Fix the --no-overwrite-dir option

Given this option, tar failed to preserve permissions of empty directories
and to create files under directories owned by the current user that did
not have the S_IWUSR bit set.

* src/extract.c (fd_chmod): Rename to fd_i_chmod.
(fd_chmod): New function.
(safe_dir_mode): New function.
(extract_dir): Special handling for existing directories in
--no-overwrite-dir mode.
* tests/extrac23.at: New file.
* tests/Makefile.am: Add new test case.
* tests/testsuite.at: Likewise.
This commit is contained in:
Sergey Poznyakoff
2020-02-08 13:01:47 +02:00
parent 883cc555df
commit 14d8fc718f
4 changed files with 146 additions and 42 deletions

View File

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ extr_init (void)
/* Use fchmod if possible, fchmodat otherwise. */
static int
fd_chmod (int fd, char const *file, mode_t mode, int atflag)
fd_i_chmod (int fd, char const *file, mode_t mode, int atflag)
{
if (0 <= fd)
{
@@ -205,6 +205,42 @@ fd_chmod (int fd, char const *file, mode_t mode, int atflag)
return fchmodat (chdir_fd, file, mode, atflag);
}
/* A version of fd_i_chmod which gracefully handles several common error
conditions. Additional argument TYPEFLAG is the type of file in tar
notation.
*/
static int
fd_chmod(int fd, char const *file_name, int mode, int atflag, int typeflag)
{
int chmod_errno = fd_i_chmod (fd, file_name, mode, atflag) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
/* On Solaris, chmod may fail if we don't have PRIV_ALL, because
setuid-root files would otherwise be a backdoor. See
http://opensolaris.org/jive/thread.jspa?threadID=95826
(2009-09-03). */
if (chmod_errno == EPERM && (mode & S_ISUID)
&& priv_set_restore_linkdir () == 0)
{
chmod_errno = fd_i_chmod (fd, file_name, mode, atflag) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
priv_set_remove_linkdir ();
}
/* Linux fchmodat does not support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, and
returns ENOTSUP even when operating on non-symlinks, try
again with the flag disabled if it does not appear to be
supported and if the file is not a symlink. This
introduces a race, alas. */
if (atflag && typeflag != SYMTYPE && ! implemented (chmod_errno))
chmod_errno = fd_i_chmod (fd, file_name, mode, 0) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
if (chmod_errno && (typeflag != SYMTYPE || implemented (chmod_errno)))
{
errno = chmod_errno;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Use fchown if possible, fchownat otherwise. */
static int
fd_chown (int fd, char const *file, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int atflag)
@@ -259,35 +295,8 @@ set_mode (char const *file_name,
if (current_mode != mode)
{
int chmod_errno =
fd_chmod (fd, file_name, mode, atflag) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
/* On Solaris, chmod may fail if we don't have PRIV_ALL, because
setuid-root files would otherwise be a backdoor. See
http://opensolaris.org/jive/thread.jspa?threadID=95826
(2009-09-03). */
if (chmod_errno == EPERM && (mode & S_ISUID)
&& priv_set_restore_linkdir () == 0)
{
chmod_errno =
fd_chmod (fd, file_name, mode, atflag) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
priv_set_remove_linkdir ();
}
/* Linux fchmodat does not support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, and
returns ENOTSUP even when operating on non-symlinks, try
again with the flag disabled if it does not appear to be
supported and if the file is not a symlink. This
introduces a race, alas. */
if (atflag && typeflag != SYMTYPE && ! implemented (chmod_errno))
chmod_errno = fd_chmod (fd, file_name, mode, 0) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
if (chmod_errno
&& (typeflag != SYMTYPE || implemented (chmod_errno)))
{
errno = chmod_errno;
chmod_error_details (file_name, mode);
}
if (fd_chmod (fd, file_name, mode, atflag, typeflag))
chmod_error_details (file_name, mode);
}
}
}
@@ -975,6 +984,26 @@ is_directory_link (const char *file_name)
return res;
}
/* Given struct stat of a directory (or directory member) whose ownership
or permissions of will be restored later, return the temporary permissions
for that directory, sufficiently restrictive so that in the meantime
processes owned by other users do not inadvertently create files under this
directory that inherit the wrong owner, group, or permissions from the
directory.
If not root, though, make the directory writeable and searchable at first,
so that files can be created under it.
*/
static inline int
safe_dir_mode (struct stat const *st)
{
return ((st->st_mode
& (0 < same_owner_option || 0 < same_permissions_option
? S_IRWXU
: MODE_RWX))
| (we_are_root ? 0 : MODE_WXUSR));
}
/* Extractor functions for various member types */
static int
@@ -1004,18 +1033,7 @@ extract_dir (char *file_name, int typeflag)
else if (typeflag == GNUTYPE_DUMPDIR)
skip_member ();
/* If ownership or permissions will be restored later, create the
directory with restrictive permissions at first, so that in the
meantime processes owned by other users do not inadvertently
create files under this directory that inherit the wrong owner,
group, or permissions from the directory. If not root, though,
make the directory writeable and searchable at first, so that
files can be created under it. */
mode = ((current_stat_info.stat.st_mode
& (0 < same_owner_option || 0 < same_permissions_option
? S_IRWXU
: MODE_RWX))
| (we_are_root ? 0 : MODE_WXUSR));
mode = safe_dir_mode (&current_stat_info.stat);
for (;;)
{
@@ -1031,6 +1049,7 @@ extract_dir (char *file_name, int typeflag)
if (errno == EEXIST
&& (interdir_made
|| keep_directory_symlink_option
|| old_files_option == NO_OVERWRITE_DIR_OLD_FILES
|| old_files_option == DEFAULT_OLD_FILES
|| old_files_option == OVERWRITE_OLD_FILES))
{
@@ -1051,6 +1070,31 @@ extract_dir (char *file_name, int typeflag)
repair_delayed_set_stat (file_name, &st);
return 0;
}
else if (old_files_option == NO_OVERWRITE_DIR_OLD_FILES)
{
/* Temporarily change the directory mode to a safe
value, to be able to create files in it, should
the need be.
*/
mode = safe_dir_mode (&st);
status = fd_chmod(-1, file_name, mode,
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, DIRTYPE);
if (status == 0)
{
/* Store the actual directory mode, to be restored
later.
*/
current_stat_info.stat = st;
current_mode = mode & ~ current_umask;
current_mode_mask = MODE_RWX;
atflag = AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW;
break;
}
else
{
chmod_error_details (file_name, mode);
}
}
break;
}
}

