mirror of
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs.git
synced 2026-08-16 20:26:45 +00:00
* volume: gate the admin RPCs that only shell and workers call checkGrpcAdminAuth covered 19 of the 48 VolumeServer RPCs, so an operator who sets -whiteList expecting it to cover the gRPC surface gets partial coverage. Extend it to ten that mutate state and are only ever called by the shell or a worker: SetState, VolumeCopy, the EC generate/rebuild/copy/unmount/to-volume pair, both tier moves, and VolumeTailReceiver. That is safe because the same callers already reach gated RPCs today -- VolumeMarkReadonly, VacuumVolume*, VolumeEcShardsDelete, VolumeDelete -- so a whitelist deployment already lists those hosts. Nothing here is on a master or peer path, which is what made the earlier fail-closed gate break multi-host clusters. The split is by caller rather than by blast radius: the guard matches a peer IP against the whitelist, and a whitelist holds masters, shell hosts and workers, not every peer volume server. Gating a call one volume server makes to another would break replication, EC and tiering, so those stay open. Two test fakes embedded a nil grpc.ServerStream and only implemented Send; they now implement Context, which the streaming RPCs read to authorize. * volume: fail the build when a gRPC method skips the admin gate The admin gate is an opt-in list in a 48-method service, which is how it drifted down to covering 19 of them: nothing tied adding an RPC to deciding whether it needed the gate. Parse volume_server.proto, walk the AST of every *VolumeServer method, and require each RPC to either call checkGrpcAdminAuth or appear in ungatedVolumeServerRPCs with the reason it stays open. A stale entry naming an RPC that no longer exists fails too, so the list can't quietly stop exempting anything. The exemptions are the cluster-internal calls -- replica sync, EC shard distribution, vacuum reads, backup, tailing -- plus the read-only and liveness RPCs. Closing the cluster-internal ones needs a peer identity rather than an IP whitelist; recording them here makes that a visible decision instead of an omission. The AST walk also corrects the count: a line-window scan credits VacuumVolumeCheck and VolumeServerStatus with a neighbouring function's guard.
163 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
163 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
package weed_server
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"go/ast"
|
|
"go/parser"
|
|
"go/token"
|
|
"os"
|
|
"path/filepath"
|
|
"regexp"
|
|
"sort"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ungatedVolumeServerRPCs are the VolumeServer gRPC methods that intentionally
|
|
// run without checkGrpcAdminAuth, each with the reason it stays open. Every
|
|
// other RPC in volume_server.proto must call the gate.
|
|
//
|
|
// The split is by caller, not by how destructive the method is: the guard
|
|
// checks the peer IP against -whiteList, and an operator's whitelist holds
|
|
// masters, shell hosts and workers -- not every peer volume server. Gating a
|
|
// call that one volume server makes to another therefore breaks replication, EC
|
|
// and tiering in exactly the way the fail-closed gate did before it was
|
|
// reverted. Those calls are listed here and need a different mechanism (a
|
|
// cluster-peer identity) before they can be closed.
|
|
var ungatedVolumeServerRPCs = map[string]string{
|
|
// Cluster-internal: issued volume server -> volume server.
|
|
"CopyFile": "replica sync and EC task pull whole files from a peer",
|
|
"ReadNeedleBlob": "replica sync, vacuum and EC rebuild read needles from a peer",
|
|
"ReadNeedleMeta": "replica sync compares needle metadata across peers",
|
|
"WriteNeedleBlob": "replica sync repairs a peer's needle",
|
|
"ReceiveFile": "EC shard distribution pushes shards to a peer",
|
|
"ReadVolumeFileStatus": "the copy path queries the source volume server",
|
|
"VolumeEcShardRead": "a volume server reads EC shards held by a peer",
|
|
"VolumeEcBlobDelete": "EC delete is fanned out to the shard holders",
|
|
"VolumeEcShardsInfo": "EC verification polls shard holders",
|
|
"VolumeEcShardsMount": "EC shard distribution mounts on the receiving peer",
|
|
"VolumeIncrementalCopy": "volume backup pulls increments from a peer",
|
|
"VolumeSyncStatus": "sync compares volume state across peers",
|
|
"VolumeTailSender": "the tail source streams to the receiving peer",
|
|
"VolumeStatus": "replica sync and the master's vacuum loop poll volume status",
|
|
|
|
// Read-only or liveness: no state change, and gating them would break
|
|
// health checking and monitoring without closing a write path. They do
|
|
// disclose topology and usage detail, so gating them is a defensible
|
|
// tightening -- it just needs to be a decision rather than an oversight,
|
|
// which is what this list is for.
