77 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Johanna LarssonandTangled 2088f59197 Stop deleting logo blob when switching
This also means we can clean up the last blob operations that were per cid rather than user+cid 🪓

We should be setting ourselves up to be able to go garbage collect blobs safely so deleting the logo blobs manually won't matter anyway.
2026-09-12 15:34:46 +00:00
Johanna LarssonandTangled 695a7d981c Allow blobs to be owned by multiple accounts
The current tranquil database design only allows each blob to be owned by one account. This means that if a second account also has that blob, tranquil skips associated the blob with the account. That works fine a lot of the time, since blobs are looked up by cid and the blob exists. However, it can lead to loss of data under certain scenarios.

One example is where I upload a blob, the blob already exists in my instance so insertion is skipped (postgres requires cid to be unique in blobs, fjall only allows one owner per blob cid), I then decide to migrate off tranquil, the blob does not come with me since it is not mine.

Another example is where an account is deleted. If a blob was uploaded for account a, then account b uploads the same blob tranquil skips storing it since it exists. Then I delete account a, now account b's blob is missing.

I accidentally stumbled upon this when I migrated my account to my own tranuil instance and list blobs now lists 2 fewer blobs than before, two images that had been uploaded by accounts already on the PDS.

ps I found record_blobs a bit confusing, at first it looked like a blob ownership table, but then it turns out to just be used for migrations!

This PR makes the blob primary key be cid+user for postgres, and updates the queries to account for there being multiple "blobs" with the same cid. For queries that just care about the blob existing, it doesn't matter "whose" blob it is, so limit 1.

Most of the work is on the metastore side. Adds ref_count to track how many are referencing the blob since we can't just check for other rows. Instead of storing blobs directly, we now store a per account cid, and the blob reference itself is shared and keyed by cid only. This means some of these operations now require updating two places, so they're done in `batch`es.

With the new layout get_blob_value becomes simpler, all blob data is a single "table" or whatever it's called, so we just grab it using cid instead of looking it up for the user.

Migrates blobs rather than maintaining two different versions of the tables, although it seems like that could be supported.

I removed a test that asserted the old behavior, and added a reasonable (?) set of new tests that assert the new behavior, including a parity test.
2026-09-12 15:34:46 +00:00
Johanna LarssonandTangled 04689cbe25 Improve logging and correct translation string 2026-09-11 19:54:37 +00:00
Johanna LarssonandTangled 3474ed588d Make legacy login alerts configurable
This adds security alerts section to the communication settings, with one new item: a toggle for enabling/disabling legacy login alerts. It's enabled by default. Disabling it means that you no longer get emails when logging in through a non-2FA enabled login flow, like createSession.

The reason I tackled this is that I have a bot account that automatically refreshes its session, using username and app password, and I'm close to having 100 of these emails in my inbox. I also tried to just disable TOTP but I wasn't allowed (I fixed that in a different PR).

English and Swedish translations were me, the rest were MyMemory. I imagine someone can improve on them after this is merged!
2026-09-11 19:54:37 +00:00
Johanna LarssonandTangled 09ba5e4521 Allow disabling TOTP even if last session was legacy
This removes the `require_legacy_session_mfa` call on the TOTP disable path. It looks at the last session, which isn't really relevant, and we're getting a fresh TOTP from the form anyway, which should be enough proof to allow disabling TOTP.

