docs: Update all docs to prepare for v0.37 (#9243)

* Update docs references from master to main

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* Update DOCS_README to reflect current reality

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* Attempt to resolve #7908

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This commit is contained in:
Thane Thomson
2022-08-19 13:18:33 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 3cc976482d
commit daaf5d6441
89 changed files with 377 additions and 1606 deletions
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
## Context
ABCI tags were first described in [ADR 002](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-002-event-subscription.md).
ABCI tags were first described in [ADR 002](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-002-event-subscription.md).
They are key-value pairs that can be used to index transactions.
Currently, ABCI messages return a list of tags to describe an
+1 -1
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ The messages exchanged between tendermint and a remote signer currently live in
[privval/socket.go]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/d419fffe18531317c28c29a292ad7d253f6cafdf/privval/socket.go#L496-L502
[issue#1622]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/1622
[types]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/master/types
[types]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/main/types
## Decision
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
## Context
The blockchain reactor is responsible for two high level processes:sending/receiving blocks from peers and FastSync-ing blocks to catch upnode who is far behind. The goal of [ADR-40](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-040-blockchain-reactor-refactor.md) was to refactor these two processes by separating business logic currently wrapped up in go-channels into pure `handle*` functions. While the ADR specified what the final form of the reactor might look like it lacked guidance on intermediary steps to get there.
The blockchain reactor is responsible for two high level processes:sending/receiving blocks from peers and FastSync-ing blocks to catch upnode who is far behind. The goal of [ADR-40](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-040-blockchain-reactor-refactor.md) was to refactor these two processes by separating business logic currently wrapped up in go-channels into pure `handle*` functions. While the ADR specified what the final form of the reactor might look like it lacked guidance on intermediary steps to get there.
The following diagram illustrates the state of the [blockchain-reorg](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/3561) reactor which will be referred to as `v1`.
![v1 Blockchain Reactor Architecture
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ While `v1` of the blockchain reactor has shown significant improvements in terms
- Peer communication is spread over multiple components creating complex dependency graph which must be mocked out during testing.
- Timeouts modeled as stateful tickers introduce non-determinism in tests
This ADR is meant to specify the missing components and control necessary to achieve [ADR-40](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-040-blockchain-reactor-refactor.md).
This ADR is meant to specify the missing components and control necessary to achieve [ADR-40](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-040-blockchain-reactor-refactor.md).
## Decision
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Diagram](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/5cf570690f989646fb3b615b7
### Reactor changes in detail
The reactor will include a demultiplexing routine which will send each message to each sub routine for independent processing. Each sub routine will then select the messages it's interested in and call the handle specific function specified in [ADR-40](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-040-blockchain-reactor-refactor.md). The demuxRoutine acts as "pacemaker" setting the time in which events are expected to be handled.
The reactor will include a demultiplexing routine which will send each message to each sub routine for independent processing. Each sub routine will then select the messages it's interested in and call the handle specific function specified in [ADR-40](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-040-blockchain-reactor-refactor.md). The demuxRoutine acts as "pacemaker" setting the time in which events are expected to be handled.
```go
func demuxRoutine(msgs, scheduleMsgs, processorMsgs, ioMsgs) {
@@ -400,5 +400,5 @@ Implemented
## References
- [ADR-40](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-040-blockchain-reactor-refactor.md): The original blockchain reactor re-org proposal
- [ADR-40](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-040-blockchain-reactor-refactor.md): The original blockchain reactor re-org proposal
- [Blockchain re-org](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/3561): The current blockchain reactor re-org implementation (v1)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ fork the network at some point in its prior history. See Vitaliks post at
Subjectivity](https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/11/25/proof-stake-learned-love-weak-subjectivity/).
Currently, Tendermint provides a lite client implementation in the
[light](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/master/light) package. This
[light](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/main/light) package. This
lite client implements a bisection algorithm that tries to use a binary search
to find the minimum number of block headers where the validator set voting
power changes are less than < 1/3rd. This interface does not support weak
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ The linear verification algorithm requires downloading all headers
between the `TrustHeight` and the `LatestHeight`. The lite client downloads the
full header for the provided `TrustHeight` and then proceeds to download `N+1`
headers and applies the [Tendermint validation
rules](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/master/spec/light-client/verification/README.md)
rules](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/main/spec/light-client/verification/README.md)
to each block.
