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* fix(s3api): route STS GetFederationToken requests to STS handler (#9157) The STS GetFederationToken handler was implemented but never reachable. Three routing gaps sent requests to the S3/IAM path instead of STS: - No explicit mux route for Action=GetFederationToken in the URL query - iamMatcher did not exclude GetFederationToken, so authenticated POSTs with Action in the form body were matched and dispatched to IAM - UnifiedPostHandler only dispatched AssumeRole* and GetCallerIdentity to STS, leaving GetFederationToken to fall through to DoActions and return NotImplemented Add the missing route, the matcher exclusion, and the dispatch branch. Also wire TestSTS, TestAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity, and TestServiceAccount into the s3-iam-tests workflow as a new "sts" matrix entry. Before this change, none of test/s3/iam/s3_sts_get_federation_token_test.go's four test functions ran in CI, which is why this regression shipped. * test(iam): make orphaned STS/service-account tests pass under auth-enabled CI Follow-up to wiring STS tests into CI: fixes several pre-existing issues that made the newly-included tests fail locally. Server fixes: - weed/s3api/s3api_sts.go: handleGetFederationToken no longer 500s when the caller is a legacy S3-config identity (not in the IAM user store). Previously any GetPoliciesForUser error short-circuited to InternalError, which hard-failed every SigV4 caller using keys from -s3.config. - weed/s3api/s3api_embedded_iam.go: CreateServiceAccount now generates IDs in the sa:<parent>:<uuid> format required by credential.ValidateServiceAccountId. The old "sa-XXXXXXXX" format failed the persistence-layer regex and caused every CreateServiceAccount call to return 500 once a filer-backed credential store validated the ID. Test helpers: - test/s3/iam/s3_sts_assume_role_test.go: callSTSAPIWithSigV4 no longer sets req.Header["Host"]. aws-sdk-go v1 v4.Signer already signs Host from req.URL.Host, and a manual Host header made the signer emit host;host in SignedHeaders, producing SignatureDoesNotMatch. Updated missing_role_arn subtest to match the existing SeaweedFS behavior (user-context assumption). - test/s3/iam/s3_service_account_test.go: callIAMAPI now SigV4-signs requests when STS_TEST_{ACCESS,SECRET}_KEY env vars are set. Unsigned IAM writes otherwise fall through to the STS fallback and return InvalidAction. CI matrix: - .github/workflows/s3-iam-tests.yml: skip TestServiceAccountLifecycle/use_service_account_credentials only. The rest of the service-account suite passes; that one subtest depends on a separate credential-reload issue where new ABIA keys briefly register into accessKeyIdent but aren't persisted to the filer, so they vanish on the next reload. Out of scope for the #9157 GetFederationToken fix. * fix(credential): accept AWS IAM username chars in service-account IDs Gemini review on #9167 pointed out that ServiceAccountIdPattern's parent-user segment was more restrictive than an AWS IAM username: `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` vs. IAM's `[\w+=,.@-]`. Realistic usernames with `@`, `.`, `+`, `=`, or `,` (e.g. email-style principals) would fail validation at the filer store even though the embedded IAM API happily created them. Broaden the regex to `[A-Za-z0-9_+=,.@-]` (matching the AWS IAM spec at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_User.html) and add a table-driven test that locks the expansion in. * address PR review feedback on #9167 All five review items were valid; changes keyed to review bullets: - weed/s3api/s3api_sts.go: handleGetFederationToken no longer swallows arbitrary policy-lookup failures. Only credential.ErrUserNotFound is treated leniently (the legacy-config SigV4 path); any other error now returns InternalError so we don't mint tokens with an incomplete policy set. - weed/credential/grpc/grpc_identity.go: GetUser translates gRPC NotFound back to credential.ErrUserNotFound so errors.Is(...) above matches for gRPC-backed stores, not just memory/filer-direct. - weed/s3api/s3api_embedded_iam.go: CreateServiceAccount now validates the generated saId against credential.ValidateServiceAccountId before returning. Surfaces a client 400 with the offending ID instead of the opaque 500 that used to bubble up from the persistence layer. - weed/s3api/s3api_server_routing_test.go: seed a routing-test identity with a known AK/SK, sign TestRouting_GetFederationTokenAuthenticatedBody with aws-sdk-go v4.Signer so the request actually passes AuthSignatureOnly. Assert 503 ServiceUnavailable (from STSHandlers with no stsService) instead of just NotEqual(501) — 503 proves the dispatch reached STSHandlers.HandleSTSRequest. - test/s3/iam/s3_service_account_test.go: callIAMAPI signs with service="iam" instead of "s3" (SeaweedFS verifies against whichever service the client signed with, but "iam" is semantically correct). - weed/credential/validation_test.go: add positive rows for an uppercase parent (sa:ALICE:...) and a canonical hyphenated UUID suffix (sa:alice:123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000).
1063 lines
37 KiB
Go
1063 lines
37 KiB
Go
package s3api
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// This file provides STS (Security Token Service) HTTP endpoints for AWS SDK compatibility.
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// It exposes AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity as an HTTP endpoint that can be used with
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// AWS SDKs to obtain temporary credentials using OIDC/JWT tokens.
