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Fixes #1327 Fixes #1567 Closes #2264 Wires the S3 gateway up to the standalone IAM service so identity policies, not just bucket policies and ACLs, are enforced on the S3 data plane. The gateway authenticates SigV4 requests by calling new private derive-signing-key and resolve-identity endpoints on the IAM service instead of holding secrets itself, and evaluates identity policy through the same PolicyEvaluator path added to auth.VerifyAccess, combined with the bucket policy using explicit-deny-wins precedence. The private endpoints are served over their own mTLS listener (new iamapi/private package, genmtlscerts.sh to generate test material, and client-cert support in internal/netutil), separate from the public IAM API. As part of this the vendored aws/signer/v4 package is deleted and replaced by a pure-Go SigV4 implementation in internal/sigv4auth, which now reads canonical request data directly off the fiber.Ctx instead of reconstructing an http.Request, and is shared by both the S3 request-signing verification and the new private-endpoint signing. DeleteObjects moves from an all-or-nothing authorization check to true partial success: VerifyObjectsAccess evaluates every object in a batch independently against both the identity policy and any object lock, so a denial or a locked object only removes that key from the batch instead of failing the whole request. It also batches the identity-policy round trip and the bucket-policy fetch once per request rather than once per object, and separates plain deletes from versioned ones since a versioned delete needs s3:DeleteObjectVersion rather than s3:DeleteObject. Object lock handling got a few correctness fixes alongside this: a bypass is now modeled as BypassNone/BypassRequested/BypassOverwrite rather than a single bool, because root's blanket ability to override a GOVERNANCE retention should only apply when the client actually asked to bypass it (DeleteObject/DeleteObjects/PutObjectRetention), not when the gateway is silently replacing a locked object via an overwrite, which needs the permission from everyone including root. Retention changes are now correctly classified as an extension (allowed under plain s3:PutObjectRetention) versus a weakening (date or mode change, which needs the bypass permission), and a COMPLIANCE lock can never be weakened by anyone regardless of permissions, matching AWS. Separately, VerifyObjectCopyAccess had a readonly-mode gap: it returned early for root/admin before ever calling VerifyAccess, so the readonly check inside VerifyAccess never ran for them on CopyObject; access checks are now ordered so the readonly gate always applies before any root/admin bypass, for copy as well as every other write path. Bucket policies also gained Condition block support, via a new shared internal/condition package moved out of the IAM policy package since both bucket and identity policies share the same evaluation semantics. It implements the full AWS operator set — String{Equals,NotEquals,EqualsIgnoreCase,NotEqualsIgnoreCase,Like,NotLike}, Numeric{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Date{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Bool, BinaryEquals, Arn{Equals,Like,NotEquals,NotLike}, IpAddress/NotIpAddress, and Null — along with the ForAllValues/ForAnyValue set qualifiers and the IfExists modifier. A new requestConditionContext builds the per-request keys a bucket policy's Condition block can reference — aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, aws:CurrentTime, aws:EpochTime, aws:UserAgent, aws:Referer, s3:prefix, s3:delimiter, s3:max-keys, s3:x-amz-acl, s3:VersionId — following AWS's own per-action rules for which keys a given S3 operation actually populates. Identity-derived keys such as aws:PrincipalArn and aws:username are deliberately left unwired here, since the gateway has no way to know them; the standalone IAM service fills those in itself when it evaluates an identity policy. Also added new integration test suites for S3-side IAM: s3_iam_access_control.go and s3_iam_session_access_control.go cover identity-policy enforcement and session-credential requests against real S3 operations, alongside expanded OIDC/web-identity coverage and a new runoidctests.sh runner wired into the OIDC GitHub Actions workflow.
348 lines
9.6 KiB
Go
348 lines
9.6 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2023 Versity Software
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// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
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// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
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// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
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// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
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// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
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// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
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// specific language governing permissions and limitations
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// under the License.