### Bisecting Verification
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ network usage.
---
Check out the formal specification
[here](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/master/spec/light-client).
[here](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/main/spec/light-client).
## Status
+2 -2
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ graceful here, but that's for another day.
It's possible to fool lite clients without there being a fork on the
main chain - so called Fork-Lite. See the
[fork accountability](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/spec/light-client/accountability/README.md)
[fork accountability](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/light-client/accountability/README.md)
document for more details. For a sequential lite client, this can happen via
equivocation or amnesia attacks. For a skipping lite client this can also happen
via lunatic validator attacks. There must be some way for applications to punish
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ checking).
Currently, evidence verification is handled by Tendermint. Once committed,
[evidence is passed over
ABCI](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/proto/tendermint/abci/types.proto#L354)
ABCI](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/proto/tendermint/abci/types.proto#L354)
in BeginBlock in a reduced form that includes only
the type of evidence, its height and timestamp, the validator it's from, and the
total voting power of the validator set at the height. The app trusts Tendermint
@@ -179,13 +179,13 @@ This then ends the process and the verify function that was called at the start
the user.
For a detailed overview of how each of these three attacks can be conducted please refer to the
[fork accountability spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/spec/consensus/light-client/accountability.md).
[fork accountability spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/consensus/light-client/accountability.md).
## Full Node Verification
When a full node receives evidence from the light client it will need to verify
it for itself before gossiping it to peers and trying to commit it on chain. This process is outlined
in [ADR-059](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-059-evidence-composition-and-lifecycle.md).
in [ADR-059](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-059-evidence-composition-and-lifecycle.md).
## Status
@@ -212,9 +212,9 @@ clear from the current information which nodes behaved maliciously.
## References
* [Fork accountability spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/spec/consensus/light-client/accountability.md)
* [ADR 056: Light client amnesia attacks](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-056-light-client-amnesia-attacks.md)
* [ADR-059: Evidence Composition and Lifecycle](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-059-evidence-composition-and-lifecycle.md)
* [Fork accountability spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/consensus/light-client/accountability.md)
* [ADR 056: Light client amnesia attacks](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-056-light-client-amnesia-attacks.md)
* [ADR-059: Evidence Composition and Lifecycle](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-059-evidence-composition-and-lifecycle.md)
* [Informal's Light Client Detector](https://github.com/informalsystems/tendermint-rs/blob/master/docs/spec/lightclient/detection/detection.md)
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
## Context
Whilst most created evidence of malicious behavior is self evident such that any individual can verify them independently there are types of evidence, known collectively as global evidence, that require further collaboration from the network in order to accumulate enough information to create evidence that is individually verifiable and can therefore be processed through consensus. [Fork Accountability](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/spec/consensus/light-client/accountability.md) has been coined to describe the entire process of detection, proving and punishing of malicious behavior. This ADR addresses specifically what a light client amnesia attack is and how it can be proven and the current decision around handling light client amnesia attacks. For information on evidence handling by the light client, it is recommended to read [ADR 47](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-047-handling-evidence-from-light-client.md).
Whilst most created evidence of malicious behavior is self evident such that any individual can verify them independently there are types of evidence, known collectively as global evidence, that require further collaboration from the network in order to accumulate enough information to create evidence that is individually verifiable and can therefore be processed through consensus. [Fork Accountability](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/consensus/light-client/accountability.md) has been coined to describe the entire process of detection, proving and punishing of malicious behavior. This ADR addresses specifically what a light client amnesia attack is and how it can be proven and the current decision around handling light client amnesia attacks. For information on evidence handling by the light client, it is recommended to read [ADR 47](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-047-handling-evidence-from-light-client.md).
### Amnesia Attack
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ The decision surrounding amnesia attacks has both a short term and long term com
The latter of the two options meant storing a record of all votes in any height with which there was more than one round. This information would then be accessible for applications if they wanted to perform some off-chain verification and punishment.
