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Fixes #1327 Fixes #1567 Closes #2264 Wires the S3 gateway up to the standalone IAM service so identity policies, not just bucket policies and ACLs, are enforced on the S3 data plane. The gateway authenticates SigV4 requests by calling new private derive-signing-key and resolve-identity endpoints on the IAM service instead of holding secrets itself, and evaluates identity policy through the same PolicyEvaluator path added to auth.VerifyAccess, combined with the bucket policy using explicit-deny-wins precedence. The private endpoints are served over their own mTLS listener (new iamapi/private package, genmtlscerts.sh to generate test material, and client-cert support in internal/netutil), separate from the public IAM API. As part of this the vendored aws/signer/v4 package is deleted and replaced by a pure-Go SigV4 implementation in internal/sigv4auth, which now reads canonical request data directly off the fiber.Ctx instead of reconstructing an http.Request, and is shared by both the S3 request-signing verification and the new private-endpoint signing. DeleteObjects moves from an all-or-nothing authorization check to true partial success: VerifyObjectsAccess evaluates every object in a batch independently against both the identity policy and any object lock, so a denial or a locked object only removes that key from the batch instead of failing the whole request. It also batches the identity-policy round trip and the bucket-policy fetch once per request rather than once per object, and separates plain deletes from versioned ones since a versioned delete needs s3:DeleteObjectVersion rather than s3:DeleteObject. Object lock handling got a few correctness fixes alongside this: a bypass is now modeled as BypassNone/BypassRequested/BypassOverwrite rather than a single bool, because root's blanket ability to override a GOVERNANCE retention should only apply when the client actually asked to bypass it (DeleteObject/DeleteObjects/PutObjectRetention), not when the gateway is silently replacing a locked object via an overwrite, which needs the permission from everyone including root. Retention changes are now correctly classified as an extension (allowed under plain s3:PutObjectRetention) versus a weakening (date or mode change, which needs the bypass permission), and a COMPLIANCE lock can never be weakened by anyone regardless of permissions, matching AWS. Separately, VerifyObjectCopyAccess had a readonly-mode gap: it returned early for root/admin before ever calling VerifyAccess, so the readonly check inside VerifyAccess never ran for them on CopyObject; access checks are now ordered so the readonly gate always applies before any root/admin bypass, for copy as well as every other write path. Bucket policies also gained Condition block support, via a new shared internal/condition package moved out of the IAM policy package since both bucket and identity policies share the same evaluation semantics. It implements the full AWS operator set — String{Equals,NotEquals,EqualsIgnoreCase,NotEqualsIgnoreCase,Like,NotLike}, Numeric{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Date{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Bool, BinaryEquals, Arn{Equals,Like,NotEquals,NotLike}, IpAddress/NotIpAddress, and Null — along with the ForAllValues/ForAnyValue set qualifiers and the IfExists modifier. A new requestConditionContext builds the per-request keys a bucket policy's Condition block can reference — aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, aws:CurrentTime, aws:EpochTime, aws:UserAgent, aws:Referer, s3:prefix, s3:delimiter, s3:max-keys, s3:x-amz-acl, s3:VersionId — following AWS's own per-action rules for which keys a given S3 operation actually populates. Identity-derived keys such as aws:PrincipalArn and aws:username are deliberately left unwired here, since the gateway has no way to know them; the standalone IAM service fills those in itself when it evaluates an identity policy. Also added new integration test suites for S3-side IAM: s3_iam_access_control.go and s3_iam_session_access_control.go cover identity-policy enforcement and session-credential requests against real S3 operations, alongside expanded OIDC/web-identity coverage and a new runoidctests.sh runner wired into the OIDC GitHub Actions workflow.
177 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
177 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
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// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
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// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
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// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
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// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
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// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
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// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
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// specific language governing permissions and limitations
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// under the License.
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package policy
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"github.com/versity/versitygw/debuglogger"
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"github.com/versity/versitygw/iamapi/types"
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"github.com/versity/versitygw/internal/condition"
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)
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// MaxSessionPolicyBytes is the maximum length, in bytes, of the optional
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// inline session policy document AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity's Policy
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// parameter accepts, matching AWS's documented quota for that parameter.
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const MaxSessionPolicyBytes = 2048
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// RequestContext carries the request-scoped values an identity-policy
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// statement is evaluated against, matching AWS's treatment of authorization
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// as a full request-context decision (action, resource, and condition —
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// principal is already fixed by which documents are passed in) rather than
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// the action name alone.
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type RequestContext struct {
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// Action is the "<service>:<Action>" string being authorized, e.g.
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// "iam:GetRole".
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Action string
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// Resource is the ARN of the specific resource the action targets
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// (e.g. a role's own Arn for GetRole, or "*" for an action AWS
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// classifies as resource-less, such as a List action).
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Resource string
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// Condition is the "aws:<GlobalKey>"-keyed context (aws:SourceIp,
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// aws:username, aws:PrincipalArn, aws:userid, ...) a statement's
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// Condition block is evaluated against.
