Files
versitygw/auth/iam_ipa.go
T
niksis02 2147a0c304 feat: integrate standalone IAM service with S3 gateway for identity-based policy enforcement
Fixes #1327
Fixes #1567
Closes #2264

Wires the S3 gateway up to the standalone IAM service so identity policies, not just bucket policies and ACLs, are enforced on the S3 data plane. The gateway authenticates SigV4 requests by calling new private derive-signing-key and resolve-identity endpoints on the IAM service instead of holding secrets itself, and evaluates identity policy through the same PolicyEvaluator path added to auth.VerifyAccess, combined with the bucket policy using explicit-deny-wins precedence. The private endpoints are served over their own mTLS listener (new iamapi/private package, genmtlscerts.sh to generate test material, and client-cert support in internal/netutil), separate from the public IAM API. As part of this the vendored aws/signer/v4 package is deleted and replaced by a pure-Go SigV4 implementation in internal/sigv4auth, which now reads canonical request data directly off the fiber.Ctx instead of reconstructing an http.Request, and is shared by both the S3 request-signing verification and the new private-endpoint signing.

DeleteObjects moves from an all-or-nothing authorization check to true partial success: VerifyObjectsAccess evaluates every object in a batch independently against both the identity policy and any object lock, so a denial or a locked object only removes that key from the batch instead of failing the whole request. It also batches the identity-policy round trip and the bucket-policy fetch once per request rather than once per object, and separates plain deletes from versioned ones since a versioned delete needs s3:DeleteObjectVersion rather than s3:DeleteObject. Object lock handling got a few correctness fixes alongside this: a bypass is now modeled as BypassNone/BypassRequested/BypassOverwrite rather than a single bool, because root's blanket ability to override a GOVERNANCE retention should only apply when the client actually asked to bypass it (DeleteObject/DeleteObjects/PutObjectRetention), not when the gateway is silently replacing a locked object via an overwrite, which needs the permission from everyone including root. Retention changes are now correctly classified as an extension (allowed under plain s3:PutObjectRetention) versus a weakening (date or mode change, which needs the bypass permission), and a COMPLIANCE lock can never be weakened by anyone regardless of permissions, matching AWS. Separately, VerifyObjectCopyAccess had a readonly-mode gap: it returned early for root/admin before ever calling VerifyAccess, so the readonly check inside VerifyAccess never ran for them on CopyObject; access checks are now ordered so the readonly gate always applies before any root/admin bypass, for copy as well as every other write path.

Bucket policies also gained Condition block support, via a new shared internal/condition package moved out of the IAM policy package since both bucket and identity policies share the same evaluation semantics. It implements the full AWS operator set — String{Equals,NotEquals,EqualsIgnoreCase,NotEqualsIgnoreCase,Like,NotLike}, Numeric{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Date{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Bool, BinaryEquals, Arn{Equals,Like,NotEquals,NotLike}, IpAddress/NotIpAddress, and Null — along with the ForAllValues/ForAnyValue set qualifiers and the IfExists modifier. A new requestConditionContext builds the per-request keys a bucket policy's Condition block can reference — aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, aws:CurrentTime, aws:EpochTime, aws:UserAgent, aws:Referer, s3:prefix, s3:delimiter, s3:max-keys, s3:x-amz-acl, s3:VersionId — following AWS's own per-action rules for which keys a given S3 operation actually populates. Identity-derived keys such as aws:PrincipalArn and aws:username are deliberately left unwired here, since the gateway has no way to know them; the standalone IAM service fills those in itself when it evaluates an identity policy.

Also added new integration test suites for S3-side IAM: s3_iam_access_control.go and s3_iam_session_access_control.go cover identity-policy enforcement and session-credential requests against real S3 operations, alongside expanded OIDC/web-identity coverage and a new runoidctests.sh runner wired into the OIDC GitHub Actions workflow.
2026-08-25 01:07:36 +04:00

