Files
versitygw/iamapi/policy/identity.go
T
niksis02 4756b4d236 feat: add STS web identity federation, IAM policy Condition support, and access control enforcement
Implements the `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` and `GetCallerIdentity` STS actions, letting callers exchange an external OIDC token for temporary credentials scoped to an IAM role. Token handling covers JWT claim parsing, issuer/audience resolution (including `azp` override semantics), JWKS fetching and caching with `singleflight`-deduplicated refresh, and rate-limited forced refresh on unrecognized `kid` values. OIDC provider thumbprint fetching now performs a real TLS handshake verified against the system trust store and the provider hostname (previously `InsecureSkipVerify`), since the observed certificate is persisted as a long-lived trust anchor rather than used once and discarded; all discovery-document and JWKS fetches go through an SSRF-safe HTTP client with bounded redirects and response size.

Adds policy `Condition` block evaluation, supporting `String`, `Numeric`, `Date`, `Bool`, `BinaryEquals`, and `IpAddress` operators along with their `IfExists`/`Not` variants and `ForAllValues`/`ForAnyValues` set qualifiers, plus policy variable substitution (e.g. `${aws:username}`) in supported operators. Adds identity-based inline policy evaluation and a new IAM authorization middleware that authorizes each request against action, resource, and condition context together, applying the session-policy-intersects-role-policy semantics for assumed-role sessions.

Adds a new debug logger `--log-level` flag (`silent`/`debug`/`unsafe`), along with a tree-based XML masker that redacts secrets and tokens at the property level in logged request/response bodies instead of skipping the whole body. The old `--debug/VGW_DEBUG` flag is kept as a deprecated alias for `--log-level=debug`, printing a console warning that points users at `--log-level` for finer-grained control.

Fixes a Vault storage bug where CAS (check-and-set) writes always read the current document version as 0 because `kvVersion` asserted metadata as `float64` while the Vault client actually returns `json.Number`, causing every write past the first to be rejected as a concurrent modification. Also adds a constant-time `SecureCompare` for signature/token comparisons in sigv4 auth.

Adds an integration test suite (`iam_access_control.go`) covering IAM access control across user, role, and session identities.
2026-08-15 17:49:00 +04:00

151 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
// specific language governing permissions and limitations
// under the License.
package policy
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/versity/versitygw/debuglogger"
"github.com/versity/versitygw/iamapi/types"
)
// MaxSessionPolicyBytes is the maximum length, in bytes, of the optional
// inline session policy document AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity's Policy
// parameter accepts, matching AWS's documented quota for that parameter.
const MaxSessionPolicyBytes = 2048
// RequestContext carries the request-scoped values an identity-policy
// statement is evaluated against, matching AWS's treatment of authorization
// as a full request-context decision (action, resource, and condition —
// principal is already fixed by which documents are passed in) rather than
// the action name alone.
type RequestContext struct {
// Action is the "<service>:<Action>" string being authorized, e.g.
// "iam:GetRole".
Action string
// Resource is the ARN of the specific resource the action targets
// (e.g. a role's own Arn for GetRole, or "*" for an action AWS
// classifies as resource-less, such as a List action).
Resource string
// Condition is the "aws:<GlobalKey>"-keyed context (aws:SourceIp,
// aws:username, aws:PrincipalArn, aws:userid, ...) a statement's
// Condition block is evaluated against.
Condition map[string][]string
}
// EvaluateIdentityPolicies reports whether reqCtx is allowed by documents
// (each a user's or role's inline policy entry), using IAM's evaluation
// semantics: a statement must cover the action, the resource, and (if
// present) its Condition block to be considered at all; an explicit Deny
// statement that does so makes the whole evaluation deny regardless of any
// Allow found elsewhere (in the same or another document), and absent an
// explicit deny, at least one covering Allow statement is required — so an
// identity with no matching statement at all is denied by default.
//
// A document that fails to parse, or a statement whose Condition block can't
// be evaluated (see evaluateCondition's ok return), denies the whole
// evaluation rather than being skipped: PutUserPolicy/PutRolePolicy already
// reject any policy document that wouldn't parse or whose Condition uses an
// unrecognized operator, so this only matters for documents written before
// that validation existed - and for exactly that legacy-data case, we can't
// rule out a hidden Deny inside the part we can't evaluate, so the safe
// outcome is to deny rather than silently proceed as if it wasn't there.
func EvaluateIdentityPolicies(documents []types.PolicyEntry, reqCtx RequestContext) bool {
allowed := false
for _, entry := range documents {
var doc Document
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(entry.PolicyDocument), &doc); err != nil {
debuglogger.Logf("identity policy document failed to parse: %v", err)
return false
}
// PutUserPolicy/PutRolePolicy already reject a document that
// wouldn't pass Validate (e.g. both Action and NotAction on one
// statement) at write time, but a document stored before that
// validation existed — or reaching storage through a migration,
// backup restore, or out-of-band write — could still fail it. Assign
// no meaning to a document AWS itself would reject rather than
// evaluating it anyway: re-check it here, at the security boundary,
// not just at ingress.
if err := doc.Validate(); err != nil {
debuglogger.Logf("identity policy document failed validation: %v", err)
return false
}
for _, stmt := range doc.Statement {
if stmt.Effect != "Allow" && stmt.Effect != "Deny" {
continue
}
if !statementCoversAction(stmt, reqCtx.Action) {
continue
}
if !statementCoversResource(stmt, reqCtx.Resource, reqCtx.Condition, doc.Version) {
continue
}
matched, ok := evaluateCondition(stmt.Condition, reqCtx.Condition, doc.Version)
if !ok {
debuglogger.Logf("identity policy evaluation: statement condition could not be evaluated, denying")
return false
}
if !matched {
continue
}
if stmt.Effect == "Deny" {
debuglogger.Logf("identity policy evaluation: action %q on resource %q explicitly denied", reqCtx.Action, reqCtx.Resource)
return false
}
allowed = true
}
}
return allowed
}
// statementCoversResource reports whether stmt's Resource/NotResource
// authorizes resource. Matching is case-sensitive (unlike action matching):
// ARNs are case-sensitive. version is the enclosing document's Version
// element: each pattern has policy variables (e.g. "${aws:username}")
// substituted from ctxVars before matching only when version is exactly
// Version2012 — AWS documents policy variables as requiring the
// 2012-10-17 policy version; a document with no Version, or the older
// 2008-10-17, matches Resource patterns containing "${...}" as the literal
// text instead, the same as real AWS. A statement with neither Resource nor
// NotResource never matches — Validate already requires every statement to
// carry one, so this only matters for documents written before that
// validation existed.
func statementCoversResource(stmt Statement, resource string, ctxVars map[string][]string, version string) bool {
if len(stmt.Resource) > 0 {
return matchAnyResource(stmt.Resource, resource, ctxVars, version)
}
if len(stmt.NotResource) > 0 {
return !matchAnyResource(stmt.NotResource, resource, ctxVars, version)
}
return false
}
func matchAnyResource(patterns []string, resource string, ctxVars map[string][]string, version string) bool {
for _, p := range patterns {
pattern := p
if version == Version2012 {
pattern = substitutePolicyVariables(p, ctxVars)
}
if globMatch(pattern, resource) {
return true
}
}
return false
}