Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/auth_security_test.go
Chris Lu cce98fcecf fix(s3): strip client-supplied X-SeaweedFS-Principal/Session-Token in AuthSignatureOnly (#9120)
* fix(s3): strip client-supplied X-SeaweedFS-Principal/Session-Token in AuthSignatureOnly

AuthSignatureOnly is the only auth gate in front of S3Tables routes
(incl. CreateTableBucket) and UnifiedPostHandler, but unlike
authenticateRequestInternal it did not clear the internal IAM
trust headers before running signature verification. S3Tables
authorizeIAMAction reads X-SeaweedFS-Principal directly from the
request and prefers it over the authenticated identity's PrincipalArn,
so a signed low-privilege caller could append that header after signing
(unsigned header, SigV4 still verifies) and have IAM policy evaluated
against a spoofed principal, bypassing authorization.

Clear both X-SeaweedFS-Principal and X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token at the
top of AuthSignatureOnly, mirroring the existing guard in
authenticateRequestInternal. Add a regression test covering the
header-injection path.

* refactor(s3): route AuthSignatureOnly through authenticateRequestInternal

Addresses review feedback: both entry points were independently
maintaining the internal-IAM-header stripping and the auth-type dispatch
switch. Collapse AuthSignatureOnly into a thin wrapper around
authenticateRequestInternal so the security-critical header scrub and
the signature-verify switch live in one place. Post-auth behavior
unique to AuthSignatureOnly (AmzAccountId header) stays inline.

No functional change beyond two harmless telemetry tweaks that now
match authenticateRequestInternal: the per-branch glog verbosity shifts
from V(3) to V(4), and the anonymous-found path now sets AmzAuthType.

* refactor(s3): centralize X-SeaweedFS-Principal/Session-Token header names

Introduce SeaweedFSPrincipalHeader and SeaweedFSSessionTokenHeader in
weed/s3api/s3_constants so the trust-header literals are defined once and
referenced consistently by the auth scrub, JWT auth path, bucket policy
principal resolution, IAM authorization, and S3Tables IAM evaluation.
Replace every remaining usage in weed/s3api and weed/s3api/s3tables.
This removes the drift risk the reviewer called out: adding another call
site with a typo can no longer silently bypass the scrub.

Pure rename, no behavior change. No-op integration-test helper in
test/s3/iam/s3_iam_framework.go left untouched (separate module, and the
server now strips the client-supplied value regardless).
2026-04-17 12:23:21 -07:00