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/xml"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"regexp"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/credential"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/integration"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/ldap"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/sts"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/utils"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/request_id"
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)
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// STS API constants matching AWS STS specification
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const (
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stsAPIVersion = "2011-06-15"
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stsAction = "Action"
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stsVersion = "Version"
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stsWebIdentityToken = "WebIdentityToken"
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stsRoleArn = "RoleArn"
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stsRoleSessionName = "RoleSessionName"
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stsDurationSeconds = "DurationSeconds"
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// STS Action names
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actionAssumeRole = "AssumeRole"
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actionAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity = "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"
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actionAssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity = "AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity"
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actionGetCallerIdentity = "GetCallerIdentity"
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actionGetFederationToken = "GetFederationToken"
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// GetFederationToken-specific parameters
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stsFederationName = "Name"
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// LDAP parameter names
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stsLDAPUsername = "LDAPUsername"
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stsLDAPPassword = "LDAPPassword"
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stsLDAPProviderName = "LDAPProviderName"
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)
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// federationNameRegex validates the Name parameter for GetFederationToken per AWS spec
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var federationNameRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^[\w+=,.@-]+$`)
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// STS duration constants (AWS specification)
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const (
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minDurationSeconds = int64(900) // 15 minutes
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maxDurationSeconds = int64(43200) // 12 hours (AssumeRole)
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defaultFederationDurationSeconds = int64(43200) // 12 hours (GetFederationToken default)
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maxFederationDurationSeconds = int64(129600) // 36 hours (GetFederationToken max)
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)
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// parseDurationSecondsWithBounds parses and validates the DurationSeconds parameter
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// against the given min and max bounds. Returns nil if the parameter is not provided.
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func parseDurationSecondsWithBounds(r *http.Request, minSec, maxSec int64) (*int64, STSErrorCode, error) {
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dsStr := r.FormValue("DurationSeconds")
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if dsStr == "" {
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return nil, "", nil
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}
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ds, err := strconv.ParseInt(dsStr, 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, STSErrInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("invalid DurationSeconds: %w", err)
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}
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if ds < minSec || ds > maxSec {
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return nil, STSErrInvalidParameterValue,
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fmt.Errorf("DurationSeconds must be between %d and %d seconds", minSec, maxSec)
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}
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return &ds, "", nil
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}
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// parseDurationSeconds parses DurationSeconds for AssumeRole (15 min to 12 hours)
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func parseDurationSeconds(r *http.Request) (*int64, STSErrorCode, error) {
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return parseDurationSecondsWithBounds(r, minDurationSeconds, maxDurationSeconds)
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}
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// Removed generateSecureCredentials - now using STS service's JWT token generation
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// The STS service generates proper JWT tokens with embedded claims that can be validated
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// across distributed instances without shared state.
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// STSHandlers provides HTTP handlers for STS operations
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type STSHandlers struct {
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stsService *sts.STSService
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iam *IdentityAccessManagement
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}
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// NewSTSHandlers creates a new STSHandlers instance
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func NewSTSHandlers(stsService *sts.STSService, iam *IdentityAccessManagement) *STSHandlers {
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return &STSHandlers{
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stsService: stsService,
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iam: iam,
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}
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}
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func (h *STSHandlers) getAccountID() string {
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if h.stsService != nil && h.stsService.Config != nil && h.stsService.Config.AccountId != "" {
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return h.stsService.Config.AccountId
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}
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return defaultAccountID
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}
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// HandleSTSRequest is the main entry point for STS requests
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// It routes requests based on the Action parameter
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func (h *STSHandlers) HandleSTSRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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r, _ = request_id.Ensure(r)
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if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInvalidParameterValue, err)
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return
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}
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// Validate API version
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version := r.Form.Get(stsVersion)
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if version != "" && version != stsAPIVersion {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInvalidParameterValue,
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fmt.Errorf("invalid STS API version %s, expecting %s", version, stsAPIVersion))
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return
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}
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// Route based on action
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action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
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switch action {
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case actionAssumeRole:
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h.handleAssumeRole(w, r)
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case actionAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity:
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h.handleAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(w, r)
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case actionAssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity:
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h.handleAssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity(w, r)
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case actionGetCallerIdentity:
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h.handleGetCallerIdentity(w, r)
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case actionGetFederationToken:
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h.handleGetFederationToken(w, r)
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default:
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInvalidAction,
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fmt.Errorf("unsupported action: %s", action))
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}
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}
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// handleAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity handles the AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity API action
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func (h *STSHandlers) handleAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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// Extract parameters from form (supports both query and POST body)
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roleArn := r.FormValue("RoleArn")
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webIdentityToken := r.FormValue("WebIdentityToken")
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roleSessionName := r.FormValue("RoleSessionName")
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// Validate required parameters
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if webIdentityToken == "" {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
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fmt.Errorf("WebIdentityToken is required"))
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return
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}
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if roleArn == "" {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
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fmt.Errorf("RoleArn is required"))
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return
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}
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if roleSessionName == "" {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
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fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required"))
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return
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}
