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4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 niksis02
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1c1272c8a5 |
feat: add per-provider OIDC discovery URL override
`AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` always fetched a provider's discovery document from `<provider url>/.well-known/openid-configuration`, so an identity provider that issues tokens naming a public issuer while serving its metadata and keys on a cluster-internal path could not be used: reaching it meant relaxing the endpoint checks for every registered provider. `--oidc-discovery-url` moves that one fetch to an operator-named endpoint, which is how keys can be looked up over an optimized private path while the tokens themselves stay verifiable from the public internet against the issuer alone, as the JWT spec requires. The flag takes `<provider url>=<discovery url>` pairs, can be repeated once per provider, and is also read from `VGW_IAM_OIDC_DISCOVERY_URLS` as a comma-separated list; the Helm chart exposes the same list as `iamServer.oidc.discoveryUrls`. The discovery URL is fetched exactly as written, so it must carry the `/.well-known/openid-configuration` path when the provider serves it there. A malformed pair is rejected at startup rather than at the first assume-role call. Only the fetch moves. The provider URL is still what a token's `iss` claim is matched against, the fetched document's own `issuer` field must still equal it, and the key set still comes from the `jwks_uri` that document publishes. A configured discovery endpoint is named by the operator at startup rather than by a request, so it and the `jwks_uri` it publishes waive the private-address check for that provider's fetch chain only, without `--oidc-allow-private-endpoints` and its far broader effect on every other provider. Transport rules are unchanged: a plaintext discovery URL still requires `--oidc-allow-insecure-transport`. Thumbprint auto-fetch follows the override and pins the discovery endpoint's certificate chain, since that is the host every later fetch is verified against. |
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niksis02
|
658c37907d |
feat: add OIDC endpoint relaxations for private/isolated networks
Closes #2364 `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` only ever trusted an `OIDC` provider reachable over verified `https`, at a publicly routable address, on the implicit `:443`. That posture is right for an internet-facing IdP but rejects every address an internal one can have, so a `SPIFFE/SPIRE` OIDC discovery provider in the same cluster — or as a sidecar in the same pod — could never be registered, let alone verified against, and no setting could express "this private address is the IdP". Two opt-in flags on `versitygw iam`, both off by default: `--oidc-allow-private-endpoints` Permit a provider `Url` resolving to a loopback/private/link-local address, and an explicit port. Transport is unchanged: still `https`, still fully verified (a self-signed in-cluster cert is trusted the way AWS documents, through `ThumbprintList`). `--oidc-allow-insecure-transport` Additionally permit plaintext `http` provider URLs, discovery/JWKS endpoints and redirects, and drop TLS verification (`thumbprint` pinning included) for `https` ones. Both apply uniformly to the thumbprint auto-fetch at `CreateOpenIDConnectProvider` time and to the discovery-document plus `JWKS` fetch at `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` time. Neither weakens anything past the endpoint: signature verification, issuer matching, audience and trust policy evaluation are untouched, and the DNS-resolve-once/dial-the-resolved-IP shape stays in place so a rebind still cannot redirect a connection. An `http` provider keeps its scheme in its stored `Url`, `ARN` and `iss` matching, rather than being stripped like an `https` one — otherwise `"http://host"` and `"https://host"` would collapse onto a single ARN and storage key and each could satisfy the other's trust policy. It also stores an empty `ThumbprintList` rather than failing: a plaintext provider presents no certificate to thumbprint. Helm: `iamServer.oidc.{allowPrivateEndpoints,allowInsecureTransport}`, alongside `disableThumbprintAutofetch` moved into the same block (the flat `iamServer.disableOidcThumbprintAutofetch` stays honored). Chart `0.4.1 -> 0.4.2`. The WebUI's create-provider form no longer rejects `http` URLs and ports client-side; it cannot see the service's settings, so those two rules are left to the server, whose error surfaces as a toast like any other. |
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niksis02
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abb3b27149 |
feat: add standalone IAM support in WebGUI
Gates bucket listing behind an identity policy, lets browsers reach the standalone IAM API, and turns the WebUI into a dashboard for S3, IAM, or both.
**Bucket listing.** `ListBuckets` is now gated by the new `s3:ListAllMyBuckets` action, evaluated against `arn:aws:s3:::*`. The request names no bucket, so only identity policies apply — there is no resource policy to combine with, which is the same shape `CreateBucket` already had, so both now share one identity-only evaluation path. Root and admin bypass it, and backends with no identity-policy layer keep listing as before since their listing is already narrowed to the caller's own buckets. The action is IAM-only and is deliberately absent from the bucket-policy action list.
