Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3api_object_handlers_postpolicy.go
T
Chris LuandGitHub 0345658ea8 [s3] validate indirect filer path inputs (#9931)
* s3: validate indirect filer path inputs

* s3: avoid query parsing on common request path

* filer: scope copy/move source against JWT AllowedPrefixes

maybeCheckJwtAuthorization only checked r.URL.Path, but copy and move read
their source from the cp.from / mv.from query params. A prefix-restricted
token could copy or move data out of a subtree it cannot otherwise reach.
Check every path the request touches, reusing pathHasComponentPrefix so
`..` in the source is collapsed before the prefix match.

* s3: confine iceberg CreateTable location to the catalog bucket

CreateTable derived the metadata bucket and path from the client-supplied
req.Location / req.Name and wrote there directly, so a caller scoped to one
table bucket could place metadata in another bucket (and path.Join collapsed
any `..`). Require the parsed bucket to equal the request's catalog bucket
and reject traversal segments in the table path.

* webdav: clean client path before subFolder confinement

wrappedFs concatenated subFolder + name before the underlying FileSystem
ran path.Clean, so `..` in the request path or COPY/MOVE Destination
resolved across the FilerRootPath confinement boundary. Clean the name as a
rooted path first so traversal segments collapse below subFolder. Only the
non-default -filer.path (non-empty subFolder) setup was affected.

* filer: enforce read-only rule on real write path with destination header

The x-seaweedfs-destination header overrides the path used for storage-rule
matching while the entry is written at r.URL.Path, letting a caller select a
writable rule for a read-only target. When the header is present, also check
the read-only/quota rule against the actual write path.
2026-06-11 21:56:16 -07:00