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// Parse and validate DurationSeconds using helper
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durationSeconds, errCode, err := parseDurationSeconds(r)
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if err != nil {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, errCode, err)
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return
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}
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// Check if STS service is initialized
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if h.stsService == nil || !h.stsService.IsInitialized() {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrSTSNotReady,
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fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized"))
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return
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}
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sessionPolicyJSON, err := sts.NormalizeSessionPolicy(r.FormValue("Policy"))
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if err != nil {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMalformedPolicyDocument,
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fmt.Errorf("invalid Policy document: %w", err))
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return
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}
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var sessionPolicyPtr *string
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if sessionPolicyJSON != "" {
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sessionPolicyPtr = &sessionPolicyJSON
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}
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// Build request for STS service
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request := &sts.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest{
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RoleArn: roleArn,
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WebIdentityToken: webIdentityToken,
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RoleSessionName: roleSessionName,
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DurationSeconds: durationSeconds,
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Policy: sessionPolicyPtr,
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}
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// Call STS service
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response, err := h.stsService.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(ctx, request)
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if err != nil {
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glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity failed: %v", err)
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// Use typed errors for robust error checking
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// This decouples HTTP layer from service implementation details
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errCode := STSErrAccessDenied
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if errors.Is(err, sts.ErrTypedTokenExpired) {
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errCode = STSErrExpiredToken
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} else if errors.Is(err, sts.ErrTypedInvalidToken) {
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errCode = STSErrInvalidParameterValue
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} else if errors.Is(err, sts.ErrTypedInvalidIssuer) {
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errCode = STSErrInvalidParameterValue
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} else if errors.Is(err, sts.ErrTypedInvalidAudience) {
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errCode = STSErrInvalidParameterValue
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} else if errors.Is(err, sts.ErrTypedMissingClaims) {
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errCode = STSErrInvalidParameterValue
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}
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, errCode, err)
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return
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}
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// Build and return XML response
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xmlResponse := &AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse{
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Result: WebIdentityResult{
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Credentials: STSCredentials{
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AccessKeyId: response.Credentials.AccessKeyId,
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SecretAccessKey: response.Credentials.SecretAccessKey,
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SessionToken: response.Credentials.SessionToken,
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Expiration: response.Credentials.Expiration.Format(time.RFC3339),
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},
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SubjectFromWebIdentityToken: response.AssumedRoleUser.Subject,
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},
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}
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xmlResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestId = request_id.GetFromRequest(r)
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s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK, xmlResponse)
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}
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// handleAssumeRole handles the AssumeRole API action
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// This requires AWS Signature V4 authentication
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// Inline session policies (Policy parameter) are supported for AssumeRole,
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// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity, and AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity.
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func (h *STSHandlers) handleAssumeRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Extract parameters from form
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roleArn := r.FormValue("RoleArn")
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roleSessionName := r.FormValue("RoleSessionName")
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// Validate required parameters
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// RoleArn is optional to support S3-compatible clients that omit it
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if roleSessionName == "" {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
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fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required"))
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return
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}
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// Parse and validate DurationSeconds using helper
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durationSeconds, errCode, err := parseDurationSeconds(r)
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if err != nil {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, errCode, err)
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return
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}
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// Check if STS service is initialized
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if h.stsService == nil || !h.stsService.IsInitialized() {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrSTSNotReady,
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fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized"))
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return
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}
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// Check if IAM is available for SigV4 verification
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if h.iam == nil {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrSTSNotReady,
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fmt.Errorf("IAM not configured for STS"))
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return
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}
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// Validate AWS SigV4 authentication
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identity, _, _, _, sigErrCode := h.iam.verifyV4Signature(r, false)
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if sigErrCode != s3err.ErrNone {
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glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRole SigV4 verification failed: %v", sigErrCode)
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
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fmt.Errorf("invalid AWS signature: %v", sigErrCode))
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return
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}
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if identity == nil {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
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fmt.Errorf("unable to identify caller"))
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return
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}
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glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRole: caller identity=%s, roleArn=%s, sessionName=%s",
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identity.Name, roleArn, roleSessionName)
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// Check if the caller is authorized to assume the role (sts:AssumeRole permission)
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// This validates that the caller has a policy allowing sts:AssumeRole on the target role
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// Check authorizations
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if roleArn != "" {
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// Check if the caller is authorized to assume the role (sts:AssumeRole permission)
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if authErr := h.iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, Action(sts.ActionAssumeRole), "", roleArn); authErr != s3err.ErrNone {
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glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRole: caller %s is not authorized to assume role %s", identity.Name, roleArn)
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
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fmt.Errorf("user %s is not authorized to assume role %s", identity.Name, roleArn))
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return
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}
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// Validate that the target role trusts the caller (Trust Policy)
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if err := h.iam.ValidateTrustPolicyForPrincipal(r.Context(), roleArn, identity.PrincipalArn); err != nil {
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glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRole: trust policy validation failed for %s to assume %s: %v", identity.Name, roleArn, err)
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied, fmt.Errorf("trust policy denies access"))
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return
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}
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} else {
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// If RoleArn is missing, default to the caller's identity (User Context)
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// This allows the user to "assume" a session for themselves, inheriting their own permissions.
