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Javier de la TorreGitHubJavier de la TorreDevin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
74da88fc29 s3, iceberg: record the access key a request was signed with (#11901)
* s3, iceberg: record the access key a request was signed with

Several access keys can belong to one identity, but nothing downstream of
authentication says which one signed a request: the audit log carries the
identity name only, and every table credential the Iceberg catalog vends for
that identity gets the same session name. When an identity is shared (one key
per person or per service), the log cannot tell the holders apart.

The verifier that matched a credential now records that credential's access
key id in the request's identity holder (verifyV4Signature for header,
presigned, streaming and STS requests; both SigV2 verifiers). Nothing re-reads
the request for a key, so a second, unverified key elsewhere in the request
(a junk X-Amz-Credential on a SigV2 request, a junk SigV4 header on a SigV2
presigned URL) is never recorded.

- s3err.AccessLog gains access_key_id (omitempty): a static key's id, or an
  STS session's temporary key id. Every other field is unchanged.
- The Iceberg and Lance catalogs install the holder before authenticating a
  SigV4 request; a Bearer token records the key it was minted from (the token
  is verified with a key derived from it); a Lance x-api-key records its key.
- VendTableCredentials ends the session name with "-k" and the first 12 hex
  digits of SHA-256 of the key id (the table part gives way within the
  64-character limit; the tag is never cut), and carries the key id in the
  session token (src_ak, SessionInfo.SourceAccessKeyId).

Tests: auth_access_key_attribution_test.go and auth_access_key_shapes_test.go
(two keys on one identity, the deny path, SigV2 and presigned SigV2 with a
junk key elsewhere, streaming seed, STS session, failed signatures record
nothing), s3api_iceberg_session_name_test.go, iceberg and lance Auth tests,
sts source_access_key_test.go.

* s3: record the access key of a verified POST-policy form and of a retargeted signature

Two verified signatures left access_key_id empty in the audit log:

- A browser POST upload is verified in PostPolicyBucketHandler from its form
  fields by doesPolicySignatureV2Match / doesPolicySignatureV4Match, which did
  not record the key. Both now take the request context and record the
  credential's key once its signature verifies; a form that fails
  verification records nothing.
- verifyV4Signature refuses a signature that verified for one virtual-hosted
  bucket but was routed to another. The key was recorded only after that
  check, so the refusal carried none. It is now recorded as soon as a host
  candidate verifies.

Test: TestPostPolicyUploadRecordsTheSigningKey (SigV4 and SigV2 forms, and a
form with a wrong signature) and TestSignedVirtualHostRetargetRecordsTheSigningKey;
both fail before this change.

* s3: test VendTableCredentials end to end for the caller's access key

TestVendTableCredentialsRecordsTheCallersKey mints sessions through
VendTableCredentials with a configured STS service, the key recorded the way
the catalog's authentication records it, then validates each session token:
SourceAccessKeyId and the session name's key tag match the key, and a caller
without a key gets an untagged session. It fails if the vendor stops passing
either field.

---------

Co-authored-by: Javier de la Torre <jatorre@lakehousebox.com>
Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-21 20:33:08 -07:00

