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Chris Lu a10607f90a Add Terraform support for VM-based SeaweedFS deployment (#9754)
* terraform: add cloud-agnostic core renderer module

Renders per-node weed argv, systemd units, config files, disk-mount and secret-fetch scripts, and cloud-init from an address map. Creates zero cloud resources. Flags verified against the weed binary: volume uses -mserver for the master list, gRPC is -port.grpc (auto http+10000), minFreeSpacePercent is a string, filer store via -defaultStoreDir.

* terraform: add mTLS and JWT security module

Generates the CA, per-component certs with distinct CNs, and JWT signing keys via the tls/random providers. Emits a core_security object plus PEMs for secret-store delivery.

* terraform: add AWS deployment module and examples

Reserves stable ENIs first, renders config via the core, then creates instances, prevent_destroy EBS data disks mounted at /data, and the cluster security group. With enable_security, generates certs/JWT, stores them in SSM SecureString, grants an instance role, and fetches them at boot so secrets stay out of user_data. Keyed for_each on every stateful tier.

* terraform: add local cluster test harnesses

run_local_cluster.sh and run_local_secure.sh render a cluster with the core and run real weed processes, asserting master quorum, volume registration, filer/s3 round-trips, mutual-TLS formation, and JWT enforcement. Use an isolated high port range with a guard so they never touch a cluster already running on the machine. The weed binary defaults to $(go env GOPATH)/bin/weed.

* terraform: add CI workflow and README

fmt/validate/tofu-test plus smoke jobs that build weed and run both harnesses.

* terraform: guard against empty filesystem UUID in mount script

An empty UUID made grep -q match any fstab line, skipping the fstab entry and breaking the mount. Fail fast when blkid returns no UUID.

* terraform: sanitize cluster name in WEED_CLUSTER env keys

Hyphens or spaces in cluster_name produced invalid systemd/bash env var names; map non-alphanumerics to underscores.

* terraform: omit empty jwt.signing block from security.toml

With enable_security and no JWT key, the template emitted [jwt.signing] key="". Gate the block on a non-empty key and cover it with a test.

* terraform: mark core security input as sensitive

The security object carries JWT signing keys; keep them out of plan output and known values.

* terraform: enforce jwt_length minimum of 32

* terraform: note region/AZ coupling in HA example

* terraform: guard WORKDIR before recursive delete in test harnesses

* terraform: fix README fence language and test count

* terraform: handle embedded s3 with no filer nodes

Indexing sort(keys(var.filers))[0] errored at plan time when embedded S3 was enabled but no filers were defined; fall back to an empty config source.

* terraform: scope kms:Decrypt to a configurable key arn

Replace the hardcoded Resource="*" with a kms_key_arn variable (default "*") so production can restrict decrypt to a specific CMK.

* terraform: encrypt EBS data volumes at rest

Set encrypted = true on the volume/filer data disks and the all-in-one example disk.

* terraform: protect filer instances from API termination

Filers hold the leveldb2 metadata store, so they are stateful and get the same disable_api_termination as masters and volumes.

* terraform: stop instance before detaching in all-in-one example

* terraform: drop stale references to the removed plan doc

* terraform: correct stale mount-step comment in aws module

* terraform: mark Terraform support as experimental in README
2026-05-30 23:43:17 -07:00

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2.1 KiB
Terraform

# Cluster security group + the SeaweedFS port matrix.
# Intra-cluster: all TCP allowed within the SG (master 9333/19333, volume
# 8080/18080, filer 8888/18888, admin 33646, ...). Client-facing: only S3 (8333)
# and filer (8888). Metrics ports (9327) are never opened to clients.
resource "aws_security_group" "cluster" {
name_prefix = "${var.name}-cluster-"
description = "SeaweedFS cluster"
vpc_id = var.vpc_id
tags = merge(var.tags, { Name = "${var.name}-cluster" })
lifecycle {
create_before_destroy = true
}
}
# All intra-cluster TCP via SG self-reference.
resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "intra_cluster" {
security_group_id = aws_security_group.cluster.id
referenced_security_group_id = aws_security_group.cluster.id
ip_protocol = "tcp"
from_port = 0
to_port = 65535
description = "intra-cluster (http + gRPC for all roles)"
}
resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "s3" {
for_each = toset(var.client_ingress_cidrs)
security_group_id = aws_security_group.cluster.id
cidr_ipv4 = each.value
ip_protocol = "tcp"
from_port = 8333
to_port = 8333
description = "S3 gateway"
}
resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "filer" {
for_each = toset(var.client_ingress_cidrs)
security_group_id = aws_security_group.cluster.id
cidr_ipv4 = each.value
ip_protocol = "tcp"
from_port = 8888
to_port = 8888
description = "filer HTTP"
}
resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "ssh" {
for_each = toset(var.ssh_ingress_cidrs)
security_group_id = aws_security_group.cluster.id
cidr_ipv4 = each.value
ip_protocol = "tcp"
from_port = 22
to_port = 22
description = "SSH"
}
resource "aws_vpc_security_group_egress_rule" "all" {
security_group_id = aws_security_group.cluster.id
cidr_ipv4 = "0.0.0.0/0"
ip_protocol = "-1"
description = "all egress"
}