Files
versitygw/debuglogger/redact.go
T
niksis02 4756b4d236 feat: add STS web identity federation, IAM policy Condition support, and access control enforcement
Implements the `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` and `GetCallerIdentity` STS actions, letting callers exchange an external OIDC token for temporary credentials scoped to an IAM role. Token handling covers JWT claim parsing, issuer/audience resolution (including `azp` override semantics), JWKS fetching and caching with `singleflight`-deduplicated refresh, and rate-limited forced refresh on unrecognized `kid` values. OIDC provider thumbprint fetching now performs a real TLS handshake verified against the system trust store and the provider hostname (previously `InsecureSkipVerify`), since the observed certificate is persisted as a long-lived trust anchor rather than used once and discarded; all discovery-document and JWKS fetches go through an SSRF-safe HTTP client with bounded redirects and response size.

Adds policy `Condition` block evaluation, supporting `String`, `Numeric`, `Date`, `Bool`, `BinaryEquals`, and `IpAddress` operators along with their `IfExists`/`Not` variants and `ForAllValues`/`ForAnyValues` set qualifiers, plus policy variable substitution (e.g. `${aws:username}`) in supported operators. Adds identity-based inline policy evaluation and a new IAM authorization middleware that authorizes each request against action, resource, and condition context together, applying the session-policy-intersects-role-policy semantics for assumed-role sessions.

Adds a new debug logger `--log-level` flag (`silent`/`debug`/`unsafe`), along with a tree-based XML masker that redacts secrets and tokens at the property level in logged request/response bodies instead of skipping the whole body. The old `--debug/VGW_DEBUG` flag is kept as a deprecated alias for `--log-level=debug`, printing a console warning that points users at `--log-level` for finer-grained control.

Fixes a Vault storage bug where CAS (check-and-set) writes always read the current document version as 0 because `kvVersion` asserted metadata as `float64` while the Vault client actually returns `json.Number`, causing every write past the first to be rejected as a concurrent modification. Also adds a constant-time `SecureCompare` for signature/token comparisons in sigv4 auth.

Adds an integration test suite (`iam_access_control.go`) covering IAM access control across user, role, and session identities.
2026-08-15 17:49:00 +04:00

136 lines
4.9 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
// specific language governing permissions and limitations
// under the License.
package debuglogger
import (
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3/middleware/logger"
"github.com/valyala/fasthttp"
)
// redactedValue replaces the value of a matched sensitive field entirely.
// The debug logger uses the same mask character for the partial masking
// applied to fields like AccessKeyId
const redactedValue = "****"
// sensitiveFieldNames lists header, query, and form field names (matched
// case-insensitively) whose values are bearer credentials or raw key
// material rather than diagnostic data: a JWT, a session token, a request
// signature, or an SSE-C encryption key. Anyone with log access could
// replay or reuse a logged value directly, so these are replaced with
// redactedValue everywhere a request or response is logged, in both normal
// and debug-mode logging.
var sensitiveFieldNames = map[string]bool{
"authorization": true,
"x-amz-security-token": true,
"webidentitytoken": true,
// The request signature itself: with the rest of a presigned URL
// (which is not otherwise secret) this is everything needed to replay
// the exact request until it expires.
"x-amz-signature": true,
// Carries the access key ID. Not secret on its own, but there's no
// diagnostic value in logging it that isn't already available from
// the (also masked) Authorization header, so mask it defensively too.
"x-amz-credential": true,
// SSE-C requests carry the raw AES-256 customer-provided encryption
// key in these headers. The paired "...-key-md5" headers are just a
// checksum of the key (not reversible to the key itself), so they're
// left unmasked to help correlate requests using the same key.
"x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-key": true,
"x-amz-copy-source-server-side-encryption-customer-key": true,
}
func isSensitiveFieldName(name string) bool {
return sensitiveFieldNames[strings.ToLower(name)]
}
// redact returns redactedValue in place of value when key names a
// credential-bearing header, query, or form field.
func redact(key, value string) string {
if isSensitiveFieldName(key) {
return redactedValue
}
return value
}
// RedactedQueryString rebuilds the request's query string with sensitive
// parameter values (see sensitiveFieldNames) replaced by redactedValue. It
// is safe to write to any log, including the default (non-debug) access
// log.
func RedactedQueryString(queryArgs *fasthttp.Args) string {
if queryArgs.Len() == 0 {
return ""
}
var b strings.Builder
first := true
for key, value := range queryArgs.All() {
if !first {
b.WriteByte('&')
}
first = false
b.WriteString(url.QueryEscape(string(key)))
b.WriteByte('=')
b.WriteString(url.QueryEscape(redact(string(key), string(value))))
}
return b.String()
}
// RedactedQueryParamsTag is a logger.LogFunc that replaces the fiber logger
// middleware's built-in ${queryParams} tag with a redacted query string
// (see RedactedQueryString). Register it as a CustomTags override for
// logger.TagQueryStringParams so the default (non-debug) access log never
// writes credential-bearing query parameters such as WebIdentityToken or
// X-Amz-Security-Token.
var RedactedQueryParamsTag logger.LogFunc = func(output logger.Buffer, ctx fiber.Ctx, _ *logger.Data, _ string) (int, error) {
return output.WriteString(RedactedQueryString(ctx.Request().URI().QueryArgs()))
}
// debugRedact is redact's counterpart for the debug logger's own
// header/query/form-field printing. Unlike redact (used by the always-on,
// non-debug access log), it honors LevelUnsafe: at that level it returns
// value unchanged so the debug output shows exactly what was on the wire.
// At LevelDebug it masks identically to redact.
func debugRedact(key, value string) string {
if IsUnsafeEnabled() {
return value
}
return redact(key, value)
}
// debugRedactedQueryString is RedactedQueryString's counterpart for the
// debug logger, using debugRedact so LevelUnsafe shows unmasked values.
func debugRedactedQueryString(queryArgs *fasthttp.Args) string {
if queryArgs.Len() == 0 {
return ""
}
var b strings.Builder
first := true
for key, value := range queryArgs.All() {
if !first {
b.WriteByte('&')
}
first = false
b.WriteString(url.QueryEscape(string(key)))
b.WriteByte('=')
b.WriteString(url.QueryEscape(debugRedact(string(key), string(value))))
}
return b.String()
}