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Chris LuandGitHub c0f33d599b rust volume: mirror Go volume server logic to gate the admin RPCs (#10748)
rust volume: gate the remaining admin RPCs behind check_grpc_admin_auth

The Go volume server gates 29 destructive VolumeServer RPCs on the
-whiteList admin check; the Rust port only gated 14. Add the gate to the
other 15 -- batch_delete, read_all_needles, fetch_and_write_needle, the
EC-shard generate/rebuild/copy/unmount/to-volume RPCs, both tier-move RPCs,
volume_copy, volume_tail_receiver, set_state, scrub_ec_volume and
volume_needle_status -- so a configured whitelist restricts them the same
way it already does on the Go side.

check_grpc_admin_auth also required peer info before checking whether any
control was configured, unlike Go's `if vs.guard == nil { return nil }`.
Short-circuit when no whitelist and no signing key are set, so in-process
callers keep working with security inactive and only the gate ordering
changes for configured servers.

tests/admin_auth_coverage.rs mirrors the Go coverage test: every handler
must either gate or be listed as intentionally open with a reason, so the
two implementations can't silently drift apart again.
2026-08-13 13:17:23 -07:00

134 lines
6.2 KiB
Rust

//! Parity guard for the gRPC admin-auth gate.
//!
//! Every `VolumeServer` handler must either call `check_grpc_admin_auth` or be
//! listed here as intentionally ungated, with the reason it stays open. Mirrors
//! the Go side's `TestVolumeServerAdminAuthCoverage`
//! (`weed/server/volume_grpc_admin_auth_coverage_test.go`). The gate had
//! silently dropped off 15 handlers on the Rust side; this keeps the two
//! implementations from drifting apart again.
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
/// Handlers that intentionally run without `check_grpc_admin_auth`, each with
/// the reason. Kept in sync with `ungatedVolumeServerRPCs` on the Go side.
///
/// The split is by caller, not by how destructive the call is: the guard checks
/// the peer IP against `-whiteList`, which holds masters, shell hosts and
/// workers -- not every peer volume server. Gating a volume-server ->
/// volume-server call therefore breaks replication, EC and tiering, so those
/// calls stay open and need a cluster-peer identity before they can be closed.
fn ungated_handlers() -> HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> {
[
// Cluster-internal: issued volume server -> volume server.
("copy_file", "replica sync and EC task pull whole files from a peer"),
("read_needle_blob", "replica sync, vacuum and EC rebuild read needles from a peer"),
("read_needle_meta", "replica sync compares needle metadata across peers"),
("write_needle_blob", "replica sync repairs a peer's needle"),
("receive_file", "EC shard distribution pushes shards to a peer"),
("read_volume_file_status", "the copy path queries the source volume server"),
("volume_ec_shard_read", "a volume server reads EC shards held by a peer"),
("volume_ec_blob_delete", "EC delete is fanned out to the shard holders"),
("volume_ec_shards_info", "EC verification polls shard holders"),
("volume_ec_shards_mount", "EC shard distribution mounts on the receiving peer"),
("volume_incremental_copy", "volume backup pulls increments from a peer"),
("volume_sync_status", "sync compares volume state across peers"),
("volume_tail_sender", "the tail source streams to the receiving peer"),
("volume_status", "replica sync and the master's vacuum loop poll volume status"),
// Read-only or liveness: no state change.
("ping", "liveness probe"),
("get_state", "read-only volume server state"),
("query", "read-only data query"),
("vacuum_volume_check", "read-only garbage ratio; the vacuum steps that act on it are gated"),
("volume_server_status", "read-only status, the gRPC counterpart of the /status page"),
]
.into_iter()
.collect()
}
/// Whether a handler body actually invokes the gate. We can't run a real AST
/// pass like the Go side without pulling in a parser, so approximate it: drop
/// `//` line comments (the realistic way a stray mention would sneak in) and
/// look for the call form `check_grpc_admin_auth(`, not the bare identifier, so
/// a comment or doc reference can't make an ungated handler pass.
fn calls_gate(body: &str) -> bool {
body.lines()
.map(|line| line.split_once("//").map_or(line, |(code, _)| code))
.any(|code| code.contains("check_grpc_admin_auth("))
}
/// Enumerate the `VolumeServer` trait handlers and whether each gates on
/// `check_grpc_admin_auth`, by scanning the source of the trait impl block.
fn handler_gating(src: &str) -> Vec<(String, bool)> {
let impl_start = src
.find("impl VolumeServer for VolumeGrpcService {")
.expect("locate the VolumeServer trait impl");
let after = &src[impl_start..];
// rustfmt keeps every method body indented, so the impl's own closing brace
// is the first line that begins at column 0.
let impl_end = after
.match_indices("\n}")
.next()
.map(|(i, _)| i + 1)
.expect("locate the end of the trait impl");
let block = &after[..impl_end];
let marker = "\n async fn ";
let starts: Vec<usize> = block.match_indices(marker).map(|(i, _)| i).collect();
let mut handlers = Vec::with_capacity(starts.len());
for (i, &start) in starts.iter().enumerate() {
let name_start = start + marker.len();
let name_end = name_start
+ block[name_start..]
.find('(')
.expect("handler signature has an argument list");
let name = block[name_start..name_end].to_string();
let body_end = starts.get(i + 1).copied().unwrap_or(block.len());
let gated = calls_gate(&block[start..body_end]);
handlers.push((name, gated));
}
handlers
}
#[test]
fn volume_server_admin_auth_coverage() {
let src = std::fs::read_to_string(concat!(
env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"),
"/src/server/grpc_server.rs"
))
.expect("read grpc_server.rs");
let handlers = handler_gating(&src);
assert!(
handlers.len() >= 40,
"parsed only {} handlers from the trait impl, expected the full service",
handlers.len()
);
let ungated = ungated_handlers();
let mut problems = Vec::new();
for (name, gated) in &handlers {
match (gated, ungated.contains_key(name.as_str())) {
(true, true) => problems.push(format!(
"{name} calls check_grpc_admin_auth but is also listed as intentionally ungated; drop it from ungated_handlers"
)),
(false, false) => problems.push(format!(
"{name} does not call check_grpc_admin_auth and is not listed as intentionally ungated; gate it, or add it with the reason it must stay open"
)),
_ => {}
}
}
// Keep the exemption list honest: an entry for a handler that no longer
// exists hides the fact that nothing is being exempted.
let names: HashSet<&str> = handlers.iter().map(|(n, _)| n.as_str()).collect();
for name in ungated.keys() {
if !names.contains(name) {
problems.push(format!(
"ungated_handlers lists \"{name}\", which is not a VolumeServer handler"
));
}
}
assert!(problems.is_empty(), "admin-auth coverage gaps:\n{}", problems.join("\n"));
}