**Fixed bucket ownership.** The standalone IAM client has no per-user ownership to express — accounts are all plain users, cannot be enumerated, and access is decided by policy rather than ACL — so it now implements `auth.FixedBucketOwner` and every bucket is owned by root. Bucket creation stops resolving an owner, `ListBuckets` returns every bucket to every caller (what they may then do with one stays a per-request policy decision), and the admin `ChangeBucketOwner` reports method-not-supported. Other IAM backends are untouched.
**IAM service CORS.** `--cors-allow-origin` now applies to the `iam` command: it answers preflights and stamps the CORS headers, mirroring back the requested method and headers rather than enumerating the SigV4 header set. Without it no browser can reach the IAM API at all, so setting `--webui` without it falls back to `*` with a warning. The chart gets `iamServer.corsAllowOrigin`.
**WebUI.** New IAM pages for users, roles and OIDC providers, signing IAM/STS query-form requests directly from the browser. Navigation is capability-gated rather than role-gated: on sign-in the session probes the S3, admin and IAM endpoints independently and each page shows only what those credentials actually reach, so one build serves an IAM-only dashboard, an S3-only dashboard, and a combined one. The login page takes an optional IAM endpoint, seeded from the new `--webui-iam-gateways` (chart: `webui.iamGateways`) — never auto-detected, since the IAM service is a separate process. The WebUI can also be hosted by `versitygw iam` itself, for deployments with no S3 gateway behind it.
**The admin API is ignored once an IAM endpoint is in play.** The IAM service is then the user directory and bucket ownership is fixed, which leaves the admin API no job: the session is given no admin endpoint at all, its login field is hidden, `users.html` redirects to its IAM counterpart, and every admin-only surface stays off screen. Dashboard and Buckets remain available to any S3 session in such a deployment, running on the S3 and IAM APIs alone and surfacing each denial per action instead of redirecting.
Also fixes two WebUI bugs: embedded assets went out with a zero modification time and no `Cache-Control`, so browsers treated them as fresh for centuries and an upgraded gateway served new HTML against stale JS — they now revalidate against an ETag; and the login page's advanced-options section clipped its last field, since it animated to a height named in the stylesheet rather than the one it measures now.
**Usage**
IAM-only dashboard, served by the IAM service:
versitygw iam --port :7076 --webui :8080 --cors-allow-origin http://localhost:8080/
IAM + S3, dashboard served by the IAM service — point it at the gateway with `--webui-gateways`, and let the gateway accept the dashboard's origin:
versitygw iam --port :7076 --webui :8080 --webui-gateways http://localhost:7070/ --cors-allow-origin http://localhost:8080/
versitygw --port :7070 --cors-allow-origin http://localhost:8080/ posix /data
IAM + S3, dashboard served by the S3 gateway — point it at the IAM service with `--webui-iam-gateways`, and let the IAM service accept the dashboard's origin:
versitygw --port :7070 --webui :8080 --webui-iam-gateways http://localhost:7076/ posix /data
versitygw iam --port :7076 --cors-allow-origin http://localhost:8080/
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niksis02
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7b6b816df9 |
feat: add Helm chart support for the standalone IAM service
This adds a new iamServer Deployment, split public and private Services, a PersistentVolumeClaim, and cert-manager Certificate resources so the standalone versitygw iam API server can be deployed directly from this chart, independently scalable from the S3 gateway and backed by either internal file storage or HashiCorp Vault, with Vault auth credentials and Vault TLS material kept in separate Kubernetes secrets. The gateway side gains iam.type=standalone client wiring that reaches the IAM service over its private mTLS endpoint, with certificates supplied either through an existing secret or auto-provisioned via cert-manager using a shared CA-type issuer so both peers can verify each other from their own certificate's ca.crt, and the chart auto-targets the in-chart service when no external endpoint is configured. gateway.logLevel and iamServer.logLevel replace the old boolean debug flag with the silent, debug, and unsafe levels the binary now supports, docker-entrypoint.sh gained iam as a recognized VGW_BACKEND value so the new deployment can start through the existing entrypoint, NetworkPolicy resources were corrected to use proper peer lists and to default to deny instead of allow when no ingress rules are configured, pod and Deployment selector labels were separated between the gateway and the IAM server to prevent them from matching each other's Services, and a battery of template time validation guards was added to fail fast on invalid combinations such as multiple replicas against the internal file store or a missing certificate for a TCP private endpoint, together with expanded helm lint coverage in CI for these new configurations. |