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Implements the `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` and `GetCallerIdentity` STS actions, letting callers exchange an external OIDC token for temporary credentials scoped to an IAM role. Token handling covers JWT claim parsing, issuer/audience resolution (including `azp` override semantics), JWKS fetching and caching with `singleflight`-deduplicated refresh, and rate-limited forced refresh on unrecognized `kid` values. OIDC provider thumbprint fetching now performs a real TLS handshake verified against the system trust store and the provider hostname (previously `InsecureSkipVerify`), since the observed certificate is persisted as a long-lived trust anchor rather than used once and discarded; all discovery-document and JWKS fetches go through an SSRF-safe HTTP client with bounded redirects and response size.
Adds policy `Condition` block evaluation, supporting `String`, `Numeric`, `Date`, `Bool`, `BinaryEquals`, and `IpAddress` operators along with their `IfExists`/`Not` variants and `ForAllValues`/`ForAnyValues` set qualifiers, plus policy variable substitution (e.g. `${aws:username}`) in supported operators. Adds identity-based inline policy evaluation and a new IAM authorization middleware that authorizes each request against action, resource, and condition context together, applying the session-policy-intersects-role-policy semantics for assumed-role sessions.
Adds a new debug logger `--log-level` flag (`silent`/`debug`/`unsafe`), along with a tree-based XML masker that redacts secrets and tokens at the property level in logged request/response bodies instead of skipping the whole body. The old `--debug/VGW_DEBUG` flag is kept as a deprecated alias for `--log-level=debug`, printing a console warning that points users at `--log-level` for finer-grained control.
Fixes a Vault storage bug where CAS (check-and-set) writes always read the current document version as 0 because `kvVersion` asserted metadata as `float64` while the Vault client actually returns `json.Number`, causing every write past the first to be rejected as a concurrent modification. Also adds a constant-time `SecureCompare` for signature/token comparisons in sigv4 auth.
Adds an integration test suite (`iam_access_control.go`) covering IAM access control across user, role, and session identities.
151 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
151 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
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// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
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// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
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// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
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// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
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// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
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// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
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// specific language governing permissions and limitations
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// under the License.
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package policy
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"github.com/versity/versitygw/debuglogger"
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"github.com/versity/versitygw/iamapi/types"
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)
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// MaxSessionPolicyBytes is the maximum length, in bytes, of the optional
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// inline session policy document AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity's Policy
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// parameter accepts, matching AWS's documented quota for that parameter.
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const MaxSessionPolicyBytes = 2048
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// RequestContext carries the request-scoped values an identity-policy
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// statement is evaluated against, matching AWS's treatment of authorization
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// as a full request-context decision (action, resource, and condition —
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// principal is already fixed by which documents are passed in) rather than
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// the action name alone.
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type RequestContext struct {
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// Action is the "<service>:<Action>" string being authorized, e.g.
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// "iam:GetRole".
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Action string
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// Resource is the ARN of the specific resource the action targets
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// (e.g. a role's own Arn for GetRole, or "*" for an action AWS
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// classifies as resource-less, such as a List action).
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Resource string
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// Condition is the "aws:<GlobalKey>"-keyed context (aws:SourceIp,
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// aws:username, aws:PrincipalArn, aws:userid, ...) a statement's
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// Condition block is evaluated against.
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Condition map[string][]string
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}
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// EvaluateIdentityPolicies reports whether reqCtx is allowed by documents
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// (each a user's or role's inline policy entry), using IAM's evaluation
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// semantics: a statement must cover the action, the resource, and (if
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// present) its Condition block to be considered at all; an explicit Deny
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// statement that does so makes the whole evaluation deny regardless of any
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// Allow found elsewhere (in the same or another document), and absent an
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// explicit deny, at least one covering Allow statement is required — so an
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// identity with no matching statement at all is denied by default.
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//
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// A document that fails to parse, or a statement whose Condition block can't
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// be evaluated (see evaluateCondition's ok return), denies the whole
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// evaluation rather than being skipped: PutUserPolicy/PutRolePolicy already
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// reject any policy document that wouldn't parse or whose Condition uses an
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// unrecognized operator, so this only matters for documents written before
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// that validation existed - and for exactly that legacy-data case, we can't
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// rule out a hidden Deny inside the part we can't evaluate, so the safe
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// outcome is to deny rather than silently proceed as if it wasn't there.
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func EvaluateIdentityPolicies(documents []types.PolicyEntry, reqCtx RequestContext) bool {
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allowed := false
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for _, entry := range documents {
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var doc Document
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(entry.PolicyDocument), &doc); err != nil {
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debuglogger.Logf("identity policy document failed to parse: %v", err)
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return false
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}
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// PutUserPolicy/PutRolePolicy already reject a document that
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// wouldn't pass Validate (e.g. both Action and NotAction on one
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// statement) at write time, but a document stored before that
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// validation existed — or reaching storage through a migration,
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// backup restore, or out-of-band write — could still fail it. Assign
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// no meaning to a document AWS itself would reject rather than
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// evaluating it anyway: re-check it here, at the security boundary,
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// not just at ingress.
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if err := doc.Validate(); err != nil {
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debuglogger.Logf("identity policy document failed validation: %v", err)
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return false
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}
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for _, stmt := range doc.Statement {
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if stmt.Effect != "Allow" && stmt.Effect != "Deny" {
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continue
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}
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if !statementCoversAction(stmt, reqCtx.Action) {
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continue
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}
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if !statementCoversResource(stmt, reqCtx.Resource, reqCtx.Condition, doc.Version) {
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continue
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}
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matched, ok := evaluateCondition(stmt.Condition, reqCtx.Condition, doc.Version)
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if !ok {
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debuglogger.Logf("identity policy evaluation: statement condition could not be evaluated, denying")
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return false
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}
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if !matched {
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continue
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}
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if stmt.Effect == "Deny" {
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debuglogger.Logf("identity policy evaluation: action %q on resource %q explicitly denied", reqCtx.Action, reqCtx.Resource)
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return false
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}
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allowed = true
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}
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}
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return allowed
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}
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// statementCoversResource reports whether stmt's Resource/NotResource
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// authorizes resource. Matching is case-sensitive (unlike action matching):
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// ARNs are case-sensitive. version is the enclosing document's Version
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// element: each pattern has policy variables (e.g. "${aws:username}")
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// substituted from ctxVars before matching only when version is exactly
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// Version2012 — AWS documents policy variables as requiring the
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// 2012-10-17 policy version; a document with no Version, or the older
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// 2008-10-17, matches Resource patterns containing "${...}" as the literal
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// text instead, the same as real AWS. A statement with neither Resource nor
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// NotResource never matches — Validate already requires every statement to
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// carry one, so this only matters for documents written before that
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// validation existed.
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func statementCoversResource(stmt Statement, resource string, ctxVars map[string][]string, version string) bool {
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if len(stmt.Resource) > 0 {
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return matchAnyResource(stmt.Resource, resource, ctxVars, version)
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}
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if len(stmt.NotResource) > 0 {
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return !matchAnyResource(stmt.NotResource, resource, ctxVars, version)
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}
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return false
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}
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func matchAnyResource(patterns []string, resource string, ctxVars map[string][]string, version string) bool {
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for _, p := range patterns {
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pattern := p
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if version == Version2012 {
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pattern = substitutePolicyVariables(p, ctxVars)
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}
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if globMatch(pattern, resource) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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