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package auth
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import (
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"crypto/tls"
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"fmt"
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"net/url"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"github.com/davecgh/go-spew/spew"
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"github.com/go-ldap/ldap/v3"
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"github.com/versity/versitygw/debuglogger"
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)
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type LdapIAMService struct {
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conn *ldap.Conn
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queryBase string
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objClasses []string
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accessAtr string
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secretAtr string
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roleAtr string
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groupIdAtr string
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userIdAtr string
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projectIdAtr string
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rootAcc Account
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url string
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bindDN string
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pass string
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tlsSkipVerify bool
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mu sync.Mutex
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}
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var _ IAMService = &LdapIAMService{}
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func NewLDAPService(rootAcc Account, ldapURL, bindDN, pass, queryBase, accAtr, secAtr, roleAtr, userIdAtr, groupIdAtr, projectIdAtr, objClasses string, tlsSkipVerify bool) (IAMService, error) {
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if ldapURL == "" || bindDN == "" || pass == "" || queryBase == "" || accAtr == "" ||
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secAtr == "" || roleAtr == "" || userIdAtr == "" || groupIdAtr == "" || projectIdAtr == "" || objClasses == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("required parameters list not fully provided")
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}
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conn, err := dialLDAP(ldapURL, tlsSkipVerify)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to connect to LDAP server: %w", err)
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}
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err = conn.Bind(bindDN, pass)
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if err != nil {
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conn.Close()
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to bind to LDAP server %w", err)
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}
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return &LdapIAMService{
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conn: conn,
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queryBase: queryBase,
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objClasses: strings.Split(objClasses, ","),
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accessAtr: accAtr,
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secretAtr: secAtr,
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roleAtr: roleAtr,
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userIdAtr: userIdAtr,
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groupIdAtr: groupIdAtr,
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projectIdAtr: projectIdAtr,
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rootAcc: rootAcc,
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url: ldapURL,
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bindDN: bindDN,
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pass: pass,
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tlsSkipVerify: tlsSkipVerify,
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}, nil
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}
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// dialLDAP establishes an LDAP connection with optional TLS configuration
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func dialLDAP(ldapURL string, tlsSkipVerify bool) (*ldap.Conn, error) {
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u, err := url.Parse(ldapURL)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid LDAP URL: %w", err)
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}
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// For ldaps:// URLs, use DialURL with custom TLS config if needed
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if u.Scheme == "ldaps" && tlsSkipVerify {
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tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
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InsecureSkipVerify: tlsSkipVerify,
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}
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return ldap.DialURL(ldapURL, ldap.DialWithTLSConfig(tlsConfig))
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}
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// For ldap:// or when TLS verification is enabled, use standard DialURL
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return ldap.DialURL(ldapURL)
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) reconnect() error {
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ld.conn.Close()
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conn, err := dialLDAP(ld.url, ld.tlsSkipVerify)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to reconnect to LDAP server: %w", err)
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}
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err = conn.Bind(ld.bindDN, ld.pass)
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if err != nil {
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conn.Close()
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to bind to LDAP server on reconnect: %w", err)
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}
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ld.conn = conn
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return nil
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) execute(f func(*ldap.Conn) error) error {
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ld.mu.Lock()
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defer ld.mu.Unlock()
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err := f(ld.conn)
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if err != nil {
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if e, ok := err.(*ldap.Error); ok && e.ResultCode == ldap.ErrorNetwork {
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if reconnErr := ld.reconnect(); reconnErr != nil {
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return reconnErr
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}
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return f(ld.conn)
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}
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}
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return err
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) CreateAccount(account Account) error {
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if ld.rootAcc.Access == account.Access {
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return ErrUserExists
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}
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userEntry := ldap.NewAddRequest(ld.buildUserDN(account.Access), nil)
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userEntry.Attribute("objectClass", ld.objClasses)
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userEntry.Attribute(ld.accessAtr, []string{account.Access})
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userEntry.Attribute(ld.secretAtr, []string{account.Secret})
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userEntry.Attribute(ld.roleAtr, []string{string(account.Role)})
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userEntry.Attribute(ld.groupIdAtr, []string{fmt.Sprint(account.GroupID)})
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userEntry.Attribute(ld.userIdAtr, []string{fmt.Sprint(account.UserID)})
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userEntry.Attribute(ld.projectIdAtr, []string{fmt.Sprint(account.ProjectID)})
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err := ld.execute(func(c *ldap.Conn) error {
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return c.Add(userEntry)
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})
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("error adding an entry: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) buildUserDN(access string) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("%v=%v,%v", ld.accessAtr, ldap.EscapeDN(access), ld.queryBase)
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) buildSearchFilter(access string) string {
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var searchFilter strings.Builder
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for _, el := range ld.objClasses {
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searchFilter.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("(objectClass=%v)", el))
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}
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if access != "" {
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searchFilter.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("(%v=%v)", ld.accessAtr, ldap.EscapeFilter(access)))
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}
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return fmt.Sprintf("(&%v)", searchFilter.String())
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) GetUserAccount(access string) (Account, error) {
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if access == ld.rootAcc.Access {
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return ld.rootAcc, nil
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}
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var result *ldap.SearchResult
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searchRequest := ldap.NewSearchRequest(
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ld.queryBase,
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ldap.ScopeWholeSubtree,
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ldap.NeverDerefAliases,
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0,