525 lines
12 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2025 Versity Software
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
// specific language governing permissions and limitations
// under the License.
package auth
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/cookiejar"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/versity/versitygw/debuglogger"
)
const IpaVersion = "2.254"
type IpaIAMService struct {
client http.Client
id int
version string
host string
vaultName string
username string
password string
kraTransportKey *rsa.PublicKey
rootAcc Account
}
var _ IAMService = &IpaIAMService{}
func NewIpaIAMService(rootAcc Account, host, vaultName, username, password string, isInsecure bool) (*IpaIAMService, error) {
ipa := IpaIAMService{
id: 0,
version: IpaVersion,
host: host,
vaultName: vaultName,
username: username,
password: password,
rootAcc: rootAcc,
}
jar, err := cookiejar.New(nil)
if err != nil {
// this should never happen
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cookie jar creation: %w", err)
}
mTLSConfig := &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: isInsecure}
tr := &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: mTLSConfig,
Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment,
}
ipa.client = http.Client{Jar: jar, Transport: tr}
err = ipa.login()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ipa login failed: %w", err)
}
req, err := ipa.newRequest("vaultconfig_show/1", []string{}, map[string]any{"all": true})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ipa vaultconfig_show: %w", err)
}
vaultConfig := struct {
Kra_Server_Server []string
Transport_Cert Base64EncodedWrapped
Wrapping_default_algorithm string
Wrapping_supported_algorithms []string
}{}
err = ipa.rpc(req, &vaultConfig)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ipa vault config: %w", err)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(vaultConfig.Transport_Cert)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ipa cannot parse vault certificate: %w", err)
}
ipa.kraTransportKey = cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
isSupported := slices.Contains(vaultConfig.Wrapping_supported_algorithms, "aes-128-cbc")
if !isSupported {
return nil,
fmt.Errorf("IPA vault does not support aes-128-cbc. Only %v supported",
vaultConfig.Wrapping_supported_algorithms)
}
return &ipa, nil
}
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) CreateAccount(account Account) error {
return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
}
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) GetUserAccount(access string) (Account, error) {
if access == ipa.rootAcc.Access {
return ipa.rootAcc, nil
}
req, err := ipa.newRequest("user_show/1", []string{access}, map[string]any{})
if err != nil {
return Account{}, fmt.Errorf("ipa user_show: %w", err)
}
userResult := struct {
Gidnumber []string
Uidnumber []string
PidNumber []string
}{}
err = ipa.rpc(req, &userResult)
if err != nil {
return Account{}, err
}
uid, err := parseToInt(userResult.Uidnumber, "userID")
if err != nil {
return Account{}, err
}
gid, err := parseToInt(userResult.Gidnumber, "groupID")
if err != nil {
return Account{}, err
}
pId, err := parseToInt(userResult.PidNumber, "projectID")
if err != nil {
return Account{}, err
}
account := Account{
Access: access,
Role: RoleUser,
UserID: uid,
GroupID: gid,
ProjectID: pId,
}
session_key := make([]byte, 16)
_, err = rand.Read(session_key)
if err != nil {
return account, fmt.Errorf("ipa cannot generate session key: %w", err)
}
encryptedKey, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, ipa.kraTransportKey, session_key)
if err != nil {
return account, fmt.Errorf("ipa vault secret retrieval: %w", err)
}
req, err = ipa.newRequest("vault_retrieve_internal/1", []string{ipa.vaultName},
map[string]any{"username": access,
"session_key": Base64EncodedWrapped(encryptedKey),
"wrapping_algo": "aes-128-cbc"})
if err != nil {
return Account{}, fmt.Errorf("ipa vault_retrieve_internal: %w", err)
}
data := struct {
Vault_data Base64EncodedWrapped
Nonce Base64EncodedWrapped
}{}
err = ipa.rpc(req, &data)
if err != nil {
return account, err
}
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(session_key)
if err != nil {
return account, fmt.Errorf("ipa cannot create AES cipher: %w", err)
}
cbc := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(aes, data.Nonce)
cbc.CryptBlocks(data.Vault_data, data.Vault_data)
secretUnpaddedJson, err := pkcs7Unpad(data.Vault_data, 16)
if err != nil {
return account, fmt.Errorf("ipa cannot unpad decrypted result: %w", err)
}
secret := struct {
Data Base64Encoded
}{}
json.Unmarshal(secretUnpaddedJson, &secret)
account.Secret = string(secret.Data)
return account, nil
}
// ResolveAccounts returns the subset of accessKeyIDs that do not exist.
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) ResolveAccounts(accessKeyIDs []string) ([]string, error) {
return resolveAccountsByLookup(accessKeyIDs, ipa.GetUserAccount)
}
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) UpdateUserAccount(access string, props MutableProps) error {
return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
}
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) DeleteUserAccount(access string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
}
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) ListUserAccounts() ([]Account, error) {
return []Account{}, fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
}
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) Shutdown() error {
return nil
}
// Implementation
const requestRetries = 3
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) login() error {
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("user", ipa.username)
form.Set("password", ipa.password)
req, err := http.NewRequest(
"POST",
fmt.Sprintf("%s/ipa/session/login_password", ipa.host),
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
if err != nil {
return err
}
req.Header.Set("referer", fmt.Sprintf("%s/ipa", ipa.host))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
var resp *http.Response