In summary, this seemed like too much to ask of the application to implement only on a temporary basis, whilst not having the domain specific knowledge and considering such a difficult and unlikely attack. Therefore the short term decision is to identify when the attack has occurred and implement the detector algorithm highlighted in [ADR 47](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-047-handling-evidence-from-light-client.md) but to not implement any accountability protocol that would identify malicious validators and allow applications to punish them. This will hopefully change in the long term with the focus on eventually reaching a concrete and secure protocol with identifying and dealing with these attacks.
In summary, this seemed like too much to ask of the application to implement only on a temporary basis, whilst not having the domain specific knowledge and considering such a difficult and unlikely attack. Therefore the short term decision is to identify when the attack has occurred and implement the detector algorithm highlighted in [ADR 47](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-047-handling-evidence-from-light-client.md) but to not implement any accountability protocol that would identify malicious validators and allow applications to punish them. This will hopefully change in the long term with the focus on eventually reaching a concrete and secure protocol with identifying and dealing with these attacks.
## Implications
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Light clients where all witnesses are faulty can be subject to an amnesia attack
## References
- [Fork accountability algorithm](https://docs.google.com/document/d/11ZhMsCj3y7zIZz4udO9l25xqb0kl7gmWqNpGVRzOeyY/edit)
- [Fork accountability spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/spec/consensus/light-client/accountability.md)
- [Fork accountability spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/consensus/light-client/accountability.md)
## Appendix A: Detailed Walkthrough of Performing a Light Client Amnesia Attack
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ As the distinction between these two attacks (amnesia and back to the past) can
Currently, the evidence reactor is used to simply broadcast and store evidence. The idea of creating a new reactor for the specific task of verifying these attacks was briefly discussed, but it is decided that the current evidence reactor will be extended.
The process begins with a light client receiving conflicting headers (in the future this could also be a full node during fast sync or state sync), which it sends to a full node to analyze. As part of [evidence handling](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-047-handling-evidence-from-light-client.md), this is extracted into potential amnesia evidence when the validator voted in more than one round for a different block.
The process begins with a light client receiving conflicting headers (in the future this could also be a full node during fast sync or state sync), which it sends to a full node to analyze. As part of [evidence handling](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-047-handling-evidence-from-light-client.md), this is extracted into potential amnesia evidence when the validator voted in more than one round for a different block.
```golang
type PotentialAmnesiaEvidence struct {
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ This trial period will be discussed later.
Returning to the event of an amnesia attack, if we were to examine the behavior of the honest nodes, C1 and C2, in the schematic, C2 will not PRECOMMIT an earlier round, but it is likely, if a node in C1 were to receive +2/3 PREVOTE's or PRECOMMIT's for a higher round, that it would remove the lock and PREVOTE and PRECOMMIT for the later round. Therefore, unfortunately it is not a case of simply punishing all nodes that have double voted in the `PotentialAmnesiaEvidence`.
Instead we use the Proof of Lock Change (PoLC) referred to in the [consensus spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/spec/consensus/consensus.md#terms). When an honest node votes again for a different block in a later round
Instead we use the Proof of Lock Change (PoLC) referred to in the [consensus spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/consensus/consensus.md#terms). When an honest node votes again for a different block in a later round
(which will only occur in very rare cases), it will generate the PoLC and store it in the evidence reactor for a time equal to the `MaxEvidenceAge`
```golang
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ invasive in the required set of protocol and implementation changes, which
simply extends the existing `CheckTx` ABCI method. The second candidate essentially
involves the introduction of new ABCI method(s) and would require a higher degree
of complexity in protocol and implementation changes, some of which may either
overlap or conflict with the upcoming introduction of [ABCI++](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/rfc/rfc-013-abci%2B%2B.md).
overlap or conflict with the upcoming introduction of [ABCI++](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/rfc/rfc-013-abci%2B%2B.md).
For more information on the various approaches and proposals, please see the
[mempool discussion](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/discussions/6295).
@@ -299,5 +299,5 @@ non-contentious and backwards compatible manner.