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0,
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false,
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ld.buildSearchFilter(access),
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[]string{ld.accessAtr, ld.secretAtr, ld.roleAtr, ld.userIdAtr, ld.groupIdAtr, ld.projectIdAtr},
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nil,
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)
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if debuglogger.IsIAMDebugEnabled() {
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debuglogger.IAMLogf("LDAP Search Request")
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debuglogger.IAMLogf(spew.Sdump(searchRequest))
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}
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err := ld.execute(func(c *ldap.Conn) error {
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var err error
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result, err = c.Search(searchRequest)
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return err
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})
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if debuglogger.IsIAMDebugEnabled() {
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debuglogger.IAMLogf("LDAP Search Result")
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debuglogger.IAMLogf(spew.Sdump(result))
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}
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if err != nil {
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return Account{}, err
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}
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if len(result.Entries) == 0 {
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return Account{}, ErrNoSuchUser
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}
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entry := result.Entries[0]
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groupId, err := strconv.Atoi(entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.groupIdAtr))
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if err != nil {
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return Account{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid entry value for group-id %q: %w",
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entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.groupIdAtr), err)
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}
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userId, err := strconv.Atoi(entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.userIdAtr))
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if err != nil {
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return Account{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid entry value for user-id %q: %w",
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entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.userIdAtr), err)
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}
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projectID, err := strconv.Atoi(entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.projectIdAtr))
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if err != nil {
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return Account{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid entry value for project-id %q: %w",
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entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.projectIdAtr), err)
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}
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return Account{
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Access: entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.accessAtr),
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Secret: entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.secretAtr),
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Role: Role(entry.GetAttributeValue(ld.roleAtr)),
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GroupID: groupId,
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UserID: userId,
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ProjectID: projectID,
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}, nil
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}
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// ResolveAccounts returns the subset of accessKeyIDs that do not exist.
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) ResolveAccounts(accessKeyIDs []string) ([]string, error) {
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return resolveAccountsByLookup(accessKeyIDs, ld.GetUserAccount)
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) UpdateUserAccount(access string, props MutableProps) error {
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req := ldap.NewModifyRequest(ld.buildUserDN(access), nil)
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if props.Secret != nil {
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req.Replace(ld.secretAtr, []string{*props.Secret})
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}
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if props.GroupID != nil {
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req.Replace(ld.groupIdAtr, []string{fmt.Sprint(*props.GroupID)})
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}
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if props.UserID != nil {
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req.Replace(ld.userIdAtr, []string{fmt.Sprint(*props.UserID)})
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}
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if props.ProjectID != nil {
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req.Replace(ld.projectIdAtr, []string{fmt.Sprint(*props.ProjectID)})
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}
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if props.Role != "" {
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req.Replace(ld.roleAtr, []string{string(props.Role)})
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}
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err := ld.execute(func(c *ldap.Conn) error {
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return c.Modify(req)
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})
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//TODO: Handle non existing user case
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) DeleteUserAccount(access string) error {
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delReq := ldap.NewDelRequest(ld.buildUserDN(access), nil)
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err := ld.execute(func(c *ldap.Conn) error {
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return c.Del(delReq)
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})
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) ListUserAccounts() ([]Account, error) {
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var resp *ldap.SearchResult
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searchRequest := ldap.NewSearchRequest(
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ld.queryBase,
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ldap.ScopeWholeSubtree,
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ldap.NeverDerefAliases,
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0,
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0,
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false,
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ld.buildSearchFilter(""),
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[]string{ld.accessAtr, ld.secretAtr, ld.roleAtr, ld.groupIdAtr, ld.projectIdAtr, ld.userIdAtr},
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nil,
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)
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err := ld.execute(func(c *ldap.Conn) error {
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var err error
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resp, err = c.Search(searchRequest)
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return err
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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result := []Account{}
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for _, el := range resp.Entries {
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groupId, err := strconv.Atoi(el.GetAttributeValue(ld.groupIdAtr))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid entry value for group-id %q: %w",
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el.GetAttributeValue(ld.groupIdAtr), err)
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}
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userId, err := strconv.Atoi(el.GetAttributeValue(ld.userIdAtr))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid entry value for user-id %q: %w",
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el.GetAttributeValue(ld.userIdAtr), err)
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}
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projectID, err := strconv.Atoi(el.GetAttributeValue(ld.projectIdAtr))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid entry value for project-id %q: %w",
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el.GetAttributeValue(ld.groupIdAtr), err)
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}
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result = append(result, Account{
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Access: el.GetAttributeValue(ld.accessAtr),
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Secret: el.GetAttributeValue(ld.secretAtr),
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Role: Role(el.GetAttributeValue(ld.roleAtr)),
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GroupID: groupId,
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ProjectID: projectID,
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UserID: userId,
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})
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}
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return result, nil
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}
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// Shutdown graceful termination of service
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func (ld *LdapIAMService) Shutdown() error {
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ld.mu.Lock()
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defer ld.mu.Unlock()
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return ld.conn.Close()
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}
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