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roleArn = identity.PrincipalArn
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glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRole: no RoleArn provided, defaulting to caller identity: %s", roleArn)
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// We still enforce a global "sts:AssumeRole" check, similar to how we'd check if they can assume *any* role.
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// However, for self-assumption, this might be implicit.
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// For safety/consistency with previous logic, we keep the check but strictly it might not be required by AWS for GetSessionToken.
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// But since this IS AssumeRole, let's keep it.
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// Admin/Global check when no specific role is requested
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if authErr := h.iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, Action(sts.ActionAssumeRole), "", ""); authErr != s3err.ErrNone {
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glog.Warningf("AssumeRole: caller %s attempted to assume role without RoleArn and lacks global sts:AssumeRole permission", identity.Name)
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied, fmt.Errorf("access denied"))
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return
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}
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}
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sessionPolicyJSON, err := sts.NormalizeSessionPolicy(r.FormValue("Policy"))
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if err != nil {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMalformedPolicyDocument,
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fmt.Errorf("invalid Policy document: %w", err))
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return
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}
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// Prepare custom claims for the session
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var modifyClaims func(claims *sts.STSSessionClaims)
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if identity.isAdmin() {
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modifyClaims = func(claims *sts.STSSessionClaims) {
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if claims.RequestContext == nil {
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claims.RequestContext = make(map[string]interface{})
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}
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claims.RequestContext["is_admin"] = true
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}
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}
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// Generate common STS components
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stsCreds, assumedUser, err := h.prepareSTSCredentials(r.Context(), roleArn, roleSessionName, durationSeconds, sessionPolicyJSON, modifyClaims)
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if err != nil {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInternalError, err)
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return
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}
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// Build and return response
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xmlResponse := &AssumeRoleResponse{
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Result: AssumeRoleResult{
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Credentials: stsCreds,
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AssumedRoleUser: assumedUser,
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},
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}
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xmlResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestId = request_id.GetFromRequest(r)
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s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK, xmlResponse)
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}
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// handleAssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity handles the AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity API action
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func (h *STSHandlers) handleAssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Extract parameters from form
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roleArn := r.FormValue("RoleArn")
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roleSessionName := r.FormValue("RoleSessionName")
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ldapUsername := r.FormValue(stsLDAPUsername)
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ldapPassword := r.FormValue(stsLDAPPassword)
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// Validate required parameters
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if roleArn == "" {
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h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
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fmt.Errorf("RoleArn is required"))
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return
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}
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|
|
if roleSessionName == "" {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ldapUsername == "" {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("LDAPUsername is required"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ldapPassword == "" {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("LDAPPassword is required"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse and validate DurationSeconds using helper
|
|
durationSeconds, errCode, err := parseDurationSeconds(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, errCode, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if STS service is initialized
|
|
if h.stsService == nil || !h.stsService.IsInitialized() {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrSTSNotReady,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Optional: specific LDAP provider name
|
|
ldapProviderName := r.FormValue(stsLDAPProviderName)
|
|
|
|
// Find an LDAP provider from the registered providers
|
|
var ldapProvider *ldap.LDAPProvider
|
|
ldapProvidersFound := 0
|
|
for _, provider := range h.stsService.GetProviders() {
|
|
// Check if this is an LDAP provider by type assertion
|
|
if p, ok := provider.(*ldap.LDAPProvider); ok {
|
|
if ldapProviderName != "" && p.Name() == ldapProviderName {
|
|
ldapProvider = p
|
|
break
|
|
} else if ldapProviderName == "" && ldapProvider == nil {
|
|
ldapProvider = p
|
|
}
|
|
ldapProvidersFound++
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ldapProvidersFound > 1 && ldapProviderName == "" {
|
|
glog.Warningf("Multiple LDAP providers found (%d). Using the first one found (non-deterministic). Consider specifying LDAPProviderName.", ldapProvidersFound)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ldapProvider == nil {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity: no LDAP provider configured")
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrSTSNotReady,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("no LDAP provider configured - please add an LDAP provider to IAM configuration"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Authenticate with LDAP provider
|
|
// The provider expects credentials in "username:password" format
|
|
credentials := ldapUsername + ":" + ldapPassword
|
|
identity, err := ldapProvider.Authenticate(r.Context(), credentials)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity: LDAP authentication failed for user %s: %v", ldapUsername, err)
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("authentication failed"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity: user %s authenticated successfully, groups=%v",
|
|
ldapUsername, identity.Groups)
|
|
|
|
accountID := h.getAccountID()
|
|
|
|
ldapUserIdentity := &Identity{
|
|
Name: identity.UserID,
|
|
Account: &Account{
|
|
DisplayName: identity.DisplayName,
|
|
EmailAddress: identity.Email,
|
|
Id: identity.UserID,
|
|
},
|
|
PrincipalArn: fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/%s", accountID, identity.UserID),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the identity is allowed to assume the role by checking the Trust Policy
|
|
// The LDAP user doesn't have identity policies, so we strictly check if the Role trusts this principal.
