Files
versitygw/iamapi/policy/validate.go
T
niksis02 4756b4d236 feat: add STS web identity federation, IAM policy Condition support, and access control enforcement
Implements the `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` and `GetCallerIdentity` STS actions, letting callers exchange an external OIDC token for temporary credentials scoped to an IAM role. Token handling covers JWT claim parsing, issuer/audience resolution (including `azp` override semantics), JWKS fetching and caching with `singleflight`-deduplicated refresh, and rate-limited forced refresh on unrecognized `kid` values. OIDC provider thumbprint fetching now performs a real TLS handshake verified against the system trust store and the provider hostname (previously `InsecureSkipVerify`), since the observed certificate is persisted as a long-lived trust anchor rather than used once and discarded; all discovery-document and JWKS fetches go through an SSRF-safe HTTP client with bounded redirects and response size.

Adds policy `Condition` block evaluation, supporting `String`, `Numeric`, `Date`, `Bool`, `BinaryEquals`, and `IpAddress` operators along with their `IfExists`/`Not` variants and `ForAllValues`/`ForAnyValues` set qualifiers, plus policy variable substitution (e.g. `${aws:username}`) in supported operators. Adds identity-based inline policy evaluation and a new IAM authorization middleware that authorizes each request against action, resource, and condition context together, applying the session-policy-intersects-role-policy semantics for assumed-role sessions.

Adds a new debug logger `--log-level` flag (`silent`/`debug`/`unsafe`), along with a tree-based XML masker that redacts secrets and tokens at the property level in logged request/response bodies instead of skipping the whole body. The old `--debug/VGW_DEBUG` flag is kept as a deprecated alias for `--log-level=debug`, printing a console warning that points users at `--log-level` for finer-grained control.

Fixes a Vault storage bug where CAS (check-and-set) writes always read the current document version as 0 because `kvVersion` asserted metadata as `float64` while the Vault client actually returns `json.Number`, causing every write past the first to be rejected as a concurrent modification. Also adds a constant-time `SecureCompare` for signature/token comparisons in sigv4 auth.

Adds an integration test suite (`iam_access_control.go`) covering IAM access control across user, role, and session identities.
2026-08-15 17:49:00 +04:00

