Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err/audit_fluent.go
T
Chris LuandGitHub 1ce106e69d s3: audit the assumed-role principal and the STS caller (#10519)
* s3: log the requester's principal ARN in the audit entry

An STS session authenticates as an opaque session subject, so requester
alone gave an operator no way back to the assumed role or the session
name. Record the principal ARN next to the identity name and emit it as
requester_arn.

* s3: record the caller identity in the STS handlers

AssumeRole, GetFederationToken and GetCallerIdentity verify the caller
themselves and are not wrapped by the auth middleware that records the
identity, so every audit entry for minting a session had an empty
requester.

* s3: resolve the audit principal ARN the way policy evaluation does

A JWT-authenticated identity carries no PrincipalArn — the auth layer
hands the principal over in a request header — so reading the field
directly left requester_arn empty for OIDC callers. buildPrincipalARN is
the resolver the policy path already uses: header first, then the
identity's own ARN, then a synthesized user ARN for legacy identities
that have none.
2026-07-31 19:51:03 -07:00

259 lines
8.4 KiB
Go

package s3err
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/fluent/fluent-logger-golang/fluent"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/request_id"
)
type AccessLogExtend struct {
AccessLog
AccessLogHTTP
}
type AccessLog struct {
Bucket string `msg:"bucket" json:"bucket"` // awsexamplebucket1
Time int64 `msg:"time" json:"time"` // [06/Feb/2019:00:00:38 +0000]
RemoteIP string `msg:"remote_ip" json:"remote_ip,omitempty"` // 192.0.2.3
Requester string `msg:"requester" json:"requester,omitempty"` // IAM user id
RequesterArn string `msg:"requester_arn" json:"requester_arn,omitempty"` // arn:aws:sts::0:assumed-role/Role/session
RequestID string `msg:"request_id" json:"request_id,omitempty"` // 3E57427F33A59F07
Operation string `msg:"operation" json:"operation,omitempty"` // REST.HTTP_method.resource_type REST.PUT.OBJECT
Key string `msg:"key" json:"key,omitempty"` // /photos/2019/08/puppy.jpg
ErrorCode string `msg:"error_code" json:"error_code,omitempty"`
HostId string `msg:"host_id" json:"host_id,omitempty"`
HostHeader string `msg:"host_header" json:"host_header,omitempty"` // s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com
UserAgent string `msg:"user_agent" json:"user_agent,omitempty"`
HTTPStatus int `msg:"status" json:"status,omitempty"`
SignatureVersion string `msg:"signature_version" json:"signature_version,omitempty"`
}
type AccessLogHTTP struct {
RequestURI string `json:"request_uri,omitempty"` // "GET /awsexamplebucket1/photos/2019/08/puppy.jpg?x-foo=bar HTTP/1.1"
BytesSent string `json:"bytes_sent,omitempty"`
ObjectSize string `json:"object_size,omitempty"`
TotalTime int `json:"total_time,omitempty"`
TurnAroundTime int `json:"turn_around_time,omitempty"`
Referer string `json:"Referer,omitempty"`
VersionId string `json:"version_id,omitempty"`
CipherSuite string `json:"cipher_suite,omitempty"`
AuthenticationType string `json:"auth_type,omitempty"`
TLSVersion string `json:"TLS_version,omitempty"`
}
const tag = "s3.access"
var (
Logger *fluent.Fluent
hostname = os.Getenv("HOSTNAME")
environment = os.Getenv("ENVIRONMENT")
)
func InitAuditLog(config string) {
configContent, readErr := os.ReadFile(config)
if readErr != nil {
glog.Errorf("fail to read fluent config %s : %v", config, readErr)
return
}
fluentConfig := &fluent.Config{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(configContent, fluentConfig); err != nil {
glog.Errorf("fail to parse fluent config %s : %v", string(configContent), err)
return
}
if len(fluentConfig.TagPrefix) == 0 && len(environment) > 0 {
fluentConfig.TagPrefix = environment
}
fluentConfig.Async = true
fluentConfig.AsyncResultCallback = func(data []byte, err error) {
if err != nil {
glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
}
}
var err error
Logger, err = fluent.New(*fluentConfig)
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("fail to load fluent config: %v", err)
}
}
// getRemoteIP returns the client IP for the audit log, honoring forwarding
// headers set by reverse proxies. Preference order: X-Forwarded-For (first
// non-empty entry), X-Real-IP, then r.RemoteAddr. Headers are trusted as-is;
// operators who expose the S3 endpoint directly to untrusted networks should
// strip these headers at the proxy boundary so clients cannot spoof them.
func getRemoteIP(r *http.Request) string {
if forwardedFor := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); forwardedFor != "" {
