Use openat2 to jailify the extraction directory

This addresses CVE-2025-45582.
* gnulib.modules: Add openat2.
* src/misc.c (open_subdir): New static function.
(fdbase_opendir): Use it.
* src/tar.c (open_searchdir_how): New var, replacing and
augmenting open_searchdir_flags.  All uses changed.
* tests/extrac31.at: New file.
* tests/Makefile (TESTSUITE_AT), tests/testuite.at: Add it.

NEWS

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-GNU tar NEWS - User visible changes. 2025-11-09
+GNU tar NEWS - User visible changes. 2025-11-13
 Please send GNU tar bug reports to <bug-tar@gnu.org>
 
 version 1.35.90 (git)
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ option.
 
 * Bug fixes
 
+** When extracting, tar no longer follows symbolic links to targets
+   outside the working directory.
+
 ** Fixed O(n^2) time complexity bug for large numbers of directories when
    extracting with --delay-directory-restore or reading incremental archives.
 

doc/tar.texi

@@ -13128,26 +13128,31 @@ when you later extract from the archive you will get incorrect data.
 When @command{tar} extracts from an archive, by default it writes into
 files relative to the working directory.  If the archive was generated
 by an untrusted user, that user therefore can write into any file
-under the working directory.  If the working directory contains a
+under the working directory.  When extracting from an
-symbolic link to another directory, the untrusted user can also write
-into any file under the referenced directory.  When extracting from an
 untrusted archive, it is therefore good practice to create an empty
-directory and run @command{tar} in that directory.
+directory and run @command{tar} in that directory.  You can use the
+@option{--directory} (@option{-C}) option to specify the working
+directory (@pxref{directory}).
 
-When extracting from two or more untrusted archives, each one should
+When extracting from an archive, @command{tar} rejects attempts to
-be extracted independently, into different empty directories.
+modify files outside the working directory.
-Otherwise, the first archive could create a symbolic link into an area
+For example, if a symbolic link points outside the working directory,
-outside the working directory, and the second one could follow the
+@command{tar} refuses to follow the link, regardless of whether the
-link and overwrite data that is not under the working directory.  For
+symbolic link existed before @command{tar} was run.
-example, when restoring from a series of incremental dumps, the
+Therefore, when extracting from two or more untrusted archives,
-archives should have been created by a trusted process, as otherwise
+each one can be extracted in turn, into the same initially-empty directory.
-the incremental restores might alter data outside the working
+Even if an earlier archive creates a symbolic link that
-directory.
+points outside the working directory,
+@command{tar} will reject any later attempts to follow that symbolic link.
+However, this safety mechanism applies only to @command{tar} itself:
+it does not apply to other programs you may run later, which will
+ordinarily follow symbolic links even if they escape the working directory.
 
 If you use the @option{--absolute-names} (@option{-P}) option when
 extracting, @command{tar} respects any file names in the archive, even
-file names that begin with @file{/} or contain @file{..}.  As this
+file names that begin with @file{/}, contain @file{..}, or that follow
-lets the archive overwrite any file in your system that you can write,
+a symbolic link to escape the extraction directory.  As this lets the
+archive overwrite any file in your system that you can write,
 the @option{--absolute-names} (@option{-P}) option should be used only
 for trusted archives.
 
@@ -13217,7 +13222,7 @@ Protect archives at least as much as you protect any of the files
 being archived.
 
 @item
-Extract from an untrusted archive only into an otherwise-empty
+Extract from untrusted archives only into an otherwise-empty
 directory.  This directory and its parent should be accessible only to
 trusted users.  For example:
 
@@ -13230,8 +13235,6 @@ $ @kbd{tar -xvf /archives/got-it-off-the-net.tar.gz}
 @end group
 @end example
 
-As a corollary, do not do an incremental restore from an untrusted archive.
-
 @item
 Do not let untrusted users access files extracted from untrusted
 archives without checking first for problems such as setuid programs.

gnulib.modules

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ mkfifoat
 modechange
 obstack
 openat
+openat2
 parse-datetime
 priv-set
 progname

src/common.h

@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ struct name
 
 /* Flags for reading, searching, and fstatatting files.  */
 extern int open_read_flags;
-extern int open_searchdir_flags;
+extern struct open_how open_searchdir_how;
 extern int fstatat_flags;
 
 extern int seek_option;

src/create.c

@@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ create_archive (void)
 			  struct fdbase f = fdbase (p->name);
 			  int fd = (f.fd == BADFD ? -1
 				    : openat (f.fd, f.base,
-					      open_searchdir_flags));
+					      open_searchdir_how.flags));
 			  if (fd < 0)
 			    {
 			      file_removed_diag (p->name, !p->parent,
@@ -1569,7 +1569,7 @@ restore_parent_fd (struct tar_stat_info const *st)
   struct tar_stat_info *parent = st->parent;
   if (parent && ! parent->fd)
     {
-      int parentfd = openat (st->fd, "..", open_searchdir_flags);
+      int parentfd = openat (st->fd, "..", open_searchdir_how.flags);
       struct stat parentstat;
 
       if (parentfd < 0)
@@ -1585,7 +1585,7 @@ restore_parent_fd (struct tar_stat_info const *st)
 	{
 	  struct fdbase f = fdbase (parent->orig_file_name);
 	  int origfd = (f.fd == BADFD ? -1
-			: openat (f.fd, f.base, open_searchdir_flags));
+			: openat (f.fd, f.base, open_searchdir_how.flags));
 	  if (0 <= origfd)
 	    {
 	      if (fstat (parentfd, &parentstat) < 0

src/misc.c

@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ chdir_do (idx_t i)
 	  if (! IS_ABSOLUTE_FILE_NAME (curr->name))
 	    chdir_do (i - 1);
 	  fd = openat (chdir_fd, curr->name,
-		       open_searchdir_flags & ~ O_NOFOLLOW);
+		       open_searchdir_how.flags & ~O_NOFOLLOW);
 	  if (fd < 0)
 	    open_fatal (curr->name);
 
