Files
versitygw/iamapi/policy/webidentity_test.go
T
niksis02 2147a0c304 feat: integrate standalone IAM service with S3 gateway for identity-based policy enforcement
Fixes #1327
Fixes #1567
Closes #2264

Wires the S3 gateway up to the standalone IAM service so identity policies, not just bucket policies and ACLs, are enforced on the S3 data plane. The gateway authenticates SigV4 requests by calling new private derive-signing-key and resolve-identity endpoints on the IAM service instead of holding secrets itself, and evaluates identity policy through the same PolicyEvaluator path added to auth.VerifyAccess, combined with the bucket policy using explicit-deny-wins precedence. The private endpoints are served over their own mTLS listener (new iamapi/private package, genmtlscerts.sh to generate test material, and client-cert support in internal/netutil), separate from the public IAM API. As part of this the vendored aws/signer/v4 package is deleted and replaced by a pure-Go SigV4 implementation in internal/sigv4auth, which now reads canonical request data directly off the fiber.Ctx instead of reconstructing an http.Request, and is shared by both the S3 request-signing verification and the new private-endpoint signing.

DeleteObjects moves from an all-or-nothing authorization check to true partial success: VerifyObjectsAccess evaluates every object in a batch independently against both the identity policy and any object lock, so a denial or a locked object only removes that key from the batch instead of failing the whole request. It also batches the identity-policy round trip and the bucket-policy fetch once per request rather than once per object, and separates plain deletes from versioned ones since a versioned delete needs s3:DeleteObjectVersion rather than s3:DeleteObject. Object lock handling got a few correctness fixes alongside this: a bypass is now modeled as BypassNone/BypassRequested/BypassOverwrite rather than a single bool, because root's blanket ability to override a GOVERNANCE retention should only apply when the client actually asked to bypass it (DeleteObject/DeleteObjects/PutObjectRetention), not when the gateway is silently replacing a locked object via an overwrite, which needs the permission from everyone including root. Retention changes are now correctly classified as an extension (allowed under plain s3:PutObjectRetention) versus a weakening (date or mode change, which needs the bypass permission), and a COMPLIANCE lock can never be weakened by anyone regardless of permissions, matching AWS. Separately, VerifyObjectCopyAccess had a readonly-mode gap: it returned early for root/admin before ever calling VerifyAccess, so the readonly check inside VerifyAccess never ran for them on CopyObject; access checks are now ordered so the readonly gate always applies before any root/admin bypass, for copy as well as every other write path.

Bucket policies also gained Condition block support, via a new shared internal/condition package moved out of the IAM policy package since both bucket and identity policies share the same evaluation semantics. It implements the full AWS operator set — String{Equals,NotEquals,EqualsIgnoreCase,NotEqualsIgnoreCase,Like,NotLike}, Numeric{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Date{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Bool, BinaryEquals, Arn{Equals,Like,NotEquals,NotLike}, IpAddress/NotIpAddress, and Null — along with the ForAllValues/ForAnyValue set qualifiers and the IfExists modifier. A new requestConditionContext builds the per-request keys a bucket policy's Condition block can reference — aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, aws:CurrentTime, aws:EpochTime, aws:UserAgent, aws:Referer, s3:prefix, s3:delimiter, s3:max-keys, s3:x-amz-acl, s3:VersionId — following AWS's own per-action rules for which keys a given S3 operation actually populates. Identity-derived keys such as aws:PrincipalArn and aws:username are deliberately left unwired here, since the gateway has no way to know them; the standalone IAM service fills those in itself when it evaluates an identity policy.

Also added new integration test suites for S3-side IAM: s3_iam_access_control.go and s3_iam_session_access_control.go cover identity-policy enforcement and session-credential requests against real S3 operations, alongside expanded OIDC/web-identity coverage and a new runoidctests.sh runner wired into the OIDC GitHub Actions workflow.
2026-08-25 01:07:36 +04:00