495 lines
18 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
v4 "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/signer/v4"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func signRawHTTPRequest(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request, accessKey, secretKey, region string) error {
creds := aws.Credentials{
AccessKeyID: accessKey,
SecretAccessKey: secretKey,
}
signer := v4.NewSigner()
payloadHash := fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte{}))
return signer.SignHTTP(ctx, creds, req, payloadHash, "s3", region, time.Now())
}
func TestReproIssue7912(t *testing.T) {
// Create a temporary s3.json
configContent := `{
"identities": [
{
"name": "xx",
"credentials": [
{
"accessKey": "xx_access_key",
"secretKey": "xx_secret_key"
}
],
"actions": ["Admin", "Read", "Write", "List", "Tagging"]
},
{
"name": "read_only_user",
"credentials": [
{
"accessKey": "readonly_access_key",
"secretKey": "readonly_secret_key"
}
],
"actions": ["Read", "List"]
}
]
}`
tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "s3-config-*.json")
assert.NoError(t, err)
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
_, err = tmpFile.Write([]byte(configContent))
assert.NoError(t, err)
tmpFile.Close()
// Initialize Identities Access Management
option := &S3ApiServerOption{
Config: tmpFile.Name(),
}
iam := NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option, nil, "memory")
assert.True(t, iam.isEnabled(), "Auth should be enabled")
// Test case 1: Unknown access key should be rejected
t.Run("Unknown access key", func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/", nil)
r.Host = "localhost:8333"
err := signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), r, "unknown_key", "any_secret", "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrInvalidAccessKeyID, errCode, "Should be denied with unknown access key")
assert.Nil(t, identity)
})
t.Run("Positive test case: properly signed credentials", func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/", nil)
r.Host = "localhost:8333"
err := signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), r, "readonly_access_key", "readonly_secret_key", "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrNone, errCode)
require.NotNil(t, identity)
assert.Equal(t, "read_only_user", identity.Name)
})
t.Run("Nil identity tests for guards", func(t *testing.T) {
var nilIdentity *Identity
// Test isAdmin guard
assert.False(t, nilIdentity.isAdmin())
// Test CanDo guard
assert.False(t, nilIdentity.CanDo(s3_constants.ACTION_LIST, "bucket", "object"))
})
t.Run("AuthSignatureOnly path", func(t *testing.T) {
// Valid request
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/", nil)
r.Host = "localhost:8333"
err := signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), r, "xx_access_key", "xx_secret_key", "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
identity, errCode := iam.AuthSignatureOnly(r)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrNone, errCode)
require.NotNil(t, identity)
assert.Equal(t, "xx", identity.Name)
// Invalid request (wrong signature)
r2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/", nil)
r2.Host = "localhost:8333"
err = signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), r2, "xx_access_key", "this_is_a_wrong_secret", "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, errCode2 := iam.AuthSignatureOnly(r2)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch, errCode2)
// Verify fix: Streaming unsigned payload should be denied without auth header in AuthSignatureOnly
r3 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://localhost:8333/somebucket/someobject", nil)
r3.Header.Set("x-amz-content-sha256", "STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER")
// No Authorization header
_, errCode3 := iam.AuthSignatureOnly(r3)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, errCode3, "AuthSignatureOnly should be denied with unsigned streaming if no auth header")
// Verify fix: client-supplied X-SeaweedFS-Principal / X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token
// headers must be stripped, otherwise a signed low-privilege caller could
// spoof the principal that downstream IAM authorization (e.g. S3Tables
// CreateTableBucket) evaluates against.
r4 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/", nil)
r4.Host = "localhost:8333"
err = signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), r4, "readonly_access_key", "readonly_secret_key", "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
// Attacker injects these headers after signing; they are not part of
// SignedHeaders, so SigV4 verification still passes.
r4.Header.Set(s3_constants.SeaweedFSPrincipalHeader, "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root")
r4.Header.Set(s3_constants.SeaweedFSSessionTokenHeader, "spoofed-session-token")
_, errCode4 := iam.AuthSignatureOnly(r4)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrNone, errCode4)
assert.Empty(t, r4.Header.Get(s3_constants.SeaweedFSPrincipalHeader), "client-supplied X-SeaweedFS-Principal must be stripped")
assert.Empty(t, r4.Header.Get(s3_constants.SeaweedFSSessionTokenHeader), "client-supplied X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token must be stripped")
})
t.Run("Wrong secret key", func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/", nil)
r.Host = "localhost:8333"
err := signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), r, "readonly_access_key", "this_is_a_wrong_secret", "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch, errCode, "Should NOT be allowed with wrong signature")
assert.Nil(t, identity)
})
t.Run("Anonymous request to protected bucket", func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/somebucket/", nil)