|
|
if err := h.iam.ValidateTrustPolicyForPrincipal(r.Context(), roleArn, ldapUserIdentity.PrincipalArn); err != nil {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity: trust policy validation failed for %s to assume %s: %v", ldapUsername, roleArn, err)
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied, fmt.Errorf("trust policy denies access"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sessionPolicyJSON, err := sts.NormalizeSessionPolicy(r.FormValue("Policy"))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMalformedPolicyDocument,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("invalid Policy document: %w", err))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate common STS components with LDAP-specific claims
|
|
modifyClaims := func(claims *sts.STSSessionClaims) {
|
|
claims.WithIdentityProvider("ldap", identity.UserID, identity.Provider)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stsCreds, assumedUser, err := h.prepareSTSCredentials(r.Context(), roleArn, roleSessionName, durationSeconds, sessionPolicyJSON, modifyClaims)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInternalError, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build and return response
|
|
xmlResponse := &AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentityResponse{
|
|
Result: LDAPIdentityResult{
|
|
Credentials: stsCreds,
|
|
AssumedRoleUser: assumedUser,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
xmlResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestId = request_id.GetFromRequest(r)
|
|
|
|
s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK, xmlResponse)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleGetFederationToken handles the GetFederationToken API action.
|
|
// This allows long-term IAM users to obtain temporary credentials scoped down
|
|
// by an optional inline session policy. Temporary credentials cannot call this action.
|
|
func (h *STSHandlers) handleGetFederationToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
// Extract parameters
|
|
name := r.FormValue(stsFederationName)
|
|
|
|
// Validate required parameters
|
|
if name == "" {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMissingParameter,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("Name is required"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AWS requires Name to be 2-32 characters matching [\w+=,.@-]+
|
|
if len(name) < 2 || len(name) > 32 {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInvalidParameterValue,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("Name must be between 2 and 32 characters"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !federationNameRegex.MatchString(name) {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInvalidParameterValue,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("Name contains invalid characters, must match [\\w+=,.@-]+"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse and validate DurationSeconds (GetFederationToken allows up to 36 hours)
|
|
durationSeconds, errCode, err := parseDurationSecondsWithBounds(r, minDurationSeconds, maxFederationDurationSeconds)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, errCode, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Reject calls from temporary credentials (session tokens) early,
|
|
// before SigV4 verification — no need to authenticate first.
|
|
// GetFederationToken can only be called by long-term IAM users.
|
|
securityToken := r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
|
|
if securityToken == "" {
|
|
securityToken = r.URL.Query().Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
|
|
}
|
|
if securityToken != "" {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("GetFederationToken cannot be called with temporary credentials"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if STS service is initialized
|
|
if h.stsService == nil || !h.stsService.IsInitialized() {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrSTSNotReady,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if IAM is available for SigV4 verification
|
|
if h.iam == nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrSTSNotReady,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("IAM not configured for STS"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate AWS SigV4 authentication
|
|
identity, _, _, _, sigErrCode := h.iam.verifyV4Signature(r, false)
|
|
if sigErrCode != s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("GetFederationToken SigV4 verification failed: %v", sigErrCode)
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("invalid AWS signature: %v", sigErrCode))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if identity == nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("unable to identify caller"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("GetFederationToken: caller identity=%s, name=%s", identity.Name, name)
|
|
|
|
// Check if the caller is authorized to call GetFederationToken
|
|
if authErr := h.iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, Action(sts.ActionGetFederationToken), "", ""); authErr != s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("GetFederationToken: caller %s is not authorized to call GetFederationToken", identity.Name)
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("user %s is not authorized to call GetFederationToken", identity.Name))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate session policy if provided
|
|
sessionPolicyJSON, err := sts.NormalizeSessionPolicy(r.FormValue("Policy"))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrMalformedPolicyDocument,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("invalid Policy document: %w", err))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Calculate duration (default 12 hours for GetFederationToken)
|
|
duration := time.Duration(defaultFederationDurationSeconds) * time.Second
|
|
if durationSeconds != nil {
|
|
duration = time.Duration(*durationSeconds) * time.Second
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate session ID
|
|
sessionId, err := sts.GenerateSessionId()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInternalError,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
expiration := time.Now().Add(duration)
|
|
accountID := h.getAccountID()
|
|
|
|
// Build federated user ARN: arn:aws:sts::<account>:federated-user/<Name>
|
|
federatedUserArn := fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:sts::%s:federated-user/%s", accountID, name)
|
|
federatedUserId := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", accountID, name)
|
|
|
|
// Create session claims — use the caller's principal ARN as the RoleArn
|
|
// so that policy evaluation resolves the caller's attached policies
|
|
claims := sts.NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, h.stsService.Config.Issuer, expiration).
|
|
WithSessionName(name).
|
|
WithRoleInfo(identity.PrincipalArn, federatedUserId, federatedUserArn)
|
|
|
|
// Embed the caller's effective policies into the token.
|
|
// Merge identity.PolicyNames (from SigV4 identity) with policies resolved
|
|
// from the IAM manager (which may include group-attached policies).
|
|
policySet := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
for _, p := range identity.PolicyNames {
|
|
policySet[p] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var policyManager *integration.IAMManager
|
|
if h.iam.iamIntegration != nil {
|
|
if provider, ok := h.iam.iamIntegration.(IAMManagerProvider); ok {
|
|
policyManager = provider.GetIAMManager()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if policyManager != nil {
|
|
userPolicies, err := policyManager.GetPoliciesForUser(r.Context(), identity.Name)
|
|
switch {
|
|
case err == nil:
|
|
for _, p := range userPolicies {
|
|
policySet[p] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
case errors.Is(err, credential.ErrUserNotFound):
|
|
// Legacy-config IAM users authenticated via SigV4 are not
|
|
// present in the IAM user store. Fall back to
|
|
// identity.PolicyNames — the caller's SigV4 identity is
|
|
// authoritative for them.
