mirror of
https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint.git
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types: remove VerifyFutureCommit (#4961)
It was previously used by the now removed `lite` package.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -714,82 +714,6 @@ func (vals *ValidatorSet) VerifyCommit(chainID string, blockID BlockID,
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return ErrNotEnoughVotingPowerSigned{Got: talliedVotingPower, Needed: votingPowerNeeded}
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}
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// VerifyFutureCommit will check to see if the set would be valid with a different
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// validator set.
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//
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// vals is the old validator set that we know. Over 2/3 of the power in old
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// signed this block.
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//
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// In Tendermint, 1/3 of the voting power can halt or fork the chain, but 1/3
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// can't make arbitrary state transitions. You still need > 2/3 Byzantine to
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// make arbitrary state transitions.
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//
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// To preserve this property in the light client, we also require > 2/3 of the
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// old vals to sign the future commit at H, that way we preserve the property
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// that if they weren't being truthful about the validator set at H (block hash
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// -> vals hash) or about the app state (block hash -> app hash) we can slash
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// > 2/3. Otherwise, the light client isn't providing the same security
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// guarantees.
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//
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// Even if we added a slashing condition that if you sign a block header with
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// the wrong validator set, then we would only need > 1/3 of signatures from
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// the old vals on the new commit, it wouldn't be sufficient because the new
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// vals can be arbitrary and commit some arbitrary app hash.
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//
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// newSet is the validator set that signed this block. Only votes from new are
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// sufficient for 2/3 majority in the new set as well, for it to be a valid
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// commit.
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//
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// NOTE: This doesn't check whether the commit is a future commit, because the
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// current height isn't part of the ValidatorSet. Caller must check that the
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// commit height is greater than the height for this validator set.
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func (vals *ValidatorSet) VerifyFutureCommit(newSet *ValidatorSet, chainID string,
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blockID BlockID, height int64, commit *Commit) error {
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oldVals := vals
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// Commit must be a valid commit for newSet.
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err := newSet.VerifyCommit(chainID, blockID, height, commit)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Check old voting power.
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oldVotingPower := int64(0)
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seen := map[int32]bool{}
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for idx, commitSig := range commit.Signatures {
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if commitSig.Absent() {
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continue // OK, some signatures can be absent.
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}
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// See if this validator is in oldVals.
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oldIdx, val := oldVals.GetByAddress(commitSig.ValidatorAddress)
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if val == nil || seen[oldIdx] {
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continue // missing or double vote...
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}
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seen[oldIdx] = true
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// Validate signature.
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voteSignBytes := commit.VoteSignBytes(chainID, int32(idx))
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if !val.PubKey.VerifyBytes(voteSignBytes, commitSig.Signature) {
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return fmt.Errorf("wrong signature (#%d): %X", idx, commitSig.Signature)
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}
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// Good!
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if blockID.Equals(commitSig.BlockID(commit.BlockID)) {
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oldVotingPower += val.VotingPower
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}
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// else {
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// It's OK that the BlockID doesn't match. We include stray
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// signatures (~votes for nil) to measure validator availability.
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// }
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}
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if got, needed := oldVotingPower, oldVals.TotalVotingPower()*2/3; got <= needed {
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return ErrNotEnoughVotingPowerSigned{Got: got, Needed: needed}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// VerifyCommitTrusting verifies that trustLevel of the validator set signed
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// this commit.
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//
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