for _, entry := range strings.Split(forwardedFor, ",") {
if ip := strings.TrimSpace(entry); ip != "" {
return ip
}
}
}
if realIP := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); realIP != "" {
return realIP
}
if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr); err == nil {
return host
}
return r.RemoteAddr
}
func getREST(httpMetod string, resourceType string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("REST.%s.%s", httpMetod, resourceType)
}
func getResourceType(object string, query_key string, method string) (string, bool) {
if object == "/" {
switch query_key {
case "delete":
return "BATCH.DELETE.OBJECT", true
case "tagging":
return getREST(method, "OBJECTTAGGING"), true
case "lifecycle":
return getREST(method, "LIFECYCLECONFIGURATION"), true
case "acl":
return getREST(method, "ACCESSCONTROLPOLICY"), true
case "policy":
return getREST(method, "BUCKETPOLICY"), true
default:
return getREST(method, "BUCKET"), false
}
} else {
switch query_key {
case "tagging":
return getREST(method, "OBJECTTAGGING"), true
default:
return getREST(method, "OBJECT"), false
}
}
}
func getOperation(object string, r *http.Request) string {
queries := r.URL.Query()
var operation string
var queryFound bool
for key, _ := range queries {
operation, queryFound = getResourceType(object, key, r.Method)
if queryFound {
return operation
}
}
if len(queries) == 0 {
operation, _ = getResourceType(object, "", r.Method)
}
return operation
}
func GetAccessLog(r *http.Request, HTTPStatusCode int, s3errCode ErrorCode) *AccessLog {
bucket, key := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
var errorCode string
if s3errCode != ErrNone {
errorCode = GetAPIError(s3errCode).Code
}
remoteIP := getRemoteIP(r)
hostHeader := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host")
if len(hostHeader) == 0 {
hostHeader = r.Host
}
return &AccessLog{
HostHeader: hostHeader,
RequestID: request_id.GetFromRequest(r),
RemoteIP: remoteIP,
Requester: s3_constants.GetIdentityNameFromContext(r), // Get from context, not header (secure)
RequesterArn: s3_constants.GetPrincipalArnFromContext(r),
SignatureVersion: r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzAuthType),
UserAgent: r.Header.Get("user-agent"),
HostId: hostname,
Bucket: bucket,
HTTPStatus: HTTPStatusCode,
Time: time.Now().Unix(),
Key: key,
Operation: getOperation(key, r),
ErrorCode: errorCode,
}
}
func PostLog(r *http.Request, HTTPStatusCode int, errorCode ErrorCode) {
if r == nil {
return
}
// Mark before the Logger nil-check so the middleware fallback in track()
// still sees that audit was handled by the caller in deployments that
// haven't configured fluent — keeps the flag behavior consistent and
// makes wiring testable without standing up a fluent server.
markAuditLogged(r)
if Logger == nil {
return
}
if err := Logger.Post(tag, *GetAccessLog(r, HTTPStatusCode, errorCode)); err != nil {
glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
}
}
func PostAccessLog(log AccessLog) {
if Logger == nil || len(log.Key) == 0 {
return
}
if err := Logger.Post(tag, log); err != nil {
glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
}
}
// auditLogCtxKey identifies the per-request flag used to detect whether an
// audit entry has already been emitted, so middleware can supply a fallback
// log for handlers that don't call PostLog themselves without double-logging
// the ones that do.
type auditLogCtxKey struct{}
// EnsureAuditTracking attaches an audit-tracking flag to the request context
// if one is not already present. Safe to call when no fluent logger is
// configured; the flag is harmless in that case.
func EnsureAuditTracking(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
if r == nil {
return nil
}
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
return r
}
flag := new(atomic.Bool)
return r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), auditLogCtxKey{}, flag))
}
// MarkAuditLogged signals that an audit entry has already been emitted for r.
// Callers that emit logs via paths other than PostLog (e.g. PostAccessLog in
// batch delete) should invoke this so the middleware fallback skips r.
func MarkAuditLogged(r *http.Request) {
markAuditLogged(r)
}
func markAuditLogged(r *http.Request) {
if r == nil {
return
}
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
v.Store(true)
}
}
// AuditAlreadyLogged reports whether PostLog (or MarkAuditLogged) has run for r.
func AuditAlreadyLogged(r *http.Request) bool {
if r == nil {
return false
}
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
return v.Load()
}
return false
}