234 lines
7.4 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
// specific language governing permissions and limitations
// under the License.
package policy
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/versity/versitygw/iamapi/iamerr"
)
// MaxDocumentLength is IAM's parameter-level maximum length for a
// PolicyDocument value.
const MaxDocumentLength = 131072
// vendorPattern is the inferred grammar for the service prefix of a policy
// action/resource (the text before the first ':', e.g. "s3", "iam",
// "elasticloadbalancing"). AWS does not publish this pattern; alphanumeric
// + hyphen matches every real service prefix and was verified to reject an
// empty or space-containing prefix the same way live IAM does.
var vendorPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9-]+$`)
// validPartition is the only ARN partition name supported byt the gateway: real
// IAM also accepts "aws-cn", "aws-us-gov", and the "aws-iso*" partitions,
// but this deployment only ever runs in the standard "aws" partition, so a
// resource ARN whose partition field is anything else is rejected
const validPartition = "aws"
var (
errSyntax = iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument("Syntax errors in policy.")
errMissingActions = iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument("Policy statement must contain actions.")
errMissingResources = iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument("Policy statement must contain resources.")
errPrincipalNotAllowed = iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument("Policy document should not specify a principal.")
errDuplicateSid = iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument("Statement IDs (SID) in a single policy must be unique.")
errMissingVendorPrefix = iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument("Actions/Conditions must be prefaced by a vendor, e.g., iam, sdb, ec2, etc.")
errLegacyParsing = iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument("The policy failed legacy parsing")
)
// Validate checks raw against IAM's parameter-level constraints for a
// PolicyDocument value: a maximum length of 131072 and the allowed
// character set (tab/LF/CR plus printable Latin-1, U+0020-U+00FF, with at
// least one such character present — so an empty value is rejected here
// too, as a charset violation).
func Validate(field, raw string) error {
if len(raw) > MaxDocumentLength {
return iamerr.ValueTooLong(field, MaxDocumentLength)
}
if !isValidDocumentCharset(raw) {
return iamerr.InvalidCharset(field)
}
return nil
}
func isValidDocumentCharset(s string) bool {
if s == "" {
return false
}
for _, r := range s {
switch r {
case '\t', '\n', '\r':
continue
}
if r < 0x20 || r > 0xFF {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// Parse parses raw as an IAM policy document and checks it against IAM
// policy grammar
func Parse(raw string) error {
var doc Document
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &doc); err != nil {
return errSyntax
}
return doc.Validate()
}
// Validate checks d against IAM policy document grammar: a valid Version if
// present, a non-empty Statement (single object or array), document-wide
// unique Sids, and per statement, the rules enforced by Statement.Validate.
func (d Document) Validate() error {
if d.Version != "" && d.Version != Version2008 && d.Version != Version2012 {
return errSyntax
}
if len(d.Statement) == 0 {
return errSyntax
}
seenSids := make(map[string]struct{}, len(d.Statement))
for _, stmt := range d.Statement {
if err := stmt.Validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if stmt.Sid != "" {
if _, ok := seenSids[stmt.Sid]; ok {
return errDuplicateSid
}
seenSids[stmt.Sid] = struct{}{}
}
}
return nil
}
// Validate checks s against IAM policy statement grammar: a valid Effect,
// no Principal/NotPrincipal, an Action or NotAction (not both) with
// vendor-prefixed values, a Resource or NotResource (not both) with
// ARN-shaped values, and - if present - a Condition block whose operators
// are all recognized (see conditionShapeValid; condition *keys* and operand
// *values* are deliberately not validated here, matching AWS behavior).
func (s Statement) Validate() error {
switch s.Effect {
case "Allow", "Deny":
default:
return errSyntax
}
if len(s.Principal) > 0 || len(s.NotPrincipal) > 0 {
return errPrincipalNotAllowed
}
if !conditionShapeValid(s.Condition) {
return errSyntax
}
if len(s.Action) > 0 && len(s.NotAction) > 0 {
return errSyntax
}
if len(s.Action) == 0 && len(s.NotAction) == 0 {
return errMissingActions
}
for _, action := range s.Action {
if err := validateActionVendor(action); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, action := range s.NotAction {
if err := validateActionVendor(action); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if len(s.Resource) > 0 && len(s.NotResource) > 0 {
return errSyntax
}
if len(s.Resource) == 0 && len(s.NotResource) == 0 {
return errMissingResources
}
for _, resource := range s.Resource {
if err := validateResourceARN(resource); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, resource := range s.NotResource {
if err := validateResourceARN(resource); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// validateActionVendor checks that action is either the bare wildcard "*"
// or has a syntactically valid "vendor:name" shape. The action name after
// the colon is not checked against any known service/action list — real
// IAM accepts unrecognized service/action names at this stage too.
func validateActionVendor(action string) error {
if action == "*" {
return nil
}
before, _, ok := strings.Cut(action, ":")
if !ok {
return errMissingVendorPrefix
}
vendor := before
if !vendorPattern.MatchString(vendor) {
return iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument(fmt.Sprintf("Vendor %s is not valid", vendor))
}
return nil
}
// validateResourceARN checks a single Resource/NotResource entry against
// IAM's ARN grammar: either the bare wildcard "*", or
// "arn:partition:service:region:account:resource". The service, region,
// account, and resource fields are not further validated — only the
// partition is checked, matching what real IAM enforces at this stage
func validateResourceARN(resource string) error {
if resource == "*" {
return nil
}
if !strings.Contains(resource, ":") {
return iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument(fmt.Sprintf("Resource %s must be in ARN format or \"*\".", resource))
}
if strings.HasPrefix(resource, "arn:") {
fields := strings.SplitN(resource[len("arn:"):], ":", 5)
if len(fields) < 5 {
return errLegacyParsing
}
partition := fields[0]
if partition != validPartition {
return iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument(fmt.Sprintf("Partition %q is not valid for resource %q.", partition, resource))
}
return nil
}
tokens := strings.SplitN(resource, ":", 6)
field := func(i int) string {
if i < len(tokens) {
return tokens[i]
}
return "*"
}
partition := field(1)
reconstructed := fmt.Sprintf("arn:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s", partition, field(2), field(3), field(4), field(5))
return iamerr.MalformedPolicyDocument(fmt.Sprintf("Partition %q is not valid for resource %q.", partition, reconstructed))
}