Fixes#1327Fixes#1567Closes#2264
Wires the S3 gateway up to the standalone IAM service so identity policies, not just bucket policies and ACLs, are enforced on the S3 data plane. The gateway authenticates SigV4 requests by calling new private derive-signing-key and resolve-identity endpoints on the IAM service instead of holding secrets itself, and evaluates identity policy through the same PolicyEvaluator path added to auth.VerifyAccess, combined with the bucket policy using explicit-deny-wins precedence. The private endpoints are served over their own mTLS listener (new iamapi/private package, genmtlscerts.sh to generate test material, and client-cert support in internal/netutil), separate from the public IAM API. As part of this the vendored aws/signer/v4 package is deleted and replaced by a pure-Go SigV4 implementation in internal/sigv4auth, which now reads canonical request data directly off the fiber.Ctx instead of reconstructing an http.Request, and is shared by both the S3 request-signing verification and the new private-endpoint signing.
DeleteObjects moves from an all-or-nothing authorization check to true partial success: VerifyObjectsAccess evaluates every object in a batch independently against both the identity policy and any object lock, so a denial or a locked object only removes that key from the batch instead of failing the whole request. It also batches the identity-policy round trip and the bucket-policy fetch once per request rather than once per object, and separates plain deletes from versioned ones since a versioned delete needs s3:DeleteObjectVersion rather than s3:DeleteObject. Object lock handling got a few correctness fixes alongside this: a bypass is now modeled as BypassNone/BypassRequested/BypassOverwrite rather than a single bool, because root's blanket ability to override a GOVERNANCE retention should only apply when the client actually asked to bypass it (DeleteObject/DeleteObjects/PutObjectRetention), not when the gateway is silently replacing a locked object via an overwrite, which needs the permission from everyone including root. Retention changes are now correctly classified as an extension (allowed under plain s3:PutObjectRetention) versus a weakening (date or mode change, which needs the bypass permission), and a COMPLIANCE lock can never be weakened by anyone regardless of permissions, matching AWS. Separately, VerifyObjectCopyAccess had a readonly-mode gap: it returned early for root/admin before ever calling VerifyAccess, so the readonly check inside VerifyAccess never ran for them on CopyObject; access checks are now ordered so the readonly gate always applies before any root/admin bypass, for copy as well as every other write path.
Bucket policies also gained Condition block support, via a new shared internal/condition package moved out of the IAM policy package since both bucket and identity policies share the same evaluation semantics. It implements the full AWS operator set — String{Equals,NotEquals,EqualsIgnoreCase,NotEqualsIgnoreCase,Like,NotLike}, Numeric{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Date{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Bool, BinaryEquals, Arn{Equals,Like,NotEquals,NotLike}, IpAddress/NotIpAddress, and Null — along with the ForAllValues/ForAnyValue set qualifiers and the IfExists modifier. A new requestConditionContext builds the per-request keys a bucket policy's Condition block can reference — aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, aws:CurrentTime, aws:EpochTime, aws:UserAgent, aws:Referer, s3:prefix, s3:delimiter, s3:max-keys, s3:x-amz-acl, s3:VersionId — following AWS's own per-action rules for which keys a given S3 operation actually populates. Identity-derived keys such as aws:PrincipalArn and aws:username are deliberately left unwired here, since the gateway has no way to know them; the standalone IAM service fills those in itself when it evaluates an identity policy.
Also added new integration test suites for S3-side IAM: s3_iam_access_control.go and s3_iam_session_access_control.go cover identity-policy enforcement and session-credential requests against real S3 operations, alongside expanded OIDC/web-identity coverage and a new runoidctests.sh runner wired into the OIDC GitHub Actions workflow.
Fixes#1896
Enforces the S3 `5 GiB` copy source size limit across the posix and azure
backends for `CopyObject` and `UploadPartCopy`, returning `InvalidRequest` when
the source object exceeds the threshold.
The limit is now configurable via `--copy-object-threshold`
(`VGW_COPY_OBJECT_THRESHOLD`, default 5 GiB).
A new `--mp-max-parts flag` (`VGW_MP_MAX_PARTS`, default `10000`) has been added to make multipart upload parts number limit configurable.
No integration test has been added, as GitHub Actions cannot reliably
handle large objects.
Closes#1847
This PR introduces a global optional gateway CLI flag `--disable-acl` (`VGW_DISABLE_ACL`) to disable ACL handling. When this flag is enabled, the gateway ignores all ACL-related headers, particularly in `CreateBucket`, `PutObject`, `CopyObject`, and `CreateMultipartUpload`.
`GetBucketAcl` behavior is unchanged simply returning the bucket ACL config.
There's no change in object ACL actions(`PutObjectACL`, `GetObjectACL`). They return a`NotImplemented` error as before.
A new custom error is added for PutBucketAcl calls when ACLs are disabled at the gateway level. Its HTTP status code and error code match AWS S3’s behavior, with only a slightly different error message.
In the access-control checker, ACL evaluation is fully bypassed. If ACLs are disabled only the bucket owner gets access to the bucket and all grantee checks are ignored.
The PR also includes minor refactoring of the S3 API server and router. The growing list of parameters passed to the router’s Init method has been consolidated into fields within the router struct, initialized during router construction. Parameters not needed by the S3 server are no longer stored in the server configuration and are instead forwarded directly to the router.
Closes#1731
Implements the admin `CreateBucket` (`PATCH /:bucket/create`) endpoint and CLI command, which create a new bucket with the provided owner access key ID. The endpoint internally calls the S3 `CreateBucket` API, storing the new owner information in the request context under the `bucket-owner` key. This value is then retrieved by the S3 API layer and the backends.
The endpoint uses the custom `x-vgw-owner` HTTP header to pass the bucket owner access key ID.
The admin CLI command mirrors `aws s3api create-bucket` and supports all flags implemented by the gateway (for example, `--create-bucket-configuration`, `--acl`, `--object-ownership`, etc.).
Adjusts the admin apis to the new advanced routing changes.
Enables debug logging for the separate admin server(when a separate server is run for the admin apis).
Adds the quiet mode for the separate admin server.
Add helper util auth.UpdateBucketACLOwner() that sets new
default ACL based on new owner and removes old bucket policy.
The ChangeBucketOwner() remains in the backend.Backend
interface in case there is ever a backend that needs to manage
ownership in some other way than with bucket ACLs. The arguments
are changing to clarify the updated owner. This will break any
plugins implementing the old interface. They should use the new
auth.UpdateBucketACLOwner() or implement the corresponding
change specific for the backend.
This moves the internal iam service from the posix backend so
that we can start implementing new iam services right in the auth
module.
The internal iam service has same behavior as before, but now
must be enabled with the --iam-dir cli option.
New single user service is the default when no other iam service
is selected. This just runs the gateway in single user mode with
just the root account.
niksis02
Ben McClelland
jonaustin09