chore: Format and fix lints (#9336)

* make format

Signed-off-by: Thane Thomson <connect@thanethomson.com>

* Fix linting directives

Signed-off-by: Thane Thomson <connect@thanethomson.com>

* make mockery

Signed-off-by: Thane Thomson <connect@thanethomson.com>

* Appease CI linter

Signed-off-by: Thane Thomson <connect@thanethomson.com>

* Appease CI linter

Signed-off-by: Thane Thomson <connect@thanethomson.com>

Signed-off-by: Thane Thomson <connect@thanethomson.com>
This commit is contained in:
Thane Thomson
2022-08-30 12:28:46 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7b40167f58
commit cceea4de22
87 changed files with 402 additions and 384 deletions
+11 -9
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@@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ func (c *Client) detectDivergence(ctx context.Context, primaryTrace []*types.Lig
//
// 1: errConflictingHeaders -> there may have been an attack on this light client
// 2: errBadWitness -> the witness has either not responded, doesn't have the header or has given us an invalid one
// Note: In the case of an invalid header we remove the witness
//
// Note: In the case of an invalid header we remove the witness
//
// 3: nil -> the hashes of the two headers match
func (c *Client) compareNewHeaderWithWitness(ctx context.Context, errc chan error, h *types.SignedHeader,
witness provider.Provider, witnessIndex int) {
@@ -275,16 +277,16 @@ func (c *Client) handleConflictingHeaders(
// it has received from another and preforms verifySkipping at the heights of each of the intermediate
// headers in the trace until it reaches the divergentHeader. 1 of 2 things can happen.
//
// 1. The light client verifies a header that is different to the intermediate header in the trace. This
// is the bifurcation point and the light client can create evidence from it
// 2. The source stops responding, doesn't have the block or sends an invalid header in which case we
// return the error and remove the witness
// 1. The light client verifies a header that is different to the intermediate header in the trace. This
// is the bifurcation point and the light client can create evidence from it
// 2. The source stops responding, doesn't have the block or sends an invalid header in which case we
// return the error and remove the witness
//
// CONTRACT:
// 1. Trace can not be empty len(trace) > 0
// 2. The last block in the trace can not be of a lower height than the target block
// trace[len(trace)-1].Height >= targetBlock.Height
// 3. The
// 1. Trace can not be empty len(trace) > 0
// 2. The last block in the trace can not be of a lower height than the target block
// trace[len(trace)-1].Height >= targetBlock.Height
// 3. The
func (c *Client) examineConflictingHeaderAgainstTrace(
ctx context.Context,
trace []*types.LightBlock,
+1 -1
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@@ -216,6 +216,6 @@ func validateHeight(height int64) (*int64, error) {
// exponential backoff (with jitter)
// 0.5s -> 2s -> 4.5s -> 8s -> 12.5 with 1s variation
func backoffTimeout(attempt uint16) time.Duration {
// nolint:gosec // G404: Use of weak random number generator
//nolint:gosec // G404: Use of weak random number generator
return time.Duration(500*attempt*attempt)*time.Millisecond + time.Duration(rand.Intn(1000))*time.Millisecond
}
+2 -4
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@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ func makeHealthFunc(c *lrpc.Client) rpcHealthFunc {
type rpcStatusFunc func(ctx *rpctypes.Context) (*ctypes.ResultStatus, error)
// nolint: interfacer
func makeStatusFunc(c *lrpc.Client) rpcStatusFunc {
return func(ctx *rpctypes.Context) (*ctypes.ResultStatus, error) {
return c.Status(ctx.Context())
@@ -259,8 +258,8 @@ type rpcABCIQueryFunc func(ctx *rpctypes.Context, path string,
func makeABCIQueryFunc(c *lrpc.Client) rpcABCIQueryFunc {
return func(ctx *rpctypes.Context, path string, data bytes.HexBytes,
height int64, prove bool) (*ctypes.ResultABCIQuery, error) {
height int64, prove bool,
) (*ctypes.ResultABCIQuery, error) {