The way I bumped into this was having a "bot account" log in with app password on some app on a schdule, triggering lots of warning emails. So I tried to disable TOTP to stop the flood and wasn't allowed.
2026-09-05 18:16:56 +00:00
LewisandTangled 8c3386a3ab caddy: on-demand TLS endpoint
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <did:plc:3fwecdnvtcscjnrx2p4n7alz>
2026-09-01 16:31:10 +00:00
nelindandTangled 0e82a38add fix(api): dont do rotation key validation in signPlcOperation as it blocks migrations 2026-08-29 05:42:03 +00:00
Louis EscherandTangled 0ce725174d fix: DID length test, service test, cloning, dead code (should be it!) 2026-08-20 08:21:53 +00:00
Louis EscherandTangled b9e7955606 fix: pass exp to token creation 2026-08-20 08:21:53 +00:00
Louis EscherandTangled 1b5a2b319c fix: getServiceAuth aud parsing 2026-08-20 08:21:53 +00:00
LewisandTangled 8d0b6f8322 cache: DID, SSO, & OAuth client metadata caches onto shared cache
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <did:plc:3fwecdnvtcscjnrx2p4n7alz>
2026-08-16 17:15:23 +00:00
LewisandTangled 135912194d types: HttpUrl newtypes, shared cache key/JSON helpers
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <did:plc:3fwecdnvtcscjnrx2p4n7alz>
2026-08-16 17:15:23 +00:00
LewisandTangled 0b8787d1de pds: compile bsky-specific proxy, CORS, & validation out under bsky features
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <did:plc:3fwecdnvtcscjnrx2p4n7alz>
2026-08-16 17:15:23 +00:00
Lewis 18455f54f2 api: moorfc compliance endpoint toggle
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <did:plc:3fwecdnvtcscjnrx2p4n7alz>
2026-08-16 19:58:24 +03:00
Johanna LarssonandTangled 9e78206cf4 Switch back to SecurityKey, remove hint 2026-08-08 15:41:29 +00:00
Johanna LarssonandTangled 779dc1b985 Replace SecurityKey with Passkey 2026-08-08 15:41:29 +00:00
Edmund EdgarandTangled 1dc0c40206 fix: don't require a server-custodied rotation key
Remove the requirement that the user's did can be controlled by the
server rotation key and signing key. This was preventing users who
didn't want to trust the PDS with their rotation keys from activating
their accounts. Errors are removed but we issue debug messages.
2026-07-26 11:45:09 +03:00
nelindandTangled 59934cc184 feat: add bsky and bsky-support cargo features to manage bsky specific code 2026-07-25 18:31:06 +03:00
nelindandTangled 34a47e6e5a chore: clean up Cargo.toml files with cargo-shear and remove default feature on lib crates 2026-07-25 18:31:06 +03:00
LewisandTangled b6274bb3c4 api: validated newtypes from their checked constructors
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-25 08:27:40 +03:00
LewisandTangled 2a96a8f420 server: report absent repo rev instead of an empty one
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-25 08:27:40 +03:00
LewisandTangled 1e2311f8fc repo: keep user_blocks equal to the reachable block set
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-25 08:27:40 +03:00
LewisandTangled 0c7cccb14c invite: require owning account for generated codes
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-25 08:27:39 +03:00
LewisandTangled 932b0c07d4 db: make stored handle optional when it no longer parses
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-25 08:27:39 +03:00
LewisandTangled 00ca223b5f identity: force did:web signkey check to #atproto verification
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-23 10:34:21 +03:00
Lewis e41f34746a db: newtype Rkey and final newtype touches for now
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 08:03:14 +02:00
Lewis fbfa15b0b4 invite: newtype InviteCode for invite endpoints + store
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 08:03:14 +02:00
Lewis eb1a89dc58 db: Did type for repos and handlers
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 08:03:14 +02:00
Lewis 6ca6c45605 identity: Handle type for stored handles & extract_handle
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 08:03:14 +02:00
Lewis d238affd76 repo: newtype commit cid & rev to CidLink & Tid
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 08:03:14 +02:00
Lewis 469255f5a9 db: newtype PasswordHash for users & app passwords
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 08:03:14 +02:00
Lewis 8559764d31 auth: newtype jti claims, sessions, & store
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 08:03:14 +02:00
Lewis a405d523ca oauth: newtype client, token, device & request ids
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 00:25:08 +03:00
Lewis 3c46e5fc73 lexicon: Nsid instead of strs for collections
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-12 00:21:32 +03:00
Lewis f330dcd366 types: did, nsid, & rkey in AtUri::from_parts
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-07-11 16:14:56 +03:00
Lewis aab1a945c2 session: deletes scope to did, route muts by did
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-06-28 09:55:11 +03:00
aveandTangled 9dc184ee33 bsky(auth): add grace period to legacy session refresh
Concurrent or retried com.atproto.server.refreshSession calls presenting the
same refresh token hit the reuse-detection path, which deleted the session and
returned "Refresh token has been revoked due to suspected compromise" —
logging users out at random. The legacy flow had no grace period, unlike OAuth.