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("GetFederationToken: %s not in IAM user store, using SigV4 identity policies only", identity.Name)
|
|
default:
|
|
// Any other failure (store unreachable, misconfigured, etc.)
|
|
// means we cannot compute the caller's effective policies.
|
|
// Fail closed rather than mint a token with an incomplete set.
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("GetFederationToken: failed to resolve policies for %s: %v", identity.Name, err)
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInternalError,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve caller policies"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(policySet) > 0 {
|
|
merged := make([]string, 0, len(policySet))
|
|
for p := range policySet {
|
|
merged = append(merged, p)
|
|
}
|
|
claims.WithPolicies(merged)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sessionPolicyJSON != "" {
|
|
claims.WithSessionPolicy(sessionPolicyJSON)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate JWT session token
|
|
sessionToken, err := h.stsService.GetTokenGenerator().GenerateJWTWithClaims(claims)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInternalError,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session token: %w", err))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate temporary credentials
|
|
stsCredGen := sts.NewCredentialGenerator()
|
|
stsCredsDet, err := stsCredGen.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(sessionId, expiration)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrInternalError,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("failed to generate temporary credentials: %w", err))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build and return response
|
|
xmlResponse := &GetFederationTokenResponse{
|
|
Result: GetFederationTokenResult{
|
|
Credentials: STSCredentials{
|
|
AccessKeyId: stsCredsDet.AccessKeyId,
|
|
SecretAccessKey: stsCredsDet.SecretAccessKey,
|
|
SessionToken: sessionToken,
|
|
Expiration: expiration.Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
},
|
|
FederatedUser: FederatedUser{
|
|
FederatedUserId: federatedUserId,
|
|
Arn: federatedUserArn,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
xmlResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestId = request_id.GetFromRequest(r)
|
|
|
|
s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK, xmlResponse)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// prepareSTSCredentials extracts common shared logic for credential generation
|
|
func (h *STSHandlers) prepareSTSCredentials(ctx context.Context, roleArn, roleSessionName string,
|
|
durationSeconds *int64, sessionPolicy string, modifyClaims func(*sts.STSSessionClaims)) (STSCredentials, *AssumedRoleUser, error) {
|
|
|
|
// Calculate duration
|
|
duration := time.Hour // Default 1 hour
|
|
if durationSeconds != nil {
|
|
duration = time.Duration(*durationSeconds) * time.Second
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate session ID
|
|
sessionId, err := sts.GenerateSessionId()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return STSCredentials{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
expiration := time.Now().Add(duration)
|
|
|
|
// Extract role name from ARN for proper response formatting
|
|
roleName := utils.ExtractRoleNameFromPrincipal(roleArn)
|
|
if roleName == "" {
|
|
// Try to extract user name if it's a user ARN (for "User Context" assumption)
|
|
roleName = utils.ExtractUserNameFromPrincipal(roleArn)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if roleName == "" {
|
|
roleName = roleArn // Fallback to full ARN if extraction fails
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
accountID := h.getAccountID()
|
|
|
|
// Construct AssumedRoleUser ARN - this will be used as the principal for the vended token
|
|
assumedRoleArn := fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:sts::%s:assumed-role/%s/%s", accountID, roleName, roleSessionName)
|
|
|
|
// Use assumedRoleArn as RoleArn in claims if original RoleArn is empty
|
|
// This ensures STSSessionClaims.IsValid() passes (it requires non-empty RoleArn)
|
|
effectiveRoleArn := roleArn
|
|
if effectiveRoleArn == "" {
|
|
effectiveRoleArn = assumedRoleArn
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create session claims with role information
|
|
// SECURITY: Use the assumedRoleArn as the principal in the token.
|
|
// This ensures that subsequent requests using this token are correctly identified as the assumed role.
|
|
claims := sts.NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, h.stsService.Config.Issuer, expiration).
|
|
WithSessionName(roleSessionName).
|
|
WithRoleInfo(effectiveRoleArn, fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", roleName, roleSessionName), assumedRoleArn)
|
|
|
|
// If IAM integration is available, embed the role's attached policies into the session token.
|
|
// This makes the token self-sufficient for authorization even when role lookup is unavailable.