## References
- [ABCI++](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/rfc/rfc-013-abci%2B%2B.md)
- [ABCI++](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/rfc/rfc-013-abci%2B%2B.md)
- [Mempool Discussion](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/discussions/6295)
+2 -2
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Accepted
The advent of state sync and block pruning gave rise to the opportunity for full nodes to participate in consensus without needing complete block history. This also introduced a problem with respect to evidence handling. Nodes that didn't have all the blocks within the evidence age were incapable of validating evidence, thus halting if that evidence was committed on chain.
[ADR 068](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-068-reverse-sync.md) was published in response to this problem and modified the spec to add a minimum block history invariant. This predominantly sought to extend state sync so that it was capable of fetching and storing the `Header`, `Commit` and `ValidatorSet` (essentially a `LightBlock`) of the last `n` heights, where `n` was calculated based from the evidence age.
[ADR 068](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-068-reverse-sync.md) was published in response to this problem and modified the spec to add a minimum block history invariant. This predominantly sought to extend state sync so that it was capable of fetching and storing the `Header`, `Commit` and `ValidatorSet` (essentially a `LightBlock`) of the last `n` heights, where `n` was calculated based from the evidence age.
This ADR sets out to describe the design of this state sync extension as well as modifications to the light client provider and the merging of tm store.
@@ -93,5 +93,5 @@ This ADR tries to remain within the scope of extending state sync, however the c
## References
- [Reverse Sync RFC](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-068-reverse-sync.md)
- [Reverse Sync RFC](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-068-reverse-sync.md)
- [Original Issue](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/5617)
@@ -126,13 +126,13 @@ would probably be overly-abstract at this stage.
## Detailed Design
The [current
nodeImpl](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/node/node.go#L47)
nodeImpl](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/node/node.go#L47)
includes direct references to the implementations of each of the
reactors, which should be replaced by references to `service.Service`
objects. This will require moving construction of the [rpc
service](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/node/node.go#L771)
service](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/node/node.go#L771)
into the constructor of
[makeNode](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/node/node.go#L126). One
[makeNode](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/node/node.go#L126). One
possible implementation of this would be to eliminate the current
`ConfigureRPC` method on the node package and instead [configure it
here](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/6798/files#diff-375d57e386f20eaa5f09f02bb9d28bfc48ac3dca18d0325f59492208219e5618R441).
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
## Context
Tendermint currently provides a monotonically increasing source of time known as [BFTTime](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/spec/consensus/bft-time.md).
Tendermint currently provides a monotonically increasing source of time known as [BFTTime](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/consensus/bft-time.md).
This mechanism for producing a source of time is reasonably simple.
Each correct validator adds a timestamp to each `Precommit` message it sends.
The timestamp it sends is either the validator's current known Unix time or one millisecond greater than the previous block time, depending on which value is greater.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Proposer-based timestamps alter the current mechanism for producing block timest
1. Correct validators only approve the proposed block timestamp if it is close enough to their own currently known Unix time.
The result of these changes is a more meaningful timestamp that cannot be controlled by `<= 2/3` of the validator voting power.
This document outlines the necessary code changes in Tendermint to implement the corresponding [proposer-based timestamps specification](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/master/spec/consensus/proposer-based-timestamp).
This document outlines the necessary code changes in Tendermint to implement the corresponding [proposer-based timestamps specification](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/main/spec/consensus/proposer-based-timestamp).
## Alternative Approaches
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ We therefore decided not to remove the timestamp.
Applications often wish for some transactions to occur on a certain day, on a regular period, or after some time following a different event.
All of these require some meaningful representation of agreed upon time.
The following protocols and application features require a reliable source of time:
* Tendermint Light Clients [rely on correspondence between their known time](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/spec/light-client/verification/README.md#definitions-1) and the block time for block verification.
* Tendermint Light Clients [rely on correspondence between their known time](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/light-client/verification/README.md#definitions-1) and the block time for block verification.
* Tendermint Evidence validity is determined [either in terms of heights or in terms of time](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/8029cf7a0fcc89a5004e173ec065aa48ad5ba3c8/spec/consensus/evidence.md#verification).