Mirror the reference atproto PDS: every rotated refresh token gets a 2h grace
window measured from its own rotation time (used_refresh_tokens.used_at in
postgres; a rotated_at_ms field appended to the metastore used-marker, with
old-format markers decoding as outside the window). A refresh presenting a
recently-rotated token is served the session's current tokens, re-minted on
the fly with the same jti/expiry — signed JWTs are never persisted. Reuse
outside the window still revokes the session.

The grace lookup returns the session's encrypted signing key so the handler
verifies the presented token's signature before minting replacement tokens or
revoking a session; a forged token bearing a known jti gets a generic
rejection with no side effects.

Integration tests asserting the old replay-gets-401 behavior are reworked to
the new contract and now also cover forged-signature replays and
out-of-window revocation.
2026-06-27 23:54:22 +03:00
Lewis ab4eba6dc4 delegation: preset scopes grant identity & account
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-06-27 23:11:24 +03:00
LewisandTangled 28f2e04019 plc: always keep signing key in rotationKeys
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-06-26 18:52:12 +03:00
LewisandTangled 39a2e40b35 invite codes: dedup consumption, iron out kinks
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-06-26 13:28:49 +03:00
nelindandTangled 3b07cdfb24 fix(api): dont verify signature or DID during importRepo 2026-06-13 23:33:57 +03:00
LewisandTangled 5bbe2146ff server: serve xrpc over http/3
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-06-10 13:18:49 +03:00
aveandTangled a231d7da29 feat(auth): accept totp/backup codes in legacy login createSession 2026-06-06 10:42:24 +03:00
aveandTangled 63d84d38fb refactor(auth): unify short-code generation onto util::generate_token_code
Collapse the three ad-hoc short-code generators into one canonical generator
plus a shared normalizer:

- util::generate_token_code now emits the uppercase base32 XXXXX-XXXXX display
  form; new util::normalize_token_code canonicalizes user input (uppercase,
  strip hyphen/whitespace).
- email_token and legacy_2fa now generate via util, store the normalized form,
  and compare normalized input. Their private generate_short_token/generate_code
  (and BASE32_CHARS/CODE_LENGTH) are removed.
- PLC (request/sign) and password reset inline util::generate_token_code,
  persist the normalized form, email the display form, and normalize input
  before lookup. The generate_plc_token/generate_reset_code wrappers are removed.

Behavior changes: legacy login-2FA codes go from 8-digit numeric to XXXXX-XXXXX;
PLC and password-reset codes go from lowercase to uppercase. All four code types
are now accepted case-/hyphen-insensitively. OAuth web-login 2FA, account
deletion, and the long verification_token blobs are intentionally untouched.

Tests: add util normalize tests + email_token/legacy_2fa case/hyphen tests;
update integration tests to expect the canonical stored form and the new
emailed format.
2026-06-06 09:36:08 +03:00
LewisandTangled 3018a20843 fix(plc): allow arbitrary services to sign
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-06-03 11:23:51 +03:00
LewisandTangled cee483e358 feat(pds): selfhealing repo writing by detecting corruption & retrying
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-05-31 21:11:36 +03:00
LewisandTangled 9b58961bba feat(repo): missing $type? invent one
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-05-31 13:02:11 +03:00
LewisandTangled e9dc57d6f4 fix(firehose): lost events if seq commits out of order
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-05-30 21:10:38 +03:00
Lewis 86c5995568 fix(config): signal gate is useless since needs admin work to activate anyway
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-05-24 22:50:14 +03:00
LewisandTangled 4d2c7d4723 feat(auth): verification-gate override, inbound-migration bypass, store deleter improvement
Lewis: May this revision serve well! <lu5a@proton.me>
2026-05-23 23:02:43 +03:00