251 lines
10 KiB
Go

package lance
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3tables"
)
// FilerClient provides access to the filer for storage operations.
type FilerClient interface {
WithFilerClient(streamingMode bool, fn func(client filer_pb.SeaweedFilerClient) error) error
}
type S3Authenticator interface {
AuthenticateRequest(r *http.Request) (string, interface{}, s3err.ErrorCode)
DefaultAllow() bool
}
// CredentialValidator validates S3 access key / secret key pairs
// and provides credential lookup for OAuth token verification.
type CredentialValidator interface {
// ValidateS3Credential checks if the access key and secret key are valid.
// Returns the identity name and identity object on success.
ValidateS3Credential(accessKey, secretKey string) (identityName string, identity interface{}, err error)
// GetCredentialByAccessKey looks up a credential by access key.
// Returns the identity name, identity object, and secret key.
// Used for verifying Bearer tokens signed with a specific credential.
GetCredentialByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identityName string, identity interface{}, secretKey string, err error)
}
// VendedCredentials are short-lived S3 credentials scoped to one table.
type VendedCredentials struct {
AccessKeyID string
SecretAccessKey string
SessionToken string
Expiration time.Time
}
// CredentialVendor mints credentials limited to a single table's prefix for a
// caller the catalog has already authenticated and authorized, read-only when
// readOnly is set. A nil result with no error means the deployment has vending
// switched off.
type CredentialVendor interface {
VendTableCredentials(ctx context.Context, principal, bucket, prefix string, readOnly bool) (*VendedCredentials, error)
}
// Server implements the Lance Namespace REST spec.
type Server struct {
filerClient FilerClient
tablesManager *s3tables.Manager
authenticator S3Authenticator
credentialValidator CredentialValidator
credentialVendor CredentialVendor
s3Endpoint string
s3Region string
}
// NewServer creates a Lance namespace server over the given filer.
func NewServer(filerClient FilerClient, authenticator S3Authenticator) *Server {
manager := s3tables.NewManager()
// Mirror the S3 port: fall open by default only when the gateway itself is
// open, so an authenticated caller still passes the normal permission check.
if authenticator != nil {
manager.SetDefaultAllow(authenticator.DefaultAllow())
}
return &Server{
filerClient: filerClient,
tablesManager: manager,
authenticator: authenticator,
}
}
// SetCredentialValidator sets the credential validator for OAuth token support.
func (s *Server) SetCredentialValidator(cv CredentialValidator) {
s.credentialValidator = cv
}
// SetCredentialVendor enables storage_options credential vending for clients
// that ask for it with vend_credentials.
func (s *Server) SetCredentialVendor(vendor CredentialVendor) {
s.credentialVendor = vendor
}
// SetS3Endpoint configures the S3 endpoint advertised in storage_options so a
// client can reach the dataset without separately discovering the S3 address.
func (s *Server) SetS3Endpoint(endpoint string) {
s.s3Endpoint = endpoint
}
// SetS3Region configures the region advertised in storage_options.
func (s *Server) SetS3Region(region string) {
s.s3Region = region
}
// RegisterRoutes registers the Lance Namespace REST routes.
//
// The spec puts the identifier in the path rather than the body so a reverse
// proxy can route and authorize without deserializing the request.
func (s *Server) RegisterRoutes(router *mux.Router) {
router.Use(loggingMiddleware)
// OAuth2 token endpoint - no auth needed (this IS the auth endpoint)
router.HandleFunc("/oauth/token", s.handleOAuthTokens).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/namespace/{id}/create", s.Auth(s.handleCreateNamespace)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/namespace/{id}/list", s.Auth(s.handleListNamespaces)).Methods(http.MethodGet)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/namespace/{id}/describe", s.Auth(s.handleDescribeNamespace)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/namespace/{id}/drop", s.Auth(s.handleDropNamespace)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/namespace/{id}/exists", s.Auth(s.handleNamespaceExists)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/namespace/{id}/table/list", s.Auth(s.handleListTables)).Methods(http.MethodGet)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table", s.Auth(s.handleListAllTables)).Methods(http.MethodGet)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/declare", s.Auth(s.handleDeclareTable)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/describe", s.Auth(s.handleDescribeTable)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/exists", s.Auth(s.handleTableExists)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/register", s.Auth(s.handleRegisterTable)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/deregister", s.Auth(s.handleDeregisterTable)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/drop", s.Auth(s.handleDropTable)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/rename", s.Auth(s.handleRenameTable)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