|
|
var policyManager *integration.IAMManager
|
|
if h.iam != nil && h.iam.iamIntegration != nil {
|
|
if provider, ok := h.iam.iamIntegration.(IAMManagerProvider); ok {
|
|
policyManager = provider.GetIAMManager()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if policyManager != nil {
|
|
roleNameForPolicies := utils.ExtractRoleNameFromArn(roleArn)
|
|
if roleNameForPolicies == "" {
|
|
roleNameForPolicies = utils.ExtractRoleNameFromPrincipal(roleArn)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if roleNameForPolicies != "" && len(claims.Policies) == 0 {
|
|
roleDef, err := policyManager.GetRole(ctx, roleNameForPolicies)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Failed to load role %q for policy embedding: %v", roleNameForPolicies, err)
|
|
} else if roleDef == nil {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Role definition %q was missing for policy embedding", roleNameForPolicies)
|
|
} else if len(roleDef.AttachedPolicies) > 0 {
|
|
claims.WithPolicies(roleDef.AttachedPolicies)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sessionPolicy != "" {
|
|
claims.WithSessionPolicy(sessionPolicy)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply custom claims if provided (e.g., LDAP identity)
|
|
if modifyClaims != nil {
|
|
modifyClaims(claims)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate JWT session token
|
|
sessionToken, err := h.stsService.GetTokenGenerator().GenerateJWTWithClaims(claims)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return STSCredentials{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate temporary credentials (deterministic based on sessionId)
|
|
stsCredGen := sts.NewCredentialGenerator()
|
|
stsCredsDet, err := stsCredGen.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(sessionId, expiration)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return STSCredentials{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate temporary credentials: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
accessKeyId := stsCredsDet.AccessKeyId
|
|
secretAccessKey := stsCredsDet.SecretAccessKey
|
|
|
|
stsCreds := STSCredentials{
|
|
AccessKeyId: accessKeyId,
|
|
SecretAccessKey: secretAccessKey,
|
|
SessionToken: sessionToken,
|
|
Expiration: expiration.Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assumedUser := &AssumedRoleUser{
|
|
AssumedRoleId: fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", roleName, roleSessionName),
|
|
Arn: assumedRoleArn,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return stsCreds, assumedUser, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleGetCallerIdentity handles the GetCallerIdentity API action.
|
|
// It returns the identity (ARN, account, user ID) of the caller based on SigV4 authentication.
|
|
func (h *STSHandlers) handleGetCallerIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if h.iam == nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrSTSNotReady,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("IAM not configured for STS"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
identity, _, _, _, sigErrCode := h.iam.verifyV4Signature(r, false)
|
|
if sigErrCode != s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("GetCallerIdentity SigV4 verification failed: %v", sigErrCode)
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("invalid AWS signature: %v", sigErrCode))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if identity == nil {
|
|
h.writeSTSErrorResponse(w, r, STSErrAccessDenied,
|
|
fmt.Errorf("unable to identify caller"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
accountID := h.getAccountID()
|
|
|
|
arn := identity.PrincipalArn
|
|
if arn == "" {
|
|
arn = fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/%s", accountID, identity.Name)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
userId := identity.Name
|
|
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("GetCallerIdentity: identity=%s, arn=%s, account=%s", identity.Name, arn, accountID)
|
|
|
|
xmlResponse := &GetCallerIdentityResponse{
|
|
Result: GetCallerIdentityResult{
|
|
Arn: arn,
|
|
UserId: userId,
|
|
Account: accountID,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
xmlResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestId = request_id.GetFromRequest(r)
|
|
|
|
s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK, xmlResponse)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// STS Response types for XML marshaling
|
|
|
|
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse is the response for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
|
|
type AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse struct {
|
|
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/ AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse"`
|
|
Result WebIdentityResult `xml:"AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResult"`
|
|
ResponseMetadata struct {
|
|
RequestId string `xml:"RequestId,omitempty"`
|
|
} `xml:"ResponseMetadata,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// WebIdentityResult contains the result of AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
|
|
type WebIdentityResult struct {
|
|
Credentials STSCredentials `xml:"Credentials"`
|
|
SubjectFromWebIdentityToken string `xml:"SubjectFromWebIdentityToken,omitempty"`
|
|
AssumedRoleUser *AssumedRoleUser `xml:"AssumedRoleUser,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// STSCredentials represents temporary security credentials
|
|
type STSCredentials struct {
|
|
AccessKeyId string `xml:"AccessKeyId"`
|
|
SecretAccessKey string `xml:"SecretAccessKey"`
|
|
SessionToken string `xml:"SessionToken"`
|
|
Expiration string `xml:"Expiration"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role
|
|
type AssumedRoleUser struct {
|
|
AssumedRoleId string `xml:"AssumedRoleId"`
|
|
Arn string `xml:"Arn"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AssumeRoleResponse is the response for AssumeRole
|
|
type AssumeRoleResponse struct {
|
|
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/ AssumeRoleResponse"`
|
|
Result AssumeRoleResult `xml:"AssumeRoleResult"`