297 lines
13 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
// specific language governing permissions and limitations
// under the License.
package policy
import "testing"
const testProviderArn = "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:oidc-provider/example.com"
const otherProviderArn = "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:oidc-provider/other.com"
// existingProviders resolves testProviderArn -> "example.com" and
// otherProviderArn -> "other.com"; any other ARN reports not-found,
// modeling a dangling trust-policy reference to a provider that was never
// created (or has since been deleted).
func existingProviders(arn string) (string, bool) {
switch arn {
case testProviderArn:
return "example.com", true
case otherProviderArn:
return "other.com", true
default:
return "", false
}
}
func TestEvaluateWebIdentityTrust(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
document string
wctx WebIdentityContext
wantResult WebIdentityMatch
wantArn string
}{
{
name: "simple allow, no condition",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "aud1"},
wantResult: Allowed,
wantArn: testProviderArn,
},
{
name: "wildcard action matches",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:*"}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com"},
wantResult: Allowed,
wantArn: testProviderArn,
},
{
name: "action does not match",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRole"}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com"},
wantResult: NoPrincipal,
},
{
name: "dangling federated reference to a provider that doesn't exist",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"arn:aws:iam::000000000000:oidc-provider/never-created.example.com"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com"},
wantResult: NoPrincipal,
},
{
name: "existing provider referenced but issuer doesn't match",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "unregistered.example.com"},
wantResult: NoIssuerMatch,
},
{
name: "condition matches",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"example.com:aud":"client1"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "client1"},
wantResult: Allowed,
wantArn: testProviderArn,
},
{
name: "condition does not match",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"example.com:aud":"client1"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "wrong-client"},
wantResult: ConditionFailed,
},
{
name: "explicit deny overrides matching allow",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[
{"Effect":"Allow","Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
{"Effect":"Deny","Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"}
]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com"},
wantResult: ExplicitlyDenied,
},
{
name: "deny for a different provider does not affect allow for this one",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[
{"Effect":"Allow","Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
{"Effect":"Deny","Principal":{"Federated":"` + otherProviderArn + `"},"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"}
]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com"},
wantResult: Allowed,
wantArn: testProviderArn,
},
{
name: "second statement matches when first references a different provider",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[
{"Effect":"Allow","Principal":{"Federated":"` + otherProviderArn + `"},"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
{"Effect":"Allow","Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"}
]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com"},
wantResult: Allowed,
wantArn: testProviderArn,
},
{
name: "malformed document",
document: `not json`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com"},
wantResult: NoPrincipal,
},
{
// A Condition operator this package doesn't recognize (simulating
// a legacy document stored before write-time validation existed)
// must deny rather than being silently skipped or evaluated. The
// ValidateTrust re-check catches this before per-statement
// evaluation even runs, reported as NoPrincipal - the same
// "assign no meaning to an invalid document" outcome as an
// unresolvable Federated principal, and mapped to the identical
// AccessDenied response as ExplicitlyDenied by the controller.
name: "unrecognized operator on a matching statement denies",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"FooBarOperator":{"example.com:aud":"client1"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "client1"},
wantResult: NoPrincipal,
},
{
// Claims are genuinely multivalued in production (a token can
// carry a "groups": ["admin","banned"] claim), unlike
// RequestContext.Condition on the identity-policy side - this
// is the most realistic place to exercise the multivalue
// aggregation semantics documented on aggregate() in
// internal/condition. "banned" is present among the claim's values,
// so unqualified StringNotEquals (pre-existing, unchanged
// semantics: fails to match if any actual value matches) fails
// to match, and the Allow's condition doesn't hold.
name: "StringNotEquals against a genuinely multivalued claim doesn't match when any value matches",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"StringNotEquals":{"example.com:groups":"banned"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{
ProviderURL: "example.com",
Claims: map[string][]string{"groups": {"admin", "banned"}},
},
wantResult: ConditionFailed,
},
{
name: "Null operator against a claim that's present",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"Null":{"example.com:amr":"false"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{
ProviderURL: "example.com",
Claims: map[string][]string{"amr": {"mfa"}},
},
wantResult: Allowed,
wantArn: testProviderArn,
},
{
name: "Null operator against a claim that's absent",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"Null":{"example.com:amr":"false"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com"},
wantResult: ConditionFailed,
},
// A broad Allow plus an explicit Deny scoped to a global request key
// (aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, sts:RoleSessionName) must see
// the same request facts an Allow would, so a Deny relying on any
// of them overrides the broad Allow.
{
name: "Deny on aws:SourceIp applies when the caller's address matches",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},{"Effect":"Deny",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"IpAddress":{"aws:SourceIp":"203.0.113.0/24"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "aud1", SourceIP: "203.0.113.5"},
wantResult: ExplicitlyDenied,
},
{
name: "Deny on aws:SourceIp does not apply for a different address",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},{"Effect":"Deny",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"IpAddress":{"aws:SourceIp":"203.0.113.0/24"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "aud1", SourceIP: "198.51.100.5"},
wantResult: Allowed,
wantArn: testProviderArn,
},
{
name: "Deny on aws:SecureTransport=false applies to a plaintext request",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},{"Effect":"Deny",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"Bool":{"aws:SecureTransport":"false"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "aud1", Secure: false},
wantResult: ExplicitlyDenied,
},
{
name: "Deny on sts:RoleSessionName applies when it matches",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},{"Effect":"Deny",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"sts:RoleSessionName":"forbidden-session"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "aud1", RoleSessionName: "forbidden-session"},
wantResult: ExplicitlyDenied,
},
{
name: "Deny on sts:RoleSessionName does not apply for a different session name",
document: `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},{"Effect":"Deny",
"Principal":{"Federated":"` + testProviderArn + `"},
"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"sts:RoleSessionName":"forbidden-session"}}}]}`,
wctx: WebIdentityContext{ProviderURL: "example.com", Audience: "aud1", RoleSessionName: "allowed-session"},
wantResult: Allowed,
wantArn: testProviderArn,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result, arn := EvaluateWebIdentityTrust(tt.document, existingProviders, tt.wctx)
if result != tt.wantResult {
t.Errorf("result = %v, want %v", result, tt.wantResult)
}
if arn != tt.wantArn {
t.Errorf("providerArn = %q, want %q", arn, tt.wantArn)
}
})
}
}
func TestMatchActionPattern(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
pattern string
action string
want bool
}{
{pattern: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", action: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", want: true},
{pattern: "sts:*", action: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", want: true},
{pattern: "sts:AssumeRole*", action: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", want: true},
{pattern: "STS:ASSUMEROLEWITHWEBIDENTITY", action: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", want: true},
{pattern: "sts:AssumeRole", action: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", want: false},
{pattern: "iam:*", action: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", want: false},
{pattern: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentit?", action: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", want: true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
if got := matchActionPattern(tt.pattern, tt.action); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("matchActionPattern(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", tt.pattern, tt.action, got, tt.want)
}
}
}