for i := range requestRetries {
resp, err = ipa.client.Do(req)
if err == nil {
break
}
// Check for transient network errors
if isRetryable(err) {
time.Sleep(time.Second * time.Duration(i+1))
continue
}
return fmt.Errorf("login POST to %s failed: %w", req.URL, err)
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("login POST to %s failed after retries: %w",
req.URL, err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode == 401 {
return errors.New("cannot login to FreeIPA: invalid credentials")
}
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot login to FreeIPA: status code %d",
resp.StatusCode)
}
return nil
}
type rpcRequest = string
type rpcResponse struct {
Result json.RawMessage
Principal string
Id int
Version string
}
func (p rpcResponse) String() string {
return string(p.Result)
}
var errRpc = errors.New("IPA RPC error")
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) rpc(req rpcRequest, value any) error {
err := ipa.login()
if err != nil {
return err
}
res, err := ipa.rpcInternal(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return json.Unmarshal(res.Result, value)
}
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) rpcInternal(req rpcRequest) (rpcResponse, error) {
httpReq, err := http.NewRequest("POST",
fmt.Sprintf("%s/ipa/session/json", ipa.host),
strings.NewReader(req))
if err != nil {
return rpcResponse{}, err
}
debuglogger.IAMLogf("IPA request: %v", req)
httpReq.Header.Set("referer", fmt.Sprintf("%s/ipa", ipa.host))
httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
var httpResp *http.Response
for i := range requestRetries {
httpResp, err = ipa.client.Do(httpReq)
if err == nil {
break
}
// Check for transient network errors
if isRetryable(err) {
time.Sleep(time.Second * time.Duration(i+1))
continue
}
return rpcResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("ipa request to %s failed: %w",
httpReq.URL, err)
}
if err != nil {
return rpcResponse{},
fmt.Errorf("ipa request to %s failed after retries: %w",
httpReq.URL, err)
}
defer httpResp.Body.Close()
bytes, err := io.ReadAll(httpResp.Body)
debuglogger.IAMLogf("IPA response (%v): %v", err, string(bytes))
if err != nil {
return rpcResponse{}, err
}
result := struct {
Result struct {
Json json.RawMessage `json:"result"`
Value string `json:"value"`
Summary any `json:"summary"`
} `json:"result"`
Error json.RawMessage `json:"error"`
Id int `json:"id"`
Principal string `json:"principal"`
Version string `json:"version"`
}{}
err = json.Unmarshal(bytes, &result)
if err != nil {
return rpcResponse{}, err
}
if string(result.Error) != "null" {
return rpcResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", string(result.Error), errRpc)
}
return rpcResponse{
Result: result.Result.Json,
Principal: result.Principal,
Id: result.Id,
Version: result.Version,
}, nil
}
func isRetryable(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return true
}
if err, ok := err.(net.Error); ok && err.Timeout() {
return true
}
if opErr, ok := err.(*net.OpError); ok {
if sysErr, ok := opErr.Err.(*syscall.Errno); ok {
if *sysErr == syscall.ECONNRESET {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
func (ipa *IpaIAMService) newRequest(method string, args []string, dict map[string]any) (rpcRequest, error) {
id := ipa.id
ipa.id++
dict["version"] = ipa.version
jmethod, errMethod := json.Marshal(method)
jargs, errArgs := json.Marshal(args)
jdict, errDict := json.Marshal(dict)
err := errors.Join(errMethod, errArgs, errDict)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("ipa request invalid: %w", err)
}
request := map[string]any{
"id": id,
"method": json.RawMessage(jmethod),
"params": []json.RawMessage{json.RawMessage(jargs), json.RawMessage(jdict)},
}
requestJSON, err := json.Marshal(request)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal request: %w", err)
}
return string(requestJSON), nil
}
// pkcs7Unpad validates and unpads data from the given bytes slice.
// The returned value will be 1 to n bytes smaller depending on the
// amount of padding, where n is the block size.
func pkcs7Unpad(b []byte, blocksize int) ([]byte, error) {
if blocksize <= 0 {
return nil, errors.New("invalid blocksize")
}
if len(b) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("invalid PKCS7 data (empty or not padded)")
}
if len(b)%blocksize != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("invalid padding on input")
}
c := b[len(b)-1]
n := int(c)
if n == 0 || n > len(b) {
return nil, errors.New("invalid padding on input")
}
for i := range n {
if b[len(b)-n+i] != c {
return nil, errors.New("invalid padding on input")
}
}
return b[:len(b)-n], nil
}
/*
e.g.
"value" {
"__base64__": "aGVsbG93b3JsZAo="
}
*/
type Base64EncodedWrapped []byte
func (b *Base64EncodedWrapped) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
intermediate := struct {
Base64 string `json:"__base64__"`
}{}
err := json.Unmarshal(data, &intermediate)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*b, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(intermediate.Base64)
return err
}
func (b *Base64EncodedWrapped) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
intermediate := struct {
Base64 string `json:"__base64__"`
}{Base64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(*b)}
return json.Marshal(intermediate)
}
/*
e.g.
"value": "aGVsbG93b3JsZAo="
*/
type Base64Encoded []byte
func (b *Base64Encoded) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
var intermediate string
err := json.Unmarshal(data, &intermediate)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*b, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(intermediate)
return err
}
// parseToInt parses the first argument of input string slice
// to an integer. If slice is empty, it defaults to 0
func parseToInt(input []string, argName string) (int, error) {
if len(input) == 0 {
debuglogger.IAMLogf("empty %s slice: defaulting to 0", argName)
return 0, nil
}
id, err := strconv.Atoi(input[0])
if err != nil {
debuglogger.IAMLogf("failed to parse %s: %v", argName, err)
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid %s: %w", argName, err)
}
return id, nil
}