mirror of
https://github.com/versity/versitygw.git
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Implements the `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` and `GetCallerIdentity` STS actions, letting callers exchange an external OIDC token for temporary credentials scoped to an IAM role. Token handling covers JWT claim parsing, issuer/audience resolution (including `azp` override semantics), JWKS fetching and caching with `singleflight`-deduplicated refresh, and rate-limited forced refresh on unrecognized `kid` values. OIDC provider thumbprint fetching now performs a real TLS handshake verified against the system trust store and the provider hostname (previously `InsecureSkipVerify`), since the observed certificate is persisted as a long-lived trust anchor rather than used once and discarded; all discovery-document and JWKS fetches go through an SSRF-safe HTTP client with bounded redirects and response size.
Adds policy `Condition` block evaluation, supporting `String`, `Numeric`, `Date`, `Bool`, `BinaryEquals`, and `IpAddress` operators along with their `IfExists`/`Not` variants and `ForAllValues`/`ForAnyValues` set qualifiers, plus policy variable substitution (e.g. `${aws:username}`) in supported operators. Adds identity-based inline policy evaluation and a new IAM authorization middleware that authorizes each request against action, resource, and condition context together, applying the session-policy-intersects-role-policy semantics for assumed-role sessions.
Adds a new debug logger `--log-level` flag (`silent`/`debug`/`unsafe`), along with a tree-based XML masker that redacts secrets and tokens at the property level in logged request/response bodies instead of skipping the whole body. The old `--debug/VGW_DEBUG` flag is kept as a deprecated alias for `--log-level=debug`, printing a console warning that points users at `--log-level` for finer-grained control.
Fixes a Vault storage bug where CAS (check-and-set) writes always read the current document version as 0 because `kvVersion` asserted metadata as `float64` while the Vault client actually returns `json.Number`, causing every write past the first to be rejected as a concurrent modification. Also adds a constant-time `SecureCompare` for signature/token comparisons in sigv4 auth.
Adds an integration test suite (`iam_access_control.go`) covering IAM access control across user, role, and session identities.
192 lines
7.0 KiB
Go
192 lines
7.0 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
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// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
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// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
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// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
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// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
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// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
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// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
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// specific language governing permissions and limitations
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// under the License.
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package debuglogger
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import (
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"bytes"
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"io"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
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"github.com/valyala/fasthttp"
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)
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func TestRedact(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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key string
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value string
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want string
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}{
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{name: "Authorization header", key: "Authorization", value: "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 ...", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "header name matched case-insensitively", key: "AUTHORIZATION", value: "secret", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "security token", key: "X-Amz-Security-Token", value: "secret", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "presigned request signature", key: "X-Amz-Signature", value: "deadbeef", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "presigned request signature matched case-insensitively", key: "x-amz-signature", value: "deadbeef", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "presigned request credential", key: "X-Amz-Credential", value: "AKIAEXAMPLE/20260101/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "web identity token form/query field", key: "WebIdentityToken", value: "secret", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "SSE-C customer key header", key: "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Key", value: "base64key==", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "SSE-C copy-source customer key header", key: "X-Amz-Copy-Source-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Key", value: "base64key==", want: redactedValue},
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{name: "SSE-C customer key MD5 untouched (checksum, not a secret)", key: "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Key-MD5", value: "deadbeef==", want: "deadbeef=="},
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{name: "unrelated header untouched", key: "Content-Type", value: "application/xml", want: "application/xml"},
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{name: "unrelated query param untouched", key: "Action", value: "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", want: "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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if got := redact(tt.key, tt.value); got != tt.want {
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t.Errorf("redact(%q, %q) = %q, want %q", tt.key, tt.value, got, tt.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestDebugRedactHonorsUnsafeLevel(t *testing.T) {
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defer SetLevel(LevelSilent)
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SetLevel(LevelDebug)
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if got := debugRedact("Authorization", "secret-sig"); got != redactedValue {
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t.Errorf("debugRedact at LevelDebug = %q, want %q", got, redactedValue)
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}
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SetLevel(LevelUnsafe)
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if got := debugRedact("Authorization", "secret-sig"); got != "secret-sig" {
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t.Errorf("debugRedact at LevelUnsafe = %q, want unmasked value", got)
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}
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}
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func TestRedactedQueryString(t *testing.T) {
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args := &fasthttp.Args{}
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args.Parse("Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity&WebIdentityToken=super-secret-jwt")
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got := RedactedQueryString(args)
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if strings.Contains(got, "super-secret-jwt") {
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t.Fatalf("RedactedQueryString leaked the token: %q", got)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(got, "Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity") {
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t.Errorf("RedactedQueryString dropped a non-sensitive param: %q", got)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(got, url.QueryEscape(redactedValue)) {
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t.Errorf("RedactedQueryString missing redaction marker: %q", got)
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}
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}
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func TestRedactedQueryStringEmpty(t *testing.T) {
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if got := RedactedQueryString(&fasthttp.Args{}); got != "" {
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t.Errorf("RedactedQueryString(empty) = %q, want empty string", got)
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}
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}
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// TestRedactedQueryStringMasksPresignedCredentials asserts that a presigned
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// request's X-Amz-Signature (and X-Amz-Credential) never reach the default
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// access log, since together with the rest of the (non-secret) presigned URL
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// they're everything needed to replay the exact signed request until it
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// expires.