// No Authorization header
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, errCode, "Should be denied for anonymous")
assert.Nil(t, identity)
})
t.Run("Non-S3 request should be denied", func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/", nil)
// No headers at all
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, errCode)
assert.Nil(t, identity)
})
t.Run("Any other credentials", func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost:8333/", nil)
r.Host = "localhost:8333"
err := signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), r, "some_other_key", "some_secret", "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrInvalidAccessKeyID, errCode, "Should NOT be allowed with ANY other credentials")
assert.Nil(t, identity)
})
t.Run("Streaming unsigned payload bypass attempt", func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://localhost:8333/somebucket/someobject", nil)
r.Header.Set("x-amz-content-sha256", "STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER")
// No Authorization header
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, errCode, "Should be denied with unsigned streaming if no auth header")
assert.Nil(t, identity)
})
}
// TestExternalUrlSignatureVerification tests that S3 signature verification works
// correctly when s3.externalUrl is configured. It uses the real AWS SDK v2 signer
// to prove correctness against actual S3 clients behind a reverse proxy.
func TestExternalUrlSignatureVerification(t *testing.T) {
configContent := `{
"identities": [
{
"name": "test_user",
"credentials": [
{
"accessKey": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
"secretKey": "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY"
}
],
"actions": ["Admin", "Read", "Write", "List", "Tagging"]
}
]
}`
tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "s3-config-*.json")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
_, err = tmpFile.Write([]byte(configContent))
require.NoError(t, err)
tmpFile.Close()
accessKey := "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
secretKey := "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY"
tests := []struct {
name string
clientUrl string // URL the client signs against
backendHost string // Host header SeaweedFS sees (from proxy)
externalUrl string // s3.externalUrl config
expectSuccess bool
}{
{
name: "non-standard port with externalUrl",
clientUrl: "https://api.example.com:9000/test-bucket/object",
backendHost: "backend:8333",
externalUrl: "https://api.example.com:9000",
expectSuccess: true,
},
{
name: "HTTPS default port 443 with externalUrl (port stripped by SDK and parseExternalUrlToHost)",
clientUrl: "https://api.example.com/test-bucket/object",
backendHost: "backend:8333",
externalUrl: "https://api.example.com:443",
expectSuccess: true,
},
{
name: "HTTPS without explicit port with externalUrl",
clientUrl: "https://api.example.com/test-bucket/object",
backendHost: "backend:8333",
externalUrl: "https://api.example.com",
expectSuccess: true,
},
{
name: "HTTP default port 80 with externalUrl",
clientUrl: "http://api.example.com/test-bucket/object",
backendHost: "backend:8333",
externalUrl: "http://api.example.com:80",
expectSuccess: true,
},
{
name: "without externalUrl, internal host causes mismatch",
clientUrl: "https://api.example.com:9000/test-bucket/object",
backendHost: "backend:8333",
externalUrl: "",
expectSuccess: false,
},
{
name: "without externalUrl, matching host works",
clientUrl: "http://localhost:8333/test-bucket/object",
backendHost: "localhost:8333",
externalUrl: "",
expectSuccess: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Create IAM with the externalUrl
option := &S3ApiServerOption{
Config: tmpFile.Name(),
ExternalUrl: tt.externalUrl,
}
iam := NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option, nil, "memory")
require.True(t, iam.isEnabled())
// Step 1: Sign a request targeting the client-facing URL using real AWS SDK signer
signReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, tt.clientUrl, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
signReq.Host = signReq.URL.Host
err = signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), signReq, accessKey, secretKey, "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
// Step 2: Create a separate request as the proxy would deliver it
proxyReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, tt.clientUrl, nil)
proxyReq.Host = tt.backendHost
proxyReq.URL.Host = tt.backendHost
// Copy the auth headers from the signed request
proxyReq.Header.Set("Authorization", signReq.Header.Get("Authorization"))
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Amz-Date", signReq.Header.Get("X-Amz-Date"))
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Amz-Content-Sha256", signReq.Header.Get("X-Amz-Content-Sha256"))
// Step 3: Verify
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(proxyReq, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST)
if tt.expectSuccess {
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrNone, errCode, "Expected successful signature verification")
require.NotNil(t, identity)
assert.Equal(t, "test_user", identity.Name)
} else {
assert.NotEqual(t, s3err.ErrNone, errCode, "Expected signature verification to fail")
}
})
}
}
// TestRealSDKSignerWithForwardedHeaders proves that extractHostHeader produces
// values that match the real AWS SDK v2 signer's SanitizeHostForHeader behavior.
//
// Unlike the self-referential tests in auto_signature_v4_test.go (which sign and
// verify with the same extractHostHeader function), this test uses the real AWS
// SDK v2 signer to sign the request. The SDK has its own host sanitization:
// - strips :80 for http
// - strips :443 for https