@@ -1173,6 +1173,16 @@ fdbase_clear (void)
     }
 }
 
+/* Starting from the directory FD, open a subdirectory SUBDIR for search.
+   If extracting or diffing and --absolute-names (-P) is not in effect,
+   do not let the subdirectory escape FD, i.e., the subdirectory must
+   be at or under FD in the directory hierarchy.  */
+static int
+open_subdir (int fd, char const *subdir)
+{
+  return openat2 (fd, subdir, &open_searchdir_how, sizeof open_searchdir_how);
+}
+
 /* Return an fd open to FILE_NAME's parent directory,
    along with the base name of FILE_NAME.
    Use the alternate cache if ALTERNATE, the main cache otherwise.
@@ -1224,7 +1234,7 @@ fdbase_opendir (char const *file_name, bool alternate)
 	{
 	  /* The new directory is a subdirectory of the old,
 	     so open relative to FD rather than to chdir_fd.  */
-	  int subfd = openat (fd, &subdir[c->subdirlen], open_searchdir_flags);
+	  int subfd = open_subdir (fd, &subdir[c->subdirlen]);
 	  if (subfd < 0)
 	    {
 	      /* Keep the old directory cached and report open failure,
@@ -1251,7 +1261,7 @@ fdbase_opendir (char const *file_name, bool alternate)
 	 and add new info if the new directory can be opened.  */
       if (0 < c->subdirlen)
 	close (fd);
-      fd = openat (chdir_fd, c->subdir, open_searchdir_flags);
+      fd = open_subdir (chdir_fd, c->subdir);
       if (fd < 0)
 	{
 	  if (BADFD != -1 && fd < 0)

src/tar.c

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ idx_t archive_names;
 const char **archive_name_cursor;
 char const *index_file_name;
 int open_read_flags;
-int open_searchdir_flags;
+struct open_how open_searchdir_how;
 int fstatat_flags;
 int seek_option;
 bool unquote_option;
@@ -2709,8 +2709,12 @@ decode_options (int argc, char **argv)
 #else
     int search_flags = O_SEARCH | noatime_flag;
 #endif
-    open_searchdir_flags = (search_flags | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY
+    open_searchdir_how.flags = (search_flags | nofollow_flag
-			    | nofollow_flag);
+				| O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY);
+    if (!absolute_names_option
+	&& (subcommand_option == EXTRACT_SUBCOMMAND
+	    || subcommand_option == DIFF_SUBCOMMAND))
+      open_searchdir_how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH;
   }
   fstatat_flags = dereference_option ? 0 : AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW;
 

tests/Makefile.am

@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ TESTSUITE_AT = \
  extrac28.at\
  extrac29.at\
  extrac30.at\
+ extrac31.at\
  filerem01.at\
  filerem02.at\
  grow.at\

tests/extrac31.at

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Test suite for GNU tar.                             -*- Autotest -*-
+# Copyright 2025 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of GNU tar.
+#
+# GNU tar is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# GNU tar is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+AT_SETUP([extracting untrusted incremental])
+AT_KEYWORDS([extract extrac31 --absolute-names])
+
+
+AT_TAR_CHECK([
+
+# Extraction should not escape the extraction directory
+# even when extracting multiple times to the same directory.
+(umask 022 && mkdir -p dira/sub dirb/sym dirb/sub/sym ext victimdir victimexp)
+ln -s .. dira/sub/dotdot
+ln -s ../sub dira/sub/dot
+ln -s dotdot/sub dira/sub/anotherdot
+ln -s ../victimdir dira/sym
+ln -s dotdot/../victimdir dira/sub/sym
+echo b1 >dirb/sym/file1
+echo b2 >dirb/sub/sym/file2
+echo v >victimdir/expected
+echo v >victimdir/file1
+echo v >victimdir/file2
+cp victimdir/* victimexp
+tar -cf a.tar -C dira sub sym
+tar -cf b.tar -C dirb sym/file1 sub/sym/file2
+tar -xf a.tar -C ext
+echo status1=$?
+tar -xf b.tar -C ext
+echo status2=$?
+diff victimdir victimexp
+],
+[],
+[status1=0
+status2=2
+],
+[tar: sym/file1: Cannot open: Invalid cross-device link
+tar: sub/sym/file2: Cannot open: Invalid cross-device link
+tar: Exiting with failure status due to previous errors
+])
+AT_CLEANUP

tests/testsuite.at

@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ m4_include([extrac27.at])
 m4_include([extrac28.at])
 m4_include([extrac29.at])
 m4_include([extrac30.at])
+m4_include([extrac31.at])
 
 m4_include([backup01.at])