|
|
"Ping": "liveness probe",
|
|
"GetState": "read-only volume server state",
|
|
"Query": "read-only data query",
|
|
"VacuumVolumeCheck": "read-only garbage ratio; the vacuum steps that act on it are gated",
|
|
"VolumeServerStatus": "read-only status, the gRPC counterpart of the /status page",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestVolumeServerAdminAuthCoverage fails when a VolumeServer RPC is neither
|
|
// gated by checkGrpcAdminAuth nor listed in ungatedVolumeServerRPCs with a
|
|
// reason. A new RPC therefore cannot be added without someone deciding which
|
|
// side of the boundary it sits on -- an allowlist this size drifts otherwise,
|
|
// which is how the gate ended up covering less than half the service.
|
|
func TestVolumeServerAdminAuthCoverage(t *testing.T) {
|
|
declared := rpcNamesFromProto(t)
|
|
if len(declared) < 40 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parsed only %d RPCs from the proto, expected the full service", len(declared))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gated := gatedVolumeServerMethods(t)
|
|
|
|
for _, rpc := range declared {
|
|
_, exempt := ungatedVolumeServerRPCs[rpc]
|
|
switch {
|
|
case gated[rpc] && exempt:
|
|
t.Errorf("%s calls checkGrpcAdminAuth but is also listed as intentionally ungated; drop it from ungatedVolumeServerRPCs", rpc)
|
|
case !gated[rpc] && !exempt:
|
|
t.Errorf("%s does not call checkGrpcAdminAuth and is not listed in ungatedVolumeServerRPCs; "+
|
|
"gate it, or add it with the reason it must stay open", rpc)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Keep the exemption list honest: an entry naming an RPC that no longer
|
|
// exists hides the fact that nothing is being exempted.
|
|
declaredSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(declared))
|
|
for _, rpc := range declared {
|
|
declaredSet[rpc] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
var stale []string
|
|
for rpc := range ungatedVolumeServerRPCs {
|
|
if _, ok := declaredSet[rpc]; !ok {
|
|
stale = append(stale, rpc)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sort.Strings(stale)
|
|
for _, rpc := range stale {
|
|
t.Errorf("ungatedVolumeServerRPCs lists %q, which is not an RPC in volume_server.proto", rpc)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func rpcNamesFromProto(t *testing.T) []string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
path := filepath.Join("..", "pb", "volume_server.proto")
|
|
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
re := regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)^\s*rpc\s+([A-Za-z0-9_]+)\s*\(`)
|
|
var names []string
|
|
for _, m := range re.FindAllStringSubmatch(string(data), -1) {
|
|
names = append(names, m[1])
|
|
}
|
|
sort.Strings(names)
|
|
return names
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// gatedVolumeServerMethods reports which methods on *VolumeServer call
|
|
// checkGrpcAdminAuth anywhere in their body. It walks the AST rather than
|
|
// scanning a fixed window of lines so a guard placed after an early
|
|
// maintenance-mode check still counts.
|
|
func gatedVolumeServerMethods(t *testing.T) map[string]bool {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
fset := token.NewFileSet()
|
|
pkgs, err := parser.ParseDir(fset, ".", func(fi os.FileInfo) bool {
|
|
return strings.HasSuffix(fi.Name(), ".go") && !strings.HasSuffix(fi.Name(), "_test.go")
|
|
}, 0)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse package: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gated := make(map[string]bool)
|
|
for _, pkg := range pkgs {
|
|
for _, file := range pkg.Files {
|
|
for _, decl := range file.Decls {
|
|
fn, ok := decl.(*ast.FuncDecl)
|
|
if !ok || fn.Recv == nil || fn.Body == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if !isVolumeServerReceiver(fn.Recv) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
ast.Inspect(fn.Body, func(n ast.Node) bool {
|
|
sel, ok := n.(*ast.SelectorExpr)
|
|
if ok && sel.Sel.Name == "checkGrpcAdminAuth" {
|
|
gated[fn.Name.Name] = true
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return gated
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isVolumeServerReceiver(recv *ast.FieldList) bool {
|
|
if len(recv.List) != 1 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
star, ok := recv.List[0].Type.(*ast.StarExpr)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
ident, ok := star.X.(*ast.Ident)
|
|
return ok && ident.Name == "VolumeServer"
|
|
}
|