// - preserves all other ports
//
// If extractHostHeader disagrees with the SDK, the signature will not match.
func TestRealSDKSignerWithForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
configContent := `{
"identities": [
{
"name": "test_user",
"credentials": [
{
"accessKey": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
"secretKey": "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY"
}
],
"actions": ["Admin", "Read", "Write", "List", "Tagging"]
}
]
}`
tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "s3-config-*.json")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
_, err = tmpFile.Write([]byte(configContent))
require.NoError(t, err)
tmpFile.Close()
accessKey := "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
secretKey := "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY"
// Each test case simulates:
// 1. A client connecting to clientUrl (SDK signs with the host from this URL)
// 2. A proxy forwarding to SeaweedFS with X-Forwarded-* headers
// 3. SeaweedFS extracting the host and verifying the signature
tests := []struct {
name string
clientUrl string // URL the client/SDK signs against
backendHost string // Host header SeaweedFS receives (proxy rewrites this)
forwardedHost string // X-Forwarded-Host set by proxy
forwardedPort string // X-Forwarded-Port set by proxy
forwardedProto string // X-Forwarded-Proto set by proxy
expectedHost string // what extractHostHeader should return (must match SDK)
}{
{
name: "HTTPS non-standard port",
clientUrl: "https://api.example.com:9000/bucket/key",
backendHost: "seaweedfs:8333",
forwardedHost: "api.example.com",
forwardedPort: "9000",
forwardedProto: "https",
expectedHost: "api.example.com:9000",
},
{
name: "HTTPS standard port 443 (SDK strips, we must too)",
clientUrl: "https://api.example.com/bucket/key",
backendHost: "seaweedfs:8333",
forwardedHost: "api.example.com",
forwardedPort: "443",
forwardedProto: "https",
expectedHost: "api.example.com",
},
{
name: "HTTP standard port 80 (SDK strips, we must too)",
clientUrl: "http://api.example.com/bucket/key",
backendHost: "seaweedfs:8333",
forwardedHost: "api.example.com",
forwardedPort: "80",
forwardedProto: "http",
expectedHost: "api.example.com",
},
{
name: "HTTP non-standard port 8080",
clientUrl: "http://api.example.com:8080/bucket/key",
backendHost: "seaweedfs:8333",
forwardedHost: "api.example.com",
forwardedPort: "8080",
forwardedProto: "http",
expectedHost: "api.example.com:8080",
},
{
name: "X-Forwarded-Host with port (Traefik style), HTTPS 443",
clientUrl: "https://api.example.com/bucket/key",
backendHost: "seaweedfs:8333",
forwardedHost: "api.example.com:443",
forwardedPort: "443",
forwardedProto: "https",
expectedHost: "api.example.com",
},
{
name: "X-Forwarded-Host with port (Traefik style), HTTP 80",
clientUrl: "http://api.example.com/bucket/key",
backendHost: "seaweedfs:8333",
forwardedHost: "api.example.com:80",
forwardedPort: "80",
forwardedProto: "http",
expectedHost: "api.example.com",
},
{
name: "no forwarded headers, direct access",
clientUrl: "http://localhost:8333/bucket/key",
backendHost: "localhost:8333",
forwardedHost: "",
forwardedPort: "",
forwardedProto: "",
expectedHost: "localhost:8333",
},
{
name: "empty proto with port 80 (defaults to http, strip)",
clientUrl: "http://api.example.com/bucket/key",
backendHost: "seaweedfs:8333",
forwardedHost: "api.example.com",
forwardedPort: "80",
forwardedProto: "",
expectedHost: "api.example.com",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
option := &S3ApiServerOption{Config: tmpFile.Name()}
iam := NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option, nil, "memory")
require.True(t, iam.isEnabled())
// Step 1: Sign a request using the real AWS SDK v2 signer.
// The SDK applies its own SanitizeHostForHeader logic.
signReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, tt.clientUrl, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
signReq.Host = signReq.URL.Host
err = signRawHTTPRequest(context.Background(), signReq, accessKey, secretKey, "us-east-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
// Step 2: Build the request as the proxy would deliver it to SeaweedFS.
proxyReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, tt.clientUrl, nil)
proxyReq.Host = tt.backendHost
// Copy signed auth headers
proxyReq.Header.Set("Authorization", signReq.Header.Get("Authorization"))
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Amz-Date", signReq.Header.Get("X-Amz-Date"))
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Amz-Content-Sha256", signReq.Header.Get("X-Amz-Content-Sha256"))
// Set forwarded headers
if tt.forwardedHost != "" {
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", tt.forwardedHost)
}
if tt.forwardedPort != "" {
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Port", tt.forwardedPort)
}
if tt.forwardedProto != "" {
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", tt.forwardedProto)
}
// Step 3: Verify extractHostHeader returns the expected value.
// This is the critical correctness check: our extracted host must match
// what the SDK signed with, otherwise the signature will not match.
extractedHost := extractHostHeader(proxyReq, iam.externalHost)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expectedHost, extractedHost,
"extractHostHeader must return a value matching what AWS SDK signed with")
// Step 4: Verify the full signature matches.
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(proxyReq, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST)
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrNone, errCode,
"Signature from real AWS SDK signer must verify successfully")
require.NotNil(t, identity)
assert.Equal(t, "test_user", identity.Name)
})
}
}