View File

@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ TESTSUITE_AT = \
extrac20.at\
extrac21.at\
extrac22.at\
extrac23.at\
filerem01.at\
filerem02.at\
dirrem01.at\

58
tests/extrac23.at Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
# Test suite for GNU tar. -*- Autotest -*-
# Copyright 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
# This file is part of GNU tar.
#
# GNU tar is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# GNU tar is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
AT_SETUP([--no-overwrite-dir])
AT_KEYWORDS([extract extrac23 no-overwrite-dir])
# Description: Implementation of the --no-overwrite-dir option was flawed in
# tar versions up to 1.32.90. This option is intended to preserve metadata
# of existing directories. In fact it worked only for non-empty directories.
# Moreover, if the actual directory was owned by the user tar runs as and the
# S_IWUSR bit was not set in its actual permissions, tar failed to create files
# in it.
#
# Reported by: Michael Kaufmann <mail@michael-kaufmann.ch>
# References: <20200207112934.Horde.anXzYhAj2CHiwUrw5CuT0G-@webmail.michael-kaufmann.ch>,
# https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-tar/2020-02/msg00003.html
AT_TAR_CHECK([
# Test if the directory permissions are restored properly.
mkdir dir
chmod 755 dir
tar cf a.tar dir
chmod 777 dir
tar -xf a.tar --no-overwrite-dir
genfile --stat=mode.777 dir
# Test if temprorary permissions are set correctly to allow the owner
# to write to the directory.
genfile --file dir/file
tar cf a.tar dir
rm dir/file
chmod 400 dir
tar -xf a.tar --no-overwrite-dir
genfile --stat=mode.777 dir
chmod 700 dir
find dir
],
[0],
[777
400
dir
dir/file
])
AT_CLEANUP

View File

@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ m4_include([extrac19.at])
m4_include([extrac20.at])
m4_include([extrac21.at])
m4_include([extrac22.at])
m4_include([extrac23.at])
m4_include([backup01.at])