return c.ABCIQueryWithOptions(ctx.Context(), path, data, rpcclient.ABCIQueryOptions{
Height: height,
Prove: prove,
@@ -278,7 +277,6 @@ func makeABCIInfoFunc(c *lrpc.Client) rpcABCIInfoFunc {
type rpcBroadcastEvidenceFunc func(ctx *rpctypes.Context, ev types.Evidence) (*ctypes.ResultBroadcastEvidence, error)
// nolint: interfacer
func makeBroadcastEvidenceFunc(c *lrpc.Client) rpcBroadcastEvidenceFunc {
return func(ctx *rpctypes.Context, ev types.Evidence) (*ctypes.ResultBroadcastEvidence, error) {
return c.BroadcastEvidence(ctx.Context(), ev)
+1
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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ var errNegOrZeroHeight = errors.New("negative or zero height")
type KeyPathFunc func(path string, key []byte) (merkle.KeyPath, error)
// LightClient is an interface that contains functionality needed by Client from the light client.
//
//go:generate ../../scripts/mockery_generate.sh LightClient
type LightClient interface {
ChainID() string
+18 -18
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@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ var (
// VerifyNonAdjacent verifies non-adjacent untrustedHeader against
// trustedHeader. It ensures that:
//
// a) trustedHeader can still be trusted (if not, ErrOldHeaderExpired is returned)
// b) untrustedHeader is valid (if not, ErrInvalidHeader is returned)
// c) trustLevel ([1/3, 1]) of trustedHeaderVals (or trustedHeaderNextVals)
// signed correctly (if not, ErrNewValSetCantBeTrusted is returned)
// d) more than 2/3 of untrustedVals have signed h2
// (otherwise, ErrInvalidHeader is returned)
// e) headers are non-adjacent.
// a) trustedHeader can still be trusted (if not, ErrOldHeaderExpired is returned)
// b) untrustedHeader is valid (if not, ErrInvalidHeader is returned)
// c) trustLevel ([1/3, 1]) of trustedHeaderVals (or trustedHeaderNextVals)
// signed correctly (if not, ErrNewValSetCantBeTrusted is returned)
// d) more than 2/3 of untrustedVals have signed h2
// (otherwise, ErrInvalidHeader is returned)
// e) headers are non-adjacent.
//
// maxClockDrift defines how much untrustedHeader.Time can drift into the
// future.
@@ -81,12 +81,12 @@ func VerifyNonAdjacent(
// VerifyAdjacent verifies directly adjacent untrustedHeader against
// trustedHeader. It ensures that:
//
// a) trustedHeader can still be trusted (if not, ErrOldHeaderExpired is returned)
// b) untrustedHeader is valid (if not, ErrInvalidHeader is returned)
// c) untrustedHeader.ValidatorsHash equals trustedHeader.NextValidatorsHash
// d) more than 2/3 of new validators (untrustedVals) have signed h2
// (otherwise, ErrInvalidHeader is returned)
// e) headers are adjacent.
// a) trustedHeader can still be trusted (if not, ErrOldHeaderExpired is returned)
// b) untrustedHeader is valid (if not, ErrInvalidHeader is returned)
// c) untrustedHeader.ValidatorsHash equals trustedHeader.NextValidatorsHash
// d) more than 2/3 of new validators (untrustedVals) have signed h2
// (otherwise, ErrInvalidHeader is returned)
// e) headers are adjacent.
//
// maxClockDrift defines how much untrustedHeader.Time can drift into the
// future.
@@ -212,12 +212,12 @@ func HeaderExpired(h *types.SignedHeader, trustingPeriod time.Duration, now time
// VerifyBackwards verifies an untrusted header with a height one less than
// that of an adjacent trusted header. It ensures that:
//
// a) untrusted header is valid
// b) untrusted header has a time before the trusted header
// c) that the LastBlockID hash of the trusted header is the same as the hash
// of the trusted header
// a) untrusted header is valid
// b) untrusted header has a time before the trusted header
// c) that the LastBlockID hash of the trusted header is the same as the hash
// of the trusted header
//
// For any of these cases ErrInvalidHeader is returned.
// For any of these cases ErrInvalidHeader is returned.
func VerifyBackwards(untrustedHeader, trustedHeader *types.Header) error {
if err := untrustedHeader.ValidateBasic(); err != nil {
return ErrInvalidHeader{err}