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niksis02
2147a0c304
Fixes #1327 Fixes #1567 Closes #2264 Wires the S3 gateway up to the standalone IAM service so identity policies, not just bucket policies and ACLs, are enforced on the S3 data plane. The gateway authenticates SigV4 requests by calling new private derive-signing-key and resolve-identity endpoints on the IAM service instead of holding secrets itself, and evaluates identity policy through the same PolicyEvaluator path added to auth.VerifyAccess, combined with the bucket policy using explicit-deny-wins precedence. The private endpoints are served over their own mTLS listener (new iamapi/private package, genmtlscerts.sh to generate test material, and client-cert support in internal/netutil), separate from the public IAM API. As part of this the vendored aws/signer/v4 package is deleted and replaced by a pure-Go SigV4 implementation in internal/sigv4auth, which now reads canonical request data directly off the fiber.Ctx instead of reconstructing an http.Request, and is shared by both the S3 request-signing verification and the new private-endpoint signing. DeleteObjects moves from an all-or-nothing authorization check to true partial success: VerifyObjectsAccess evaluates every object in a batch independently against both the identity policy and any object lock, so a denial or a locked object only removes that key from the batch instead of failing the whole request. It also batches the identity-policy round trip and the bucket-policy fetch once per request rather than once per object, and separates plain deletes from versioned ones since a versioned delete needs s3:DeleteObjectVersion rather than s3:DeleteObject. Object lock handling got a few correctness fixes alongside this: a bypass is now modeled as BypassNone/BypassRequested/BypassOverwrite rather than a single bool, because root's blanket ability to override a GOVERNANCE retention should only apply when the client actually asked to bypass it (DeleteObject/DeleteObjects/PutObjectRetention), not when the gateway is silently replacing a locked object via an overwrite, which needs the permission from everyone including root. Retention changes are now correctly classified as an extension (allowed under plain s3:PutObjectRetention) versus a weakening (date or mode change, which needs the bypass permission), and a COMPLIANCE lock can never be weakened by anyone regardless of permissions, matching AWS. Separately, VerifyObjectCopyAccess had a readonly-mode gap: it returned early for root/admin before ever calling VerifyAccess, so the readonly check inside VerifyAccess never ran for them on CopyObject; access checks are now ordered so the readonly gate always applies before any root/admin bypass, for copy as well as every other write path. Bucket policies also gained Condition block support, via a new shared internal/condition package moved out of the IAM policy package since both bucket and identity policies share the same evaluation semantics. It implements the full AWS operator set — String{Equals,NotEquals,EqualsIgnoreCase,NotEqualsIgnoreCase,Like,NotLike}, Numeric{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Date{Equals,NotEquals,LessThan,LessThanEquals,GreaterThan,GreaterThanEquals}, Bool, BinaryEquals, Arn{Equals,Like,NotEquals,NotLike}, IpAddress/NotIpAddress, and Null — along with the ForAllValues/ForAnyValue set qualifiers and the IfExists modifier. A new requestConditionContext builds the per-request keys a bucket policy's Condition block can reference — aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, aws:CurrentTime, aws:EpochTime, aws:UserAgent, aws:Referer, s3:prefix, s3:delimiter, s3:max-keys, s3:x-amz-acl, s3:VersionId — following AWS's own per-action rules for which keys a given S3 operation actually populates. Identity-derived keys such as aws:PrincipalArn and aws:username are deliberately left unwired here, since the gateway has no way to know them; the standalone IAM service fills those in itself when it evaluates an identity policy. Also added new integration test suites for S3-side IAM: s3_iam_access_control.go and s3_iam_session_access_control.go cover identity-policy enforcement and session-credential requests against real S3 operations, alongside expanded OIDC/web-identity coverage and a new runoidctests.sh runner wired into the OIDC GitHub Actions workflow.
72 lines
2.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
72 lines
2.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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#
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# Generate the mTLS material the S3 gateway needs to talk to a standalone IAM
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# service's private endpoints over TCP:
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#
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# <dir>/ca.pem CA certificate, trusted by both sides
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# <dir>/iam-server.pem IAM private-listener server certificate
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# <dir>/iam-server.key
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# <dir>/gw-client.pem S3 gateway client certificate
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# <dir>/gw-client.key
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#
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# Usage: genmtlscerts.sh <output-dir> [server-ip]
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#
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# The server certificate carries an IP SAN for server-ip (default 127.0.0.1)
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# because the gateway dials the private endpoint as "https://<host>:<port>"
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# with standard Go certificate verification and no hostname override — an IP
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# endpoint therefore needs an IP SAN, not a CN or a DNS SAN, or the handshake
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# fails with a name-mismatch error.
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set -Eeuo pipefail
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if [[ $# -lt 1 ]]; then
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echo "usage: $0 <output-dir> [server-ip]" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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CERT_DIR="$1"
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SERVER_IP="${2:-127.0.0.1}"
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mkdir -p "$CERT_DIR"
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EXT_FILE="$CERT_DIR/openssl-ext.cnf"
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# Written as a file rather than passed via -addext so this works on both
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# OpenSSL and the LibreSSL
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cat >"$EXT_FILE" <<EOF
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[server]
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basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
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keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
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extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth
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subjectAltName = IP:$SERVER_IP
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[client]
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basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
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keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
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extendedKeyUsage = clientAuth
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EOF
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# CA
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openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out "$CERT_DIR/ca.key" -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl req -new -x509 -key "$CERT_DIR/ca.key" -out "$CERT_DIR/ca.pem" -days 1 \
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-subj "/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/O=Versity/OU=Software/CN=versitygw-test-ca"
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# IAM private-listener server certificate
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openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out "$CERT_DIR/iam-server.key" -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl req -new -key "$CERT_DIR/iam-server.key" -out "$CERT_DIR/iam-server.csr" \
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-subj "/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/O=Versity/OU=Software/CN=versitygw-iam-private"
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openssl x509 -req -in "$CERT_DIR/iam-server.csr" -CA "$CERT_DIR/ca.pem" -CAkey "$CERT_DIR/ca.key" \
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-CAcreateserial -out "$CERT_DIR/iam-server.pem" -days 1 \
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-extfile "$EXT_FILE" -extensions server 2>/dev/null
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# S3 gateway client certificate. The IAM service verifies it against the CA
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# but does not authorize on its identity — authorization is the root SigV4
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# credential the gateway signs each private request with.
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openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out "$CERT_DIR/gw-client.key" -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl req -new -key "$CERT_DIR/gw-client.key" -out "$CERT_DIR/gw-client.csr" \
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-subj "/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/O=Versity/OU=Software/CN=versitygw-s3-gateway"
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openssl x509 -req -in "$CERT_DIR/gw-client.csr" -CA "$CERT_DIR/ca.pem" -CAkey "$CERT_DIR/ca.key" \
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-CAcreateserial -out "$CERT_DIR/gw-client.pem" -days 1 \
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-extfile "$EXT_FILE" -extensions client 2>/dev/null
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rm -f "$CERT_DIR"/*.csr "$EXT_FILE"
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