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Condition map[string][]string
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}
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// Decision is the tri-state result of evaluating a set of identity policy
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// documents. A caller combining this with another policy source (e.g. an S3
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// bucket policy) needs this distinction, not a plain bool, to implement
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// AWS's real cross-policy precedence: an explicit Deny from either source
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// wins outright over an Allow from the other, but a NoMatch from one source
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// leaves the other free to grant access on its own.
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type Decision int
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const (
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// DecisionNoMatch means no statement in any document matched reqCtx at
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// all — neither an Allow nor a Deny.
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DecisionNoMatch Decision = iota
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// DecisionAllow means at least one statement matched with Effect Allow,
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// and no statement matched with Effect Deny.
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DecisionAllow
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// DecisionDeny means a statement matched with Effect Deny, or the
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// evaluation failed closed (unparseable/invalid document, or a
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// Condition that couldn't be evaluated).
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DecisionDeny
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)
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// EvaluateIdentityPolicies reports how documents (each a user's or role's
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// inline policy entry) decide reqCtx, using IAM's evaluation semantics: a
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// statement must cover the action, the resource, and (if present) its
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// Condition block to be considered at all; a matching explicit Deny
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// statement makes the whole evaluation DecisionDeny regardless of any Allow
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// found elsewhere (in the same or another document); absent an explicit
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// deny, at least one covering Allow statement is required for DecisionAllow
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// — an identity with no matching statement at all gets DecisionNoMatch, not
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// DecisionAllow.
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//
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// A document that fails to parse, or a statement whose Condition block
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// can't be evaluated, returns DecisionDeny
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// rather than being skipped: PutUserPolicy/PutRolePolicy already reject any
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// policy document that wouldn't parse or whose Condition uses an
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// unrecognized operator, so this only matters for documents written before
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// that validation existed - and for exactly that legacy-data case, we can't
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// rule out a hidden Deny inside the part we can't evaluate, so the safe
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// outcome is to deny rather than silently proceed as if it wasn't there.
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func EvaluateIdentityPolicies(documents []types.PolicyEntry, reqCtx RequestContext) Decision {
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allowed := false
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for _, entry := range documents {
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var doc Document
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(entry.PolicyDocument), &doc); err != nil {
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debuglogger.Logf("identity policy document failed to parse: %v", err)
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return DecisionDeny
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}
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// PutUserPolicy/PutRolePolicy already reject a document that
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// wouldn't pass Validate (e.g. both Action and NotAction on one
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// statement) at write time, but a document stored before that
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// validation existed — or reaching storage through a migration,
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// backup restore, or out-of-band write — could still fail it. Assign
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// no meaning to a document AWS itself would reject rather than
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// evaluating it anyway: re-check it here, at the security boundary,
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// not just at ingress.
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if err := doc.Validate(); err != nil {
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debuglogger.Logf("identity policy document failed validation: %v", err)
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return DecisionDeny
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}
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for _, stmt := range doc.Statement {
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if stmt.Effect != "Allow" && stmt.Effect != "Deny" {
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continue
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}
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if !statementCoversAction(stmt, reqCtx.Action) {
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continue
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}
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if !statementCoversResource(stmt, reqCtx.Resource, reqCtx.Condition, doc.Version) {
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continue
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}
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matched, ok := condition.Evaluate(stmt.Condition, reqCtx.Condition, doc.Version)
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if !ok {
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debuglogger.Logf("identity policy evaluation: statement condition could not be evaluated, denying")
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return DecisionDeny
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}
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if !matched {
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continue
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}
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if stmt.Effect == "Deny" {
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debuglogger.Logf("identity policy evaluation: action %q on resource %q explicitly denied", reqCtx.Action, reqCtx.Resource)
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return DecisionDeny
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}
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allowed = true
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}
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}
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if allowed {
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return DecisionAllow
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}
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return DecisionNoMatch
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}
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// statementCoversResource reports whether stmt's Resource/NotResource
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// authorizes resource. Matching is case-sensitive (unlike action matching):
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// ARNs are case-sensitive. version is the enclosing document's Version
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// element: each pattern has policy variables (e.g. "${aws:username}")
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// substituted from ctxVars before matching only when version is exactly
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// Version2012 — AWS documents policy variables as requiring the
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// 2012-10-17 policy version; a document with no Version, or the older
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// 2008-10-17, matches Resource patterns containing "${...}" as the literal
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// text instead, the same as real AWS. A statement with neither Resource nor
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// NotResource never matches — Validate already requires every statement to
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// carry one, so this only matters for documents written before that
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// validation existed.
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func statementCoversResource(stmt Statement, resource string, ctxVars map[string][]string, version string) bool {
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if len(stmt.Resource) > 0 {
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return matchAnyResource(stmt.Resource, resource, ctxVars, version)
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}
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if len(stmt.NotResource) > 0 {
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return !matchAnyResource(stmt.NotResource, resource, ctxVars, version)
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}
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return false
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}
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func matchAnyResource(patterns []string, resource string, ctxVars map[string][]string, version string) bool {
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for _, p := range patterns {
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pattern := p
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if version == Version2012 {
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pattern = condition.SubstitutePolicyVariables(p, ctxVars)
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}
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if condition.GlobMatch(pattern, resource) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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