|
|
ResponseMetadata struct {
|
|
RequestId string `xml:"RequestId,omitempty"`
|
|
} `xml:"ResponseMetadata,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AssumeRoleResult contains the result of AssumeRole
|
|
type AssumeRoleResult struct {
|
|
Credentials STSCredentials `xml:"Credentials"`
|
|
AssumedRoleUser *AssumedRoleUser `xml:"AssumedRoleUser,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentityResponse is the response for AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity
|
|
type AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentityResponse struct {
|
|
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/ AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentityResponse"`
|
|
Result LDAPIdentityResult `xml:"AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentityResult"`
|
|
ResponseMetadata struct {
|
|
RequestId string `xml:"RequestId,omitempty"`
|
|
} `xml:"ResponseMetadata,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LDAPIdentityResult contains the result of AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity
|
|
type LDAPIdentityResult struct {
|
|
Credentials STSCredentials `xml:"Credentials"`
|
|
AssumedRoleUser *AssumedRoleUser `xml:"AssumedRoleUser,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetCallerIdentityResponse is the response for GetCallerIdentity
|
|
type GetCallerIdentityResponse struct {
|
|
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/ GetCallerIdentityResponse"`
|
|
Result GetCallerIdentityResult `xml:"GetCallerIdentityResult"`
|
|
ResponseMetadata struct {
|
|
RequestId string `xml:"RequestId,omitempty"`
|
|
} `xml:"ResponseMetadata,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetCallerIdentityResult contains the result of GetCallerIdentity
|
|
type GetCallerIdentityResult struct {
|
|
Arn string `xml:"Arn"`
|
|
UserId string `xml:"UserId"`
|
|
Account string `xml:"Account"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetFederationTokenResponse is the response for GetFederationToken
|
|
type GetFederationTokenResponse struct {
|
|
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/ GetFederationTokenResponse"`
|
|
Result GetFederationTokenResult `xml:"GetFederationTokenResult"`
|
|
ResponseMetadata struct {
|
|
RequestId string `xml:"RequestId,omitempty"`
|
|
} `xml:"ResponseMetadata,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetFederationTokenResult contains the result of GetFederationToken
|
|
type GetFederationTokenResult struct {
|
|
Credentials STSCredentials `xml:"Credentials"`
|
|
FederatedUser FederatedUser `xml:"FederatedUser"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// FederatedUser contains information about the federated user
|
|
type FederatedUser struct {
|
|
FederatedUserId string `xml:"FederatedUserId"`
|
|
Arn string `xml:"Arn"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// STS Error types
|
|
|
|
// STSErrorCode represents STS error codes
|
|
type STSErrorCode string
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
STSErrAccessDenied STSErrorCode = "AccessDenied"
|
|
STSErrExpiredToken STSErrorCode = "ExpiredTokenException"
|
|
STSErrInvalidAction STSErrorCode = "InvalidAction"
|
|
STSErrInvalidParameterValue STSErrorCode = "InvalidParameterValue"
|
|
STSErrMalformedPolicyDocument STSErrorCode = "MalformedPolicyDocument"
|
|
STSErrMissingParameter STSErrorCode = "MissingParameter"
|
|
STSErrSTSNotReady STSErrorCode = "ServiceUnavailable"
|
|
STSErrInternalError STSErrorCode = "InternalError"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// stsErrorResponses maps error codes to HTTP status and messages
|
|
var stsErrorResponses = map[STSErrorCode]struct {
|
|
HTTPStatusCode int
|
|
Message string
|
|
}{
|
|
STSErrAccessDenied: {http.StatusForbidden, "Access Denied"},
|
|
STSErrExpiredToken: {http.StatusBadRequest, "Token has expired"},
|
|
STSErrInvalidAction: {http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid action"},
|
|
STSErrInvalidParameterValue: {http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid parameter value"},
|
|
STSErrMalformedPolicyDocument: {http.StatusBadRequest, "Malformed policy document"},
|
|
STSErrMissingParameter: {http.StatusBadRequest, "Missing required parameter"},
|
|
STSErrSTSNotReady: {http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "STS service not ready"},
|
|
STSErrInternalError: {http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error"},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// STSErrorResponse is the XML error response format
|
|
type STSErrorResponse struct {
|
|
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/ ErrorResponse"`
|
|
Error struct {
|
|
Type string `xml:"Type"`
|
|
Code string `xml:"Code"`
|
|
Message string `xml:"Message"`
|
|
} `xml:"Error"`
|
|
RequestId string `xml:"RequestId"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// writeSTSErrorResponse writes an STS error response
|
|
func (h *STSHandlers) writeSTSErrorResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, code STSErrorCode, err error) {
|
|
errInfo, ok := stsErrorResponses[code]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
errInfo = stsErrorResponses[STSErrInternalError]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
message := errInfo.Message
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
message = err.Error()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
response := STSErrorResponse{
|
|
RequestId: request_id.GetFromRequest(r),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Server-side errors use "Receiver" type per AWS spec
|
|
if code == STSErrInternalError || code == STSErrSTSNotReady {
|
|
response.Error.Type = "Receiver"
|
|
} else {
|
|
response.Error.Type = "Sender"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
response.Error.Code = string(code)
|
|
response.Error.Message = message
|
|
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("STS error response: code=%s, type=%s, message=%s", code, response.Error.Type, message)
|
|
s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, errInfo.HTTPStatusCode, response)
|
|
}
|