* Unbonding of staked assets in the Cosmos Hub [occurs after a period of 21 days](https://github.com/cosmos/governance/blob/ce75de4019b0129f6efcbb0e752cd2cc9e6136d3/params-change/Staking.md#unbondingtime).
* IBC packets can use either a [timestamp or a height to timeout packet delivery](https://docs.cosmos.network/v0.44/ibc/overview.html#acknowledgements)
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ A validator will only Prevote a proposal if the proposal timestamp is considered
A proposal timestamp is considered `timely` if it is within `PRECISION` and `MSGDELAY` of the Unix time known to the validator.
More specifically, a proposal timestamp is `timely` if `proposalTimestamp - PRECISION ≤ validatorLocalTime ≤ proposalTimestamp + PRECISION + MSGDELAY`.
Because the `PRECISION` and `MSGDELAY` parameters must be the same across all validators, they will be added to the [consensus parameters](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/blob/master/proto/tendermint/types/params.proto#L11) as [durations](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/docs/reference/google.protobuf#google.protobuf.Duration).
Because the `PRECISION` and `MSGDELAY` parameters must be the same across all validators, they will be added to the [consensus parameters](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/proto/tendermint/types/params.proto#L11) as [durations](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/docs/reference/google.protobuf#google.protobuf.Duration).
The consensus parameters will be updated to include this `Synchrony` field as follows:
@@ -328,6 +328,6 @@ This skew will be bound by the `PRECISION` value, so it is unlikely to be too la
## References
* [PBTS Spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/master/spec/consensus/proposer-based-timestamp)
* [BFTTime spec](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/blob/master/spec/consensus/bft-time.md)
* [PBTS Spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/tree/main/spec/consensus/proposer-based-timestamp)
* [BFTTime spec](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/spec/consensus/bft-time.md)
* [Issue 371](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/issues/371)
@@ -664,8 +664,8 @@ The following alternative approaches were considered:
- [indexer: unbuffered event subscription slow down the consensus][i7247] (#7247)
- [rpc: remove duplication of events when querying][i7273] (#7273)
[rfc006]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/rfc/rfc-006-event-subscription.md
[rpc-service]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/rpc/openapi/openapi.yaml
[rfc006]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/rfc/rfc-006-event-subscription.md
[rpc-service]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/rpc/openapi/openapi.yaml
[query-grammar]: https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/tendermint/tendermint@master/internal/pubsub/query/syntax
[ws]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6455
[jsonrpc2]: https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification
@@ -675,8 +675,8 @@ The following alternative approaches were considered:
<!-- markdown-link-check-disable-next-line -->
[ng-xm]: https://www.nginx.com/resources/wiki/extending/
[abci-event]: https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/tendermint/tendermint/abci/types#Event
[rfc001]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/rfc/rfc-001-storage-engine.rst
[rfc002]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/rfc/rfc-002-ipc-ecosystem.md
[rfc001]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/rfc/rfc-001-storage-engine.rst
[rfc002]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/rfc/rfc-002-ipc-ecosystem.md
[i3380]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/3380
[i6439]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/6439
[i6729]: https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/6729
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@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Accepted
## References
- State sync ADR: <https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-053-state-sync-prototype.md>
- State sync ADR: <https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-053-state-sync-prototype.md>
- State sync issue: <https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/828>
+3 -3
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@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@
## Context
Two new features: [Block pruning](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/3652)
and [State sync](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-042-state-sync.md)
and [State sync](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-042-state-sync.md)
meant nodes no longer needed a complete history of the blockchain. This
introduced some challenges of its own which were covered and subsequently
tackled with [RFC-001](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-077-block-retention.md).
tackled with [RFC-001](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-077-block-retention.md).
The RFC allowed applications to set a block retention height; an upper bound on
what blocks would be pruned. However nodes who state sync past this upper bound
(which is necessary as snapshots must be saved within the trusting period for
@@ -199,5 +199,5 @@ nodes to freely fetch and verify prior blocks
## References
- [RFC-001: Block retention](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-077-block-retention.md)
- [RFC-001: Block retention](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-077-block-retention.md)
- [Original issue](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/4629)