Amz-Signature for presigned URLs.
Reproduction
go test ./weed/s3api -run TestGetCanonicalQueryStringSortsRepeatedValues -count=1 failed before the fix with partNumber=2 before partNumber=10.
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
* test(s3api): expand canonical query coverage
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
* s3: add streaming reader interface for remote storage
Add RemoteStorageStreamReader optional interface to support efficient
streaming of large remote objects without buffering entire file in memory.
This enables future stream-through caching where data can be served to
clients while simultaneously writing to volume servers.
Implement ReadFileAsStream() for S3, GCS, and Azure backends using their
native streaming APIs. This provides the foundation for improving TTFB
on large remote file access by serving data directly from remote storage
while background cache operation populates local chunks.
The streaming interface allows remote storage backends to return io.ReadCloser,
enabling efficient memory usage for multi-GB objects compared to the
current ReadFile() approach which buffers entire ranges in memory.
* s3: adaptive timeout for remote object caching to improve TTFB
Use size-aware cache polling timeout to balance cache-hit rate against
time-to-first-byte:
- Small files (<50MB): 10s timeout - more likely to complete caching
before timeout, improving subsequent request performance
- Medium files (50-500MB): 5s timeout - default balance
- Large files (>500MB): 2s timeout - fail-fast to improve initial TTFB
for very large downloads
This reduces waiting time for large remote files while maintaining
high cache-hit rate for smaller files that cache quickly.
* s3: address code review feedback for stream-through cache
- Move startBackgroundRemoteCache call after policy recheck to avoid
cache side effects for denied requests (authorization first)
- Make startBackgroundRemoteCache version-aware by accepting versionId
parameter and using buildVersionedRemoteObjectPath
- Add timeout (5 minutes) to background cache context to prevent
goroutine pile-up if RPC stalls under load
- Update cacheRemoteObjectForStreamingWithShortTimeout to return both
entry and error, allowing callers to distinguish transient errors
(timeout/cancellation) from permanent errors (not found, denied)
- Update streamFromVolumeServers to handle permanent cache errors with
appropriate HTTP status codes (404 for not found, 503 for transient)
* s3api: add optional request interceptor to circuit breaker
Add an optional Interceptor func(next http.HandlerFunc, action string) http.HandlerFunc
field on CircuitBreaker, applied at the very top of Limit() -- before upload
concurrency limiting and before the 'if !cb.Enabled' early return -- so it runs
for every route regardless of breaker state.
It is nil by default (no behavior change). An interceptor may reject a request
(write its own response and skip next) or wrap next to observe/shape it. This
provides a single per-request extension point at the existing per-route
chokepoint (cb.Limit already wraps nearly every S3 route), useful for tracing,
auditing, or request rate limiting without touching the route table.
* s3api: evaluate circuit breaker interceptor per request
Move the Interceptor nil-check into the returned handler so it is consulted
per request instead of captured at registration time. This:
- lets the interceptor be installed after registerRouter runs (handlers are
built during construction, before request-time dependencies exist), and
- avoids dereferencing a nil CircuitBreaker at registration time, which
panicked tests that register routes on a server with a nil cb
(e.g. TestRouting_STSWithQueryParams).
Adds a regression test for installing the interceptor after Limit() returns.
* s3: bound streaming remote-cache wait so large cold GetObject returns 503, not a hang
A remote-only object whose download outlasts the 30s dedup attempt fell through
to cacheRemoteObjectForStreaming, which waited on the raw request context with no
bound. For multi-GB blobs the client read timeout fires first, so the request was
canceled and surfaced as InternalError rather than the 503 + Retry-After the
handler already emits. The filer keeps caching on a detached context, so the
retry would have streamed from the cached chunks.
Bound the wait under common client read timeouts: the 503 fires while the client
is still connected, and a retry picks up the finished cache.
* s3: make the streaming remote-cache timeout atomic
The bound is a package-level var so tests can shorten it. Hold it as an
atomic int64 so a test that stores a short value can never race the request
path that loads it.
* s3: assert the streaming-cache timeout test waits on the bound
The upper-bound-only check would also pass if the RPC returned immediately on a
setup error. Add a lower bound so the test fails unless the bounded wait fired.
* s3: register account-less identities' synthesized account in the lookup
#9962 gave each account-less identity a distinct account id derived from
its name (instead of collapsing into admin), but never registered that
account in the id->account map. GetAccountNameById then returned empty
for such ids, so ACL grantee validation rejected canonical grants to the
caller's own account with InvalidRequest, and bucket/object owner display
was dropped as 'owner is invalid'.
This broke a canned PutObjectAcl by an account-less identity (e.g.
TestVersionedObjectAcl with the default 'some_admin_user' identity):
ValidateAndTransferGrants -> GetAccountNameById -> 'account id is not
exists' -> 400 InvalidRequest.
Register the synthesized account at config load so its id resolves to a
display name. Add a regression test.
* s3: reuse explicitly-configured account for account-less identity
Address review: if an account with the same id as an account-less
identity's synthesized account is explicitly configured (custom display
name/email), reuse it instead of the synthesized one. Add a test.
* s3tables: resolve account-less identities to a distinct principal
Static identities with no account block default to the shared admin
account, so getAccountID returned "admin" for every such user and the
permission checks treated them all as the admin principal. Only keep the
admin account when the identity actually carries an admin action;
otherwise fall back to the unique identity name.
* s3tables: limit the open-by-default fallback to anonymous access
The legacy permission path allowed any request that no policy explicitly
denied whenever default-allow was on, which is the zero-config default.