// The data plane needs Lance format support that does not exist in Go. Say
// so with the spec's own code instead of returning a bare 404.
for _, action := range []string{"create", "insert", "merge_insert", "update", "delete",
"query", "count_rows", "explain_plan", "analyze_plan", "restore",
"add_columns", "alter_columns", "drop_columns", "backfill_column",
"create_index", "create_scalar_index", "stats", "schema_metadata/update"} {
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/"+action, s.Auth(s.handleUnsupported)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
}
// Version ops exist in the spec for stores that cannot order commits
// themselves. Ours can: a Lance commit is a put-if-not-exists, and this S3
// evaluates that precondition at the object's owner filer under a per-path
// lock, so the dataset keeps its own version history and the catalog stays
// out of the commit path.
for _, action := range []string{
"version/create", "version/list", "version/describe", "version/delete",
"index/list", "tags/list", "tags/version", "tags/create", "tags/delete", "tags/update",
"branches/list", "branches/create", "branches/delete"} {
router.HandleFunc("/v1/table/{id}/"+action, s.Auth(s.handleUnsupported)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
}
router.PathPrefix("/").HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
glog.V(2).Infof("lance: no route for %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.EscapedPath())
writeError(w, r, http.StatusNotFound, codeUnsupported, "no such operation")
})
glog.V(2).Infof("Registered Lance Namespace routes")
}
func (s *Server) handleUnsupported(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeError(w, r, http.StatusNotImplemented, codeUnsupported,
"this namespace records table metadata only; run data operations through a Lance client against the table location")
}
func loggingMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
glog.V(2).Infof("lance request: %s %s from %s", r.Method, r.URL.EscapedPath(), r.RemoteAddr)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// Auth authenticates the caller and puts the identity in the request context.
// Lance clients authenticate the catalog with a Bearer token or an x-api-key
// header; the S3 authenticator stays for callers that can SigV4-sign.
func (s *Server) Auth(handler http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// A request carrying a Bearer token is a Lance REST client. An invalid
// or expired token gets 401 immediately; falling through to the S3
// authenticator would parse the header as SigV4 and fail with a
// different error that clients cannot act on.
// The auth scheme is case-insensitive (RFC 7235).
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(r.Header.Get("Authorization")), "bearer ") {
if identityName, identity, accessKey, ok := s.authenticateBearerKey(r); ok {
ctx := r.Context()
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityNameInContext(ctx, identityName)
ctx = s3_constants.SetAccessKeyIdInContext(ctx, accessKey)
if identity != nil {
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityInContext(ctx, identity)
}
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
handler(w, r)
return
}
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
writeError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, codeUnauthenticated, "Bearer token is invalid or expired")
return
}
if apiKey := r.Header.Get("x-api-key"); apiKey != "" {
if identityName, identity, ok := s.authenticateApiKey(apiKey); ok {
accessKey, _, _ := strings.Cut(apiKey, ":")
ctx := r.Context()
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityNameInContext(ctx, identityName)
ctx = s3_constants.SetAccessKeyIdInContext(ctx, accessKey)
if identity != nil {
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityInContext(ctx, identity)
}
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
handler(w, r)
return
}
writeError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, codeUnauthenticated, "invalid x-api-key")
return
}
if s.authenticator == nil {
writeError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, codeUnauthenticated, "authentication required")
return
}
// The verifier records the key of the credential that matched into
// this holder; the vended credentials name it.
r = s3_constants.EnsureIdentityHolder(r)
identityName, identity, errCode := s.authenticator.AuthenticateRequest(r)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
apiErr := s3err.GetAPIError(errCode)
code := codeInternal
switch apiErr.HTTPStatusCode {
case http.StatusForbidden:
code = codePermissionDenied
case http.StatusUnauthorized:
code = codeUnauthenticated
case http.StatusBadRequest:
code = codeInvalidInput
}
writeError(w, r, apiErr.HTTPStatusCode, code, apiErr.Description)
return
}
if identityName != "" || identity != nil {
ctx := r.Context()
if identityName != "" {
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityNameInContext(ctx, identityName)
}
if identity != nil {
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityInContext(ctx, identity)
}
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
}
handler(w, r)
}
}