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Fixes #1327 Fixes #1567 Closes #2264 Wires the S3 gateway up to the standalone IAM service so identity policies, not just bucket policies and ACLs, are enforced on the S3 data plane. The gateway authenticates SigV4 requests by calling new private derive-signing-key and resolve-identity endpoints on the IAM service instead of holding secrets itself, and evaluates identity policy through the same PolicyEvaluator path added to auth.VerifyAccess, combined with the bucket policy using explicit-deny-wins precedence. The private endpoints are served over their own mTLS listener (new iamapi/private package, genmtlscerts.sh to generate test material, and client-cert support in internal/netutil), separate from the public IAM API. As part of this the vendored aws/signer/v4 package is deleted and replaced by a pure-Go SigV4 implementation in internal/sigv4auth, which now reads canonical request data directly off the fiber.Ctx instead of reconstructing an http.Request, and is shared by both the S3 request-signing verification and the new private-endpoint signing. DeleteObjects moves from an all-or-nothing authorization check to true partial success: VerifyObjectsAccess evaluates every object in a batch independently against both the identity policy and any object lock, so a denial or a locked object only removes that key from the batch instead of failing the whole request. It also batches the identity-policy round trip and the bucket-policy fetch once per request rather than once per object, and separates plain deletes from versioned ones since a versioned delete needs s3:DeleteObjectVersion rather than s3:DeleteObject. Object lock handling got a few correctness fixes alongside this: a bypass is now modeled as BypassNone/BypassRequested/BypassOverwrite rather than a single bool, because root's blanket ability to override a GOVERNANCE retention should only apply when the client actually asked to bypass it (DeleteObject/DeleteObjects/PutObjectRetention), not when the gateway is silently replacing a locked object via an overwrite, which needs the permission from everyone including root. Retention changes are now correctly classified as an extension (allowed under plain s3:PutObjectRetention) versus a weakening (date or mode change, which needs the bypass permission), and a COMPLIANCE lock can never be weakened by anyone regardless of permissions, matching AWS. Separately, VerifyObjectCopyAccess had a readonly-mode gap: it returned early for root/admin before ever calling VerifyAccess, so the readonly check inside VerifyAccess never ran for them on CopyObject; access checks are now ordered so the readonly gate always applies before any root/admin bypass, for copy as well as every other write path. Bucket policies also gained Condition block support, via a new shared internal/condition package moved out of the IAM policy package since both bucket and identity policies share the same evaluation semantics. It implements the full AWS operator set — String{Equals,NotEquals,EqualsIgnoreCase,NotEqualsIgnoreCase,Like,NotLike}, Numeric{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Date{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Bool, BinaryEquals, Arn{Equals,Like,NotEquals,NotLike}, IpAddress/NotIpAddress, and Null — along with the ForAllValues/ForAnyValue set qualifiers and the IfExists modifier. A new requestConditionContext builds the per-request keys a bucket policy's Condition block can reference — aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, aws:CurrentTime, aws:EpochTime, aws:UserAgent, aws:Referer, s3:prefix, s3:delimiter, s3:max-keys, s3:x-amz-acl, s3:VersionId — following AWS's own per-action rules for which keys a given S3 operation actually populates. Identity-derived keys such as aws:PrincipalArn and aws:username are deliberately left unwired here, since the gateway has no way to know them; the standalone IAM service fills those in itself when it evaluates an identity policy. Also added new integration test suites for S3-side IAM: s3_iam_access_control.go and s3_iam_session_access_control.go cover identity-policy enforcement and session-credential requests against real S3 operations, alongside expanded OIDC/web-identity coverage and a new runoidctests.sh runner wired into the OIDC GitHub Actions workflow.
146 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
146 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
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// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
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// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
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// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package iamutil
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"time"
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"github.com/versity/versitygw/iamapi/types"
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"github.com/versity/versitygw/internal/sigv4auth"
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)
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// ErrIdentityNotFound and ErrInvalidSessionToken are returned by
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// ResolveSessionByToken and ResolveUserIdentity, so a caller that needs to
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// know *which* failure occurred — the standalone-IAM private endpoints, and
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// iammiddleware's own sigv4 pipeline, which turn them into S3's own
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// InvalidAccessKeyId and InvalidToken respectively — can distinguish them.
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//
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// The public IAM control plane deliberately collapses both into a single
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// InvalidClientTokenId: an unauthenticated caller must not learn whether an
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// access key exists.
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var (
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ErrIdentityNotFound = errors.New("identity not found")
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ErrInvalidSessionToken = errors.New("invalid session token")
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)
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// IdentityStore resolves an access key id to the session or long-term user
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// that owns it, and resolves named resources for policy evaluation.