That let an authenticated identity without table permissions reach table
resources owned by others. Restrict the fallback to requests with no
identity or the anonymous identity; authenticated callers must pass an
explicit action or policy check. Zero-config and anonymous access are
unchanged.
* s3tables: drop the no-op ListTableBuckets account gate
The top-level check passed the principal as its own owner, so it always
allowed. Per-bucket filtering in the loop is the real authority; remove
the dead gate and the now-unused locals.
* s3tables: derive the Iceberg catalog's default-allow from auth state
The Iceberg catalog reuses the S3 Tables Manager, which hardcoded
default-allow on. Authenticated callers were enforced only because the
identity struct happens to propagate into the handler; if it were ever
dropped, a secured catalog would fall open. Mirror the S3 port and set
the Manager's default-allow from the authenticator, so an authenticated
caller is enforced regardless. Shell and admin keep their own trusted
Manager. Regression test covers the struct, name-only, and admin paths.
* s3tables: drop redundant ACTION_ADMIN string conversion
ACTION_ADMIN is an untyped string constant, so the conversion is a no-op.
* s3tables: enforce name-only authenticated callers, add trusted bypass
defaultAllowFor treated a request with no identity object as anonymous,
but the Manager path forwards only the identity name (not the struct).
A name-only authenticated caller could therefore be misclassified as
anonymous and allowed under the open default. Treat a server-set identity
name as authenticated too, and add an explicit trusted flag for the local
shell/admin tooling that legitimately bypasses authorization.
* s3tables: trim verbose comments
* s3: give STS sessions a distinct owner account, not admin
STS sessions were built with Account: &AccountAdmin, so every assumed-role
session shared the admin account for ownership and ACL checks. Use the
assumed-role user as the account id instead, matching the JWT auth path.
Session permissions are unchanged: they come from the session policies,
and admin is granted only through Actions.
* s3: resolve STS session identity to the OIDC subject
Use sessionInfo.Subject (falling back to the assumed-role user when
absent) for the session identity name and account id, so the SigV4 and
JWT auth paths resolve the same session to the same identity instead of
diverging on AssumedRoleUser vs Subject.
* s3: trim verbose comments
* s3: stop collapsing account-less identities into the admin account
Identities configured without an account block all defaulted to the
shared admin account, so distinct users got the same owner id and
ownership checks could not tell them apart. checkAccessByOwnership also
treated that id as an admin bypass, so any account-less caller passed
ownership for any bucket. Give such identities a distinct account id from
their name, and decide the ownership admin bypass by Admin capability
rather than by the account id. isUserAdmin is now nil-safe.
* s3: use the context identity in isUserAdmin before re-authenticating
The Auth middleware already verifies and stores the identity in the
request context. Read it there first so the ownership/admin checks don't
re-run signature verification, which is redundant and fails once the
request body has been consumed.
* s3: nil-guard the context identity in isUserAdmin
A non-nil interface wrapping a typed-nil *Identity passes the type
assertion; guard against it before calling isAdmin().
* s3: trim verbose comments
* s3: preserve checksums for copied multipart parts
* s3: return checksums from multipart copy
* s3: pin the upload's checksum algorithm on copy-part re-stream
* s3: note why UploadPartCopy uses the re-stream slow path
* s3: explain the TLS proxy in the multipart copy checksum test
* s3: cover nil and unknown-algorithm edge cases in copy checksum tests
* s3: cover all checksum algorithms in the multipart copy test
* s3: run all checksum integration tests, not just presigned
* s3: validate indirect filer path inputs
* s3: avoid query parsing on common request path
* filer: scope copy/move source against JWT AllowedPrefixes
maybeCheckJwtAuthorization only checked r.URL.Path, but copy and move read
their source from the cp.from / mv.from query params. A prefix-restricted
token could copy or move data out of a subtree it cannot otherwise reach.
Check every path the request touches, reusing pathHasComponentPrefix so
`..` in the source is collapsed before the prefix match.
* s3: confine iceberg CreateTable location to the catalog bucket
CreateTable derived the metadata bucket and path from the client-supplied
req.Location / req.Name and wrote there directly, so a caller scoped to one
table bucket could place metadata in another bucket (and path.Join collapsed
any `..`). Require the parsed bucket to equal the request's catalog bucket
and reject traversal segments in the table path.
* webdav: clean client path before subFolder confinement
wrappedFs concatenated subFolder + name before the underlying FileSystem
ran path.Clean, so `..` in the request path or COPY/MOVE Destination
resolved across the FilerRootPath confinement boundary. Clean the name as a
rooted path first so traversal segments collapse below subFolder. Only the
non-default -filer.path (non-empty subFolder) setup was affected.
* filer: enforce read-only rule on real write path with destination header
The x-seaweedfs-destination header overrides the path used for storage-rule
matching while the entry is written at r.URL.Path, letting a caller select a
writable rule for a read-only target. When the header is present, also check
the read-only/quota rule against the actual write path.
Reject copy sources whose bucket/object fail IsValidBucketName /
IsValidObjectKey, the helpers validateRequestPath already applies to the
request URL. The object is joined onto the bucket path and `.`/`..`
segments are collapsed by the filer, so without this the source need not
stay within the parsed bucket. Route UploadPartCopy through
ValidateCopySource too; it previously only checked for empty bucket/object.
Chris Lu
Chris Lu
jay
dongle-code
Cole Helbling
Aleksey
patrick
7y-9
Sergey Zinchenko