330 lines
10 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
)
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) PostPolicyBucketHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-HTTPPOSTConstructPolicy.html
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-post-example.html
bucket := mux.Vars(r)["bucket"]
glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler %s", bucket)
reader, err := r.MultipartReader()
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
form, err := reader.ReadForm(int64(5 * humanize.MiByte))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
defer form.RemoveAll()
fileBody, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, err := extractPostPolicyFormValues(form)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
if fileBody == nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPOSTFileRequired)
return
}
defer fileBody.Close()
formValues.Set("Bucket", bucket)
if fileName != "" && strings.Contains(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}") {
formValues.Set("Key", strings.Replace(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}", fileName, -1))
}
rawObject := formValues.Get("Key")
if rawObject == "" || !s3_constants.IsValidObjectKey(rawObject) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
return
}
object := s3_constants.NormalizeObjectKey(rawObject)
if err := s3a.validateTableBucketObjectPath(bucket, object); err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied)
return
}
successRedirect := formValues.Get("success_action_redirect")
successStatus := formValues.Get("success_action_status")
var redirectURL *url.URL
if successRedirect != "" {
redirectURL, err = url.Parse(successRedirect)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
}
// Verify policy signature.
errCode := s3a.iam.doesPolicySignatureMatch(formValues)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
policyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(formValues.Get("Policy"))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
// Handle policy if it is set.
if len(policyBytes) > 0 {
postPolicyForm, err := policy.ParsePostPolicyForm(string(policyBytes))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPostPolicyConditionInvalidFormat)
return
}
// Make sure formValues adhere to policy restrictions.
if err = policy.CheckPostPolicy(formValues, postPolicyForm); err != nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicy check failed for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponseWithMessage(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, err.Error())
return
}
// Ensure that the object size is within expected range, also the file size
// should not exceed the maximum single Put size (5 GiB)
lengthRange := postPolicyForm.Conditions.ContentLengthRange
if lengthRange.Valid {
if fileSize < lengthRange.Min {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooSmall)
return
}
if fileSize > lengthRange.Max {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooLarge)
return
}
}
}
filePath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", s3a.bucketDir(bucket), object)
// Get ContentType from post formData
// Otherwise from formFile ContentType
contentType := formValues.Get("Content-Type")
if contentType == "" {
contentType = fileContentType
}
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
// Forward validated POST form fields to the underlying PUT as headers.
applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r, formValues)
// Use fileSize, not r.ContentLength: the multipart body wrapping form
// fields and boundaries inflates ContentLength relative to the
// object body, which would mis-evaluate any size-filtered rule.
ttlSec := s3a.lifecycleTTLForObjectWrite(bucket, object, fileSize)
etag, errCode, sseMetadata := s3a.putToFiler(r, filePath, fileBody, bucket, object, 1, ttlSec, nil, false)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
if successRedirect != "" {
// Replace raw query params..
redirectURL.RawQuery = getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, object, etag)
w.Header().Set("Location", redirectURL.String())
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
setEtag(w, etag)
// Include SSE response headers (important for bucket-default encryption)
s3a.setSSEResponseHeaders(w, r, sseMetadata)
// Decide what http response to send depending on success_action_status parameter
switch successStatus {
case "201":
resp := PostResponse{
Bucket: bucket,
Key: object,
ETag: `"` + etag + `"`,
Location: w.Header().Get("Location"),
}
s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusCreated, resp)
s3err.PostLog(r, http.StatusCreated, s3err.ErrNone)
case "200":
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK)
case "204":
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
default:
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
}
}
// postPolicyReservedFormFields are multipart form fields that are part of the
// POST Object auth/policy mechanism (or handled explicitly elsewhere in the
// handler) and must not be forwarded to the upload as HTTP headers. Keys are
// already run through http.CanonicalHeaderKey before lookup.
var postPolicyReservedFormFields = map[string]struct{}{
// POST policy signature (V2)
"Policy": {},
"Signature": {},
"Awsaccesskeyid": {},
// POST policy signature (V4)
"X-Amz-Signature": {},
"X-Amz-Credential": {},
"X-Amz-Algorithm": {},
"X-Amz-Date": {},
"X-Amz-Security-Token": {},
// Target descriptors
"Key": {},
"File": {},
"Bucket": {},
// Success actions (handled elsewhere in the handler)
"Success_action_redirect": {},
"Success_action_status": {},
"Redirect": {},
// Content-Type is resolved separately above (from form or file part)
"Content-Type": {},
}
// applyPostPolicyFormHeaders forwards validated POST Object form fields to the
// request headers so they are applied to the resulting PUT. Reserved fields
// that are part of the POST policy mechanism itself (signature, key, etc.) are
// skipped. The acl form field is translated to the X-Amz-Acl header to match
// how AWS promotes the form value to the underlying PUT.
func applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r *http.Request, formValues http.Header) {
for k := range formValues {
if _, reserved := postPolicyReservedFormFields[k]; reserved {
continue
}
switch {
case k == "Acl":
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl, formValues.Get(k))
case k == "Cache-Control",
k == "Expires",
k == "Content-Disposition",
k == "Content-Encoding",
k == "Content-Language":
r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
case strings.HasPrefix(k, "X-Amz-"):
r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
}
}
}
// Extract form fields and file data from a HTTP POST Policy
func extractPostPolicyFormValues(form *multipart.Form) (filePart io.ReadCloser, fileName, fileContentType string, fileSize int64, formValues http.Header, err error) {
// / HTML Form values
fileName = ""
fileContentType = ""
// Canonicalize the form values into http.Header.
formValues = make(http.Header)
for k, v := range form.Value {
formValues[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = v
}
// Validate form values.
if err = validateFormFieldSize(formValues); err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// this means that filename="" was not specified for file key and Go has
// an ugly way of handling this situation. Refer here
// https://golang.org/src/mime/multipart/formdata.go#L61
if len(form.File) == 0 {
var b = &bytes.Buffer{}
for _, v := range formValues["File"] {
b.WriteString(v)
}
fileSize = int64(b.Len())
filePart = io.NopCloser(b)
return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
}
// Iterator until we find a valid File field and break
for k, v := range form.File {
canonicalFormName := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)
if canonicalFormName == "File" {
if len(v) == 0 {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, errors.New("Invalid arguments specified")
}
// Fetch fileHeader which has the uploaded file information
fileHeader := v[0]
// Set filename
fileName = fileHeader.Filename
// Set contentType
fileContentType = fileHeader.Header.Get("Content-Type")
// Open the uploaded part
filePart, err = fileHeader.Open()
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// Compute file size
fileSize, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 2)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// Reset Seek to the beginning
_, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// File found and ready for reading
break
}
}
return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
}
// Validate form field size for s3 specification requirement.
func validateFormFieldSize(formValues http.Header) error {
// Iterate over form values
for k := range formValues {
// Check if value's field exceeds S3 limit
if int64(len(formValues.Get(k))) > int64(1*humanize.MiByte) {
return errors.New("Data size larger than expected")
}
}
// Success.
return nil
}
func getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, key, etag string) string {
redirectValues := make(url.Values)
redirectValues.Set("bucket", bucket)
redirectValues.Set("key", key)
redirectValues.Set("etag", "\""+etag+"\"")
return redirectValues.Encode()
}
// Check to see if Policy is signed correctly.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doesPolicySignatureMatch(formValues http.Header) s3err.ErrorCode {
// For SignV2 - Signature field will be valid
if _, ok := formValues["Signature"]; ok {
return iam.doesPolicySignatureV2Match(formValues)
}
return iam.doesPolicySignatureV4Match(formValues)
}