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func TestRedactedQueryStringMasksPresignedCredentials(t *testing.T) {
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args := &fasthttp.Args{}
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args.Parse("X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAEXAMPLE%2F20260101%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=deadbeefcafe")
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got := RedactedQueryString(args)
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for _, secret := range []string{"deadbeefcafe", "AKIAEXAMPLE"} {
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if strings.Contains(got, secret) {
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t.Fatalf("RedactedQueryString leaked presigned credential material %q: %q", secret, got)
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}
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}
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if !strings.Contains(got, "X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256") {
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t.Errorf("RedactedQueryString dropped a non-sensitive param: %q", got)
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}
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}
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// TestLogFiberRequestAndResponseDetailsRedactSensitiveFields sends dummy
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// secrets through the request header, query, and form-body paths (plus the
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// response header path) and asserts that none of them appear in the debug
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// logger's captured output, only the redaction marker in their place. This
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// covers a GET AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity's WebIdentityToken query parameter,
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// and, in debug mode, the Authorization and X-Amz-Security-Token headers.
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func TestLogFiberRequestAndResponseDetailsRedactSensitiveFields(t *testing.T) {
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const (
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dummyToken = "dummy-web-identity-jwt"
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dummyAuth = "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=AKIADUMMYEXAMPLE/..."
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dummySecurity = "dummy-security-token"
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)
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app := fiber.New()
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app.Post("/", func(ctx fiber.Ctx) error {
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LogFiberRequestDetails(ctx)
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ctx.Response().Header.Set("X-Amz-Security-Token", dummySecurity)
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LogFiberResponseDetails(ctx)
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return ctx.SendString("ok")
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})
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body := "Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity&WebIdentityToken=" + dummyToken
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/?WebIdentityToken="+dummyToken, strings.NewReader(body))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", fiber.MIMEApplicationForm)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", dummyAuth)
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req.Header.Set("X-Amz-Security-Token", dummySecurity)
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output := captureLogOutput(t, func() {
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if _, err := app.Test(req); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("app.Test: %v", err)
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}
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})
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for _, secret := range []string{dummyToken, dummyAuth, dummySecurity} {
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if strings.Contains(output, secret) {
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t.Errorf("captured debug output leaked secret %q:\n%s", secret, output)
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}
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}
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if !strings.Contains(output, redactedValue) {
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t.Errorf("expected redaction marker %q in captured output:\n%s", redactedValue, output)
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}
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}
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// captureLogOutput redirects both fmt.Printf (via os.Stdout, used by the
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// box-drawing helpers) and the standard "log" package (used for the
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// per-query-arg lines) into a buffer for the duration of fn.
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func captureLogOutput(t *testing.T, fn func()) string {
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t.Helper()
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r, w, err := os.Pipe()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("os.Pipe: %v", err)
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}
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origStdout := os.Stdout
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origLogOutput := log.Writer()
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os.Stdout = w
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log.SetOutput(w)
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defer func() {
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os.Stdout = origStdout
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log.SetOutput(origLogOutput)
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}()
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fn()
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w.Close()
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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if _, err := io.Copy(&buf, r); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("io.Copy: %v", err)
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}
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return buf.String()
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}
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