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// storage.Storer satisfies this directly.
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type IdentityStore interface {
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GetSession(ctx context.Context, accessKeyID string) (*types.Session, error)
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GetRole(ctx context.Context, roleName string) (*types.Role, error)
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GetUserByAccessKeyID(ctx context.Context, accessKeyID string) (*types.User, error)
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GetUser(ctx context.Context, username string) (*types.User, error)
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GetOIDCProvider(ctx context.Context, arn string) (*types.OIDCProvider, error)
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RecordAccessKeyUsage(ctx context.Context, accessKeyID, service, region string, when time.Time) error
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}
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// ResolveSessionByToken resolves a temporary (ASIA…) access key to the
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// session that owns it, requiring token to match the session's stored
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// SessionToken. The empty-token rejection and the constant-time comparison
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// both live here rather than in any caller: this is the only function that
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// may turn a session access key id into a secret, so no caller can be
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// written that skips them.
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//
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// It does not itself verify a SigV4 signature — request-pipeline callers do
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// that next, so a stolen or guessed access key id plus token is never
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// sufficient on its own.
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func ResolveSessionByToken(ctx context.Context, store IdentityStore, accessKeyID, token string) (*types.Identity, string, error) {
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// No token means there is nothing to resolve the access key against, so
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// the key is reported as simply not existing rather than as a bad token
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// — matching real S3, which answers InvalidAccessKeyId for a temporary
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// access key presented with no X-Amz-Security-Token, and InvalidToken
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// only once a token is actually present and wrong.
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if token == "" {
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return nil, "", ErrIdentityNotFound
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}
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session, err := store.GetSession(ctx, accessKeyID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", ErrIdentityNotFound
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}
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if !sigv4auth.SecureCompare(token, session.SessionToken) {
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return nil, "", ErrInvalidSessionToken
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}
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// A signature-valid, unexpired session still authenticates even if its
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// role has since been deleted — real STS credentials are self-contained
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// and don't re-check role existence on every call. What such a session
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// can no longer do is get any IAM action past the policy middleware:
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// with Role/IdentityPolicies left unset, EvaluateIdentityPolicies denies
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// by default, same effective outcome as an explicit rejection here would
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// have had for every pipeline except GetCallerIdentity, which needs
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// none of this and must keep working regardless.
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//
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// The reloaded role must also still be the *same* role the session was
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// originally minted against — RoleID and Arn, both captured in the
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// session at AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity time, must match the freshly
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// loaded role's own values. Without this check, deleting a role and
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// recreating one of the same name (necessarily getting a new RoleID)
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// would let every pre-existing session for the old role silently
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// inherit whatever policies the new role happens to carry.
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identity := &types.Identity{
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Session: session,
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SessionPolicy: session.Policy,
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}
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if role, err := store.GetRole(ctx, session.RoleName); err == nil &&
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role.RoleID == session.RoleID && role.Arn == session.RoleArn {
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identity.Role = role
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identity.IdentityPolicies = role.Policies.Inline
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}
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return identity, session.SecretAccessKey, nil
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}
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// ResolveUserIdentity resolves accessKeyID to its long-term (AKIA…) IAM user
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// and secret, reporting the ErrIdentityNotFound/ErrInvalidSessionToken
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// sentinels rather than an opaque API error — callers on the public control
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// plane that want the opaque error do that translation themselves.
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//
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// Temporary (ASIA…) session access keys are rejected here: resolving one
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// safely requires validating its security token, which this function has no
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// parameter for. A caller that can supply a token uses ResolveSessionByToken
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// instead. Silently resolving a session's secret from its access key id
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// alone, with no token check at all, would let anyone who merely knows the
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// id impersonate the session.
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func ResolveUserIdentity(ctx context.Context, store IdentityStore, accessKeyID string) (*types.Identity, string, error) {
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if sigv4auth.IsTempAccessKeyID(accessKeyID) {
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return nil, "", ErrInvalidSessionToken
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}
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user, err := store.GetUserByAccessKeyID(ctx, accessKeyID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", ErrIdentityNotFound
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}
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var keyEntry *types.AccessKeyEntry
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for i := range user.AccessKeys {
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if user.AccessKeys[i].AccessKeyId == accessKeyID {
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keyEntry = &user.AccessKeys[i]
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break
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}
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}
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if keyEntry == nil || keyEntry.Status != AccessKeyStatusActive {
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return nil, "", ErrIdentityNotFound
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}
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identity := &types.Identity{
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User: user,
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IdentityPolicies: user.Policies.Inline,
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}
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return identity, keyEntry.SecretAccessKey, nil
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}
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